

The Responses of Indonesian Muslims to Humanitarian Crisis in Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar

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Abstract: Humanitarian crises have been responded widely, including by Indonesian Muslims particularly related to those happened in Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar. There are some differences in responding to these phenomena and this need to be investigated since they are essential for national and international interests. Therefore, this paper addresses this topic, in particular, to see how Muslims in Indonesia in responding to humanitarian crises in Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar. They called for jihad for humanitarian cases in Syria and Myanmar. As for the Yemen case, they responded not by way of jihad. There are fundraising for the three areas, and the biggest concern to date is for humanitarian crises in Syria. The primary data of this qualitative research are news and comments related to this topic that is published both on the related organizations' websites and social media networks. This paper analyses and explains how Muslims in Indonesia can differ on the humanitarian issues that occurred in the three countries. It also investigates and explains how the differences are formed to produce a stored concept from the minds of each Islamic group in Indonesia in looking at the issues of humanity.

1 INTRODUCTION

There are two quick responses from the Indonesian Muslim community in facing a humanitarian crisis that is experienced by Muslim communities in several countries like Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar. The Indonesian Muslim community in question is one that forms organizations in the name of Islam like for social, educational, charity or sharia implementation purposes. The first quick response was to call for donations to help them, and the second response was to call for jihad. The call for donations is a call to help those who face a humanitarian crisis in the form of money while the call for jihad is to defend the oppressed Muslim sovereignty there. Usually, the call for jihad goes to war. Jihad means war is more voiced by groups now known as Islamic terrorist groups.

The call for donations and jihad often became a package like two sides of a coin that could not be separated. The urge for jihad also becomes a significant factor in Indonesian Muslim communities to give donations to help them. Besides being interpreted as war, Jihad is also interpreted by giving their wealth to them or also helping them directly

who want to go to war there as in responding to a humanitarian crisis in Syria.

Therefore, this paper wants to see more about Indonesian Muslims in responding to humanitarian crises in three countries namely Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar. The three countries were chosen because first of all is the humanitarian crisis had received widespread attention from Indonesian Muslims. The second is that the crisis comes to the Muslim community in a Buddhist-majority country like Myanmar. Then, the call for donations and jihad issued by Indonesian Muslim community in responding to the humanitarian crisis there was also interesting to see.

The human crisis in Syria is the most getting severe crisis attention between two other countries such as Yemen and Myanmar. The crisis occurred in 2011 with the outbreak of the Arab Spring in Middle Eastern countries that hoped for a democratic state. As a result of this crisis, the United Nations recorded more than 400 thousand people died, 5 million people sought abroad and 540 thousand people trapped in the conflict (Human Rights Watch, 2017). The humanitarian crisis in Syria has also brought Muslims in the world to engage as foreign fighters in the name of jihad. The Indonesian government

calculated that there were around 1,000 Indonesians leaving for Syria to join rebel groups there, including joining the Islamic State group. Those who departed for Syria were those who returned to Indonesia and posed a security threat within Indonesia.

Then the humanitarian crisis in Yemen has resulted in 5,295 civilians died, and nearly 10,000 people were injured due to the crisis (Human Rights Watch, 2017). The crisis that occurred in Myanmar was an act of expulsion and violence that happened to Muslims Rohingya by Buddhist community groups there. The BBC news noted that at least 6,700 Muslims were killed during the August 2017 period and half a million others fled to Bangladesh (BBC, 2017).

The response of the Muslim community to these three crises has more attention to the crisis in Syria than the other two crises. Then from the three humanitarian crises, Yemen was the region that received the least attention from Indonesian Muslims. There is no call for jihad from Muslims in Indonesia to come to Yemen as a humanitarian crisis in Syria to help rebel groups there.

If the crises are viewed from the level of the humanitarian crisis, Yemen should also get attention as a response to the humanitarian crisis in Syria. And there should also be the same call for jihad as to Syria from Muslim groups in Indonesia to help the humanitarian crisis in Yemen.

