

National Attributes Analysis on Russia Crimea Annexation

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Abstract: In the last decade, there was a crisis that occurred in Ukraine. The crisis began when the president of Ukraine Viktor F. Yanukovich withdrew from signing the Association Agreement (AA) with the EU in November 2013 that had been negotiated for several years. The crisis then widened and led to the annexation of the Crimea conducted by Russia in 2014. The annexation violated Budapest Memorandum of 1994 mentioning Russia guarantees that Russia will respect the independence and sovereignty in the territory of Ukraine and refrain from using threats or force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine. This article then tries to explain the reasons behind the Russians' action. Based on the assumption that the national attributes such as geographic, military capability, economic capacity and system of government can influence foreign policy decisions, this article explores how these national attributes affect Russia's decision to annex Crimea in 2014. In this article, address national attributes such as the geographical location as well as the national military capabilities possessed by Russia.

1 INTRODUCTION

For a long time, the Crimean Peninsula or Crimea was part of Russia, which in 1954 was officially moved to the part of the Hryvnia region under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev who was First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Deliagin, 2015: 4). 2014 has been an important year for the international political constellation in Europe because there was an event that could be called 'surprising' for international actors, especially in Europe, namely the annexation of Russia to the Crimea on March 18, 2014 (Deliagin 2015: 3). Briefly, the annexation of Russia began with the crisis in Ukraine. The crisis began when the then president of Ukraine Viktor F. Yanukovich resigned from the signing of the Association Agreement (AA) with the European Union in November 2013 which has been negotiated for several years.

There are two opinions in the Ukrainian society regarding the withdrawal of Ukraine in the signing of the AA with the EU. On the one hand, the AA is considered a symbol of hope for the Ukrainian society that dreams of integration with the EU (which is represented in the central and western regions of Ukraine), on the other hand the withdrawal of Ukraine in the signatories is welcomed by the Ukrainian people who wish to maintain close ties with Russia (represented in southern and eastern

regions of Ukraine) (Menon & Rumer, 2015: x). With differences of opinion within the Ukrainian society, the stance taken by President Yanukovich then led to a protest demonstration of the taking of the stance in the central Kyiv region around the Maidan square. The protest movement was later known as Euromaidan who wanted a close relationship between Ukraine and the European Union (Biersack & O'Lear, 2014: 248). Shortly after the protests, Yanukovich's president took an assertive and tending toward violence by deploying riot police and snipers to quell the protests. Steps taken by the Ukrainian government at that time even enlarge the action and even until February at least 100 people died. This then made the president of Yanukovich on 21 February promising reforms within Ukraine and the signing of AA with the European Union (Biersack & O'Lear, 2014: 248).

Yanukovich also signed a pact with the leaders of the revolution mediated by EU envoys. The pact includes forming a "national unity" government within 10 days, trimming presidential powers, restoring the 2004 constitution and holding early elections under new guidance by the end of the year. The action was welcomed by leaders in the European Union and America (Menon & Rumer, 2015: x). The Russian government along with the media in Russia later saw that Ukraine had become the puppets of the European Union and America. With the support of America and the EU in the revolution taking place in

Ukraine, making Ukraine a "geopolitical" battlefield for Russia with the West (Biersack & O'Lear, 2014: 248). The Russian government also mentioned that neo-Nazi and right-wing groups would commit violence against ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine because of the revolution as well as some roles in the Ukrainian government occupied by members of right-wing groups who could then threaten Russia (Biersack & O'Lear, 2014: 248).

With the internal turmoil of Ukraine, the Russian government affirms its interest in Ukraine by placing its troops in the Crimean all-time region of Ukraine with the largest Russian population and speakers. Within the Crimean territory itself, with the Russian military presence, the Crimean republic's parliament called for wider autonomy to demand independence from Ukraine (Biersack & O'Lear, 2014: 251). Furthermore, Russia's actions in developing such a succession and annexation attempt violate the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, an agreement that ensures that Russia, together with the United States and Britain, will respect the independence and sovereignty of the territory of Ukraine and refrain from using threats or violence against territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine in exchange that Ukraine will stop developing its nuclear weapons (Biersack & O'Lear, 2014: 251).

