A Game of Stakeholders in Evolutional Tourism

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Abstract: The popularization of the Internet and information technology redefined the form of education and eliminated the educational barriers, which make educational tourism within reach. This paper constructs a hybrid strategy model to study the benefit relations of subjects and equilibrium points among the government, schools, and families under the background of education reform due to the rapid development of the Internet and the compatibility of disciplines. The result shows that the government and family not only influence each other's strategic choices but also affect the decision-making of schools. Specifically, reasonable rewards or subsidies for schools and families can remarkably promote the construction of the educational system and participation in educational tourism.

1 INTRODUCTION

In 2021, the government issue not only reduce the pressure of homework and after-school training but also required improving the quality of educational resources, which included building professional extracurricular activities and educational bases (Yan Lin, 2021). However, now schools merely paying attention to knowledge acquisition and emphasizing discipline standards, fail to promote educational travel that advocates all-around development. Importantly, under the social background of development diversification, families have more freedom of choice, rather than the only choice from school about educational tourism. The benefit relations among the government, schools, and families have ushered in a major restructuring. The quality of educational travel in the future has attracted extensive attention from all walks of life. In addition, the rise of cloud computing has also facilitated the popularity of educational tourism. More and more families have begun to attach importance to comprehensive development. As for this, it is necessary to solve the benefit conflicts initiated by educational travel subjects (Bo Ma, 2020).

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

To fully implement the effective way of comprehensive practical education, scholars have studied different aspects of educational tourism, which mostly stay in qualitative analysis and less quantitative analysis, being in contradiction with the vigorous development in China. Foreign scholars focus on the role of educational tourism, and the existing research results show that educational tourism has a positive impact on self-view (Roberson and Donald N., 2018), practical education (Xiaoyan Wang, 2017), and cross-cultural development (Hao Zhang, 2017). The causes and countermeasures of educational tourism summarized have been widely recognized by the academic circles, which include a lack of accurate understanding of educational value, lack of strict planning, and so on (Meaux J B, Saviers B and Traywick L, 2021). Some scholars have studied different types, which demonstrated the practical value. It can be found that scholars widely agree to bring research and learning into the teaching system. However, few schools effectively integrate educational tourism into the teaching system. Specifically, schools lack professional talents, mostly cooperate with institutions to complete educational activities and ignore students' subjective initiative

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(Shujuan Yu, Yuan Wang and Huijun Wu., 2017). which demonstrates the effective gain of schools, government, and families in educational tourism. Government participation or policy formulation plays an important role, and tourism institutions will also affect educational tourism (Lei Rong, 2021). Moreover, the rapid development of the social economy has shaken the cooperative relationship, put forward new requirements for the government. The government's support for families will change enthusiasm of stakeholders. Therefore, the benefit relations need to be reconsidered.

To sum up, the different demands of stakeholders inevitably lead to contradictions, that is the game between stakeholders under the background of reform in education. Scholars mainly focus on students and families. They are mostly empirical research and qualitative analysis. The traditional research methods fail to reflect the game relationship and conduct analysis. Therefore, this paper studies the stakeholders through the evolutionary game method, which is not only conducive to expanding the research ideas and enriching the application fields of the evolutionary game but also conducive to clarifying the contradictions between stakeholders and the mutually compromised interest relations and strategies, providing effective gains for the implementation of educational reform and the development of educational tourism.

3 ASSUMPTIONS & VARIABLE

The relevant parameters are shown as follows:

r_1: Excellence reputation of government regulation;

r_2: Revenue from educational tourism;

r_3: Acquired knowledge of family;

k_1: Profit sharing coefficient of school, $0< k_1 <1$;

k_2: Cost coefficient of family, $0< k_2 <1$;

k_3: Acquired Knowledge coefficient, $0< k_3 <1$;

c_1: Cost of government regulation;

c_2: Cost of constructing tourism system in schools;

j: Government rewards for schools;

b: Government subsidies for the family;

f: Government fines on schools.

