

# Analyzing the Political Economy of Indonesia's Global Hijab-Fashion Goal 2020: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective

Witri Elvianti

*International Relations Department, President University*

**Keywords :** hijab, fashion, Indonesia, neo-Gramsci, hegemony, neo-liberalism, capitalization

**Abstract:** The Government of Indonesia (GoI) is in ways of aiming itself to become the next Mecca of global hijab fashion Mecca by 2020. To promote and socialize hijab fashion trend, on 21 September 2016, the Ministry of Trade of Indonesia's government under President Joko Widodo's administration officially opened an event called '*Hijab, Fashion, & Accessories Mall to Mall 2016*'. This study came to questioning whether or not it succeeds the influence of Indonesian political Islam in challenging the hegemony of state and neo-liberal capitalism. Recent literatures put little emphasis on the state and global level of analysis as to elucidate this hijab trend in Indonesia. With reference to neo-Gramscian methodology and theorization on hegemony, the analyst seeks to fill this gap by historicizing the political economy of Indonesia's global hijab fashion goal 2020. Employing qualitative study and using library research to earning secondary resources, the analyst found that the Indonesia's global hijab fashion goal 2020 shows the hegemonic power of the state and neo-liberal capitalism. Instead of absorbing political Islam agenda in challenging the hegemony of neo-liberal economy and its body of politics, Muslim society rather shows adaptability toward the values brought by neo-liberal capitalism in greater details. Therefore, the analyst comes to conclude that capitalization of hijab remains massive in contemporary Indonesia.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

In many parts of the world, Muslim women experienced responses from the state in various forms pertaining to the rights in wearing *hijab* in public spaces. Furthermore, Eickelmen and Piscatori state that

"...From Malaysia to Morocco, the choice of dress for Muslim women, both married and unmarried, is a complex political statement... In some societies it is a matter of personal choice; in others it is virtually prescribed by government, social convention, or peer pressure" (1996, 90).

It justifies that although clothes literally become one of human's primary needs that cover and protect human's body, it does indeed represent much meaning ranging from cultural identity and loyalty to the economic interest (Stillman, 2000; Hussein, 2007). On one hand, clothes become a means to communicate our personality and presence in society (Agustina 2015, 2). The cultural values attached to the fashion can be varied as wide as "...gender, age, social position, ethnic background... and ideology" (Tantowi, 2010: 63).

Therefore, one should note that the discussion of dress code is of key importance and should not be underestimated since it seems to be one critical aspect in society including Muslim society. In the realm of Islamic dress code, the application of *hijab* by Muslim women, most of the time, has been challenged by the state's hegemony. On the other hand, in the context of globalization, due to rapid development of information and technology the modification of fashion finds its own market and turns to strategic economic commodity. When meets with global market, fashion becomes one of promising sector accumulating both economic and social capital. Subsequently it potentially helps the increase of public consumerism, which of course gives much benefit to the state and private sector. This phenomenon is apparently shown in the flourish of *hijab* as part of Islamic dress code and currently a new fashion style of Muslim women particularly in Indonesia.

To promote and socialize Indonesia's Muslim fashion trend nationwide, on 21 September 2016, the Ministry of Trade of Indonesia's government under President Joko Widodo's administration officially

opened an event called ‘*Hijab, Fashion, & Accessories Mall to Mall 2016*’, which lasted for four days giving fashion entrepreneurs opportunities to displaying their products on *hijab* fashion and its accessories. As the Ministry’s spokesperson said that “...we have to show that Indonesian fashion products ... are highly competitive with a high sales value...”(Kemendag.go.id 2016). Blessed with cultural heritages that inspire unique design of *hijab* and Muslim clothing, the GoI optimistically attempts to globalize its Muslim fashion products or even probably establish a new Muslim fashion empire at last. Therefore, despite the fact that global Muslim fashion market is competitive; the Government of Indonesia (GoI) is in ways of aiming itself to become the next Mecca of global Muslim fashion trend by 2020.