This is clearly different from humanitarian crisis in Syria which is not only responded with the calls for donations and jihad, but it is also interpreted excessively by several Muslim groups in Indonesia by saying that the humanitarian crisis in Syria as a sign that doomsday is coming soon. The crisis signifies the upholding of the Islamic Caliphate for the last time, and after that, the Judgment will come. This interpretation has also prompted almost a thousand Indonesian Muslims to go to Syria to emigrate and afterward do jihad. Nur Shadrina, one of the Indonesian citizens who was influenced by the interpretation. She decided to leave Indonesia to emigrate to Syria because of the impulse of the end-time hadiths that would come to Syria. The late arrival of the marker with the flag of *lailaha ilallah* (there is no God but Allah) fluttered by the Islamic State (IS) (Lestari, 2018).

Among those Muslim groups in Indonesia who were noted to be concentrated on the call for donations and jihad for the crisis were Aksi Cepat Tanggap (ACT), Yufid, Sham Organizer, Peduli Muslim, Misi Medis Suriah, Lembaga Zakat Infak Nahdlatul Ulama (LAZISNU), and Lembaga Zakat

Infak Muhamadiyah (LAZISMU). Although there were no official and specific reports on their respective websites related to the amount obtained from the Indonesian Muslim community for donations to the three crisis areas, a small media reported that in less than a month the call for donations to Ghouta, Syria, ACT managed to raise funds IDR 11.6 billion (Syarif, 2018). Then Peduli Muslim claimed that since 26 February 2013 it had raised IDR 30,229,000 for a humanitarian crisis in Syria (Tim Peduli Muslim, 2013). Media also reports that the funds were channeled to armed groups in Syria, not only for humanitarian assistance (Hasan, 2017).

There is almost no call for jihad to Yemen humanitarian crisis. It could have caused the lack of attention of Muslims in Indonesia to the humanitarian crisis there. The call by using the word of jihad to help the humanitarian crisis there also seems to help the boost of the amount of donation from certain institutions. Then the question is how does it occur a difference between Muslim communities to respond to humanitarian crises in Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar?

2 RESPONSE TO CALL FOR DONATION AND JIHAD

Calls for donations and jihad to help the humanitarian crisis in Syria, Yemen and Myanmar have strong legitimacy in the teachings of Islam. The call for donations, for example, is always referred to in a Quran which says that a Muslim is a brother with another Muslim (Qur'an Al-Hujurat: 10). Then the parable of a Muslim is one body where one other body is in pain, and the other body will get sick (Hadith).

Therefore, this call for donation is possible as part of concern or brotherhood among Muslims in helping fellow Muslims who are experiencing distress. Humanitarian crises in Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar are victims of Muslim. Not only that—in some humanitarian crises which are also involved Muslim as victim, it is not only in the form of calls for donation but also jihad to help them in the conflict directly. For example is the case of the humanitarian crisis in Ambon and Poso-Indonesia in 1998-2002. The initial call for a donation was brought by an organization of Dewan Dakwah Islami Indonesia (DDII) called Komite Penanggulangan Krisis (KOMPAK), then transformed into a call for jihad war in responding

humanitarian crisis in Ambon and Poso, Indonesia (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2016).

Then the call for jihad is far more legitimate than the call for donation only, mainly the call for jihad in areas of conflict or war involving Muslims. Moreover, the conflict involved actors outside of Islam. Many meanings of jihad develop in the repertoire of Islamic studies. However, the meaning of jihad which is quite well known in many kinds of literature is that jihad means war; war against the enemies of Islam. The enemies of Islam, in this case, are people or groups categorized as infidels. Imam Samudra, the main perpetrator of the Bali bombings on 12 October 2002, cited the meaning of jihad as war and fighting the infidels. Samudra cites the four most significant schools of fiqh in Islam which also defines jihad as a war, including Imam Syafii which is a reference for Islamic fiqh for moderate Islam group like Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The infidels referred to by Samudra are Americans and their allies. According to Samudra, America is as an infidel who must be fought because it has committed adultery for Muslims in Palestine and Afghanistan. Therefore, the Bali bombing acts as an act of jihad against America and its allies (Samudra, 2009).