Assumption 1 Educational tourism stakeholders in this paper refer to the government, schools, and families. Three stakeholders are limited rationality, limited access to information, and commitment to maximizing their interests.

Assumption 2 The income of educational tourism of schools comes from family, so the cost of family educational tourism should be directly proportional to the total income of educational tourism, but less than the total income. Therefore, the family cost coefficient k_2 is introduced.

Assumption 3 Schools are the main position for the development of educational tourism. Particularly, when schools cooperate with institutions, educational tourism is mostly outsourced to institutions, which makes students have a poor sense of experience and could not systematically acquire knowledge. Therefore, this paper introduces the knowledge acquisition coefficient k_3.

Assumption 4 There are two strategic choices for government subjects: Supervision and Non-Supervision. The policy set is $S_1= (X_1, X_2)$. In particular, when the government carries out supervision, it rewards schools that incorporate educational tourism into the education program and build a complete system. In addition, the government punishes schools that fail to implement the policy, and grant subsidies to family participating in activities. When the government is non-supervision, schools and families will not be rewarded or punished for any strategy. But the government can gain a good reputation through regulation.

Assumption 5 There are two strategic choices for school subjects: Non-Cooperation and Cooperation. The policy set is $S_2 = (Y_1, Y_2)$. The difference lies in whether to choose to cooperate with institutions and whether to build an educational tourism system independently. When a school chooses to cooperate with the institutions, the income should be shared with the institution. The cost of cooperation should be borne by the institution. When the school does not cooperate with institutions, the school needs to build an educational tourism system, and schools bear all costs without sharing the profits.

Assumption 6 There are two strategic choices for family subjects: Participation and Non-Participation. The policy set is $S_4 = (W_1, W_2)$. When the family chooses to participate, the cooperation between schools and institutions will reduce the acquisition of family knowledge. Besides, the cost of family participation in educational tourism is directly proportional to the income of schools. The main income of family participation in educational tourism is reflected by the acquired knowledge. When the family chooses not to participate, no matter what strategies the schools and institutions adopt, it will not have an impact on the family, and the knowledge acquired through educational tourism is 0.

For the three-party game subjects, the strategy choice of any two parties will affect the income of the third party. Hence, in the case of incomplete

information symmetry, stakeholders being difficult to determine whether their strategy is the best, only adjusting the strategy through the continuous game. Suppose that the probability of the government choosing to supervise is x and the probability of choosing not to supervise is 1-x; The probability of choosing cooperation is y and the probability of choosing noncooperation is 1−y; The probability of families choosing to participate is z and the probability of choosing not to participate is 1− z. Thus, the different game payment matrix is shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Parameter.

Strategy	GR	SR	FR
H_1（X_1, Y_1, Z_1）	$r_1 - c_1 - j - b$	$j + r_2 - c_2$	$r_3 - k_2 r_2 + b$
H_2（X_1, Y_2, Z_1）	$r_1 + f - c_1 - b$	$k_1 r_2 - f$	$k_3 r_3 - k_1 k_2 r_2 + b$
H_3（X_1, Y_1, Z_2）	$r_1 - c_1 - j$	$j - c_2$	0
H_4（X_1, Y_2, Z_2）	$r_1 + f - c_1$	$-f$	0
H_5（X_2, Y_1, Z_1）	0	$r_2 - c_2$	$r_3 - k_2 r_2$
H_6（X_2, Y_2, Z_1）	0	$k_1 r_2$	$k_3 r_3 - k_1 k_2 r_2$
H_7（X_2, Y_1, Z_2）	0	$-c_2$	0
H_8（X_2, Y_2, Z_2）	0	0	0

4 MODEL ANALYSIS

4.1 The Expected Return

When the government selects "Supervision (U11)", otherwise "Non-supervision (U12)"; When the school chooses "Non-cooperation (U21)", otherwise "Cooperation (U22)"; When the family chooses "Participation (U31)", otherwise " Non-participation (U32)"; As follows:

$U_{11} = r_1 - c_1 - zb - y(j - f)$;

$\overline{U_1} = xr_1 - xc_1 - xzb - xy(j - f)$;

$U_{21} = xj + zr_2 - c_2$;

$U_{22} = zk_1 r_2 - xf$;

$\overline{U_2} = yU_{21} + (1 - y)U_{22}$;

$U_{31} = y(r_3 - k_2 r_2) + (1 - y)(k_3 r_3 - k_1 k_2 r_2) + xb$;

$\overline{U_3} = yz(r_3 - k_2 r_2) + (1 - y)z(k_3 r_3 - k_1 k_2 r_2) + xzb$.

