Should We Prove Security Policies Correct?

Sebastiano Battiato, Giampaolo Bella, Salvatore Riccobene

2004

Abstract

Security policies are abstract descriptions of how a system should behave to be secure. They typically express what is obligatory, permitted, or forbidden in the system. When the system is implemented, its formal verification consists in checking whether it conforms to the norms that its policy stated. Hence, security policies significantly influence the final assessment of real systems. Experience shows that important policies suffering inconsistencies have reached the final stage of implementation in a real system. Here comes the need for formal analysis at the abstract level of policies. It is advocated that known inductive techniques and a general-purpose proof assistant can be used profitably for the proof of correctness of security policies.

References

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Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

Battiato S., Bella G. and Riccobene S. (2004). Should We Prove Security Policies Correct? . In Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Electronic Government and Commerce: Design, Modeling, Analysis and Security - Volume 1: EGCDMAS, (ICETE 2004) ISBN 972-8865-17-1, pages 56-65. DOI: 10.5220/0001389600560065


in Bibtex Style

@conference{egcdmas04,
author={Sebastiano Battiato and Giampaolo Bella and Salvatore Riccobene},
title={Should We Prove Security Policies Correct?},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Electronic Government and Commerce: Design, Modeling, Analysis and Security - Volume 1: EGCDMAS, (ICETE 2004)},
year={2004},
pages={56-65},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0001389600560065},
isbn={972-8865-17-1},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Electronic Government and Commerce: Design, Modeling, Analysis and Security - Volume 1: EGCDMAS, (ICETE 2004)
TI - Should We Prove Security Policies Correct?
SN - 972-8865-17-1
AU - Battiato S.
AU - Bella G.
AU - Riccobene S.
PY - 2004
SP - 56
EP - 65
DO - 10.5220/0001389600560065