loading
Papers Papers/2022 Papers Papers/2022

Research.Publish.Connect.

Paper

Paper Unlock

Authors: Nadia Chaabane Fakhfakh ; Cyril Briand and Marie-José Huguet

Affiliation: CNRS, LAAS and Université de Toulouse, France

Keyword(s): Multi-Agent, Network Flow, Nash Equilibrium, Complexity, Min-Cost Flow.

Related Ontology Subjects/Areas/Topics: Applications ; Artificial Intelligence ; Game Theory ; Knowledge Discovery and Information Retrieval ; Knowledge-Based Systems ; Methodologies and Technologies ; Network Optimization ; Operational Research ; Optimization ; Pattern Recognition ; Software Engineering ; Symbolic Systems

Abstract: A Multi-Agent Minimum-Cost Flow problem is addressed in this paper. It can be seen as a basic multi-agent transportation problem where every agent can control the capacities of a set of elementary routes (modeled as arcs inside a network), each agent incurring a cost proportional to the chosen capacity. We assume that a customer is interesting in transshipping a product flow from a source to a sink node through the transportation network. It offers a reward that is proportional to the flow that the agents manage to provide. The reward is shared among the agents according to a pre-established policy. This problem can be seen as a non-cooperative game where every agent aims at maximizing its individual profit. We take interest in finding stable strategies (i.e., Nash Equilibrium) such that no agent has any incentive to modify its behavior. We show how such equilibrium can be characterized by means of augmenting or decreasing path in a reduced network. We also focus on the problem of fi nding a Nash equilibrium that maximizes the flow value and prove its NP-hardness. (More)

CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Sign In Guest: Register as new SciTePress user now for free.

Sign In SciTePress user: please login.

PDF ImageMy Papers

You are not signed in, therefore limits apply to your IP address 3.144.102.239

In the current month:
Recent papers: 100 available of 100 total
2+ years older papers: 200 available of 200 total

Paper citation in several formats:
Chaabane Fakhfakh, N.; Briand, C. and Huguet, M. (2014). A Multi-Agent Min-Cost Flow problem with Controllable Capacities - Complexity of Finding a Maximum-flow Nash Equilibrium. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems - ICORES; ISBN 978-989-758-017-8; ISSN 2184-4372, SciTePress, pages 27-34. DOI: 10.5220/0004765500270034

@conference{icores14,
author={Nadia {Chaabane Fakhfakh}. and Cyril Briand. and Marie{-}José Huguet.},
title={A Multi-Agent Min-Cost Flow problem with Controllable Capacities - Complexity of Finding a Maximum-flow Nash Equilibrium},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems - ICORES},
year={2014},
pages={27-34},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0004765500270034},
isbn={978-989-758-017-8},
issn={2184-4372},
}

TY - CONF

JO - Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems - ICORES
TI - A Multi-Agent Min-Cost Flow problem with Controllable Capacities - Complexity of Finding a Maximum-flow Nash Equilibrium
SN - 978-989-758-017-8
IS - 2184-4372
AU - Chaabane Fakhfakh, N.
AU - Briand, C.
AU - Huguet, M.
PY - 2014
SP - 27
EP - 34
DO - 10.5220/0004765500270034
PB - SciTePress

- Science and Technology Publications, Lda.
RESOURCES

Proceedings

Papers

Authors

Ontology

CONTACTS

Science and Technology Publications, Lda
Avenida de S. Francisco Xavier, Lote 7 Cv. C,
2900-616 Setúbal, Portugal.

Phone: +351 265 520 185 (National fixed network call)
Fax: +351 265 520 186
Email: info@scitepress.org

EXTERNAL LINKS

PRIMORIS

INSTICC

SCITEVENTS

CROSSREF

PROCEEDINGS SUBMITTED FOR INDEXATION BY:

dblp

Ei Compendex

SCOPUS

Semantic Scholar

Google Scholar

Microsoft Academic