Given this fact, it seems to be relevant noting that there is a shifting meaning of *hijab* as part of Islamic identity. The analyst highlights that the government’s initiative to establish the Indonesia’s 2020 Global *Hijab* Fashion Empire indicates *hijab* (re)production is offering strategic business opportunity. Assuming this perception is valid, it becomes important noting that such an ambition remains strongly contradicted to the previous regimes’ orientation on *hijab*. In the context of *hijab* practices in Indonesia, the recent decision on building Indonesia as a world *hijab*-fashion empire justifies clear distinction to the previous regimes particularly Suharto’s New Order that massively controlled the discourse and practice of *hijab*.

Although the current trend of *hijab* practices in Indonesia signs such a tolerance to the application of Islamic identity, it is also widely rejected. To some opinions, the presence of *hijab* in Indonesian public could be seen as a symbolic manifesto of Indonesian political Islam agenda in challenging western modernity that, unfortunately, nourishes the hegemonic power of western capitalism. The modernized fashion was inherent with western consumerism, which contradicts to the view saying that *hijab* as expression of modesty (Nef-Saluz 2007).

A growing body of research shows its interests on the reproduction of *hijab* practices in Indonesia. A report by Claudia Nef-Saluz in 2007 described the increasing trend of *hijab* as a form of Islamic popular culture in Indonesia. The research found the “...process of hybridization between the local and the global... focusing on the triangular relation between global Islamic influences, Western influences and local traditions...” (Nef-Saluz 2007). However, the analysis draws discussion on

sociopolitical dynamics of *hijab* as a popular culture, which is lacking the explanation on what power allows such hybridization. Therefore, this paper is expected to fill in this gap.

Thus, given the fact that Indonesia’s government thirsts to establish a world *hijab*-fashion empire, it becomes important to ask whether or not it succeeds the influence of Indonesian political Islam in challenging state’s hegemony and liberal political economy. This paper provides the analysis with regards to this question by historicizing the materialist power of *hijab* practices, which eventually unveils the consolidation between western capitalism and middle class of Muslim society to nourish Indonesia’s creative economy. In doing so, the analyst employs (neo)-Gramscian perspectives as it offers historical materialism as one alternative to understand the shifting of “...global structure of power in the global political economy...” (Morton 2007: 112).

To provide comprehensive analysis, the analyst will first substantiate how it defines hegemony and how this term is being contested in theory and remains evident in reality particularly in the building of Indonesia’s political economy. In next section, the analyst will figure out the dynamic of *hijab* practices and (re)production in Indonesia by highlighting that state remains hegemonic and thus determines the direction of *hijab* practice in Indonesia. In this context, the analyst found that the practice of *hijab* in Indonesia has been through four types of state’s dominance; alienation; compromise and capitalization. Last but not least, to answer the main question, this paper will explain whether or not the establishment of Indonesia’s global *hijab* fashion goal 2020 illuminates political Islam’s challenges toward state’s hegemony and neo liberal political economy.

## 2 HEGEMONY

Generally speaking, hegemony is conceived as a symbolic gesture of a hegemon continuously practicing particular degree of power or influence among other states to avoid power deficits. A clear evidence of state’s hegemony is the US global leadership. Since the alliance between Western European countries, Japan and the U.S was strengthened during World War II, it gave rise to the US hegemony as a global superpower. The U.S mission was the internationalization of its liberal ideology. The manifestation of US hegemony was also evident during Cold War and afterwards. When

Cold War took place, the US hegemony was aiming at the spread of capitalism within the capitalist world order (Cox 1993).

