

# Dual-use Research in Ransomware Attacks: A Discussion on Ransomware Defence Intelligence

Ziya Alper Genç<sup>a</sup> and Gabriele Lenzini<sup>b</sup>

*Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SnT), University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg*

**Keywords:** Ransomware, Double Use Research in Cryptography, Threat Intelligence and Counter-intelligence.

**Abstract:** Previous research has shown that developers rely on public platforms and repositories to produce functional but insecure code. We looked into the matter for ransomware, enquiring whether also ransomware engineers re-use the work of others and produce insecure code. By methodically reverse-engineering 128 malware executables, we have found that, out of 21 ransomware samples, 9 contain copy-paste code from public resources. Thanks to this finding, we managed to retrieve the decryption keys with which to nullify the ransomware attacks. From this fact, we recall critical cases of code disclosure in the recent history of ransomware and, arguing that ransomware are components in cyber-weapons, reflect on the dual-use nature of this research. We further discuss benefits and limits of using cyber-intelligence and counter-intelligence strategies that could be used against this threat.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

In anti-ransomware research, ransomware samples are routinely analyzed. The goal is to understand how they generate or retrieve the encryption keys; how they search, sort and prioritize which files to target first; and which files they encrypt first and by using which encryption algorithm. In this quite methodical work, it is routine to reverse engineer ransomware samples and analyze their source codes. While performing this task, we found that some piece of code was not original but *copy-and-pasted* from well-known public repositories or developers communities. From this discovery, with some additional work, we managed to build a decryptor for those ransomware samples.

Although our discovery is not surprising—researchers have already commented on how codes from public repositories is re-used and how this impacts security (*e.g.*, see (Fischer et al., 2017))—realizing that also ransomware’s security depends on public code has captured our attention. We started wondering whether there were other cases of copy-and-pasted code in ransomware. And we started reflecting on which consequences such re-use of code may bring into the fight against ransomware attacks.

This articles report on our insights on the subject.

Although motivated by some experimental findings, our contribution is purely argumentative. But, by developing our argument rigorously, we hope to contribute to a scientific discussions on “the matter”. And being “the matter” related to *dual-use of concern* in ransomware research, we intend to embark on other questions as well: What famous precedents exist in the recent history of ransomware that could enlighten us on the pros and cons of dual-use research? Should ransomware be considered components of a cyber-weapon? And, as such, are there reasons to classify ransomware as having military use? Thus, would it be reasonable to resort to intelligence and counter-intelligence strategies, such as those suggesting to contain information spreading in case of an attack or to control public information, to mitigate the threat? We restrict our argument to cryptographic ransomware, those which rely on cryptography. Other kind of ransomware, *e.g.*, those which aim to distress victims to pay up but, like the *scareware*, only pretend to use encryption but do not, are excluded from the discussion.

## 2 PRELIMINARIES

Is copy-and-paste from public repositories a practice in ransomware engineering? To investigate the ques-

<sup>a</sup>  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7198-7437>

<sup>b</sup>  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8229-3270>

tion we have first to collect and obtain the code of real-world ransomware samples and reverse engineer it.

The most accurate way to accomplish this latter is to *decompile* the malicious binaries. The task becomes quite practical if the malware is implemented using the .NET framework. Looking into malicious .NET assemblies downloaded from “Hybrid Analysis”, an automated malware analysis platform (Hybrid Analysis, 2019). Hybrid Analysis utilize sandboxing technique to determine if an executable exhibits malicious behaviour or poses no specific threat. From it, we collected ransomware samples by searching on report database with the following settings: (i) Exact Filetype Description as Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows; (ii) Verdict field as Malicious; and (iii) Hashtag field as #ransomware.

On a initial set of 128 executable, we applied dnSpy (dnSpy, 2019), a tool to obtain source codes. 39 samples, obfuscated, precluded any analysis. Of the remaining 89, we manually perused the source code, searching for key generation and encryption routines. 68 samples turned out to be non-cryptographic ransomware, with no such routines in their program body. The remaining 21 cryptographic ransomware samples were our final data set.