From the background described earlier, the central question arises in this article, which is why Russia annexed the Crimea in 2014? Although the action violated the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 that ensured that Russia would respect independence and sovereignty residing in the territory of Ukraine and refrain from using threats or violence against territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine. What then underlies Russia's foreign policy making regarding its annexation in the territory of Ukraine?

1.1 National Attributes in Foreign Policy Analysis

To answer that question, the author uses some concepts and theories about foreign policy. Before discussing further, defining foreign policy is considered the right step to take at this time. Foreign policy is defined by Charles Hermann (in Neack, 2008: 9) as actions that have goals derived from political decisions at the individual level as well as a group of individuals. Hermann does not see foreign policy as a decision but as a product of decision. Deborah Gerner (in Neack, 2008: 9) defines foreign policy as the intention, statement, and action of an actor, usually a country, directed to the outside world

and the response of other actors to it. In addition, George Modelski (1962) defines foreign policy as "the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behavior of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment". The author then takes the red thread from previous opinions that foreign policy can be interpreted as an intention, statement and action taken by the state with a particular purpose both in relation to the state or other actors as well as its adaptation to the international environment.

In foreign policy, there is the concept of Level Analysis or Level of Analysis (LoA). LoA is interpreted as a heuristic tool, like a camera lens in looking at a case. Each level of analysis gives each of them a special understanding of a case which then may provide sufficient understanding for the case under study but may also not consider or provide other information that can only be encountered using another level (Neack, 2008: 11). This means that if a researcher chooses to use one level in the LoA, then the researcher will only meet the information given that level alone without getting information from other levels.

The LoA has several levels (1) individuals, focusing on the personality, beliefs, perceptions of leaders and policymakers; (2) the state, which focuses on internal factors of the country such as its institutional framework, interest groups, public opinion, economic, cultural and historical conditions of the country; and (3) systems, which pay particular attention to the intergovernmental interactions in the international sphere directed by the relative capabilities of such countries, such as power in technology and military power and wealth that will then affect the possibilities of acting on a global stage (Breuning, 2007: 11-3). In the case of Russia's annexation of the Crimea in 2014, the author will use an analysis of how the capabilities or national attributes held by Russia can influence the taking of actions chosen by Russia.

The capabilities or attributes of a country provide restrictions and impetus for the state in its policy, state behavior can be more accurately predicted through knowledge of the physical attributes owned by the state and those of other countries that interact with the country (Lebovic 1985: 47). National attributes are assets that can be measured as indicators of a country's potential strength. These national attributes include size, geographic location, military capability, economic ability to governance system (Kegley & Blanton, 2011: 216). Furthermore, the geographic size and location of a country is an important part of the national attribute of a country.

The size and position of a country can be seen and measured by how large the country is and what region it is in. Whether the country is in an area with oceans or as a landlocked state or landlock. In addition, knowing the borders of what the country is also a particular concern for policy makers. Small countries surrounded by large countries will tend to act more friendly with their neighbors. Geographical location also relates to the resources owned by the country. How the resources owned by a country can affect the attitude taken by the country in the international sphere. Then, military capability can be measured by the amount of state ownership of weapons to human resources in the military. Ownership of weapons such as missiles, tanks, ships, planes, and so on. Military ability can provide more restrictions and support to policy makers in foreign policy, the ability can form a foreign policy priorities of a country (Kegley & Blanton, 2011: 219).

Economic conditions can be measured through the level of economic and industrial development of a country. In addition, economic conditions can be measured through productivity levels

and the welfare of the country concerned. In general, the more economically developed countries, the more active the country is in the global political economy (Kegley & Blanton, 2011: 220). Typically, economic conditions are measured by looking at the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), The Human Development Index (HDI), to the literacy of a country. In addition, national attributes also include a government system that can be seen from whether the country embraces a democratic and open or authoritarian and closed system. Usually policy-making within countries with democratic systems will give greater consideration to other actors within the country's domestic such as interest groups to public opinion. While countries with closed authoritarian systems will tend to consider more elite circle options only.