In the realm of International Relations theories, the term of hegemony receives attention from some conventional school of thoughts. Neo-liberalism in international relations, for instance, instead of making hegemony as its subject of analysis it rather highlights the operational procedures as well as terms and conditions to establish state of hegemony (Konrad 2012). With reference to the U.S hegemony in post Cold War, Robert Keohane states that hegemony resembles economic dominance due to the prevalence of materialist resources. It sheds lights on the practice of leadership and dominance by the state to perpetuate the hegemonic establishment through governmental administration (Keohane, 1989; Mowle and Sacko, 2007). According to Keohane, state is exercising hegemonic status when it comes showing its leadership capacity in controlling natural resources and raw materials, source of production, capital accumulation, global market and competitive advantage in processing and (re)producing highly valued goods. Beside economic capacity, the hegemony will also be present as long as the state also advances its military performance. Both military capacity and distinguished political leadership will nourish and protect hegemonic state in international political economy arena (Keohane 1984). More importantly, hegemonic power remains pertinent to sustain economic cooperation in the anarchic international system. To accomplish its mission in protecting the sustainability of international cooperation, the hegemon must possess the ability in producing most valuable and economic goods and creating competitive advantage.

However, it becomes critical to ask how such a materialist operational procedure standard on the creation of hegemony flourishes and whether or not state's materialist capability is alone helping the state to sustain its hegemonic leadership in global political economy. As the neo-liberalism sheds more lights on materialist resources, it ignores the significance of ideas in analyzing hegemony. Instead of providing more holistic understanding of hegemony, it rather downgrades it into a matter of material resources preponderance only (Keohane 1984).

Hence, according to neo-Gramscianism, hegemony is a strategic achievement that requires complex alliances between social classes to establish such a 'unitary political bloc' under the political and leadership of a ruling social class. This ruling class

then applies the combination of coercion and consent. As to maintain the domination, the presence of organic intellectuals determines this process. The intellectuals should be able to maintain "...their position and function in the world of production" in order to eventually assist itself in enforcing "...general direction to the populous masses" (Gramsci 1971, 12). Therefore, based on this perspective, hegemony is not nourished and prolonged through coercion and repression (Gramsci 1975); it rather needs "active consent and participation of the ruled" to sustain the so-called *neo-liberal hegemonic constellation* (Plehwe et al 2006, 3). The combination of active consent and proactive participation contribute to the formulation of 'popular beliefs' and similar ideas thereby producing materi (Keohane 1984) (R. O. Keohane 1989) (Sacko 2007) (Konrad 2012)al forces (Gramsci 1971, 165). More importantly, when the dominant ruling class has established national hegemony it starts such an outward expansion. For instance, as the U.S. dominant ruling class has successfully created national hegemony that resembled neo-liberal ideology it then managed to expand its hegemony outwards. Therefore, neo-Gramscian analyzes that global hegemony starts from national hegemony.

Beside, with reference to (neo) Gramscian perspective, the analyst argues that hegemony is not solely formulated on materialist basis but also the power of ideas, norms and institutions that support the hegemonic power to set up particular global standard of behavior. It was obvious at the time the US combined its political, military, economic and cultural power the US gained legitimacy as a global leader (Hunt 2007). Then the US maintained its greater influences by forming an international economic framework, the so-called Bretton Woods System. This system was intended to help coordinate global economic growth and implement 'capitalist style open economic system' worldwide. By doing so, the US is able to transfer its culture and ideas to the recipients' countries of the US alliances. Given this fact, it is worth arguing that both materialist power and ideas shape the power of hegemony (Iseri 2007; D'Attoma 2011).

Cox reformulates Gramsci's analysis on hegemony by arguing that hegemony is created and sustained through the formulation of universal norms, institutions, and mechanism. There are three conditions that shape hegemony: social condition that covers ideas and norms; political condition that includes the institutions; and economic condition that requires solid material power. Those pillars are

not exclusive one to another but rather constituting each other. The material power does not arguably support the accumulation of wealth and profit only through production but also maintain the influence of ideological and cultural leadership of the hegemonic power. The experience of American

popular culture remains an obvious example of the complex relations between culture and material power (Cox 1995: 45). Those pillars are coherently represented in a structure as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1 Cox's structure of three types of pillars (from Cox, 1996: 98)

As neo-Gramscian perspectives illuminates that global hegemony starts from within national hegemony, it becomes relevant discussing how such a global hegemony endogenously undermines ideas or norms, material resources and institutions within a national hegemony. In this context, global capitalist hegemony amplifies the implementation of neo liberal principles. Pertaining to the provision of economic and military protection authorized in developing countries such as Indonesia by the US, that is considered to be a global hegemony, it is worth noting that Indonesia's government might resemble the interests of global capitalist power.