Using the found crypto-related code lines (*e.g.*, key derivation, encryption) as keywords, we searched for those lines in public developer platforms. When analyzing the hits, we compared the semantics of code snippets, naming of constants and variables, function signatures, strings, and error messages. From this searching and matching we discovered that some code was a *verbatim* copy-paste. Other code resulted, at least apparently, a plagiarism of some public available code.

Were we witnessing code-reuse (*i.e.*, dual-use) in ransomware? Before claiming code-reuse, we had to verify whether the code had been published before the first appearance of it in the malware. There should also be a reasonable time frame between the two events. The date of the first appearance of a ransomware, checked by using VirusTotal (VirusTotal Threat Intelligence, 2019), has been compared with the date on which the knowledge was first shared on online. A double-checked on the integrity of the pieces of information available on the executable was also performed. According to our findings, at least 9 out of 21 ransomware samples resulted to contain snippets bearing a marked resemblance to codes at online resources, this leading us to conclude that they are in fact a copy-paste.

In the following, we can comment on an excerpt from the ransomware samples (see Table1) that

we have found being a copy-paste from (i) a public repository of fully functional ransomware prototypes; (ii) tutorials and posts at developer communities. We also elaborate, where possible, about where the original code comes from, and about its cryptographic qualities.

### Ransomware from Repositories of Fully Functional Prototypes.

*Tiggre*, see Table 1, is a sample of cryptographic ransomware that uses a key generation function that is copy of a piece of public code known as *HiddenTear* (Şen, 2015b) (see Fig. 2 and Fig. 1). From it, *Tiggre* inherits a weakness: the password is generated using the outputs of a cryptographically weak algorithm. In fact, the same author of *HiddenTear* had developed a decryptor by using this weakness (Şen, 2015a). We tell the full story later, but what counts for now is that the open-source ransomware *HiddenTear* is a very famous ransomware code, which was posted publicly in 2015 allegedly for educational purpose. Since then, cyber-criminals have been using it as a source of inspiration for their ransomware variants (van der Wiel, 2016). This was also the case for *Tiggre*.

The original *HiddenTear* works as follows: it generates a password by calling *CreatePassword* which is shown in Fig. 1. The password, from which the encryption keys are derived, is sent to Command and Control (C&C) server. Next, before notifying the user, the ransomware attempts to encrypt all the files in test folder under the user’s Desktop directory.

Ransomware authors that copy from *HiddenTear* had to implement their own back-ends before having a working ransomware, but *HiddenTear* remains their point of reference. We have found that basic functionalities such as password generation and encryption blocks have been replicated from *HiddenTear*: for each file, the encryption key is derived from the same master secret, the password; this latter is generated using *System.Random*, a class that provides (cryptographically weak) pseudo random numbers.

From a cryptographic point of view, the outputs of *System.Random* is reproducible when using the same seed and its secrets are vulnerable to a forensics analysis. But other variants of *HiddenTear* eliminate this weakness: the weak key generation method is not seen in those samples.

### Ransomware from Community Platform.

Confidentiality of data is a highly demanded and legitimate need in the digital world. While cryptographic techniques can be used to protect the secrecy of data, developing a security application is an error-prone process. Therefore, developers who recently entered in

Table 1: SHA256 digests and family names of the samples. To determine the family name, we applied AVCLASS tool on the labels provided by AV vendors which we obtained from VirusTotal. SINGLETON denotes that the tool could not find any plurality among the labels for that sample, i.e., no vendor agreed on the family name.