The attributes mentioned above can be a benchmark in determining how the state can be called a country with great power, middle power, to small power. With the classification of the state into three things mentioned earlier, the classification will provide the state of opportunity or restriction to act within the international sphere. Christopher Hill (2003) mentions there are several ways in interpreting the role of power or attributes in foreign policy, namely as an end in itself, as a means to an end and as a context within which states operate. Therefore, policymakers will see the power they possess through their national attributes, which will then serve as the objectives of foreign policy, as well as a tool for

achieving that goal. Policymakers are very concerned about the ability of the country and its neighboring countries and countries that have a long distance but have an active relationship with the country. Information about the ability of the country itself and other countries in the world to be the best guide in playing in international politics. This is because the national attributes of a country describe the various possibilities of foreign policy action (Breuning, 2007: 153).

The authors then argue that the annexation policy undertaken by Russia against the Crimea in 2014 is due to Russia having a national attribute that moves Russia to carry out the policy. The peculiarities of Russia's national attributes serve as a tool for moving the goal of Russia's foreign policy. In addition, Russia's national attributes may also serve as an end in itself as well as serve as a context in Russia's operation in the international sphere.

This paper is divided into sections. The first part contains a brief overview of the history of the development of the crisis in Ukraine which then led to the annexation of the Crimea by Russia which later became the central issue raised in this article. This first part also contains a frame of mind to be used in this analysis. The second part of the article contains the peculiarities of national attributes held by Russia. The third section of the article contains an analysis of how the peculiarities of Russia's national attributes affect Russia in adopting a policy to annex the Crimea in 2014. At the end, this paper tries to give a conclusion on the issues raised.

1.2 Russia National Attributes

Based on Charles W. Kegley and Shannon L. Blanton (2011: 216) National attributes include size, geography location, military capability, economic ability to governance system. The national attribute becomes a benchmark in determining or in viewing the strength of a country which can then become an important consideration in determining the foreign policy of a country. If in the first part of this article has been explained briefly how these attributes can be measured, then in this section the author will try to see these attributes in the Russian state. The author will focus on some of the national attributes that are perceived to be uniqueness that Russia currently possesses in terms of size, geographic location, and military capability. With an area of 17,075,200 km², making Russia as the largest country in the world. As shown in Figure 1, it shows how vast Russia is in the Eurasian region, extending about 4,500 km from north to south and 9,000 km from west to east

(Blinnikov, 2011: 11). Russia is 11.3% of the world's land, bordering 14 neighboring countries Norway, with a length of 196 km; Finland, 1.340 km; Estonia, 294 km; Latvia, 217 km; Lithuania (bordering Kaliningrad Oblast), 280.5 km; Poland (adjacent Kaliningrad Oblast), 232 km; Belarus, 959 km; Ukraine, 1,576 km; Georgia, 723 km; Azerbaijan, 284 km; Kazakhstan, 6.846 km; China, 3.645 km; Mongolia, 3,485 km; and North Korea, 19 km (Blinnikov, 2011: 77).



Figure 1. (Source Blinnikov, 2011:3)

In addition, by being located in the Eurasian region, Russia has a fairly extreme climate. Extreme in the sense that when Russia experiences winter, some locations in Russia have temperatures below freezing. Russia has an average temperature of about -10 to -15°C for 3-5 months in winter, even below -40°C in the coldest months. It is also similar to happen in the summer, where Russia can experience a fairly hot temperature, about more than 35°C (Blinnikov, 2011: 23-7). Russian water access can be achieved through the North of Russia, namely the Arctic Ocean, although the oceans freeze for nearly 6 months each year. This causes Russia to build a warm water port in some areas where the water does not freeze. Furthermore, Russia is also known for producing energy sources. Russia is considered a resource-based development country with the oil sector as a driver of its economic development. The development of post-2000 Russia relies heavily on the natural resources of hydrocarbons (Ahrend, 2005: 584). This is reasonable, because Russia has a source of hydrocarbon energy that makes it rely on that source to drive the economy. From 1998-2004, Russia increased the supply of world oil by 48 percent. In 2007, Russia pumped up to 9.8 million barrels of oil per day, about 12 percent of global supply (Rutland, 2008: 203).