### 3 HEGEMONIC POWER OF NEO LIBERAL ECONOMY

As the hegemonic power allows the sustainability of neo liberalism in economy, it becomes important to discuss how this study views this economic principle. This study defines liberalism in economy as "...a resurrection of the ideology and practice of free market economies and private enterprises" (Apeldoorn 2001,1). In theory, this free market policy orientation led to massive practice of privatization and deregulation by allowing private actors to determine the market and public sector, which then labeled as economic neo-liberalism. This

principle has helped western capitalism dominated world economy along with the rise of US-led globalization and the European's economic integration in late 1980s.

Specifically, according to the literatures of Historical International Political Economy, the hegemonic power of capitalism in world finance and economy had been present in the organization of credit practices. The (neo) liberal economy established the concept of money and finance. On one hand, money can be used as a means of "...exchange..., payment, a unit of account, and a store of value..." and on the other hand, the concept of finance itself is built as to "...become the automatic use of holdings of money as a store of value in order to facilitate investment and further exchange, equating saving and investment at a market-clearing rate of interest and maintaining macroeconomic equilibrium" (Guttmann 1994, 28 cited in Langley 2002, 27). Despite this, it is worth also arguing that credit practices is sociologically a product by social relations produced through the productive and exchange relations and "...framed by institutions, norms, and values" (Langley 2002, 27). In this context, the hegemonic power of capitalism determines state's capacity accessing to credit instruments. Creating the credit will mobilize the capital that assists the production process and therefore, the presence of credit is indeed pertinent to the capital accumulation.

#### 4 LIBERALIZATION AND POLITICAL ISLAM IN INDONESIA

In a way of historicizing the materialist power of current practices and production of *hijab* fashion in Indonesia, it becomes pertinent unveiling historical narrative of the hegemony of western capitalism vis a vis political Islam. Vedi R Hadiz defines political Islam as "... a response to issues related to inequalities of power and wealth...as conveyed through the ideals, terminology, imagery and symbolism of the Islamic religion (2011, 4). In this context, the analyst takes into account political Islam as a strategic and well-structured reaction represented in the forms of images and symbols toward the manifestation of western capitalism inducing inequality of power and wealth in Muslim community. Therefore the analyst argues political Islam in largest extent has massively employed *hijab* as to convey its political reactionary in practice and ideology.

Political Islam in Indonesia is part of global conflict between Islamic movements and the West. Back to eighteenth century, the global force of political Islam had attempted to portray itself "...as plausible alternatives to Western power and culture" (Cribb, 1999: 12). It was, however, terminated due to the collapse of Ottoman Empire that marked the loss of Muslim societies. Given this circumstance, a global project of westernization in Muslim societies came to realization. The western capitalism hegemony, pioneered by European colonialism, was about to impinge European civilization in many parts of Muslim societies including in Indonesia in order to pursuing European economic interests. Under Dutch colonial administration, western imperialism in Indonesia then started to introduce "the supposed blessings of Western civilization..." through "...technological prowess and cultural and intellectual virtuosity of the West..." (Cribb, 1999: 11).

It is widely stated that political Islam massively emerged among Muslim societies that suffered from the colonization. When being independent, they rather faced authoritarian and corrupt regimes. The regimes, most of the time, started to modernizing Muslims. The choices that they faced were two; either Islamization or modernization. Given this situation, the modernization remained possible to be implemented in Muslim societies. It gave rise to the initiation of applying neo-liberal economic policies in the counties with Muslim as majority through the

lens of industrialization and modernization. However, the collapse of European power in global political economy in post World War I gave rise to the establishment of Pax Americana preserving the US mission on internationalization of liberalism and capitalism. It then led to another form of dynamic relationship between Islam and the West which probably gives credit to Huntington's thesis on clash of civilization.

