SIMULATION ASSISTED, MODEL-BASED DEVELOPMENT OF SAFETY RELATED INTERLOCKS

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Abstract: Dynamic simulators could support in several ways the development of industrial automation and control systems including their interlocking functions, which constitute an important and tedious part of control system development. In this paper, we present a tool-supported, partially automated approach for creating simulation models of controlled systems and their interlocking functions based on UML AP models of control systems. The approach is integrated to a model-based development approach of control applications with the purpose of facilitating manual development work and enabling early testing and comparison of control solutions. The tools and the techniques are demonstrated with an exemplary modelling project and the paper also discusses the relationship between interlocking and safety functions.

1 INTRODUCTION

Model-based development and documentation of software applications and systems have recently been the topic of numerous publications in different application domains, including software engineering and industrial control. Due to the interests, there already exist guidelines, languages and tool sets for implementing such approaches. For example, Object Management Group (OMG) has pioneered in standardization of model-based development approaches (Model-Driven Architecture, MDA) and languages for modelling (UML and profiles e.g. SysML), metamodeling (Meta Object Facility, MOF) and transforming (Query/View/Transformation, QVT) purposes. The modelling and transformation languages are already mature and supported by different tool vendors on several platforms, such as the open source Eclipse platform.

The idea of model-driven Architecture (MDA) and related approaches, e.g. Model-Driven Development (MDD) and Model-Driven Software Development (MDSD) is to use models (instead of documents) as primary engineering artefacts during the development. In the systems engineering domain, model-based systems engineering (MBSE) refers to applying models as part of the systems engineering process with the aim to support analysis, specification, design and verification of the systems being developed (Friedenthal et al. 2008).

In model-based development processes, models are revised towards executable applications by use of model transformations but also manual development work with the models. Such processes often enable automated processing of bulk design information and are aimed at automatic code generation but can also aid analysis, understanding and documentation of the system.

In addition to analysis of models and automating error-prone development phases, another approach to improve the quality of systems and applications could be to integrate the use of simulations to model-based development. Especially, simulations could be used to facilitate the manual development work of developers by enabling, for example, comparisons of alternative design decisions. In their previous work, the authors of this paper have created and prototyped a preliminary approach to transform functional models conforming to the UML automation profile (Ritala et al. 2007, Hästbacka et al. 2011) to simulation models conforming to ModelicaML (Schamai 2009). The concept was presented in (Vepsäläinen et al 2010a) and its purpose is to facilitate control system development by enabling automated creation of simulation models of controlled manufacturing systems.

In the process, the simulation models of controlled systems are composed by creating and
developed according to safety standards because against closed pipelines. Interlocks do not need to prevent pumps from running dry or to be started instrumentation from being misused, such as, to prevent deviation situations from occurring or the critical safety functions. They are often aimed to control functions.

Interlocks could be characterized as non-safety-critical safety functions. They are often aimed to prevent deviation situations from occurring or the instrumentation from being misused, such as, to prevent pumps from running dry or to be started against closed pipelines. Interlocks do not need to be developed according to safety standards because safety is usually ensured with separate safety systems. However, because actual safety systems are often designed to shut down the whole processes, they should not be activated unless absolutely necessary. Another goal of interlocks can thus be seen in keeping the system in its designed operating state. To achieve this goal, interlocks can be developed to be more complex than actual safety functions because they do not need certifications.

The development of interlocks is, however, difficult. This is because of both the complexity of the functions and because they are specific to applications and thus cannot be re-used as, for example, control functions (e.g. parameterizable function blocks implementing control algorithms) can be. The actual logic, how to protect the devices, is dependent on both the controlled process and the control approach used to control the plant or process. Another reason for the difficulty is that interlocks come from several sources. For example in industrial processes, part of the interlocking needs may originate from process design whereas others originate from hydraulics and electrics design. Because of the separate sources, they may have unpredictable cross-effects to the controlled system.

In this paper, we aim to extend our approach to automatically generate simulations to cover and facilitate the development of interlocking functions. We present a modeling framework supporting the modeling of the functionality of interlocks and how a simulation model of a controlled system can be created using model-based techniques. The paper also discusses the relationship between safety functions and interlocks with the purpose of assessing whether also the development of safety functions could be simulation-assisted. For defining interlocks, we do not suggest any new modeling notation. Instead, we integrate a commonly used notation to our model-based approach. The novelty of the approach is, thus, not in the way of specifying the interlocks but in the way in which simulations are integrated to model-based interlock development and how the simulation models can be created based on early design models.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews work related to use of simulations and model-based development in industrial control and automation domain, and provides a more detailed introduction to interlocking functions. Sections 3 and 4 present our approach to simulation-assisted development of interlocks and the developed tool support, respectively. Section 5 presents an example modeling project in which the tools and techniques are utilized. Finally, before concluding the paper, section 6 discusses how the techniques could be used in development of actual safety functions.