4.2 Replicated Dynamic Equation

The replicated dynamic equation of government "Supervision" is:

$$F(x) = \frac{dx}{dt} = x(1 - x)[r_1 - c_1 - zb - y(j - f)] \quad (1)$$

1) If $y = \frac{r_1 - c_1 - f - zb}{(j - f)}$, F'(*x*)=0, F(*x*)=0, *x* is in a stable state from 0 to 1.

2) If $y \neq \frac{r_1 - c_1 - f - zb}{(j - f)}$, when F(*x*)=0, then *x*=0 or *x*=1. Derive F(*x*)=0, then F'(*x*)=(1-2*x*) [r_1-c_1-*f*-*z* (*b*+*f*) - *yj*].

a. If $y > \frac{r_1 - c_1 - f - zb}{(j - f)}$, $\frac{dF(x)}{dt}|_{x=0} < 0, \frac{dF(x)}{dt}|_{x=1} > 0$, therefore, *x*=0 is the government's stability strategy.

b. If $y < \frac{r_1 - c_1 - f - zb}{(j - f)}$, $\frac{dF(x)}{dt}|_{x=0} > 0, \frac{dF(x)}{dt}|_{x=1} < 0$, therefore, *x*=1 is the government's stability strategy.

Similarly, perform the same operation on $F(y)$ and $F(z)$ as follows:

The replicated dynamic equation when the school chooses "Non-Cooperation " is:

$$F(y) = \frac{dy}{dt} = y(1 - y)[x(j + f) + zr_2(1 - k_1) - c_2] \quad (2)$$

1) If $z = \frac{x(j+f) - c_2}{r_2(k_1 - 1)}$, $F(y) = 0$, $F'(y) = 0, z$ is in a stable state from 0 to 1.

2) If $z \neq \frac{x(j+f) - c_2}{r_2(k_1 - 1)}$, when $F(y) = 0$, then $y = 0$ or $y = 1$. Derive $F(y) = 0$, then $F'(y) = (1 - 2y)[x(j + f) + zr_2(1 - k_1) - c_2]$.

① If $z > \frac{x(j+f) - c_2}{r_2(k_1 - 1)}$, $\frac{dF(y)}{dt}|_{y=0} < 0, \frac{dF(y)}{dt}|_{y=1} > 0$, therefore, $y = 0$ is the schools' evolutionary stability strategy.

②If $z < \frac{x(j+f) - c_2}{r_2(k_1 - 1)}$, $\frac{dF(y)}{dt}|_{y=0} > 0, \frac{dF(y)}{dt}|_{y=1} < 0$, therefore, $y = 1$ is the schools' evolutionary stability strategy.

The replicated dynamic equation when the family chooses " Participation " is:

$$F(z) = \frac{dz}{dt} = z(1-z)[y(r_3 - k_2r_2) + (1-y)(k_3r_3 - k_1k_2r_2) + xb] \quad (3)$$

1) If $x = \frac{(y-1)(k_3r_3-k_1k_2r_2)-y(r_3-k_2r_2)}{b}$, $F(z) = 0, F'(z) = 0, z$ is in a stable state from 0 to 1.

2) If $x \neq \frac{(y-1)(k_3r_3-k_1k_2r_2)-y(r_3-k_2r_2)}{b}$, when $F(z) = 0$, then $z = 0$ or $z = 1$. Derive $F(z) = 0$, then $F'(z) = (1-2z)[y(r_3 - k_2r_2) + (1-y)(k_3r_3 - k_1k_2r_2) + xb]$.

