

Policy Consistency of Poland Responding to Russia's Annexation Policy of 2014: In the Group Level of Analysis

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Abstract: The annexation of Russia to the territory of the Crimean Peninsula, Ukraine in 2014 opens opportunities for greater open conflict. The use of military instruments approved by the Upper House of Russia triggered the protests of several neighboring countries, especially Poland. Polish-Russian attempts to normalize relations but ultimately fail, due to the rejection of Russian action against the will of Poland before the annexation took place, helped the post-reform reform process of Ukraine in 1991. One of the efforts to reduce the widespread conflict perpetrated by the European Union is through sanctions on economic embargoes. While from the beginning, Poland's attitude consistently supports EU sanctions policy against Russia. Through the use of group analytics ratings, the author will identify the decision units and structures within them and look for relationships on the influence of small group involvement in the Polish government in the process of foreign policy making. The dominance of cadres comes from the Civic Platform Party as the government-era coalition party of President Komorowski, further simplifying the policy-making process without any outside or opposition intervention. The design of the cabinet making basically refers to the party cadre portion. The hypothesis of this paper mentions the process of making foreign policy produces an integrative solution.

1 INTRODUCTION

As members of NATO and the EU, Polish foreign policy is focusing on further integration into European political and security structures including escalating the crisis in Ukraine and helping Ukraine gain a stable, prosperous and democratic future for all its citizens. After President Putin's request to the Upper House of Russia regarding the permission of military forces in the territory of Ukraine was granted, the situation was dramatic. The President of Poland immediately held a meeting with Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski and Defense Minister Tomasz Siemoniak on March 1, 2014 discussed the peace activities of Ukraine. As a result, the Polish government urged NATO to hold a meeting of the North Atlantic Council to immediately prepare itself to respond to Russia's provocative actions in the Crimea (president.pl, 2014). At its peak, Russia finally annexed Ukraine on March 21, 2014 which was unilaterally held in the autonomous region of the Crimea, further exacerbating diplomatic relations between Poland and Russia. The Polish government criticized Russia's unilateral action of annexing the

region on the Crimean Peninsula, Ukraine as it had done similar things when the Georgia crisis of 2008. Poland declared itself that it would never recognize the annexation of the Crimea by Russia. Later Poland also stated that its support to Ukraine consistently includes becoming one of the countries supporting the imposition of economic embargo on Russia by the European Union as agreed Minsk and recognize the appointment of Arseniy Yatsenyuk as interim president of Ukraine.

In the explanation of Polish foreign policy priority report 2014-2015 presented by Polish Foreign Minister Grzegorz Schetyna said the conflict in Ukraine has made Polish relations with the Russian Federation worse (Schetyna in Polish Foreign Policy Priorities, 2014). He considered Russian policy to be against the will of Poland in politics and economy that Poland has built in Ukraine. With the imposition of four months (March-July 2014) economic embargo against Russia is expected to provide a deterrent effect for Russia to immediately stop its annexation action in the Crimea. On the other hand, the economic embargo can't prevent Russia's intention to annex the Crimea so that the EU is forced to repeatedly

extend the embargo. For Poland, which makes Russia into the ranks of geographical concentric circles, the EU economic embargo affects Poland's exports to Russia. So far, Poland is supplying agricultural commodities to Russia, which has been the main destination of Polish food exports, due to the imposition of sanctions Poland is willing to lose 500 million Euros only from agriculture by 2014 (Kraatz, 2014). Nevertheless, material losses earned by Poland are not underlying it to withdraw its support of EU sanctions.

Based on this background, this paper will use group level of analysis that is used as a preference for analytical tools to identify the decisions unit in Polish foreign policy consistency related to Crimean issue of the ultimate decisions unit, the structure of the unit itself and understand Polish foreign policy making process. The Republic of Poland is a multiparty parliamentary democracy, with the concept of checks and balances consisting of executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In Poland, the prime minister has more political power than the president of Poland Republic of Poland Country Report, t.t). The last branch is the legislative of the Senate and the Sejm (Polish Parliament). In a case study of Poland's response to Crimean righteousness policy, this paper will emphasize the role of small groups compiled by author namely prime ministers, foreign ministers, defense ministers, presidential advisory councils, and government parties.