The practice of economic liberalism evidently yielded various forms of contestation among the nation states. In this context, Indonesia contributed significantly to such contestation when Sukarno's administration took place. The rise of 'Bandung regime', which "...anchored a wider effort to ostensibly steer national development in Third World between the capitalism of US and the communism of Soviet Union..." (Berger 2006, 107) was apparently showing off its values of anti-imperialism and challenging the domination of western capitalism in particular US capitalism. To highlight their political challenges toward economic liberalism, the states sought to apply socialism and national liberation to accelerate their national development project (Scott 1990). However, at the time the economic crisis in late 1980s emerged, the state-led development or even the socialist ones could not help the countries economically survive. It carried the revision of neo-liberal economy promoted by World Bank and as a result it came to offer the developmental package with "...uneven transformation of nation-states into (neo) liberal states" (Berger 2006, 112).

In the context of Indonesia's liberalization, after the fall of Sukarno's regime following the contested moment of PKI in 1960s, Indonesian society experienced political turmoil and economic crisis. The anti-capitalism-Old Order could not any longer help the nation to survive and consequently the regime's interpretation on socialism found its end. At the time the New Order began, the Suharto's administration could not reject the helpful hand of liberal economists. Given this fact, the US capitalist power provided a glance of hope for the improvement politically and economically by pervasively stimulating "...classical formulation of aid and development policies through as such international institutions as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund..." (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996, 23). Those institutions weighted recommendation that pushed the state to go for liberal economic policies such as deregulation, foreign investment, and privatization. This package then stimulated such a dramatic increase in economy



based on manufacturing, factory construction sector and maximized export on non-oil and gas products (Borsuk 1999, 139-140). As a symbolic manifesto of liberalization, two giant mining corporations – Freeport from the United States and Canada's Inco – managed to establish its copper exploitation in Papua and nickel exploration in Sulawesi respectively (Borsuk 1999, 147). Afterwards, capitalist projects in Indonesia came to realization.

## 5 THE EMERGING FASHIONABLE HIJAB AND STATE'S HEGEMONY

Fashion is indeed critical part of capitalist forces that seeks to dominate sources of production. In the realm of capitalists, fashion production and market remains significant aspect in accumulating materialist power. Regarding that fashion represents symbolic gesture of collective identity and ideology, the forces of political Islam massively utilize the discourse of Muslim women's dress code and thus enforce the practice of *hijab* as its main manifesto. At global level, political Islam contends the modernity in fashion resembles one agenda called westernization or liberalization. It is assumed to prolong the hegemony of capitalists' power through the maintenance of liberal economy. Therefore, this political Islam recalls the unity of ummah under the application of Islamic jurisprudences as to empower Muslim communities worldwide in challenging the hegemony of western capitalism. In this context, fashion and its accessories are associated with conflicting relationship between western capitalism and political Islam. Substantially, according to Indonesian political Islam, the westernized women dress-code promoted by global capitalist system led Muslim women down to the path of secularization and moral degradation.

As to secure the achievement of capitalist agenda in Indonesia, Suharto decided to alienate political Islam in sociopolitical spheres in Indonesia specifically in the context of *hijab* practices. As a consequence, *hijab* practices in Indonesia has been undermined by state's hegemonic power in three forms; alienation, compromise, and capitalization.

### 5.1 Alienation (Mid 1960s – Late 1980s)

At the time Suharto was in power, state's reaction toward the discourse and practice of *hijab* was

apparently rejectionist. It considered the decision to allow Muslim women covering their head and body in public spaces was not seen as purely representing the true identity of being Indonesian Muslim women. It was due to the absence of historical connection between the originality of *hijab* and the Indonesia's women dress code. In the early of twentieth century, Muslim women in Indonesia were not familiar to the practice of *hijab*. The tradition of covering the head was more frequently present when performing prayer (known as *mukena*) or attending religious ceremony (Tantowi 2010, 67). Given this information, this regime prohibited the use of *hijab* in public particularly in governmental institutions and public schools.