Furthermore, the call for jihad also came out in response to the event for the election of the Jakarta governor in 2017 where one of the contestants was considered an infidel (not Islam) namely Basuki Tjahaya Purnama alias Ahok. So those involved in defeating Ahok in the gubernatorial election are not just participating in elections or supporting. More than that, it is the call for jihad that encourages the Muslim community to fight infidels like Ahok (VOA Islam, 2017).

Such level of concern is indeed still far from the concept of humanitarian intervention where there are efforts to prevent or stop human rights violations with certain powers (diplomatic and military) in a country, either with or without the approval of countries that are experiencing internal conflicts (Scheffer, 1992). The purpose of this intervention is certainly to end the conflict, not to help among those who conflict. The form of concern is certainly not based on religious equality but the form of humanity. However, in the context of Muslim societies, they are still focused on helping fellow Muslims in cases of conflict or war (except in responding to natural disasters).

For the humanitarian crises in Syria, Muslim in Indonesia respond that is not only to call for donation but also calls for jihad. There were several factors behind the call for jihad that also appear to respond to the crisis there. A substantial factor is the

futuristic arguments which in the Syrian region will be a final battle between Muslim and infidel groups. Therefore, the humanitarian crisis that occurred there is as a sign of the end of time. Some Muslim community groups believe that the end of time will occur in Syria with the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate for the last time with a symbol of the black banner. The group is known as the Islamic State group (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2014).

Another factor is that they call for jihad against the Shiite Basyar Asad Syrian regime. If it is viewed from the attacking actors, they consider the Shia to be heretical in Islam. For example, an alliance was formed in response to a humanitarian crisis in Syria called the National Anti-Shia Alliance (ANAS). In many of their campaigns, they call Shia, not Islam (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2016).

Those who called that the conflict in Syria as a call for jihad were Sham Organizer and Hilal Ahmar. Syam Organizer is an institution that was born in 2013 to respond to the conflict in Syria. Then, Hilal Ahmar was established in 2008 which concentrated on the religious, social and humanitarian fields. In 2014, Hilal Ahmar was declared a group that had an international terrorist network by the United Nations. The two groups have also collaborated to raise funds for the conflict in Syria by calling for jihad to help him. This picture below is one of example a call for jihad in responding the humanitarian crisis in Syria organized by Hilal Ahmar.



Calls for donations and jihad can also be found in responding to the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar that resulted in displaced Muslims in Rohingya and became victims of violence by the majority Buddhist community. The call for jihad here is defined as resistance or in the next step the call for war to the infidel in Myanmar. In the infidel sense that is widely known in Muslim societies, there are two infidel models namely *dzimmi* and *harbi*. *Dzimmi* is infidels who live in Muslim areas, and *harbi* is a type of infidel who fights Muslims. If one refers to the *harbi* type, then the Buddhist groups in Myanmar who have fought against Muslims are allowed to be fought for jihad against them (Mahzam & Ansar, 2017).

The Islamist group that has been the strongest calling for jihad in helping the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar is the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). This group is known as a radical Islamic group which was born in 1998 after the Suharto authoritarian regime fell. Initially, the group was formed to stem the flow of liberalism and communism amid a wave of liberal democracy after the authoritarian regime fell. On the journey, this group often raided places of disobedience such as prostitution places and places that sell alcoholic beverages. At the same time, this group also often disbanded discussions containing understandings of liberalism or communism. In the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2017, FPI is the group that leads to voice jihad against Ahok's Christian leadership so that bringing Anis Baswedan who is Muslim can win the Jakarta gubernatorial election.