2 RELATED WORK

Simulations can facilitate the development of manufacturing processes, machines and plants as well as automation and control systems in several ways. For example, (Karhela 2002) mentions the use of simulations to control system testing, operator training, plant operation optimisation, process reliability and safety studies, improving processes, verifying control schemes and strategies, and start-up and shutdown analyses.

In (Dougall 1998) the author compares the I/O simulation approach to the traditional approach of performing system testing only on-site with the actual processes. According to the paper, the use of simulations may result in shorter start-up times as well as less waste of end products during the start-ups. In addition, simulations enable better operator training, ability to test control program in smaller modules, and the ability to thorough testing of emergency and dangerous situations. (Dougall 1998)

A more recent survey on use of simulations in industrial control domain is (Carrasco and Dormido 2006). According to the paper, the benefits of using control systems in simulators before installation include improvements to 1) design, development and validation of the control programs and strategies, 2) design, development and validation of the HMI (human-machine Interface) and 3) adjustments of control loops and programs. (Carrasco and Dormido 2006) It is thus evident that simulations may facilitate both the development and commissioning...
of control systems. Simulation solutions are nowadays also provided by major control system vendors as listed in (Carrasco and Dormido 2006).

The goal of our approach is to enable automated utilization of design-time models of control systems and applications so that, for example, early simulated testing of a control approach would not need the actual control system hardware or tools and fully setting the system parameters. Later in development, the same techniques could enable testing and validating larger entities. Development of simulations could be less tedious and they could be utilized also by companies performing outsourced development phases. In our approach, we assume that a simulation model of the process to be controlled is already available. In creation of a simulation model of the controlled system including both the parts of the control system and the controlled process, we utilize model transformations that are commonly used in model-based development approaches, such as MDA of OMG.

Model-Driven Architecture (MDA) is an initiative of OMG that encourages the use of models in development of software as well as re-use of solutions and best practices. MDA identifies three types of models which are Computation Independent Model (CIM), Platform Independent Model (PIM) and Platform Specific Model (PSM). (OMG 2003)

The development starts from CIM models and proceeds to PIM models and finally to PSM models which are the most detailed ones and often source models for code generation. Our focus is in PIM and PSM models with the goal of being capable of utilizing both PIM and PSM models in creation of simulation models. Thus, for example, a preliminary simulation model could be created based on PIM and used for evaluating control schemes. Later, after selection of the control system vendor, the model could be refined to PSM level and simulated in conjunction with vendor specific functions.

In addition to our approach (Vepsäläinen et al. 2010b, Hästbacka et al. 2011), the use of model-based techniques in the automation domain has been recently proposed by several projects and papers. However, not all of these approaches identify simulation as an essential and beneficial part of development. The approach of the MEDEIA project, as discussed in (Strasser et al. 2009b) and (Ferrarini et al. 2009), is based on Automation Components - composable combinations of embedded hardware and software including integrated simulation, verification and diagnostics services. In their approach, the simulation of models will be based on their interfaces, behaviour and timing specifications using IEC 61499 as a basic simulation model language (Strasser et al. 2009a).

Another application of model based techniques to development of industrial control applications has been presented in (Tranoris and Thramboulidis 2006). In their approach, the design and deployment of applications is addressed by means of the function block (FB) construct of IEC 61499. Model transformations are used to create function block models. In the paper, they don’t address simulations but similarly to the MEDEIA approach, FB models could be possibly used with simulations of the process to be controlled.

In both the approach of MEDEIA and that of Tranoris and Thramboulidis, simulations could be supported with the implementation technology (IEC 61499) of produced applications. The essential difference to our approach is that we aim to support simulation with a simulation language so that, for example, basic simulation functions of simulation tools could be fully exploited. These functions are listed in (Carrasco and Dormido 2006) and include saving and loading current and initial states, freeze, run and replay simulation, working in slow and fast mode and support for malfunction situations.

Furthermore, we claim that also model-based development requires manual work and genuine design decisions made by developers. To facilitate the manual design work, we foresee that simulation techniques could provide a feasible solution and that model-based techniques could facilitate the creation of the required simulation models.

