

# Return On Security Investment (ROSI) A Practical Quantitative Model

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**Abstract.** Organizations need practical security benchmarking tools in order to plan effective security strategies. This paper explores a number of techniques that can be used to measure security within an organization. It proposes a new benchmarking methodology that produces results that are of strategic importance to both decision makers and technology implementers. The approach taken reflects a work-in-progress that is a combination of practical experience and direct research.

## 1 Introduction

In a world where hackers, computer viruses and cyber-terrorists are making headlines daily, security has become a priority in all aspects of life, including business. But how does a business become secure? How much security is enough? How does a business know when its security level is reasonable? Most importantly, what's the right amount of money and time to invest in security?

Executive decision-makers don't really care whether firewalls or lawn gnomes protect their company's servers. Rather, they want to know the impact security is having on the bottom line. In order to determine how much they should spend on security, they need to know:

- How much is the lack of security costing the business?
- What impact is lack of security having on productivity?
- What impact would a catastrophic security breach have?
- What are the most cost-effective solutions?
- What impact will the solutions have on productivity?

Before spending money on a product or service, decision-makers want to know that the investment is financially justified. Security is no different -- it has to make business sense. What decision-makers need are security metrics that show how security expenditures impact the bottom line. There's no point in implementing a solution if its true cost is greater than the risk exposure. This paper will present a

model for calculating the financial value of security expenditures, and will look at techniques for obtaining the data necessary to complete the model.

## 2 A Return on Investment Model for Security

"Which of these options gives me the most value for my money?" That's the fundamental question that Return On Investment (ROI) is designed to answer. ROI is frequently used to compare alternative investment strategies. For example, a company might use ROI as a factor when deciding whether to invest in developing a new technology or extend the capabilities of their existing technology.

$$ROI = \frac{\text{Expected Returns} - \text{Cost of Investment}}{\text{Cost of Investment}} \quad (1)$$

To calculate ROI, the cost of a purchase is weighed against the expected returns over the life of the item (1). An overly simplistic example: if a new production facility will cost \$1M and is expected to bring in \$5M over the course of three years, the ROI for the three year period is 400% (4x the initial investment of net earnings).

A simple equation for calculating the Return on Investment for a security investment (ROSI) is as follows:

$$ROSI = \frac{(\text{Risk Exposure} \cdot \% \text{ Risk Mitigated}) - \text{Solution Cost}}{\text{Solution Cost}} \quad (2)$$

Let's see how this equation works by looking at the ROI profile for a virus scanner. ViriCorp has gotten viruses before. It estimates that the average cost in damages and lost productivity due to a virus infection is \$25,000. Currently, ViriCorp gets four of these viruses per year. ViriCorp expects to catch at least 3 of the 4 viruses per year by implementing a \$25,000 virus scanner.

Risk Exposure: \$25,000, 4x per year = \$100,000

Risk Mitigated: 75%

Solution Cost: \$25,000

$$ROSI = \frac{(\$100,000 \cdot 75\%) - \$25,000}{\$25,000} = 200\% \quad (3)$$

The virus scanner appears to be worth the investment, but only because we're assuming that the cost of a disaster is \$25,000, that the scanner will catch 75% of the viruses and that the cost of the scanner is truly \$25,000. In reality, none of these numbers are likely to be very accurate. What if three of the four viruses cost \$5,000 in damages but one costs \$85,000? The average cost is still \$25,000. Which one of

those four viruses is going to get past the scanner? If it's a \$5,000 one, the ROSI increases to nearly 300% -- but if it's the expensive one, the ROSI becomes negative!

Coming up with meaningful values for the factors in the ROSI equation is no simple task. At the time of writing, there is no "standard" model for determining the financial risk associated with security incidents. Likewise, there are also no standardized methods for determining the risk mitigating effectiveness of security solutions. Even methods for figuring out the cost of solutions can vary greatly. Some only include hardware, software and service costs, while others factor in internal costs, including indirect overhead, and long-term impacts on productivity.

There are techniques for quantitatively measuring risk exposure, but the results tend to vary in accuracy. For most types of risk, the exposure can be found by consulting actuarial tables built from decades of claims and demographic statistics. Unfortunately, similar data on security risk does not yet exist. Furthermore, the variability in exposure costs can lead to misleading results when predicting based on actuarial data. In the ViriCorp example, the exposure cost is misleading -- the average cost of \$25,000 doesn't reflect the fact that most incidents cost very little while some cost quite a lot.