In the case of the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, on 6 October 2017, the FPI led a protest in front of the Myanmar embassy to Jakarta. The FPI also opened registration for Indonesian Muslims to go to jihad to Myanmar against the Buddhist government there. However, the implementation of jihad in Myanmar for the next time there was no news that whether the FPI really sent Indonesian Muslims to Myanmar or not. Previously in 2013, FPI had also led a demonstration in front of Myanmar's embassy office in Jakarta. The picture below is a call for jihad from FPI in responding to the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar.



At the same time in responding the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, terrorist groups then enter the Myanmar embassy in Jakarta as a target of their violent jihad (Nailufar, 2017). During the humanitarian crisis in Rohingya, a series of protests from Muslim community groups in Indonesia were massive. They are calling for jihad to help the Muslim community there (Kami, 2017).

The word jihad is used in responding to the conflict in Syria and Myanmar as a strategy. As the Great Indonesian Language Dictionary (KBBI) says that strategy is the science and art of using all the resources of nations to carry out certain policies in war and peace; or science and art lead armies to confront enemies in war, in favorable conditions; or a careful plan for activities to achieve specific goals; and or a good place according to war tactics.

In the strategic study as studied by international relations students, strategy according to Carl von Clausewitz, "is the use of engagements for the object of war"; Or according to Von Moltke, "strategy is the practical adaptation of the means placed at a general's disposal to the attainment of the object in war"; Or according to Liddel Hart, "strategy is the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy"; or according to Gregory D Foster, "strategy is ultimately about effectively exercising power"; Or according to J.C. Wylie, "strategy is a plan of action designed in order to achieve some end or a purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment"; Or according to W. Murray and M. Grimslay, "strategy is a process, a constant adaptation to the shifting condition and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate"; and or according to Robert Osgood, "strategy must now be understood as nothing less than the overall plan for utilizing the capacity for armed coercion—in conjunction with economic, diplomatic, and psychological instruments of power—to support foreign policy most effectively by overt, covert, and tacit means."

When the word jihad is used as a strategy, this strategy seems to work. Therefore when a donation call to help a humanitarian crisis in Syria and Myanmar is combined by using the word jihad, the response of the Muslim community in Indonesia is more interested in the call than just a call for donation.

The word jihad has also been used as a strategy by Al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden against the Americans which resulted in the September 11, 2001 attacks on America and other attacks in many countries concerning American interests, including the Bali Bombing on 12 October 2002. Osama issued a jihad fatwa against the American government and its allies in 1996 which was completed in 1998. The title of fatwa is more or less named "Declaration of War against Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places" for a fatwa in 1996 and in 1998 expanded its reach because America had colonized Muslim countries in world. This fatwa became a problem for America when the climax of Osama and Al-Qaeda staged a hijacking of a plane crashed into a twin building in New York, America on September 11, 2001 which killed thousands of Americans. In the case of Indonesia, the fatwa of Jihad was brought by Jamaah Islamiyah networks where they met Osama in Afghanistan when getting military training there.

The word Jihad issued by Osama is interpreted as a holy war among Muslims and its enemies. In the beliefs of Muslims when engaged in holy war, this is like an option of life or death. Life means winning Islam in this war and the deaths of Muslims are promised in the beauty of heaven as suicide bombers on behalf against the enemies of Islam.

And it seems, the word Jihad used in the call to help the humanitarian crisis in Syria and Myanmar as a step to interpret the holy war for Muslims because the humanitarian crisis there is caused by the Shia regime which in their view is misguided and the Buddhist regime of Myanmar which in their view as infidels categorized enemy of Islam.