#	SHA256 Digest	Family	Reuse From
1	0e5a696773b0c9ac48310f2cda53b1742a121948df5bcb822f841d387f0f5f68	Jigsaw	
2	1d57564398057df9d73cca27015af24142c25828287837c73d2daf0b3c3af5b	Mimikatz	
3	1ebdbfea6ab13f258a7d00dea47de48261cfb84d52ebbb6f282498c3ab1b1b39	Occamy	
4	3b4aaf37510c0f255e238c81b7e1a446bfa925bd54f93969c3155d988fbb6501	HiddenTear	(Şen, 2015b)
5	41ee4623d60544dd0ca16f6177565d99825afb38b932ccec305ef2fc20e03f4	HiddenTear	(Şen, 2015b)
6	58d11ef74b062e9996e75d238501a3f4d23691b101997d898d478696795ae3ff	CloudSword	(den Bosch, 2005)
7	662d0f034f2852e4e43d22a3625c1c8600c3d36660b596db1d6bad5c4980d9df	Ryzerlo	(Şen, 2015b)
8	66a3172e0f46d4139cc554c5e2a3a5b6e2179c4a14aff7e788bb9cc98a2219d5	Tiggre	
9	7cdd7e30c7091fd2fa3e879dd70087517412a165bf14c4ea4fd354337f22c415	HiddenTear	(Şen, 2015b)
10	87ce0b2e22b02572146676277cd6e9d89225e75361d1b696555cfe695c2e1f45	SINGLETON	
11	894aa842c129b39c0b9a7d575133d68b25de2ecd4e77f129e58481d30dfbf4e	Omegax	
12	950be5b5501ee84b1641c3a9a780242a57cdd412892c781eac8781498bf11f3e	Bobik	
13	951d78dd92eba7daa3ef009ce08bba91a308e13bdeb8325af35bc8202bd76e9b	Tiggre	
14	b5f3a090556ea30210a23fc90b69c85c68e8e08c89f8e58eb6a829e356dcca42e	Occamy	
15	ce53233a435923a68a9ca6987f0d6333bb97d5a435b942d0944356ac29df598	Crypren	(Lydford, 2008) & (Johnson, 2008)
16	d36e6282363c0f9c05b7b04412d10249323d8b0000f2c25f96c6f9de207eedf8	HiddenTear	(Şen, 2015b)
17	def09368d22c7b3f6a046ef206a57987095b2f4ddae1d26c6ef2594d6be09bfc	Diztakun	
18	e2ac9692c0816ccd59d1844048c6238dc5d105b0477620eeb1cdb0909804a787	WhiteRose	(Şen, 2015b)
19	f37080ee4cc445919cae0b1eb40eff46571f7ce0d85b189321d80a41c8752212	SINGLETON	
20	f535879cf05a099b0f6d2a7fa182d399ec9568f131abb23d9f98418f45789d	Perseus	(den Bosch, 2005)
21	fd99bfeac78c087a9dc9d4c0c1d26a7ea9780a330f88ba0d803f346221b4723	SINGLETON	

the field of cybersecurity might need to use the help of online tutorials. For example, Fig. 3 shows a post on CodeProject website (Lydford, 2008) which explains a simple way to encrypt a file using a key derived from a password in C# language (see Fig. 3). The function, EncryptFile, is poorly written from a cryptographic point of view. There are weaknesses, such as (i) presence of a hard-coded secret in the code; and (ii) improper key derivation, to name a few. That said, we found a Crypren ransomware variant (see Table 1) which copies the file encryption and decryption functions from (Lydford, 2008). Fig. 4 shows the function modified by the ransomware author, who disdained to write a password generation method and even used almost the same hard-coded secret.

Furthermore, the same Crypren sample contains the exact code snippet shared at another developer community (Johnson, 2008). That piece of code, is meant to impersonate another user, i.e., to launch a process under that user's account. However, the said code portion is not used/referenced by the program.

In another case, we observed that an online tutorial published in 2005 inspired two ransomware samples: Perseus and CloudSword (see Table 1). The post, available at (den Bosch, 2005), explains how to encrypt files with a user-supplied password in VB.NET programming language. Many portions of the code is reused by the ransomware samples, bar the part which takes input (i.e., the password) from the user. Alternatively, the Perseus variant uses an embedded password to derive key, while the CloudSword variant uses the System.Random to generate a password from which the key is derived. The CloudSword sample even contains the exact error messages as in

the full project at (den Bosch, 2005); the Perseus sample uses the same code portions as in the tutorial, that without error messages.