Similarities between interlocks of basic control system and safety functions of safety systems are remarkable. The main difference is that actual safety functions are developed according to safety standards, such as IEC 61508 (IEC 2010), and require a much more detailed documentation. In addition, the use of model-based techniques in safety system development has been traditionally unusual. However, also according to the present edition (2) of IEC 61508, automatic software generation could aid the completeness and correctness of architecture design as well as freedom from intrinsic design faults. Hence, the use of model-based techniques in development of also safety-critical applications may be increasing in near future. The question of how to develop safety-critical systems with model-based techniques is thus both important and current but not addressed by many papers, so far.

However, for example (Biehl et al. 2010) have attempted to integrate safety analysis to model-based software development in automotive industry in order to automate performing of safety-analysis on
refined models with minimal effort. In (Zoughbi et al. 2007) the authors have extracted the key safety-related concepts of RTCA DO-178B standard into a UML profile in order to use them to facilitate the communication between different stakeholders in software development.

3 TOWARDS SIMULATION OF INTERLOCKINGS DESIGN

The focus of this paper is in interlocking (or constraint control) functions of basic control systems, which are an important and challenging part of control system development. Interlocks are control functions, the purpose of which is to either guarantee the safety of the process or to keep the system in its designed operating state and protect the devices and actuators from being misused by the control system. Quite often, safety is achieved with a separate safety system so that the purpose of the interlocks is the latter one.

During our previous AUKOTON project, we interviewed personnel from six Finnish and international companies involved in process and industrial control system delivery projects. According to the interviewees, interlockings are typically designed during the basic design phase of the control system. The amount of program code related to interlockings is often smaller than that of code related to basic control functionality. However, the development of interlocks is still time-consuming and prone to errors because interlocks cannot be reused similarly as, for example, controllers can be. This is due to the fact that the actual interlocking needs, logics and delays are always specific to the application. Solutions to re-occurring needs in controlled processes can be librarized but even they need careful examination before re-use.

Specification of interlocks often utilizes vendor neutral logic diagrams - or vendor specific logic and FB diagrams if the control system vendor has been selected. In the process, the diagrams are used for depicting the activating and disabling conditions of the functions, and possibly overriding control values for locked actuators or devices. Logic diagrams suit well to this purpose because they are familiar to developers and unambiguous. Logic diagrams, as a semi-formal method, are also highly recommended by IEC 61508 to detailed design of safety-critical software (IEC 2010). Logic diagram based approach for defining the interlocks is thus both sound and already familiar to developers of the domain.

The purpose of UML AP is to cover both the specification of requirements and functionality of applications. Logic diagrams may aid in supporting both of these features. Especially, in the development of safety-related applications, requirements must be defined clearly and in an unambiguous manner. On the other hand, formal or semi-formal specification of functionality is a necessity in enabling simulation of design or in automating generation of code. In our approach, we added the logic diagram concepts to be used with both the requirements modelling sub-profile and functional Automation Concepts sub-profile of UML AP and the UML AP tool that we have developed along with the profile. The concepts and some related existing modelling concepts of the profile are presented in figure 1. Existing UML AP and UML metamodel elements are highlighted with grey colour.

In UML AP, requirements are structured concepts that can be connected to others with port-like interfaces in order to model dependencies between required functions. The purpose of the logic concepts, on the other hand, is to enable the modelling of required activations of interlocks and algorithms to compute control values. Required interchange of computed signals and values can then be modelled with the interfaces. The operations include familiar operations, such as AND and OR, but also delay, constant, Activation gate (that lets its input flow to output when control input is activated),
comparison operator and a UserOperation with which the developer can specify the logic to output from inputs with a textual equation. Examples of use of the concepts will be provided in section 5.

The functional modelling concepts of UML AP, Automation Functions, constitute a hierarchy of function-block-like concepts. The hierarchy is based on their purpose, such as to execute control algorithms or to interface with sensors or actuators of the system. They are presented in detail in (Hästbacka et al. 2011). Automation Functions (AFs) exchange signals between them with ports that extend the UML::Connectable concept (see figure 1). The logic operators and connections, on the other hand, can be used inside the AFs to define the functionality of them. Consequently, the technical challenges of our approach to simulate the models are in transforming the specifications conforming to UML AP to simulation models. The solution to transform the models to ModelicaML models and finally to simulateable Modelica models will be discussed in next section.