However not all humanitarian crises were responded to as a call for jihad, this is different from their response to the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. The crisis there is responded very little to the call for donations and hardly to the call for jihad. Muslim community groups, who voice jihad in responding to humanitarian crises in Syria and Myanmar, do not voice jihad for a humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Even if it is seen from the number of victims, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is not small. In Syria one of the factors of the call for jihad is driven by resistance to the Shiite and heretical Basyar regime,

meanwhile, in Yemen, the victims of the humanitarian crisis are believed to be a Shiite and perverted group. Therefore the response of jihad does not come out in Yemen because it could be that the victims are misguided people since war is believed to be a prevention of evil.

3 ACTOR EFFECT IN RESPONDING TO HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

The different response from Muslims in Indonesia in seeing the humanitarian crisis in Syria, Myanmar, and Yemen can be seen from the actors. First are actors who voiced calls for donation and humanity, donations and jihad. These actors are important to be addressed in seeing the difference in their attitudes. In the representative theory proposed by Stuart Hall, differences in understanding to respond something depend on the knowledge and insight of the readers. If they have the same knowledge and insight, it is very likely they will have the same attitude. The point of importance is in the concept (mind) and sign (language). Therefore, differences occur in the concept of each actor only.

The actor in question is not a state actor or furthermore they are non-state actors in the form of Muslim communities in Indonesia. Indonesia's attitude as a state actor in responding to the humanitarian crisis in Syria, Myanmar and Yemen only conducts diplomatic relations, especially for Myanmar. While the issue of humanitarian crises in Yemen and Syria, Indonesia seems to have no interest as it does not enter the coalition of countries involved in the conflict there, such as a coalition led by America against extremist groups in Syria and a coalition led by Saudi Arabia in Yemen. For Myanmar itself, Indonesia as a country is hindered by the principle of non-intervention of fellow members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). But the interactions that occur between non state actors and state actors sometimes influence each other. Indonesia as a country does not respond with jihad calls in responding to humanitarian crises in the three regions. Indonesia certainly has a certain mechanism as a consequence of members of the United Nations internationally and ASEAN as a member of the country at the regional level.

The call for jihad in responding to the humanitarian crisis in Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar was not found in moderate groups such as Nahdlatul

Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Both groups only voiced calls for donations and in the name of humanity. These two groups are not involved in several demonstrations calling for jihad for humanitarian crises in Syria and Myanmar. LAZISNU only issued a call for donation assistance to Yemen about famine due to war.

NU is a non-state group based on religion in Indonesia. This organization was born on January 31, 1926. It was long before Indonesia became independent on August 17, 1945. This organization was engaged in religious, educational, social and economic fields. But in its implementation, this organization is more focused on the field of religious education where pesantren (Islamic boarding school) is the basis of its education. While Muhammadiyah is also a non-state group that was born in 1912 and long before Indonesia's independence and NU's birth.

These two groups are often referred to as groups that represent Islam in Indonesia. NU is representative of traditional Islamic style and Muhammadiyah from modern Islam. Both have a moderate style. And both were also involved in Indonesia's independence efforts with a commitment that the Indonesian state was not based on a particular religion but based on the agreement adopted under the Pancasila ideology in which the country accommodates differences in religion, ethnicity and language. Often when there are other Islamic groups who try to disrupt national commitment under Pancasila, they are dealing with these two Islamic organizations.

The response of NU and Muhammadiyah to the humanitarian crisis was represented by an organization called LAZISNU for NU and LAZISMU for Muhammadiyah. LAZISNU was established in 2004 whose main task was to accommodate the infaq and zakat (charity) money from Muslims to be channeled to those in need. As in its purpose, LAZISNU was formed for community empowerment programs to overcome the problems of poverty, unemployment, and lack of access to adequate education. But on another occasion, this institution also channeled funds for humanitarian crises in Muslim countries such as Syria, Yemen and Myanmar.