Until now, Russia is very dependent on its natural resources to drive the wheels of economic growth.

Until 2015, Hydrocarbon exports are between 55 and 75% of Russia's total exports in one year and generate up to 380 billion USD in export revenues (Brashaw & Connolly,

2016: 15). In addition to hydrocarbons, Russia is also concerned with other natural resources such as coal. The production of coal in Russia has grown from 122 mtoe in 2001 to more than 165 mtoe in 2013 with export value of 2.7% of total Russian exports (Brashaw & Connolly, 2016: 15).

In addition to the geographical area as well as geographical location, the author tries to see the national attributes of Russia with the other side. One of them is the military capability possessed by Russia. Since 2012, the armed forces have undergone modernization under the new Minister of Defense, Sergey Shoygu. Although the desire to reform the armed forces comprehensively has been present since 2008. The modernization program brought by Shoygu promises to channel 700 billion dollars between 2011 and 2020 to increase all of the state owned weapons such as the purchase of 2,300 tanks, 600 fighters, 1,000 helicopters, 28 regiments of the S-400 air defense system, each with 72 launchers, 16 submarines, 51 combat ships, and other equipment systems (Golts & Kofman, 2016: 3). As a country that has a large area, Russia has more responsibility to maintain the sovereignty of the country. Russia has purchased heavy equipment weapons ranging from nuclear strategic equipment, submarines and ships, to fighter planes, tactical fighters, and a number of ground warfare systems. The level of Russia's modern equipment has increased from 30 to 47 percent, and will reach 50 percent by the end of 2016 through the State Armament Program 2011-20 or the Armament Program

This country (Golts & Kofman, 2016: 3). Furthermore, on land forces, Russia has developed and purchased new weapon models. There has been an increase in tanks and armored vehicles with increased protection and mobility, missiles and artillery systems with the ability to target precision and electronic warfare through more sophisticated communication systems (Klein, 2016: 12).

On air power, there has been modernization in combat aircraft systems and air defense systems. One example is the arrival of the new fighter Sukhoi Su-34 attack aircraft and the Sukhoi Su-35 multifunctional fighter aircraft that will gradually replace the old ones such as Su-24, Su-27, MiG-29 and MiG-31 (Klein, 2016: 12). This modernization of Russian air power significantly enhances the Russian air military capability in terms of ability to lock in targets, maneuvering up to reach. Though often

focusing military power on land, the State Armament Program also focuses on the modernization of military capabilities at sea. This military upgrading in the maritime will then increase its capability for coastal defense, combat support and anti-area / access denial operations in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea in particular (Klein, 2016: 12). In addition, Russia also focuses on modernizing its nuclear power. The State Armament Program seeks to procure 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs, SLBMs) based on sea and terrestrial as well as 8 strategic submarines (SSBNs). By 2022, all former Soviet ICBMs will be replaced with new missiles. This development is based on the fact that President Putin describes nuclear weapons as "claws and teeth of the Russian bear" (Klein, 2016: 11).

Some of the previously mentioned Russian national attributes are the uniqueness of Russia today. The author considers that with an enormous area of 17,075,200 km², stretching about 4,500 km from north to south and 9,000 km from west to east, making Russia the largest country in the world. Located in the Eurasian region, Russia is not classified as a landlocked country, a country not directly adjacent to the sea. This is because the Russian region has access to the Arctic Ocean. Nonetheless, with sufficient climates in the country, the Arctic Ocean froze for almost 6 months each year that forced Russia to make warm-water ports in other regions. Coupled with Russia still dependent on energy in moving its wheels of economy, the geographical region of Russia becomes one of the peculiarities for Russian national attributes. In addition, today Russia is experiencing modernization in its military capabilities. With a program called State Armament Program 2020, Russia is conducting comprehensive reform of the armed forces. In order to improve its military capability, Russia channeled 700 billion dollars by 2020 on its defense budget. The results of the program have been seen with the addition of a number of members to armed equipment in the land, air to sea.