**Discussion.** From our findings, we can conclude that certain ransomware engineers do copy-and-paste code from public sites. Surely, this conclusion cannot be representative of how all ransomware variants are coded. We do not even know whether who took advantage the public resources are professionals or amateurs, and it may be inherently hard to investigate for an answer on this matter due to the difficulty to reach out ransomware developers. However, we speculate, ransomware engineers are likely not in a different position than security developers. In (Acar et al., 2017), it is reported that in a population of three hundreds developers among which also professionals, only a quarter relied on the official documentation, while the rest consulted “the Internet”, inevitably relaying in their code errors naïvities “out there”, cause them to introduce security vulnerabilities in their code.

This seems to remain valid in our case: the security of some ransomware depends, at least in part, on the security reliability of the unofficial sources. A question remains open. Has the code-use helped ransomware criminals? The question is intertwined with the practice of dual-use of research in the field and, for this reason, we looked into the recent history of ransomware attacks in search for episodes of code reuse.

```

public string CreatePassword(int length)
{
    const string valid =
    ↪ "a..zA..Z1234567890*!~&?&"/";
    StringBuilder res = new StringBuilder();
    Random rnd = new Random();

    while (0 < length--)
        res.Append(valid[rnd.Next(valid.Length)]);

    return res.ToString();
}

```

Figure 1: Password generation method of HiddenTear. This password will later be used as the master secret to derive encryption keys.

```

private static string RandomString(int
↪ length)
{
    string chars = "a..zA..Z0123456789";
    StringBuilder stringBuilder = new
    ↪ StringBuilder();
    Random random = new Random();

    while (0 < length--)
        stringBuilder.
        Append(chars[random.Next(chars.Length)]);

    return stringBuilder.ToString();
}

```

Figure 2: Password generation method used by Tiggre. The set of valid characters is shortened, most probably, to ease the typing of the password when asked for recovery.

### 3 DUAL-USE & RANSOMWARE

Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 defines ‘dual-use items’ as items which can be used for both civil and military purposes. The article includes “Computers” and “Telecommunications and Information security” as categories to be screened for potential dual-use.

When it comes to cryptography, dual-use is a serious matter. In response to the US Munitions List, Category XIII, Materials and Miscellaneous Articles, which mentions “cryptographic devices, software and components”, in a T-shirt shown at a DEFCON conference it was reported provocatively a piece of (encryption) code with the comment “this [code] can also be a munition” (Herr and Rosenzweig, 2015).

Within the cryptography community there is awareness that dual-use comes with a moral burden. Rogaway wrote that “cryptography is an inherently political tool, and it confers on the field an intrinsically moral dimension” (Rogaway, 2016). Rogaway’s argument is scoped in the contention between privacy on one side and mass surveillance on the other, but the message on that DEFCON T-shirt extends, even reverses, the matter. It raises the stake by pointing out that cryptographic code can be misused as a *weapon*. This is still the vision in certain countries, for instance the US, where non-military cryptography exports are if not forbidden at least controlled.

Being the subject of this paper ‘ransomware’, the matter must be contextualized: what about dual-use for cryptographic ransomware? And are ransomware and their cryptographic components weapons? To answer this question we look into cases of dual-use in ransomware. The most controversial is that of HiddenTear and its clones.

**HiddenTear and Its Clones.** In 2015, a Turkish programmer Utku Şen published the first fully-

fledged, open-source ransomware HiddenTear. This is the sample we commented in the previous section and whose code to generate a password is shown in Fig. 1.

From the early days, the release of HiddenTear prototype received criticisms from the security community (Kovacs, 2016). The main concern of the researchers is that even novice programmers can also make use of the published ransomware code while developing new variants. Time showed that they were right. A McAfee researcher stated that “in June (2017) almost 30% of the ‘new’ ransomware species we discovered was based on the HiddenTear code” (bee, ).

Three months after the first release, Şen claimed that he wished (i) to provide an example of ransomware for beginners (ii) to build a honeypot for script kiddies (Şen, 2015a). It was partly true that the first variants of HiddenTear contained the same critical bugs that enabled the recovery of files (van der Wiel, 2016). However, one real thing in the malware history is evolution. The bugs in the original HiddenTear was fixed, and HiddenTear variant replaced the cryptographically insecure key generation method with a new one (Trend Micro Blog, 2017) which evades the state-of-the-art key-oriented anti-ransomware defenses. Later, Şen admitted that his experiment was a total failure.