1.2 Elaboration of Group Level of Analysis

Hudson (2014) assesses that leaders can't create and implement their foreign policy by themselves. Most of the foreign policy always made in a group setting. These groups contribute to the formulation of a country's foreign policy. The term group decision making best describes the group, using a group level of analysis that makes the unit as an object for analyzing foreign policy. The group LoA according to Breuning (2007) is understood to be a group of people or a group of individuals who not only focus on the formulation of foreign policy but to prevent any misuse of policies by other entities in the government. The existence of this group can be said as a protector of a leader in implementing its policy. The groups referred to by Breuning (2007) may be coalition parties, advisory boards and groups residing in government or ministerial institutions. Group arrangements framed in group decision making have a major contribution when foreign

policy is formulated. Regardless of the political orientation they derive from, they are in charge of professionally accommodating existing national interests.

Members in the small groups of the unit decision according to Neack's (2008) interpretation do not represent the institution, they are likely to remain open to external influences, including information relevant to the group's decisions. Sometimes small groups act independently, not open to confidential outside information about tactics and diplomacy strategies, in order to quickly reach consensus. In the use of this group level of analysis, the author argues that the role of group decision making actually only supplies information, options and policies, where policy makers remain in the hands of the president (ultimate decision). The dominance of a dominant group or actor other than the leader behind this decision making, the author's assumption is in line with Breuning's (2007) assumption about the assumption of the first group that the leader is inactive or has no capability in taking foreign policy, will hear and obtain varied information from some group perspective behind him (supporters). In the case of the Crimea in 2014, the government did not undergo a change of leadership, President Komorowski at that time served since 2010-2015. The author highlights the consistency of Polish policy toward EU sanctions given to Russia in 2014. This paper, the author chose to use the group level of analysis. The author identifies Polish decision units as small groups whose composition consists of ministry officials, advisory boards up to Prime Minister. While other actors who seem to show the existence of its influence is the Sejm or the Polish Parliament. According to Neack (2008) small groups are defined by a set of individuals who can be two or more persons from the same government or government agency or ministry, which are collectively involved in the process of policy formulation through direct interaction. The output produced later is a collective and interactive decision in which all members are required to participate to make government commitments.

Furthermore the author then shifted the focus of the analysis of the identification decision switch unit using a tree approach formulated by Hermann et. al, (in Neack, 2008). The author uses the tree approach presented in the Neack material shown there are several branches which then produce four types of decision type: adoption of dominant solution, deadlock solution, integrative solution, and subset solution. Although the elites identified by the author in the final paragraph are individuals who have the

same party affiliation. The author uses the concept of management style of group ranking, collegial. Actually the style of management expressed by Breuning depends on the leader's tendency, how the leader organizes the system in the executive. Collegial, the leader attempts to mediate between groups, and reduces group disputes by opening dialog or open discussions, a key feature of collegial management is open debates between advisors, emphasize teamwork and the problem of mutual agreement (Breuning, 2007). From the Polish president's management style the author can interpret the use of the theory of policy convergence, because the loyalty of small groups to him is guaranteed. The policy of President Komorowski is the result of reflection on the consideration of the Civic Platform Party that can be analyzed from its identity and role in the Polish government.

1.2 Unit Decision Identification

The selection of small groups is selected through several authors' considerations, as follows: 1) they are from one political party in Poland, the similarity of a political view minimizes the potential for cross-pollination in the government because the parliamentary forces have gained support and interest in the party their politics is ensured one vote. 2) Their task is directly related to the ongoing problems in Eastern Europe, which are related to the stability of the region and the future of Ukraine. Automatic, foreign ministers and defense ministers often make intense communication with the president following the development of the situation on the Crimean Peninsula. Predictably, the average intensity of their communications responds to peaceful efforts in Ukraine above the average of other Komorowski ministers. 3) Although the Minister for Foreign Affairs Radoslaw has retired, the author state the role of Foreign Minister Grzegorz Schetyna who replaced him as of September 22, 2014 because it is still his responsible for the implementation of Polish foreign policy priorities in 2014-2015 (Schetyna in Polish Foreign Policy Priorities, 2014). 4) The parties that sit in the government elite in small groups are president's confidant whose have high loyalty. Some analysts have analyzed the relationship of group influence to decision-making by the leaders, some of them are US government policy related to war on terror, deal with nuclear Iran and Putin in its policy annexation of Crimea in 2014.