The code of dress for Muslim women was significantly under state's control. Prolonged patriarchal tradition influenced national sociopolitical landscape which consequently limited Muslim women to occupy an idealist and pious woman style. Beneath this regime, Muslim women experienced incapacity "...in several aspects merely by reasons of gender..." to express their "...ritual purity..." or even restricted Muslim women "...may or may not do or should do in their social life..." (Hooker 2003: 130). It remained a dilemma for Muslim women to perpetuate their submission in sacred interpretations, making them deviant.

To confirm its rejectionist view toward *hijab*, on 17 March 1982, Suharto's administration under Ministry of Education and Culture (Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan) outlawed a decree (Surat Keputusan) No. 052/C/Kep/D.82 that regulated the school uniforms in the state-owned schools – starting from kindergarten, elementary school, junior and senior high school – and even universities. Although this regulation did not clearly emphasize the prohibition of *hijab*, it rather obviously controlled the uniformity of schools wear in order to secure the unity and integrity as a nation. There were two options available for the students to follow; either every student wearing or not wearing *hijab* at all. It was a taboo if some students were found wearing *hijab*. The state's regulation controlling students' dress code apparently mentioned that any piece of clothes covering the head, hair and skin was not allowed. As a consequence, this decree was used by the schools and teachers to not give students opportunity of wearing headscarf or *hijab* at schools (Mudjito, 1984).

## 5.2 Compromise (Early 1990s)

As the state facing existential threats endogenously from political Islam, *hijab* then became an instrument for reconciliation. Facing state's repressive behavior on *hijab*, some elements of Muslim societies came to question this regulation. In some cases, students who veiled their head were being forced to unveil since it opposed the regulation. Very often too, as they opposed to unveil, they received discrimination in class and they were being interrogated by the headmaster. Students with *hijab* turned to become social deviance. The response from society toward this practice was varied. Those whose strong financial resources decided to continue the case to Supreme Court (*Mahkamah Agung*) in order to find justification and even justice since the school interrogated students that psychologically obstructed their convenience at school (Mudjito 1984). In response to this, some elements of Muslim society attempted to reconcile with government regarding this discriminative policy. In the early 1990s, MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) held its national assembly and agreed to force the government to change this regulation.

At the time Suharto's authoritarian regime juxtaposed his oppressive approach toward Indonesian political Islam, in mid 1990s, this regime was consciously facing the threat of political instability and financial crises which might potentially led it to the absence of power. It gave rise to the presence of 'a crisis in hegemony' – where there was little or even no hegemonic power took place – due to the ruling elite separated itself with the ruled social groups (Hunt 2007). During Suharto's presidency, to avoid the "...Islamization of political life..." the level of participation from Muslim communities was downgraded (Liddle, 1999: 60). As a consequence, instead of building consensus through active participation, Suharto rather exploited coercion to eliminate the dissent from political Islam. The image of Suharto's regime was portrayed as secular nationalist regime could not help prevent this regime from its fall. Suharto was blamed for the toxic created to widen the gap of wealth and prolong poverty. It then stimulated the larger scope of political Islam to challenge Suharto's dominance. In this vein, Suharto managed to employ this momentum as to gain consent from political Islam and reduce coercion toward Muslim society to strengthen his hegemonic leadership. Hence, in 1991 the ruling elite found its compromise style toward the practice of *hijab* by lowering its authoritarianism

as to allowing students wearing *hijab* at school by outlawing a decree No.100/C/Kep/D/1991. Given this fact, it is worth noting that the state's hegemonic power created *hijab* politically instrumental.

## 5.3 Capitalization (post reformasi)

By way in contrast, current *hijab* practices and production somewhat depicts a state of transformative development in Indonesia. Significant transformation of *hijab* practice was evident after the fall of Suharto's regime and the rise of reformasi movement in 1998. Since the birth of *reformasi* era which dovetailed Suharto's authoritarian regime in 1998, the practice and the discussion of freedom of expression has been unfolded. It downgraded the New Order's strict regulation that limited the use of cultural and religious symbols in public. As a consequence, Muslim community has gained more confidence to express their piety and therefore, in the last decade, Muslim women wearing *hijab* in Indonesia have been present almost in any corner of public spaces along with the growing trend of *hijab* movements in Indonesia (Global Business Guide Indonesia, 2016).