Another criticism to publishing the full source codes of a ransomware regards the principle of responsible disclosure. Prior to sharing the sources, Şen did not inform the anti-virus vendors. It should be noted that, when HiddenTear was released, on August 2015, only a few anti-ransomware systems existed: signature-based detection was the main technique to stop ransomware, just as the other malware types. Since HiddenTear and its variants were previously unseen, they were not recognized by AVs and therefore could run undetected for a while. The only

```

private void EncryptFile(string inputFile,
    ↪ string outputFile)
try
{
    // Your Key Here
    string password = @"myKey123";
    UnicodeEncoding UE = new
    ↪ UnicodeEncoding();
    byte[] key = UE.GetBytes(password);

    string cryptFile = outputFile;
    FileStream fsCrypt = new
    ↪ FileStream(cryptFile,
    ↪ FileMode.Create);

    RijndaelManaged RMCrypto = new
    ↪ RijndaelManaged();
    CryptoStream cs = new
    ↪ CryptoStream(fsCrypt,
    ↪ RMCrypto.CreateEncryptor(key, key),
    ↪ CryptoStreamMode.Write);
    FileStream fsIn = new
    ↪ FileStream(inputFile,
    ↪ FileMode.Open);

    int data;
    while ((data = fsIn.ReadByte()) != -1)
        cs.WriteByte((byte) data);

    fsIn.Close();
    cs.Close();
    fsCrypt.Close();
}
catch
{
    MessageBox.Show("Encryption failed!",
    ↪ "Error");
}
}

```

Figure 3: A simple function to encrypt files with a password, published at CodeProject. Contrary to the common practices, e.g., PBKDF2 (Kaliski, 2000), encryption key is derived directly using UTF-16 character encoding. In addition, instead of generating a unique value, encryption key is used as IV.

precaution Şen took was putting a warning message in HiddenTear source code, which cyber-criminals could easily ignore.

**Further Public Prototypes.** Şen is not the only person that published a full ransomware prototype. There are several ransomware projects in different programming languages, publicly available on the Internet. For instance, Arescrypt is another open source ransomware implemented in C# (Fox, 2017). GonnaCry is a Linux ransomware, implemented in both C and Python (Marinho, 2017). Aiming at web servers, a ransomware script written in PHP is also available at (Şincek, 2019). There is even an “academic” ransomware prototype implemented in Go language (de Souza Nunes, 2016). All these projects are publicly available at GitHub, a well-known plat-

```

private static string GetEncKey()
{try
{
    using (WebClient webClient = new
    ↪ WebClient())
        return webClient.DownloadString(
    ↪ @"http://ohad.000webhostapp.
    ↪ com/cnc.php?txt=saveme")
    ↪ .Trim();
}
catch
{
    return "myke123!";
}}

private static void EncryptFile(string
    ↪ inputFile, string outputFile, string
    ↪ password)
{try
{
    byte[] bytes = new UnicodeEncoding()
    ↪ .GetBytes(password);
    FileStream fileStream1 = new
    ↪ FileStream(outputFile,
    ↪ FileMode.Create);
    RijndaelManaged rijndaelManaged = new
    ↪ RijndaelManaged();

    // [...]

    fileStream1.Close();
    System.IO.File.Delete(inputFile);
}
catch
{
    Console.WriteLine("Error: Encryption
    ↪ failed!");
}
}

```

Figure 4: File encryption function of the Crypren sample. If C&C server is not reachable, which is shut down at the time of this writing, the embedded password is used to derive keys. The resemblances between hard-coded passwords, key derivation methods and error messages are remarkable.

form among software developers. Moreover, although Şen abandoned the HiddenTear project, there are still several clones of the original repository and even some improved versions of HiddenTear on GitHub website, for example (Rosa, 2017).