The author will use the first decision tree approach by Hermann et al. (1978 in Neack, 2008)

which explains the group decision making process. Regarding group decision management, do not cover the possibility of cross opinion that can develop into internal conflict, this is usual because in group decision making is not always harmonious as US foreign policy in the current era of President Trump. Internal Polish government is relatively good, one voice addressing the Crimean issue. The actors who play the roles in the formulation of Polish foreign policy consists of the names of government elites Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk (2007-2014), Polish Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz (2014-2015), Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Radoslaw Sikorski (2007-2014), Polish Minister of Defense Tomasz Siemoniak (2011-2015), Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Grzegorz Schetyna (2014-2015), Sejm (Polish Parliament), and six members of the Advisory Council for President Bronislaw Komorowski. Both Radoslaw, Tomasz, Grzegorz, and Ewa are affiliated with the Civic Platform political party, meaning the dominance of the Civic Platform Party demonstrates policy convergence among Polish government elites. Despite serving after the Crimean annexation ended, the author includes PM Ewa Kopacz and Foreign Minister Grzegorz because both of them still serve at the same period of this issue in Polish government. Polish foreign policy also remains consistent in favor of the how EU encounter Russia to prevent escalating tensions in Eastern Europe. The state officials whose appointed by President Komorowski who ruled for five years showed the same loyalty and perception among the government to address the issue of the Crimea.

Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who is currently president of the EU Council, is a politician and historian who also served as Polish prime minister for 7 years (2007-2014). Professionally as a politician, Donald Tusk was noted to have entered the membership of the Liberal Democratic Congress and Freedom Union in 1994-2001, before joining the Civic Platform Party to date. In his era of leadership, he was renowned for his foreign policy of trying to improve relations with Germany and Russia, which in the Kaczynski era was problematic (Der Spiegel, 2009). The annexation of Russia then changed Tusk's perceptions who consider that the biggest challenge today is Russia's movement, not only for Ukraine but also for the EU, and urging the EU to meet Russia to end this conflict (Euractiv.com , 2014). PM Donald Tusk, who has a greater political power than the president, has a tolerance bounded by the Polish constitution's rules of duty, subject and function. However strategic the position of Prime

Minister Donald Tusk, who at that time assumed three roles among them as head of government, the head of the Civic Platform Party and the head of the Cabinet Council did not close the indication of his considerable contribution to Poland's foreign policy.

The next identified actor is Minister of Foreign Affairs Radoslaw Sikorski, experienced in strategic position in Poland, former Deputy Minister of Defense for Jan Olszewski and then a career as a senator, and elected as Minister of Defense in 2005. His profession as a high-ranking Polish official, shows his ability in the formulation of foreign policy especially in the field of defense. Currently he is affiliated with the Civic Platform Party. Sikorski was involved in the events of the winter of 2014 which was a wave of protests by Euromaidan at the international level. Sikorski alongside Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich and opposition leader Vitalu Kitchiko, Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Oleg Tyagnibok signed the MoU to promote peace in Ukrainian power (Guradian.com, 2014). It is an acceptable move because as the Polish Foreign Minister, Sikorski is a strong supporters of EU's close relationship with Eastern Neighbors. He chose the integration of these countries into the structure of the European Union, and advocated Ukraine to enter the EU. Sikorski is more in favor of Ukraine which has been Poland's strategic partner in Eastern Europe.