Is there any point to calculating ROSI if the underlying data is inaccurate? Apparently so, since some industries have been successfully using inaccurate ROI metrics for decades. The advertising industry is one such example. Ads are priced based on the number of potential viewers, which is often extrapolated from circulation data and demographics. The ad buyers assume that the true number of ad viewers is directly correlated to the number of potential viewers; if the viewer base doubles, roughly twice as many people will probably see the ad. Therefore, even though they may never know the true number of viewers, ad buyers can nonetheless make informed purchasing decisions based on other more reliable measurements.

If the method for determining ROSI produces repeatable and consistent results, ROSI can serve as a useful tool for comparing security solutions based on relative value. In the absence of pure accuracy, an alternate approach is to find consistent measurements for the ROSI factors that return comparably meaningful results. This task is much easier, and breaks through the barrier of accuracy that has kept ROSI in the domain of academic curiosity.

**KEY POINT:** *Repeatable and consistent metrics can be extremely valuable -- even if they're "inaccurate".*

## 2.1 Quantifying Risk Exposure

A simple analytical method of calculating risk exposure is to multiply the projected cost of a security incident (Single Loss Exposure, or SLE) with its estimated annual rate of occurrence (ARO). The resulting figure is called the Annual Loss Exposure (ALE).

While there are no standard methods for estimating SLE or ARO, there are actuarial tables that give average statistical values based on real-world damage reports. These tables are created from insurance claim data, academic research, or independent surveys.

$$\text{Risk Exposure} = \text{ALE} = \text{SLE} * \text{ARO} \quad (4)$$

It's very difficult to obtain data about the true cost of a security incident (the SLE). This is because few companies successfully track security incidents. Security breaches that have no immediate impact on day-to-day business often go completely unnoticed. When a breach does get noticed, the organization is usually too busy fixing the problem to worry about how much the incident actually costs. After the disaster, internal embarrassment and/or concerns about public image often result in the whole incident getting swept under the rug. As a result of this "ostrich response" to security incidents, the volume of data behind existing actuarial tables is woefully inadequate.

Currently, the "best" actuarial data comes from efforts such as the annual survey of businesses conducted by the Computer Security Institute (CSI) and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The businesses are asked to estimate the cost of security incidents for various categories over the course of a year. Unfortunately, the methods used to calculate these costs vary from business to business. For example, one business might value a stolen laptop based on its replacement cost. Another might factor in the lost productivity and IT support time, and yet another might factor in lost intellectual property costs. As a result, some businesses value a laptop theft at \$3000; others put it down as \$100,000+. The final number is more likely to be influenced by business factors (how much will insurance reimburse, what are the tax implications, what impact will a large loss have on the stock price) than by financial reality.

For the purposes of ROSI, the accuracy of the incident cost isn't as important as a consistent methodology for calculating and reporting the cost, as previously discussed. It would be quite challenging to get companies to agree upon a standard technique for tabulating the internal cost of a security incident. Therefore, the focus must be on cost factors that are independently measurable and directly correlate to the severity of the security incident.

One potentially significant cost is the loss of highly confidential information. In organizations valued for their intellectual property, a security breach resulting in theft of information might create a significant loss for the business yet not impact on productivity. The cost of a security incident in this case is the estimated value of the intellectual property that is at risk, using industry-standard accounting and valuation models. For most industries, analysts are already externally measuring this value. If an organization doesn't already estimate the value of its IP assets, it probably doesn't need to consider this cost.

Another significant cost is the productivity loss associated with a security incident. For many organizations the cost in lost productivity is far greater than the cost of data recovery or system repair. Security can be directly connected to an organization's financial health by including lost productivity in the cost of a disaster. This approach automatically forces security projects to improve business efficiency and eliminates those projects justified solely by fear of the unknown.

Lost productivity can have a serious impact on the bottom line. Just ten minutes of downtime a day per employee can quickly add up to a significant amount, as illustrated in Table 1.


**Table 1.** Lost Productivity Adds Up

	1000	employees
*	44	Hours/year security related "downtime"
*	\$20	per hour average wage
=	\$880,000	per year in lost productivity

Whether an organization uses lost productivity, intellectual property value or a combination of both as a measurement of risk exposure depends on whether it's more worried about theft of data, availability of data, or both. Professional service firms such as law and accounting firms tend to be more sensitive toward data availability; if they can't access critical files they can't bill effectively. This directly impacts on the bottom line. R&D-intensive organizations such as biotech labs will be much more concerned about data theft; the information might enable a competitor to gain an edge on time-to-market. The disaster spectrum diagram (Figure 1) further illustrates this concept.