1.3 Russia National Attributes in Crimea Annexation

The author then noticed that the national attributes described in the previous section were the drivers of policy-makers in Russia for the annexation of the Crimea in 2014. On March 17, 2014, Russian president Vladimir Putin signed the presidential regulation On Recognition of Crimea, then a day later Putin indicated Russia, the State Duma, and the Federation Council that local Crimean institutions

have submitted a desire to join Russia and on the same day together with local Crimean institutions signed an agreement on recognizing the entry of the Crimean Republic into the Russian Federation (Grant 2015: 68). President Obama stressed that the United States would not recognize the Crimean referendum and warned that Russia would get sanctioned for its actions. These sanctions include economic sanctions against Russia and travel restrictions and asset freezes on some Russian officials (Kalb, 2015: 162). The actions undertaken by Russia are heavily criticized by several international actors such as the United States and the European Union. Russia has also violated the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 that ensures that Russia will respect the independence and sovereignty that is in the territory of Ukraine and refrain from using threats or violence against territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine.

The author sees that the main factor causing Russia to take action to annex the Crimea is Russia's desire to defend the Port of Sevastopol on the Crimean peninsula. The Port of Sevastopol is a port that became a Russian naval base in the Black Sea region. The Port of Sevastopol has a seawater desalination plant that has sufficient capacity to supply water (Deliagin, 2015: 14). The existence of the navy in the region is part of a 1997 agreement between Ukraine and Russia which granted permission to reside in the Crimean territory until 2017. However, the agreement was renewed through the Kharkiv Accords to extend the permit until 2042 (Biersack & O'Lear, 2014: 256). Furthermore, according to Biersack and O'Lear (2014: 257) The Black Sea is a region rich in energy, the presence of a Russian naval base in the region is not intended for defense but to enter the energy-rich region. With the annexation of the Crimea, Russia will increase its maritime territory by obtaining an area of 36,000 square miles surrounding the Crimea. The hydrocarbon wealth possessed by the Black Sea also has a significant impact, Russia will get the oil and gas wealth contained in the Black Sea as seen in Figure 2.




Figure 2. (Source: Biersack & O'Lear, 2014:259)

From Figure 2, it can be seen that if Russia executes the Crimea, then Russia will get a part of the territory on the Black Sea that is believed to have a large hydrocarbon content. In addition, Sevastopol is also the only Russian warm-water port in the Black Sea region (Srivastava, 2016: 5). Warm-water ports are a port that does not freeze in winter, required by Russia because Russia needs a port to trade, with the Arctic Ocean region often frozen for 6 months every year, a warm water port is needed by Russia. Russia has only three warm-water ports in the Pacific region (Vladivostok), the Baltic (St. Petersburg) and the Black Sea (Crimea).

The desire for annexation of the Crimea can then be understood because of Russia's national attributes as a country with an energy dependent state. As described earlier, Russia's Hydrocarbon exports account for 55% to 75% of Russia's total exports in one year and generate up to 380 billion USD in export earnings. This indicates that Russia depends on its resources or resource-based economy. Based on Rudick Arhen's explanation (2005: 592), a country with a great dependence on energy will then have a negative impact of limited energy available. With the negative impact offered to resource-based economies like Russia, the annexation of the Crimea with greater access to the Black Sea becomes an option that can be taken to keep Russian energy available. In addition, the geographical location of Russia near the Arctic Ocean that often froze for 6 months in a year requires Russia to secure its geopolitical position in the Black Sea region. The presence of warm-water ports in the Black Sea region will secure Russia in trading without being hindered by the extreme climate of Russia.