① If $x > \frac{(y-1)(k_3r_3-k_1k_2r_2)-y(r_3-k_2r_2)}{b}$, $\frac{dF(z)}{dt}|_{z=0} < 0, \frac{dF(z)}{dt}|_{z=1} > 0$, therefore, $z = 0$ is the family's evolutionary stability strategy.

② If $x < \frac{(y-1)(k_3r_3-k_1k_2r_2)-y(r_3-k_2r_2)}{b}$, $\frac{dF(z)}{dt}|_{z=0} > 0, \frac{dF(z)}{dt}|_{z=1} < 0$, therefore, $z = 1$ is the family's evolutionary stability strategy.

4.3 Stability Analysis

Referring to Xiaolan Liu's dynamic stability analysis and Jixiang Zhang's equilibrium points stability analysis (Xiaoyan Wang, 2017). This paper only studies the stability of 8 points. The trace (trJ) and determinant (detJ) of the Jacobian matrix were obtained by derivation of the partial derivative of in F(x), F(y) and F(z) can judge the stability of the equilibrium points. When is less than 0, it belongs to the saddle point. When both are greater than 0, it is the unstable point. When is greater than 0 and r is less than 0, it belongs to the stable point. The 8 equilibrium points are calculated according to the Jacobi matrix (Xiaoyan Wang, 2017), as shown in Table 2. Ultimately, when j > r1, k2 + k1 < 1, k3r3 < k1k2r2, and k2 r2 < r3.

$$J = \begin{bmatrix} (1-2x)(U_{11}-U_{12}) & x(1-x)(f-j) & -x(1-x)b \\ y(1-y)(j+f) & (1-2y)(U_{21}-U_{22}) & r_2y(1-y)(1-k_1) \\ z(1-z)b & z(1-z)(r_3-k_2r_2-k_3r_3+k_1k_2r_2) & (1-2z)(U_{31}-U_{32}) \end{bmatrix}$$

① For the point P_1, when $r_1 - c_1 - f < 0$ and $k_3r_3 - k_1k_2r_2 > 0$, the larger the value of k_3r_3, and the smaller the value of $k_1k_2r_2$, then the more unstable the value of P_1.

②For the point P_2, when $r_1 - c_1 - j < 0$, $j + f - c_2 > 0$ and $k_3r_3 - k_1k_2r_2 > 0$, the larger the value of c_1, j and f, and the smaller the value of r_1, c_2 and $k_1k_2r_2$, then the more unstable the value of P_2.

③ For the point P_3, when $r_1 - c_1 - j > 0$ and $r_3 - k_2r_2 > 0$, the larger the value of r_1, c_2 and r_3, and the smaller the value of j、f and k_2r_2, then the more unstable the value of P_3.

④For the point P_4, when $r_1 - c_1 - f - b > 0$, $(1-k_1)r_2 - c_2 > 0$ and $k_3r_3 - k_1k_2r_2 > 0$, the larger the value of r_1 and k_3r_3, and the smaller the value of c_1, f, b, k_1 and $k_1k_2r_2$, then the more unstable the value of P_4.

⑤For the point P_5, when $j - r_1 + c_1 > 0$, $c_2 - j - f > 0$ and $r_3 - k_2r_2 + b > 0$, the larger the value of r_3, b, c_1 and c_2, and the smaller the value of r_1, f and k_2r_2, then the more unstable the value of P_5.

⑥ For the point P_6, when $c_1 - r_1 + f + b > 0$, $j + f + (1-k_1)r_2 - c_2 > 0$ and $k_1k_2r_2 - k_3r_3 - b > 0$, the larger the value of $k_1k_2r_2$, c_1, f, b, j and r_2, r_1, k_3r_3, b, c_2 and k_1, then the more unstable the value of P_6.

⑦ For the point P_7, when $r_1 - c_1 - j - b > 0, (1-k_1)r_2 - c_2 < 0$ and $k_2r_2 - r_3 - b > 0$, the larger the value of c_1, b, j and r_3, k_2r_2, r_1, c_2 and k_1, then the more unstable the value of P_7.