4 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE APPROACH

It is first necessary to present some basic information about Modelica and ModelicaML that are used in our approach as target simulation languages. Modelica is an object oriented simulation language for modelling of large, complex and heterogeneous physical systems. Modelica models are mathematically described by differential, algebraic and discrete equations. Modelica includes also a graphical notation and user models are usually described by schematics that are also called object diagrams. A schematic consists of components, which are connected together using connectors (ports) and connections. A component, on the other hand, can be defined by another schematic or, on the lowest level, as a textual equation based definition.

Modelica Modeling Language (ModelicaML), on the other hand, has been created to enable an efficient way to create, read, understand and maintain Modelica models with UML tools (Schamai 2009). ModelicaML is a UML profile and defines stereotypes and tagged values of stereotypes that correspond to the keywords and concepts of the textual Modelica language. ModelicaML models are not simulateable as they are (at least with current tool support) but can be transformed to simulateable Modelica models. Tool support for generating textual Modelica models, as well as the profile, is made publicly available by the OpenModelica project. (OpenModelica 2011) The profile is based on UML2 implementation of the UML metamodel on the Eclipse platform. UML2 is further based on Eclipse Modeling Framework (EMF) which is an implementation of OMG MOF specification on the platform.

EMF is also utilized by our UML AP metamodel implementation (Vepsäläinen et al. 2008). Because of this similar background, the shifting between UML AP and ModelicaML can be realized with use of standardized QVT languages. The possibility to use standardized transformation languages with existing open source tool support and the open source background of Modelica and ModelicaML are good reasons for selecting Modelica as the target simulation language in our approach.

In Modelica (and in ModelicaML) simulation classes are defined separately from their use context, similarly to classes in object oriented programming languages. In ModelicaML models, the model elements also need to reference the ModelicaML profile in order to use the stereotypes and tagged values of it. This results in a structure sketched in figure 2. ModelicaML models consist of Modelica class definitions and instances of the classes. Classes may contain ports with which they can be connected and both the definitions and instances of the classes need to use the stereotypes of the ModelicaML profile in order to map the concepts to Modelica keywords. In our approach, we assume that ModelicaML models of processes to be controlled are available and conform to this structure.

Figure 2: General structure of ModelicaML models.

The purpose of the transformation is to add the control system specific parts to the existing model of the process to be controlled and to connect the parts to the existing model so that the controlled system can be simulated. In this process, the transformation utilizes librarized ModelicaML classes for platform independent (PIM) and platform specific (PSM) concepts. Librarized definitions are copied to the model and instances of them are created and connected together and to the existing model elements according to the UML AP model. This process is discussed in detail in (Vepsäläinen et al. 2010a). However, because interlocks are specific to
applications they cannot be librarized, as explained earlier.

Instead, the definitions of interlock classes need to be created by the transformation based on the logic diagrams. This process is rather simple and illustrated with an example shown in figure 3. Ports contained by classes, such as interlocks, are special kind of classes in Modelica and finally typed by type definitions in ModelicaML profile. When creating ModelicaML classes based on UML AP classes, instances of such special port classes can be created and named based on ports used in the UML AP model. This applies to both input and output ports.

![Figure 3: Simple example of an interlocking function.](image)

Figure 3 contains only three kinds of logical operations of the 11 presented in figure 1: two NOT and two OR operations and one delay. The transformation processes operations by creating a property (variable) for each operation instance. In case of Boolean operations (NOT, AND, NAND, OR, NOR, XOR), the type of the property is always Boolean. In case of other operations, the type needs to be defined in the UML AP model so that the corresponding ModelicaML type can be chosen. The equations determining the values of the properties are created based on the kind (for example NOT or AND) and the connections coming into the operation which can be followed to another operation or port. For example, the value of the first OR operation (from left in figure 3) can be defined equal to the logical OR of the values of the NOT operations.

The transformation, thus, tries to define the values of properties with equations. However, if a model contains loops, this may not be possible. For example figure 3 contains a loop the purpose of which is to keep the interlock activated if it once activates so that the output of the second OR operation (from left) is true. Certain kinds of loops may produce errors, at least with the OpenModelica tool that we use for simulating, so the problem was solved by using algorithms in which operations are applied in an order (instead of equations that apply all the time). This is also one of the interactive features of our transformation. If the transformation detects a loop within an interlock or other kind of AF, it creates algorithmic statements based on the model, shows them to the user of the tool and lets the user select the order in which they are executed.