Another thing that needs to be taken into consideration is the national attributes of Russia in terms of military capability. The author sees that the military capabilities that Russia possessed at that time

moved Russia's desire for an annexation of the Crimea. This can be seen from the use of military force as a coercion or coercion strategy in the early phase of the Ukrainian crisis (Bartles, 2014: 46). According to Charles Bartles (2014: 47) Russia has reformed its military capabilities by increasing its defense budget allocated for large purchases of vehicles, equipment to training, the first time since the Soviet era. This reform can then be seen in the actions of Russia in the Crimean case in the form of equipment, communication devices, weapons to new means of transportation (Bartles, 2014: 48). Russia places its soldiers known as little green men in the Crimean region as well as 40 active warships at Naval base in Sevastopol. Instead of carrying out attacks, the presence of Russian warships in Crimea especially in the Sevastopol region as a symbol of defense of Russian-speaking speakers there (Biersack & O'lear, 2014: 257).

Russia has also replaced warships resting in Sevastopol with new ships. Reform of Russia's military capabilities can also be seen from the capabilities of soldiers residing in the Crimean region. Without making any armed contacts, the Russian army managed to isolate the Ukrainian army from command and control of the headquarters in Kiev by cutting telephone lines, disrupting communications and conducting cyber warfare. The Kremlin made a covert operations attempt to control and annex the Crimea by using special forces to take over the Ukrainian military unit without dropping a single victim (Karagaiannis, 2014: 413-4). These efforts illustrate how the reforms that run in Russia on its military capabilities can go well. In addition, other evidence of how to increase Russian military capability to be the basis for Russia's annexation in the Crimea can be described by Alexander Golts and Michael Kofman (2016). According to Golts and Kofman (2016: 9) the effect of increasing Russian military capability against annexation in the Crimea is illustrated by the mobility, preparedness and competence of special forces who have been trained through reform programs in Russia. In addition, Russia has also stepped up its capabilities in warfare technologies such as the use of unmanned aircraft to electronic war equipment. This indicates that with the reformed military capability by Russia, annexation of Crimea realization can be done. Margarete Klein (2016: 18) also mentioned that Russia's military capability has a significant role in the annexation of the Crimea. This is marked by the addition of troop numbers to reach 90,000 pieces in the region. So the authors see that Russian military ability has an important role in Russian foreign policy instruments.

Russia's military capability to be a means in achieving the desired goal by Russia, the military capability provides a possible option for annexation of the Crimea.

2 CONCLUSION

As stated by James Lebovic, the capabilities or attributes of a country provide restrictions and impetus for the state in policy. Policymakers are very concerned about the ability of the country and its neighboring countries and countries that have a long distance but have an active relationship with the country. Information about the ability of the country itself and other countries in the world to be the best guide in playing in international politics. The Crimean annexation case by Russia in 2014 illustrates it well. The Crimean annexation by Russia was driven by Russia's dominant national attributes, geographical and military capabilities. Geographically, Russia needs wider access to the Black Sea region. Russia is a country with a great dependence on resources, the dependence can then have a negative impact on the supply of resources owned by Russia. In order to meet this, Russia must annex the Crimea because the Crimea offers greater resources contained within the Black Sea. In addition, Russia's geographical location also forced Russia to secure its warm-water port. Furthermore, Russia's military capabilities at that time also played an important role in providing the impetus and option for annexation of the Crimea. After reforming its military capabilities, Russia then gained a greater possibility of possibilities for annexation.

Through the case of the Crimean annexation by Russia in 2014. The author sees that national attributes provide the possibilities and incentives for policymakers to carry out their foreign policy. As Christopher Hill (2003) has pointed out, the role of power or attributes in foreign policy is an end in itself, as a means to an end and as a context within which states operate. Even so, the author also did not rule out any shortcomings in this article. The authors assume that this case can also be described in detail by using different levels such as national leaders and identities. The author sees that the president of Putin has an important role in determining the policy as well as the existence of a Russian national identity that has a historical proximity to the Crimean region. Those two things are missed through this article. Nevertheless, the authors agree that a country's foreign policy can be driven by the country's national attribut

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