The third actor is Minister of Defense Tomasz Siemoniak who is a trust person of Donald Tusk. When the cabinet was overhauled, Tusk retained Tomasz Siemoniak as Polish Minister of Defense. Tomasz is among Polish politicians affiliated with the Civic Platform Party. In 2012, Siemoniak declared Poland's plan to build its missile defense system with an estimated cost of US\$6 billion and expressed the desire of Poland to build a missile defense system with Germany and France (Benites, 2012). Increased tensions caused by the annexation of Russia led to Poland increasing its attention in the field of defense. Russia is a major force in eastern Poland, if not wary of all possible potentialities, Poland could suffer the same fate as Ukraine. The third actor is the Advisory Board of Polish President Komorowski, there are 6 members named Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Maciej Prog, Krzysztof Jakub Kroil, Tomasz Borecki, Aleksander Sosna, and Jerzy Pruski (President.pl, 2014).

There are few sources reviewed or reported Komorowski's Advisory Board activities two years ago post-retirement. But the authors found diplomatic efforts by Mazowiecki regarding Ukraine, between Mazowiecki and former Ukrainian

Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko who advised Ukraine to hold a fair elections. Mazowiecki often held diplomatic visit in the era of President Bronislaw Komorowski including seeking a meeting between President Komorowski with the Ukrainian opposition in Warsaw in 2014. After Donald Tusk retired from the prime minister's seat and chose to take the position of EU President Council, his position replaced by Ewa Kopacz. Ewa Kopacz is equally under the auspices of the Civic Platform Party. On his first day in office, Kopacz publicly stated that as prime minister he would pledge to continue Polish foreign policy. He added that his government would not support the split in Ukraine and urged the US military presence as a bluff if Russia made possible sudden aggression. Then, the fifth actor is Grzegorz Schetyna who was appointed by Kopacz to become foreign minister to replace Sikorski. Grzegorz is also a politician of the Civic Platform Party. Most of the time Grzegorz's career outside Poland, but his presentation of Polish foreign policy priority reports helped to refresh Polish domestic politics, he presented a constructive solution to address the Crimean (Polish Foreign Policy Priorities, 2014) issue.

Ukraine has been used by Poland as region for the development of cooperation between the two countries, which intends to bring the reform process of Ukraine runs as expected. The Civic Platform Party is successfully putting its cadres in the seat of government, in coalition with the government. The Civic Platform (PO) is a liberal-conservative and Christian-Democratic party, whose voters are highly educated, professional, academic, manager, businessman and so on. In line with the Civic Platform Party, the Sejm or the Polish Parliament has an effect on the Polish government's policy and attitude. Within 7 years (2007-2014), PO incorporated into the Polish government coalition and after that period, PO became government's opposition. During the coalition with the Polish government, small groups in President Komorowski tended to be convergent in concentration. That is, they are one vote and remain restored according to Komorowski's mechanism acts as ultimate decision. In group decision making, unless the president, there is prime minister who has a dominant power in decision making process. From the political aspect, indeed the prime minister has a political position higher than the president. Appointed Ministry Councils also became part of prime minister authority.

1.3 Neack's Tree Decision Approach

The Primary identities lies in the role of prime ministers, minister of foreign affairs, minister of defense, and advisory council as described earlier. The second question is, does the leader emphasize dissent? This is not found, as the author state that their statements about Polish foreign policy are the same, there is no difference in perceptions or views Poland continues to support EU imposing sanctions on economic embargoes towards Russian government to reduce regional tensions. The loss that Poland receives economically from the EU economic blockade leads to the export of agricultural produce that typically supplies Russia into a halt. Not to mention of gas dependency and even Russia decision to breaks down the gas pipeline that linking Ukraine and Poland as Russia's impact or counterattack of EU sanctions.

The next question alludes to the norm, does it impede dissent? Looking at the reality in Poland, from the unit that the author has tried to identify that the most influential (minister) are from the same party, they automatically embrace the same understanding or ideology. Disagreements among Polish internals exist but are insignificant because they prioritize collective cooperation rather than favor individual roles. The next question from the decision tree approach is about did the group evaluating many choices about the problem at hand? Obviously yes, starting from 1994, Poland and Ukraine establish cooperative cooperation known Polish-Ukraine Partnership. Close ties between Poland and Ukraine aim to strengthen democracy and support Ukraine to closer with Western countries (Missala, 2016). This close relationship between Poland and Ukraine continues throughout the economic sphere between Eastern European countries.