Then, LAZISMU was established in 2002. This is no different from LAZISNU where this institution also tries to collect infaq funds and charity from Muslims to be used for the needs of Muslims. In the background of its establishment, Muhammadiyah considered that the facts in Indonesia were covered by widespread poverty, ignorance and a very low

human development index. All of them result and at the same time are caused by a weak social justice system. LAZISMU is here to try to solve this problem. But on another occasion, this institution also channeled funds to help humanitarian crises in Muslim countries.

Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah through LAZISMU did not specifically call for donations to the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. However, the assistance also collected by Muhammadiyah and other Islamic groups such as ACT was channeled to Sudan and Yemen at the same time. There is no emergence of the call for jihad in these two groups. There may already be a shift in the meaning of jihad. According to NU and Muhammadiyah, Jihad is likely no longer interpreted as an armed war or war against infidels but in the context of other struggles. From here, two moderate groups of Islam in Indonesia can be more accentuating the human side of the war, whomever the actors are involved. As the old proverb said that the war is if he wins to ash and loses to charcoal. Hence, the proverb describes all experiences of suffering in war or armed conflict.

Then the actors who voiced jihad, besides, to call for donations were not affiliated with NU and Muhammadiyah. Some Muslim community groups who voice jihad for humanitarian crises in Syria and Myanmar include Syam Organizer and Hilal Ahmar. This call for jihad was carried out in the form of discussions about jihad in Syria as well as calling for donations to help the humanitarian crisis in Syria. The emergence of the call for jihad from them could be the meaning of jihad refers to armed jihad or jihad against infidels, or amar makruf nahi munkar (against evils to groups called heretics such as Shias).

Finally, these two different responses based on the representative of Hall lie in the concept (mind) between each Islamic group. From there it can be said that these differences can be influenced by differences in accepting the concept of Islamic teachings from each group. Those who do not use the term of jihad for their donations do not use the concept of heresy and disbelief in seeing actors in the humanitarian crisis. From here NU and Muhammadiyah, including the ACT, did not use this concept except in the name of humanity. While groups that use jihad, especially war jihad in the concept of the mind, they use the concept of heresy and infidel that must be fought.

Differences like this can also determine the differences among Islamic groups in Indonesia namely between the term moderate groups and radical groups, and even terrorists. From this case,

NU and Muhammadiyah as non-state actors have proven that they have a moderate view than other Islamic groups, one of which is FPI.

4 CONCLUSIONS

Humanitarian crises in Syria, Yemen and Myanmar get serious attention from Islamic groups in Indonesia. Not only that, they also responded differently in helping them. The call for donations and jihad became very interesting in responding to the humanitarian crisis. The two largest Islamic groups in Indonesia: NU and Muhammadiyah do not use jihad as a strategy to attract the attention of Muslims in Indonesia. While other Islamic groups such as Syam Organizer, Hilal Ahmar, and FPI responded to the humanitarian crisis with calls for jihad in addition to donations.

The different response from Muslim groups in Indonesia to the humanitarian crisis in Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar is due to the different concepts of thinking. The call for jihad arises in a humanitarian crisis in Syria and Myanmar because the perpetrators of the conflict are considered as heretical groups in Islam as in the case of Syria and infidels as in the case of Buddhism in Myanmar. The word jihad is likely the right word seems to respond to that because in the heretical concept they agreed to fight in the name of violent jihad to suppress the heretical group. Then the word of jihad for the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar is to fight the kind of harbi who have been fighting Muslims in Rohingya. Meanwhile, the call for jihad did not occur in NU and Muhammadiyah because the concept of thinking on the actors did not use the concept of heresy or infidelity.

From this explanation, the word jihad is used as a strategy in responding to the humanitarian crisis in Syria, Yemen and Myanmar is quite effective in attracting the attention of Muslims in Indonesia in raising funds. Earlier, the word jihad had also been used as a strategy by Al-Qaeda to fight against America so as to produce terror attacks in many countries on American interests. From this writing, the word jihad should also be used in the future for more positive interests that can be used by the Muslim community in the future.

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