⑧For the point P_8, when $c_1 - r_1 + f + b > 0$, $c_2 - (1-k_1)r_2 - j - f > 0$ and $k_2r_2 - r_3 - b > 0$, the larger the value of $c_1, b, c_2$and k_2r_2, r_1, j, r_3, b and k_1, then the more unstable the value of P_8.

To sum up, the government tends to the "Supervision" strategy, that is to pay more attention to the government's reputation, improve the family's knowledge acquisition, reduce the cost of school construction of education system and the cost of family participation in educational tourism, which can promote the government's "Supervision" strategy; The schools tend to the "Non-Cooperation" strategy, that is, to improve the reward for colleges and universities, reduce the proportion of profit sharing when schools cooperate with institutions and reduce the cost of building the research education system, which can promote the construction of the research education system; The family tends to the " Participation "strategy, that is, to increase the knowledge acquired by the family in educational tourism and the allowance for educational tourism, and reduce the profit sharing ratio and income when schools cooperate with institutions, which can promote family to choose to "Participation" educational tourism.

Table 2: Equilibrium point.

Equilibrium point	trJ	detJ
P_1（0,0,0）	$(r_1 - c_1 - f) - c_2 + (k_3 r_3 - k_1 k_2 r_2)$	$(r_1 - c_1 - f)(-c_2)(k_3 r_3 - k_1 k_2 r_2)$
P_2（1,0,0）	$(-1)(r_1 - c_1 - j) + (j + f - c_2) + (k_3 r_3 - k_1 k_2 r_2 + b)$	$(-1)(r_1 - c_1 - j)(j + f - c_2)(k_3 r_3 - k_1 k_2 r_2 + b)$
P_3（0,1,0）	$(r_1 - c_1 - j) + c_2 + (r_3 - k_2 r_2)$	$(r_1 - c_1 - j)c_2(r_3 - k_2 r_2)$
P_4（0,0,1）	$(r_1 - c_1 - f - b) + [(1 - k_1)r_2 - c_2] + (k_3 r_3 - k_1 k_2 r_2)$	$(r_1 - c_1 - f - b)[(1 - k_1)r_2 - c_2](k_3 r_3 - k_1 k_2 r_2)$
P_5（1,1,0）	$(j - r_1 + c_1) + (c_2 - j - f) + (r_3 - k_2 r_2 + b)$	$(j - r_1 + c_1)(c_2 - j - f)(r_3 - k_2 r_2 + b)$
P_6（1,0,1）	$(c_1 - r_1 + f + b) + [j + f + (1 - k_1)r_2 - c_2] + (k_1 k_2 r_2 - k_3 r_3 - b)$	$(c_1 - r_1 + f + b)[j + f + (1 - k_1)r_2 - c_2](k_1 k_2 r_2 - k_3 r_3 - b)$
P_7（0,1,1）	$(r_1 - c_1 - j - b) - [(1 - k_1)r_2 - c_2] + (k_2 r_2 - r_3 - b)$	$(r_1 - c_1 - j - b)[c_2 - (1 - k_1)r_2](k_2 r_2 - r_3 - b)$
P_8（1,1,1）	$(c_1 - r_1 + j + b) + [c_2 - (1 - k_1)r_2 - j - f] + (k_2 r_2 - r_3 - b)$	$(c_1 - r_1 + j + b)[c_2 - (1 - k_1)r_2 - j - f](k_2 r_2 - r_3 - b)$