Zaitsev followed a different strategy when publishing CryptoTrooper (Zaitsev, 2016). He shared the core part of the prototype as a closed source binary. The encryption algorithm, whose code was not shared, contained a cryptographic flaw which enabled the recovery. Being closed source, the flaw in the encryption module of CryptoTrooper could not be fixed by the script-kiddies. Still, the community was divided: some found the idea useful, others did not (Cimpanu, 2016). In the end, Zaitsev removed the project from GitHub but, as in the case of HiddenTear, CryptoTrooper was forked by other developers. It is still accessible via various repositories.

All the developers of the publicly available ransomware prototypes states that their main motivation was *educational*. However, a well documented ransomware code would also help to-be-cyber-criminals to enter the ransomware business. Since ransomware prototypes remain available on the Internet, the ethical question here is whether security researchers need to publish and share full ransomware codes without feeling accountable of the consequences, a recognized ethical issue.

## 4 RANSOMWARE INTELLIGENCE

Herr and Rosenzweig suggest that a piece of code is cyber-weapon when it combines “propagation, exploitation, and payload [*i.e.*, damaging] capabilities” (Herr and Rosenzweig, 2015). Each components, despite innocuous in separation, carry the potentiality to be combined with the missing others into a weapon. However, to have a military use, a software ‘ must create or tangibly support the deployment of destructive effects. These could be short term, where deleted data is restored from backup, or near permanent, where a payload is designed to damage a device’s firmware” (Herr and Rosenzweig, 2015).

Ransomware may have such a destructive effect. For sake of an example, at the time of the writing, June 2019, the major electricity supplier in South Africa’s city of Johannesburg was attacked, leaving more than a quarter of a million people in the dark. Another attack forced a shutdown of its websites and billing systems as a precautionary measure.

Ransomware variants, called *wipeware*, can wipe data clean. Allegedly deployed to attack Saudi energy companies and Iranian oil companies, they had destructive consequences. One variant of it, *Shamoon wiper*, has been released to attack Sony Pictures Entertainment, succeeding to avoid the outing of ‘The Interview’, a documentary mocking the North Korean dictator, Kim Jong-un. If we adhere to Schmid’s claims that “terrorist violence is predominantly political” (Schmid, 2011), such events can be considered also “terrorist attack” .

If ransomware are to be regarded as cyber-weapons, as we claim, could it be conceivable to apply intelligence and counter-intelligence strategies to mitigate the threats and control the consequences of an attack? And, if yes, how?

Cyber-Intelligence has been defined as “the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policymakers, the products of that

process”(Lowenthal, 2016). Duvenage *et al.* (Duvenage et al., 2015), call this *positive intelligence*, to distinguish it from *counter-intelligence*, which is the countering of an hostile intelligence activity.

**Ransomware Positive Intelligence.** For ransomware threat, positive intelligence could consist in gathering information about modalities of working. It should be about how the ransomware propagates, exploits vulnerabilities, and executes it payload. In the Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), several initiatives exist aiming to collect and analyse information gathered from public or open sources. An example is the *NoMoreRansom* project<sup>1</sup>. It aims to inform the public and to collect incidents reports, including to gather the information from public platforms that can be potentially utilized by ransomware authors. Other platforms, although not specifically dedicated to ransomware, such as the *Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP)*<sup>2</sup>—a free and open source software helping information sharing of threat intelligence, including cyber-security indicators—can offer tools that enable intelligence analysis. Such platforms can be employed to control the information flow during an attack, spreading alerts following a Warning and Coordination action, and to help potential victims “raise their shields” as soon as possible.

**Ransomware Counter-intelligence.** According to (Coleman, 2009), Counter Cyber Intelligence (CCI) is the ensemble of “all efforts made by one intelligence organization to prevent adversaries, enemy intelligence organizations or criminal organizations from gathering and collecting sensitive digital information or intelligence about them via computers, networks and associated equipment”. It can be implemented using strategies that, according to Panda Security, a cyber-security company, either consists of “leaving doors open” (*i.e.*, left access points unprotected on purpose), “inject fake information” (*i.e.*, fake confidential information), and “keeping them busy while stealing” (*i.e.*, watching and obtaining information about the attacker).