Analysts and accountants can provide consistent valuations of intellectual property, but how can lost productivity be measured? Internally, productivity is often measured using a combination of performance appraisals and profit/loss metrics. The problem with this approach is that isolating security's impact on productivity from other factors (such as poor performance) is impossible. Technical measurements of system downtime are also not adequate since system downtime is only relevant when it prevents someone from doing their job. An hour of server downtime at 3am usually doesn't have a significant impact on productivity. It's much more important to measure the end-user's perception of downtime, since this directly corresponds to their productivity.

### The Disaster Spectrum

**Fig. 1.** The Disaster Spectrum

Measuring employee perception of downtime can be accomplished with a survey. If the survey is correctly constructed, there will be a strong correlation between the survey score and financial performance. Specifically, if a department shows a decrease in perceived downtime, it should also show an increase in productivity on the internal balance sheets.

A good survey will ask the employees questions that have coarse quantitative answers, or answers that imply a quantitative value. For example, one question might be, "How much spam do you receive each day?" The employee might have to choose between four answers: less than 10, 10-30, 30-50 or more than 50. Average minutes of downtime can be associated with each answer. For example, dealing with 30-50 spam messages per day can cause up to ten minutes of downtime, especially if it's hard to tell the difference between spam and desired messages.

The key to getting consistent results from a survey that measures employee perception is to ensure that the questions are quantitative, clear and answerable without too much thought. For example, a bad question would be "Estimate the amount of downtime you had this month," since few people could answer this without logging events as they happen. A better question is to ask, "How often is the fileserver unavailable for more than 10 minutes (daily, weekly, monthly, rarely)". A person who experiences weekly fileserver problems is unlikely to put down "daily" unless the problem is extremely frequent.

Once the survey answers are scored, the result will be an indication of monthly downtime. This can be converted into a dollar amount of lost productivity by using salaries expressed as hourly rates. For example, if the average salary for a department is \$75/hour and the average downtime is 30 hours per month, then the company is losing \$2250 in non-productive time per employee due to security-related issues. In a professional service firm, these employees might also generate revenue. The hourly billable rate multiplied by the revenue realization rate and the monthly downtime gives an additional quantification of lost revenue opportunity. Tuning the productivity survey so that the calculated loss exhibits stronger correlation with internal financial measurements of profit and loss can increase accuracy.

**KEY POINT:** *With a good survey and scoring system for productivity, combined with external measurements of intellectual property value, it becomes possible to quantify risk exposure in a repeatable and consistent manner.*

A downtime assessment can provide a post-mortem analysis of lost productivity during a security incident. The loss measured can be used when calculating the ROI of security solutions designed to prevent similar problems in the future. Unfortunately, there has yet to be a study combining such analyses into an actuarial table associating productivity loss with particular security incidents. This means that if a particular incident has already happened to an organization, it can't rely on commonly available statistics for estimating loss.

It is possible to use a downtime assessment to estimate the productivity loss associated with an incident that hasn't yet happened. If an organization wanted to predict the impact of a virus, it might conduct a downtime assessment to gain a baseline measurement of productivity. It would then take the assessment results and varying responses to questions dealing with lost data, bandwidth issues, etc. The result would be a range of potential productivity loss, which could be used to

calculate a maximum and minimum ROI for solutions that prevent virus outbreaks. A useful tool for this type of analysis is a Monte Carlo simulation, which automates the process of varying a number of factors at the same time and returns a range of potential results.

Another useful application of a downtime assessment is when examining the general impact of security on organizational productivity. Minor, everyday security breaches and technology failures can cause significant productivity loss when aggregated over time. Table 2 shows just a handful of factors that can eat up a few minutes here and there. In our experience, the average company has at least five of these problems, resulting in over an hour of downtime per day.

The Return on Security Investment equation takes on a new meaning if everyday productivity loss is used as the risk exposure figure. The implication is that a secure organization will have less minor breaches and technology failures, and therefore less lost productivity. The risk due to a major breach is ignored. It completely sidesteps the problem of calculating ROSI for an event that might not happen by focusing on problems that are constantly happening. If a security solution can improve overall security while eliminating some of these problems, it will actually have a positive ROSI, even if it never stops a serious incident.