Equilibrium point	trJ	detJ
P_1（0,0,0）	$(r_1 - c_1 - f) - c_2 + (k_3 r_3 - k_1 k_2 r_2)$	$(r_1 - c_1 - f)(-c_2)(k_3 r_3 - k_1 k_2 r_2)$
P_2（1,0,0）	$(-1)(r_1 - c_1 - j) + (j + f - c_2) + (k_3 r_3 - k_1 k_2 r_2 + b)$	$(-1)(r_1 - c_1 - j)(j + f - c_2)(k_3 r_3 - k_1 k_2 r_2 + b)$
P_3（0,1,0）	$(r_1 - c_1 - j) + c_2 + (r_3 - k_2 r_2)$	$(r_1 - c_1 - j)c_2(r_3 - k_2 r_2)$
P_4（0,0,1）	$(r_1 - c_1 - f - b) + [(1 - k_1)r_2 - c_2] + (k_3 r_3 - k_1 k_2 r_2)$	$(r_1 - c_1 - f - b)[(1 - k_1)r_2 - c_2](k_3 r_3 - k_1 k_2 r_2)$
P_5（1,1,0）	$(j - r_1 + c_1) + (c_2 - j - f) + (r_3 - k_2 r_2 + b)$	$(j - r_1 + c_1)(c_2 - j - f)(r_3 - k_2 r_2 + b)$
P_6（1,0,1）	$(c_1 - r_1 + f + b) + [j + f + (1 - k_1)r_2 - c_2] + (k_1 k_2 r_2 - k_3 r_3 - b)$	$(c_1 - r_1 + f + b)[j + f + (1 - k_1)r_2 - c_2](k_1 k_2 r_2 - k_3 r_3 - b)$
P_7（0,1,1）	$(r_1 - c_1 - j - b) - [(1 - k_1)r_2 - c_2] + (k_2 r_2 - r_3 - b)$	$(r_1 - c_1 - j - b)[c_2 - (1 - k_1)r_2](k_2 r_2 - r_3 - b)$
P_8（1,1,1）	$(c_1 - r_1 + j + b) + [c_2 - (1 - k_1)r_2 - j - f] + (k_2 r_2 - r_3 - b)$	$(c_1 - r_1 + j + b)[c_2 - (1 - k_1)r_2 - j - f](k_2 r_2 - r_3 - b)$

5 SIMULATION ANALYSIS

Considering the current situation of educational tourism, we assign the variables (r1=10, r2=20, r3=20, k1=0.3, k2=0.5, k3=0.8, c1=5, c2=10, j=2, f=1, b=1) and draw a graph among tripartite evolutionary game (Figure 1) and evolution scheme with time (Figure 2) through Matlab. X-axis, Y-axis, and Z-axis mean respectively the strategy choice of the government, the school, and the family, which the better equilibrium point is (1,1,1) in Figure 1.



Figure 1: Dynamic evolutionary process.



Figure 2: Time series diagram (t-x).

Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4 mean the strategy change over time among the government, the school, and the family in Figure 2. For example, the government would like to select “Supervision” and the family would like to select “Non-cooperation” under existing parameter values. In particular, the school prefers to select “Participation” first and then becomes “Non-participation” in Figure 3: Time series diagram (t-y).



Figure 3: Time series diagram (t-y).



Figure 4: Time series diagram (t-z).

6 CONCLUSIONS

Educational tourism is an innovative form of connection between theoretical learning and social education. The results show that the government and family not only influence each other's strategic choices but also affect the decision-making of schools. The government's reasonable setting of rewards or subsidies for schools and families can effectively promote the school's construction of educational tourism education system and the family's enthusiasm to participate in educational tourism. The knowledge acquired by the family has a positive impact on the government's supervision and the school's construction of educational tourism education system.

The government should implement the responsibility decomposition and responsibility boundary to prevent students from falling into the vacuum of management. And the government should ensure financial support and coordinate the resources of all social parties. Schools should incorporate it into the education plan and train professional teachers to

build an assessment mechanism. Meantime, schools should continue to carry out and improve educational tourism according to students' needs, and the process of educational reform. The family should correct their views on educational tourism and recognize that educational tourism could build a learning community for students and effectively improve students' social participation ability. And the family should actively participate in the educational tourism organized by the schools and complete the curriculum evaluation.

In short, student harmonious development requires the joint efforts of the three stakeholders under the background of educational reform lies in the cooperation and game among the government, schools, and families.

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