Another interactive feature of the transformation is related to connecting model parts of the control system to parts of the process to be controlled. These connections are necessary for, for example, connecting measurement functions of control systems to sensors of the process models. By default, the transformation uses properties of the process model with specific names or the names of properties that have been specified with a specific VariableMapping stereotype. However, if suitable properties are not found, the transformation provides the user of the tool with a list of properties available in the model class in question and lets the user to choose the correct property.

The third interactive feature is related to unconnected ports. When an unconnected input port is detected by the transformation, the user of the tool is asked for a constant value for the port. In this case, the user of the tool may leave the port unconnected or define a constant value for it in order to be able to simulate the design. If the port has been left unconnected unintentionally, the user may fix the problem before executing the transformation again.

The transformation definition was written with QVT operational mappings language and it specifies how to process target models based on source models. Executable Java-transformation code to be used in the Eclipse environment was generated with SmartQVT tooling. In order to be able to implement, for example, the interactive features, the generated transformation class was extended with a handwritten Java class that also handles the processing of tagged values related to stereotypes. In order to be able to launch and control the transformation from the UML AP tool, the transformation was packaged to a plugin defining an (Eclipse) extension to one of the extension points of the tool. The structure of the plugin was similar to the plugin structure presented in (Vepsäläinen et al. 2009). The referred paper also presents in detail the extension points of the tool.

5 EXAMPLE CASE

The purpose of this section is to provide a simple example in which the modelling concepts and tools are used in creation of a simulation model of a controlled process to evaluate two alternative interlocking approaches.

An illustration of the (partial) system to be controlled is shown in figure 4. The system consists of a cart and a rail along which the cart can be moved with an electric motor. The cart can be stopped with a brake, if necessary. The purpose of
the cart is left unspecified and not illustrated in the figure. It could be assumed, for example, to operate a boom or a gripping device nearby the rail. The control needs to be addressed in the example are related to only controlling the velocity and location of the cart. The operator of the system controls the system by giving speed requests (setpoints) with a joystick. In addition to feedback control of the cart speed, the control system is supposed to protect the cart from colliding with stoppers at the end of the rail. In detail, the location of the cart must be kept between 0.0 and 6.0. In industrial installations the need for a similar stopping interlock could be also caused by forbidden areas.

The equations are, thus, simple but sufficient for demonstration purposes.

$$V_d - \omega * K_{emf} = L_m * \frac{di}{dt} + R_m * i \tag{1}$$

$$T = K_t * i \tag{2}$$

$$\frac{T}{r_{dw}} + F_b = m_{total} * a \tag{3}$$

The UML AP control structure diagram presenting a control solution for the system is depicted in figure 6. The control solution consists of analogue measurements of cart position and speed, an interlock, a PID controller and a binary and an analogue output for controlling the brake and the motor, respectively. In the first solution, the speed request (setpoint) is not constrained. However, in order to enable that to be implemented later, the speed request is relayed through the interlock AF.

The detailed logic of the first interlocking solution is presented in figure 7. The solution is designed to activate the brake outside the intended working area if the speed request is driving the cart away from the working area. In order to be able to
revert back to the working area, the brake is not activated if the speed request is towards the allowed working area.

![Figure 7: An illustration of the first interlocking solution.](image)

After specification of the detailed control solution, the transformation, discussed in section 4, was used to transform the UML AP control solution to ModelicaML and to append it to the existing model of the physical process (see figure 5). In order to simulate the model, the ModelicaML model was further transformed to Modelica code with OpenModelica tooling. The shifting from UML AP model to simulateable model was, thus, totally automated with two model transformations.

The simulation result related to the solution is presented in figure 8. At the beginning, the position of the cart is 0 as is also its speed. The speed request is ramped from 0 to 1 and kept at 1 for 7 seconds after which, the speed request is ramped to -1 in order to revert the cart. The control solution works as it was intended, however, because it takes time to stop the cart, the location of the cart reaches 6.05 before stopping. Clearly, the control solution could be improved by decelerating the cart already before reaching the limits.

![Figure 8: Simulation result of the first control solution plotting cart position (cart.position), velocity (cart.velocity) and speed request (SICC.SPVal.p).](image)

The second control solution is illustrated in figure 9. In this solution, the braking is implemented similarly to the first solution and the speed request from the user is relayed similarly to the controller. However, when the measured location of the cart is between 0 and 1 or between 5 and 6, an automatic mode is activated and another speed setpoint is calculated by the interlock function. The setpoint is constrained so that between 0 and 1 and between 5 and 6, the maximum allowable speed setpoint is equal to the distance left to the limit. For example, if the location is 5.5, the maximum allowed speed setpoint is 0.5 to the positive direction. In order to relay the second setpoint signal and the mode activation signal, the AF block has been added two new ports. Similar ports were added also to the controller block (see figure 6) and its equations.