**KEY POINT:** *There are a number of ways in which lost productivity can provide a meaningful estimate of risk exposure, any of which can be used to calculate ROSI.*

**Table 2.** Potential Daily Causes of Lost Productivity<sup>1</sup>

Problem	Avg. Downtime (in minutes)
Application and system related crashes	10
Email filtering sorting and spam	15
Bandwidth efficiency and throughput	10
Inefficient and ineffective security policies	10
Enforcement of security policies	10
System related rollouts and upgrades from IT	10
Security patches for OS and applications	10
Insecure and inefficient network topology	15
Viruses, virus scanning	10
Worms	10
Trojans, key logging	10
Spyware, system trackers	10
Popup ads	10
Compatibility issues - hardware and software	15
Permissions based security problems (user/pass)	15
File system disorganization	10
Corrupt or inaccessible data	15
Hacked or stolen system information and data	15
Backup / Restoration	15
Application usage issues	15
<b>Total Time</b>	<b>240 minutes</b>

<sup>1</sup> Based on aggregate SecureMark results and analysis

## 2.2 Quantifying Risk Mitigated

Determining the risk-mitigating benefits of a security device is as difficult as measuring risk exposure. Most of the problems stem from the fact that security doesn't directly create anything tangible -- rather it prevents loss. A loss that's prevented is a loss that you probably won't know about. For example, a company's intrusion detection system might show that there were 10 successful break-ins last year, but only 5 this year. Was it due to the new security device the company bought, or was it because five less hackers attacked the network?

What is the amount of damage that might occur if a security solution fails? While a few breaches may be the result of direct attacks by those with harmful or criminal intent, most are not intentionally malicious -- they're the result of automated programs and curious hackers. Significant damage, while rarely intended by these hackers, is nevertheless a possibility. This damage is not just confined to systems and data -- serious incidents can lead to a loss in customer/investor confidence.

The following argument has been used to justify a simple, fixed percentage for risk mitigation:

- A security solution is designed to mitigate certain risks.
- If the solution is functioning properly, it will mitigate nearly 100% of these risks (85% to be conservative).
- Therefore, the amount of risk mitigation is 85%.

Unfortunately, there are a number of serious problems with this "logic":

- Risks are not isolatable -- a well-locked door mitigates 0% of risk if the window next to it is open
- Security solutions do not work in isolation - the existence and effectiveness of other solutions will have a major impact
- Security solutions are rarely implemented to be as effective as possible due to unacceptable impact on productivity
- Security solutions become less effective over time, as hackers find ways to work around them and create new risks

A better approach is to conduct a security assessment and "score" the assessment based on some consistent algorithm. This score can represent the amount of risk currently being mitigated. By evaluating risk mitigation within the context of the network's overall security, the two problems of isolation mentioned above are avoided. A good assessment will also capture the impact of implementation choices made for the sake of usability and productivity. Likewise, a good scoring algorithm will factor in the time impact on solution effectiveness.

When evaluating a security solution, the assessment can be conducted as if the solution were already in place. The difference between this score and the actual score is the amount of risk being mitigated due to the solution. When calculating ROSI, the predicted score (not the difference) should be used as the overall risk mitigation.



The accuracy of the score as a measurement of mitigated risk is dependent on the quality of the assessment and scoring algorithm. Following assessment guidelines published by standard-setting groups such as the International Security Forum (ISF), National Institute of Standards in Technology (NIST), and the International Standards Organization (ISO) will lead to the creation of good assessments. Artificial Neural Networks can be used to create particularly good scoring algorithms, the details of which will be discussed in a forthcoming paper.

**KEY POINT:** *Even with an inaccurate scoring algorithm, using a scored assessment as a method of determining risk mitigation is effective because the scores are repeatable and consistent, and therefore can be used to compare the ROI of different security solutions.*

### 2.3 Quantifying Solution Cost

By this point, it should be apparent that the cost of a solution is not just what's written on its price tag. At the very least, the internal costs associated with implementing the solution also need to be taken into consideration. But this is also not enough. Once again, productivity is going to rear its ugly head and demand accountability.