Emphasized here is an evaluation of the behavior of Russia that continues to provoke and even threaten back by military embargo. Russia's role is very important in order to maintain the stability of the region. However, Poland's (EU-backed) side of the vote voted in favor of Russia's actions. These possibilities are mapped and evaluated by small groups, such as the Polish defense minister's plan to build a defense system in some border areas. That is the consequence of the mature evaluation by a small groups. Thus the small groups of Polish governments of President Komorowski's era according to Neack (2008) chose an integrative solution approved by several parties involving some shift from initial preference.

2 CONCLUSION

The same identity of each individual in the small groups of in explanation earlier is all of them affiliated with the conservative, liberal and religious (Christian) Civic Platform Party. The government coalition realized by the PO which is still a government coalition that categorized as a government support group. In an attempt to legitimize the policy of a country, the government must have the support of several parties. The more that supports, the stronger the policies are. The position of Poland is actually a dilemma of addressing the conflict on the Crimean Peninsula. One side of Poland was forced to converge with the EU which approved the imposition of extended economic sanctions causing some material loss to Poland. The PO Group understands the origin or history of rival and sensational issues concerning sovereignty. They are open to enter and suggest, as an aspirational political party. The reason geography stimulates the decision-makers not to ignore all Russian movements. The Polish region that borders on conflict areas in Ukraine and Kaliningrad has been used as a Russian military post. Barry Buzan and Waever (2003) the situation on the Crimean Peninsula surrounded by small countries, especially in Europe, there is a lighter risk of to move or migrate to a place that is geographically close.

Military officials under the command of Minister Tomasz, attempted to understand Buzan's intention of assuming that the crisis in Ukraine will be a threat to the region in Poland. The author saw the friction that occurred between a group of individuals in Poland when President Ewa Kopacz where the position of foreign minister was removed by him. But the problem was solved when Ewa was known to inaugurate him as a speaker in Poland. The unit decision without looking back may be skeptical of the policies they take. The EU has established an Eastern Partnership aimed at improving integration between the EU and Eastern Europe (Smith, 2005). The countries in Eastern Europe have a relatively high interdependent level and not ready for independence. Indications of weak supervision and weakness of the economy are easy to find such as in Poland which has dependency on oil supplies from Russia. For that, Poland as the greatest promoter of cooperation of Eastern European countries made Western Europe as the newest partner. But keep in mind that Russia with all its military capabilities is readily operated on the Crimean Peninsula. Polish support as his recognition of Ukraine's independence unforgettable momentum throughout the history of

the founding of Ukraine. The authors observe that the economic losses in the context of the Crimean Crisis, entered into foreign policy preferences before the policy was taken. Because of the security aspects that Polish policy priorities are, Poland is forced to converge with the EU to hold diplomatic relations with Russia post-annexation of the Crimea.

Based on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Polish (MFA Polish) report, the increased attention of Poland towards Ukraine raises the perception that Poland's foreign policy focuses on Ukraine rather than on Russia as previous appeals. Indeed Poland provides great support for reforms in Ukraine, a priority area of Polish development and humanitarian aid. Assistance for Ukraine from MFA funds increased multiply through PLN 21 million. Poland then supported and promoted more transparent local government reforms, subsidized media freedoms, trained civil servants and assisted in the reform of military schools. After analyzing Polish foreign policy in responding to the annexation of Russia, it can be illustrated from the tree approach that the discovery of solutions is integrative, accommodating all the individuals who participated in the preparation therein plus their loyalty factors seen in their membership status as the Civic Platform Party even Donald Tusk and Foreign Minister Grzegorz had become chairman of the right-leaning party. Teamwork rather than individuals is seen in the policy-making process by President Komorowski.

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