Looking into the internet and searching for “counter-intelligence for ransomware”, we have found that the majority of the initiatives to protect from ransomware attacks focuses on raising awareness. For instance, the US National Counter-intelligence and Security Center (NCSC) has launched in January 2019 a campaign “Know the Risk, Raise Your Shield”. The Cybersecurity and In-

<sup>1</sup><https://www.nomoreransom.org/en/>

<sup>2</sup><https://www.misp-project.org/>.

frastructure Security Agency (CISA) addresses ransomware specifically, but it is all about knowing the threat and apply general security best practices such as backing-up data. We have found, within the scope of cryptographic ransomware and limitedly to this on-going work, nothing about “leaving the door open”, “inject fake information”, or “keep them busy”.

The second measure (*i.e.*, “inject fake information”) may not be fully applicable at least if that means to avoid to spread knowledge about how to build the ransomware weapon: the instruments of cryptography are nowadays already known and public. However, at the light of what we have discussed in the previous sections, it may be a strategy to post the code of variants whose decryptors already exist.

For what concerns the “keep them busy” paradigm, as discussed in (Genç et al., 2019), it may be possible the use decoy files to deflect a ransomware attack against irrelevant (for the victim) files, so gaining that amount of time required to stop the attack’s development. Using decoy files could be paired with strategies that downgrade the efficiency of encryption for applications that are not trustworthy or whitelisted. We have not investigated in this direction, but this option seems preferable to that of running untrusted application in sandbox. This can be less effective, since certain ransomware sample recognize the presence of a virtual environment and remain dormant. A few articles suggest the use of Artificial Intelligence (*e.g.*, (Huang et al., 2018)), but we did not look into this direction.

## 5 CONCLUSION

Ransomware are emerging as cyber-weapons. They have been used in attacks that resemble actions of cyber-war, and are far more dangerous and disruptive than traditional malware. Consequently, the research community should reflect on coordinated actions to address the threat under an appropriate code of ethical conduct.

Having discovered that a few ransomware contain a copy-paste from cryptographic code available in public sources, we debated the matter of dual-use in cryptographic research and recalled (in)famous antecedents in the recent ransomware history. Since we managed to build decryptors for those ransomware, the dual use turned out to be a double-edge for the criminals, but generally it is not. After having build a case for ransomware as cyber-weapon, we briefly reviewed intelligence and counter-intelligent strategies that could be used in the fight against ransomware.

We did not backed our speculations with field studies or interviews. Ours is an educated argumentation, but its purpose is to invite the anti-ransomware community to be more proactive in the cyberwar against ransomware. Even the excellent *NoMoreRansom* project, which offers decryptors when they are available (as did in June 2019, with the latest version of Gandcrab<sup>3</sup>), at the end of the day praises for keeping back-up, within a “Better Safe Than Sorry” advice.

## REFERENCES

- Acar, Y., Backes, M., Fahl, S., Kim, D., Mazurek, M. L., and Stransky, C. (2017). How Internet Resources Might Be Helping You Develop Faster but Less Securely. *IEEE Security and Privacy*, 15(2):50–60.
- Cimpanu, C. (2016). New Open Source Linux Ransomware Shows Infosec Community Divide. <https://news.softpedia.com/news/new-open-source-linux-ransomware-shows-infosec-community-divide-508669.shtml>. [20-Jul-2019].
- Coleman, K. (2009). Counter Cyber Intelligence. <https://www.military.com/defensetech/2009/03/09/counter-cyber-intelligence>. [20-Jul-2019].
- Şen, U. (2015a). Destroying The Encryption of Hidden Tear Ransomware. <https://utkusen.com/blog/destroying-the-encryption-of-hidden-tear-ransomware.html>. [21-Jul-201].
- Şen, U. (2015b). Hiddentear: an open source ransomware-like file crypter kit. <https://github.com/utkusen/hidden-tear>.
- de Souza Nunes, M. (2016). Ransomware: A POC Windows crypto-ransomware (Academic). <https://github.com/mauri870/ransomware>. [20-Jul-2019].
- den Bosch, T. V. (2005). Encrypt/Decrypt Files in VB.NET (Using Rijndael). <https://www.codeproject.com/Articles/12092/Encrypt-Decrypt-Files-in-VB-NET-Using-Rijndael>. [20-Jul-2019].
- dnSpy (2019). .NET debugger and assembly editor. <https://github.com/0xd4d/dnSpy>. [2019].
- Duvenage, P., von Solms, S., and Corregedor, M. (2015). The Cyber Counterintelligence Process: A Conceptual Overview and Theoretical Proposition. In *Proc. of the 14th ECCWS*, pages 42–52. ACPI.
- Fischer, F., Böttinger, K., Xiao, H., Stransky, C., Acar, Y., Backes, M., and Fahl, S. (2017). Stack Overflow Considered Harmful? The Impact of Copy Paste on Android Application Security. In *2017 IEEE SP*, pages 121–136.
- Fox, W. (2017). Arescrypt: Experimental ransomware for windows 7+ with aes-256 support. <https://github.com/BlackVikingPro/arescrypt>. [20-Jul-2019].