Productivity is important because security almost always comes at the cost of convenience. Most security solutions end up creating hurdles that employees need to jump in order to do their jobs. Depending on the size and frequency of these "hurdles", the lost productivity cost can seriously add up. Table 3 shows how time can easily be lost due to problems actually *created* by the very solutions designed to fix other security problems:

**Table 3.** Productivity Loss Due to Security Solutions

Problem	Average Downtime
Application and system related crashes	10 Mins
Bandwidth efficiency and throughput	10 Mins
Over-restrictive security policies	10 Mins
Enforcement of security policies	10 Mins
System related rollouts and upgrades from IT	10 Mins
Security patches for OS and applications	10 Mins
Trouble downloading files due to virus scanning	10 Mins
Compatibility issues – hardware and software	15 Mins
Too many passwords/permissions security problems	15 Mins

It is also possible for a security solution to increase productivity. This happens when a side effect of the solution happens to eliminate other significant problems that were hampering productivity. For example, implementing a firewall might require a network restructuring. The new structure might solve serious bandwidth problems that were previously creating extensive downtime.

This productivity impact can be measured by re-running the productivity surveys used to estimate risk exposure. The given answers are adjusted to assume that the solution has been put into place. The difference between the current and projected productivity is the impact factor that needs to be included in this calculation.

Let's factor productivity into our earlier example with ViriCorp's virus scanner. We can see that if cost of the solution exceeds \$60,000, the ROI is 0% and therefore it's not worth purchasing. Assuming the full cost of the system remains at \$30,000, there's a margin of \$30,000. For 100 employees earning an average of \$20/hour, that margin equates to 3.5 minutes per day of downtime. If implementing the virus scanner creates more than 3.5 minutes of downtime each day, it's more cost effective to *not* purchase the scanner. On the other hand, if the scanner can eliminate downtime by minimizing the impact of viruses, it could make the scanner quite attractive in terms of ROI.

**KEY POINT:** *The cost of a solution must include the impact of the solution on productivity, since this number is often large enough to make or break the viability of a given solution.*

## 2.4 Taking A Long-Term View

For long-term investments, most financial professionals will want to factor in the time-value of money. The money spent on the investment is money that could have been invested in other places. For example, imagine that you must choose between two functionally equivalent solutions where one costs \$100,000 up-front, and the other \$50,000 per year for two years. Both solutions ultimately cost \$100,000. But the second solution is preferable because you can invest the other \$50,000 in something else for a year. The true cost of the second solution is actually less than \$100,000 when the investment potential is factored in. This "adjusted" cost is called the Net Present Value (NPV).

One of the important factors in calculating Net Present Value is the "discount rate" -- the estimated rate of return that you could get by putting the money in some other form of investment. Another interesting piece of information can be obtained by figuring out what discount rate is necessary to result in an NPV of zero. This is called the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and basically tells you what rate the investment is effectively earning. In general, having an IRR above the discount rate is a good sign.

In most cases, Net Present Value and the Internal Rate of Return are better indicators than a simple Return on Investment calculation. But if you can't accurately predict the timing or magnitude of the costs and benefits over the lifetime of the investment, you will get misleading results. To illustrate the problem, let's look at the NPV and IRR of a \$10,000 network security device. In the first example, the device prevents a \$50,000 disaster in the fifth year after it's installed. In the second example, the same disaster is prevented during the first year:

	Rate	Cost	Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y5	NPV	IRR	ROI
#1	0.05	-10000	0	0	0	0	50000	\$27,786	38%	400%
#2	0.05	-10000	50000	0	0	0	0	\$35,827	400%	400%

Unfortunately, nobody can predict when a security device will prevent a problem. As a result, one solution is to spread the savings out across the predicted lifetime of the device. You could also "front-load" the savings, under the assumption that the device will be most effective at the beginning of its life, and lose effectiveness as the years progress and hackers figure out how to bypass the device:

	Rate	Cost	Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	Y5	NPV	IRR	ROI
#3	0.05	-10000	10000	10000	10000	10000	10000	\$31,709	97%	400%
#4	0.05	-10000	17500	15000	10000	5000	2500	\$33,316	153%	400%

The problem with using Net Present Value for security investments is that accuracy is quite critical to obtaining comparatively meaningful results. While ROSI doesn't factor in the time value of money, it can at least provide comparable figures with inaccurate (but consistent) data. This may be a case where it's better to be meaningful than precise.

## 2.5 Putting It All Together: The SecureMark System

The research and theories put forth in this article are not the result of academic study -- they are the foundation and result of a business venture. SageSecure was founded with the goal of enabling businesses to financially justify their security spending. After studying many different theoretical models and finding no standard practical models, we decided to develop our own. After a year of development and successful field use, we believe that our system is on the right track.