![Figure 9: The second interlocking solution.](image)

The simulation result related to the improved interlocking function is presented in figure 10. The speed request obtained from the user is similar to that of the first simulation. In this case, the cart is smoothly decelerated already before reaching the limit and the overshoot is much smaller than that in the first simulation. Clearly, this alternative provides a better control performance.

![Figure 10: Simulation result of the second control solution plotting cart position, velocity, speed request and constrained speed request (BI.SPAuto.p).](image)
6 TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT OF SAFETY FUNCTIONS

The use of model-based techniques in development of safety-critical applications has not been recommended by safety standards, such as IEC 61508, until recently. However, due to the new version of the standard, they could be used to, for example, aid testing and architecture design.

Perhaps the most essential difference between the development of safety systems and basic control systems is that safety systems require extensive documentation including clear and unambiguous specification of requirements and design. We are currently striving to extend the scope of UML AP to cover also the development and design of safety systems. The work is targeted to the requirement concepts of the profile (see Hästbacka et al. 2011) but also to documentation of the results of risk and hazard analysis so that the models could also document the traceability between them and software development. Another working direction is the ability to simulate designs and specifications.

Testing or simulation-aided testing of design and development specifications cannot be used to prove the correctness of them. However, simulations can be used to test the reactions of control or safety systems to events in the system that could not be tested with the actual system without compromising safety. Extensive testing is also required by standards. The problem with conventional testing is that the system should be already implemented in order to be tested. With our approach, the main improvement is the ability to test earlier in the development process.

Another difficulty in development of both safety and basic control systems is related to the specification of requirements. In development of safety-critical applications, the functional requirements (what the system must do) originate from hazard analysis and the non-functional requirements (how well it must be done) from risk analysis. However, unambiguous and complete specification of the functional requirements is still difficult. Perhaps this task could be easier with a semi-formal, domain specific modelling approach.

In (Jones 2008) the author has analysed the quality of produced software in about 12500 projects from year 1984 to 2008 and the defects delivered (and removed) during the projects. The results may not be directly generalizable to safety-critical applications, however, according to the survey, also in the best-in-class-quality, a main portion of defects delivered were related to defects in requirements specifications, partly because defects in requirements are difficult to discover.

If the design could be simulated earlier, for example with the techniques presented, simulations could be also used to assess whether the required functionality is able to detect and handle the hazardous situations. The feedback loop from design to requirements could thus be shortened. This could further facilitate the development of both basic control and safety-systems.

7 CONCLUSIONS

This paper has presented a tool-supported approach to transform functional UML AP models and their interlocking specifications to ModelicaML models and finally to simulatable Modelica models. The aim of the transformation is to enable automated and less tedious creation of simulation models and thus support model-driven development of control systems, including their interlocking and constraint control functions. Compared to present development practices of control systems, this could enable the testing of the solutions earlier during the development process. The approach also offers the other benefits of simulations.

The example system and the control approaches presented in this paper were both simple but still adequate for demonstrating the techniques in creation of two simulation models. Simulations could then be used to compare the two interlocking approaches. This is also how simulations are currently typically used if their development is considered worthwhile.

Simulations can facilitate the analysis of systems – not directly the synthesis of systems. Nevertheless, simulations can still help developers in making design decisions. The purpose of model-based techniques is often to automate simple development tasks. However, also within model-based development, real design decisions need to be made by developers and this work can be eased with simulations. In our approach, we use model-based techniques also for developing the simulation models. We thus aim to facilitate model-based development of control systems by application of more model-based techniques.

A future working direction of our approach is to shift towards safety functions which share several similarities with interlocks. It is clear that also development of safety functions could benefit from simulations. However, the development of safety related systems requires extensive documentation of
design and traceability between design artefacts. This is why we are currently working with the requirement sub-profile of UML AP. With this work, we aim to support the detailed definition of requirements but also documentation of information originating from risk and hazard analysis phases. The rationale is that the requirements of safety functions are based on these analyses but the information is not always visible for, for example, the software developers, which makes it difficult to judge the correctness and completeness of design.

REFERENCES