<sup>3</sup><https://www.malwarebytes.com/gandcrab/>

- Genç, Z. A., Lenzini, G., and Sgandurra, D. (2019). On deception-based protection against cryptographic ransomware. In *Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment*, pages 219–239. Springer.
- Herr, T. and Rosenzweig, P. (2015). Cyber Weapons & Export Control: Incorporating Dual Use with the PrEP Model. *J. National Security Law and Policy*, 8(2).
- Huang, D. Y., Aliapoulios, M. M., Li, V. G., Invernizzi, L., Bursztein, E., McRoberts, K., Levin, J., Levchenko, K., Snoeren, A. C., and McCoy, D. (2018). Tracking ransomware end-to-end. In *IEEE Security and Privacy*, pages 618–631. IEEE.
- Hybrid Analysis (2019). Free Automated Malware Analysis Service. <https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/>. [2019].
- Johnson, M. (2008). How do you do Impersonation in .NET? (rev. 2). <https://stackoverflow.com/revisions/7250145/2>. [20-Jul-2019].
- Kaliski, B. (2000). PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.0. RFC 2898.
- Kovacs, E. (2016). Educational Ransomware Abused by Cybercriminals. <https://www.securityweek.com/educational/-ransomware-abused-cybercriminals>. [20-Jul-2019].
- Lowenthal, M. M. (2016). *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*. CQ Press, Los Angeles, 7 edition.
- Lydford, S. (2008). File Encryption and Decryption in C#. <https://www.codeproject.com/Articles/26085/File-Encryption-and-Decryption-in-C>. [20-Jul-2019].
- Marinho, T. (2017). GonnaCry: A Linux Ransomware. <https://github.com/tarcisio-marinho/GonnaCry>. [20-Jul-2019].
- Rogaway, P. (2016). *The Moral Character of Cryptographic Work*. Austin, TX. USENIX Association.
- Rosa, A. (2017). Hiddentear (forked). <https://github.com/Virgula0/hidden-tear>. [20-Jul-2019].
- Schmid, A. P. (2011). The Definition of Terrorism. In *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, chapter 2, pages 39–157. Routledge, Oxon, UK.
- Trend Micro Blog (2017). Ransomware Recap: The Ongoing Development of Hidden Tear Variants. <https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/the-ongoing-development-of-hidden-tear-variants>. [20-Jul-2019].
- van der Wiel, J. (2016). Hidden tear and its spin offs. <https://securelist.com/hidden-tear-and-its-spin-offs/73565/>. [20-Jul-2019].
- VirusTotal Threat Intelligence (2019). Virustotal. <https://www.virustotal.com/>.
- Šincek, I. (2019). Ransomware: PHP ransomware that encrypts your files as well as file and directory names. <https://github.com/ivan-sincek/ransomware>. [20-Jul-2019].
- Zaitsev, M. (2016). CryptoTrooper: The world's first Linux white-box ransomware. <https://github.com/cryptolok/CryptoTrooper>. [20-Jul-2019].