The SecureMark system is a real-world implementation of the concepts put forth in this article. Its goal is to provide a trustworthy standard for security benchmarking, one that produces consistently repeatable results that are strongly correlated to financial performance. SecureMark scores can truly be used to compare security expenditures based on meaningful Return on Security Investment calculations. Our scoring model is constantly improving and approaching its ultimate goal of providing meaningful, accurate and consistent results.

SecureMark's assessment surveys are based on ISO17799, NIST and ISF standards. All major areas recommended by these standards are covered by questions found in the SecureMark survey. There is even the ability to provide an alternate scoring that quantifies compliance with ISO17799, NIST and ISF recommendations. This is not a standard focus of SecureMark, however, since we believe that 100% compliance with standards does not necessarily equate to ideal security, and certainly would create serious productivity issues in most organizations. We believe that specific compliance goals are dependent on the industry and size of an organization. Achieving 95% compliance with a standard is not impressive if the missing 5% is in areas of critical importance.

A particularly unique approach taken by SecureMark is its focus on productivity. Risk exposure is measured as the productivity loss due to existing security issues. Solutions are presented that minimize this loss and therefore provide instantly realizable returns, as opposed to returns that only happen if the security solution prevents a major disaster. Our assumption is that serious disasters are rare and hard to quantify, but everyday incidents create a significant amount of aggregate loss. Solving these problems provides real returns and improves security at the same time, which has the side effect of preventing some of those major disasters. That said, SecureMark could also be used to measure the productivity loss due to a major disaster. This figure can be used as a specifically accurate risk exposure figure when comparing the return on security investment of preventative solutions for that particular type of incident. Either way, productivity is a critical factor and is the cornerstone of SecureMark's analysis.

Not only is productivity a major factor in calculating risk exposure, but it's also a significant factor in the cost of a solution. Security solutions can have a positive, negative or neutral influence on organizational productivity. This influence can be significant, and must be factored into the cost of the solution. SecureMark can estimate the impact a given solution will have on overall productivity. This impact is factored in when prioritizing underlying problems and their respective solutions.<sup>1</sup>

The resulting SecureMark scorecard gives all the factors necessary to calculate the Return On a Security Investment: Risk Exposure expressed in dollars of lost productivity, and the percentage of risk currently mitigated expressed as a SecureMark Score. The analysis indicates the top problems prioritized by their impact on risk exposure and lost productivity. Likewise, the solutions presented are selected based on their predicted ability to mitigate risk and minimize lost productivity.

<sup>1</sup> It might appear that the productivity impact of a security solution is getting factored in twice: once because the Risk Mitigated \* Risk Exposure gives a \$ figure for productivity savings, and a second time when factored into the cost. These are actually two different ways in which productivity affects ROSI. The first shows that any security improvement will minimize the chance of productivity draining incidents, and therefore reclaims some lost productivity, proportional to the increase in risk mitigation. The second way is the impact that the solution itself will directly have on productivity loss. For example, implementing a spam filter will marginally improve overall security by stopping a number of different email-borne threats. This will impact on overall productivity by minimizing downtime due to these threats. This impact will be captured by the increase in risk mitigation. The spam filter may also save employees up to 15 minutes per day by improving their email usage efficiency. Factoring the productivity impact into the cost of the solution will capture this gain. In some cases there is a small amount of overlap between the two influences, but this is generally inconsequential and can be further minimized by adjusting the scoring system.

In a few years, the data accumulated by SecureMark will allow an unprecedented amount of accuracy in its scoring and analysis. For now, we have not yet collected enough data to begin eliminating subjectivity from SecureMark's scoring and analysis. That said, our system is still consistent, which allows for meaningful comparison of solutions. It also allows for meaningful industry comparisons -- a company can tell if its score is above or below industry average. Until the system can automatically provide accurate results, SageSecure security experts review all scores and analyses to ensure consistency and accuracy. The result is the only automated, repeatable and consistent ROSI benchmarking system available to date.

### 3 Conclusion

In this paper we've presented an analysis of the problem of determining a meaningful Return on Security Investment for security expenditures. We presented a model for calculating ROSI, and then showed how the various factors could be obtained. Some unique approaches to measuring Risk Exposure and Risk Mitigation were explored, specifically those that focused on lost productivity as a critical factor. The importance of factoring productivity into both exposure and solution cost was stressed. The suitability of using Net Present Value in this context was explored, and a real-world implementation of the entire model (SecureMark) was examined.

We hope the concepts discussed in this paper will encourage further research into the connection between productivity and security. We feel that this is one of the most promising areas in which a strong connection can be made between security and financial performance.

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