*Hijab* is no longer a taboo; it becomes a vital source of fashion production instead. One can notice this dramatic transformation in last five years pertaining to the facts that *hijab* fashion shows are mushrooming with numbers of models wearing *hijab* increase. Events to promote new *hijab* styles and other Muslim fashion products are often held in big cities in Indonesia. Beside, the government does indeed encourage many events to promote various *hijab* and Muslim fashion products by local designers in other countries. *Hijab* was previously sacred and limited in styles and colors. It now turns to festive celebration of sophisticated arts in fashion. *Hijab* was not merely articulated based on sacred interpretation but luxurious and deluxe fashion taste. The sophistication of *hijab* is expressed into many forms with greater details such as long tropical and colorful skirts, tunics, dresses, sweater, *hijab* for children and even *hijab* for sport. Given this fact, it seems relevant noting the scary image of Islam as antithesis of western modernity is slowly disappeared as the *hijab* production nowadays resemble western fashion trend with radiant color choices and high quality fabrics.

Realizing the trend has been growing significantly, the government of Indonesia under Jokowi's administration eventually declared its confidence to expand the scope of *hijab* production from national to global market. It dovetails global

market by forming Indonesia a world hijab-fashion empire by 2020. The analyst argues that the establishment of such an expansionist goal does not resemble the succeeded intervention of political Islam or Islamist agenda. It rather justifies capitalization of hijab in Indonesia that contributes to legitimating the growing nexus between neo-liberal capitalism and consumerism in Muslim society at global and national level. Instead of preserving the image of hijab as a symbolic identification of Islamist revolutionary imagination to challenge the body of western capitalism in Indonesia, it rather now turns to become a strategic means of capital accumulation and source of materialism.

This capitalization owes state's legitimacy since the state helps undermine the practice and discourse of hijab in Indonesia. In this vein, state's hegemonic power has shifted its mode of interaction with the practice and discourse of hijab. It then highlights the shifting relations between hijab and capitalism. Previously and specifically in the meantime of Suharto's era, hijab was alienated in practice and production; currently it positions itself in the centre of capitalism. Thus, according to Robert Cox, any hegemonic power is built on three pillars of hegemony which are ideas, institutions and material resources.

On the basis of ideas, the hegemonic power seeks to disseminate the essential of capitalism. In the context of hijab fashion in Indonesia, hijab becomes a new trend that increases consumerist behavior in Muslim society. According to Jean Baudrillard (1999), one of the characteristics of consumerist society is the changing logic behind any consumptive behavior. Baudrillard also notes that fashion somehow seem to lose the sense of morality since it reduces the meaning and increases consumer capitalism (Baudrillard 1993: 93-4). The idea that travels across many elements in secular society or even Muslim society portray image of hijab an oxymoron (Moors and Tarlo, 2013: 25). Hijab, as a piece of religious fashion in Islam, in all its manifestations probably brings a key role as to maintain "religious boundaries and the reproduction of tradition" (Arthur 1999). As the hijab itself turns to the process of production, packaging, it shifts the value it carries with. In the context of fashionable hijab or hijab fashion, the piety or religious identity, as a use value, is not by any means the main logic behind hijab consumption but the trend or even social class (Budiati, 2011: 66). Wearing hijab amongst Muslim women in contemporary Indonesia could deliver new identity. Most of the time, *Hijab*

is not only sold in traditional market; it rather dovetails the high-end department store. In this vein, hijab does not only address material value but also social value to Muslim women; a new symbol of modern Muslim women which confirms the capital ownership. It endeavors a new trend in urban Muslim society that eventually leads to the rise of new social value and bourgeoisie class – Muslim women with high consumer lifestyle.

On institutional basis, the government of Indonesia has also attempted to enlarge the potential market of hijab fashion through strengthening government's institutional support. The newly elected President Joko Widodo has marked his generous support toward the trend of hijab practice. In early 2015, Indonesian National Police, for example, allowed Muslim police women wearing hijab while working in order to fulfill the demand from those who seek to become a better *Muslimah* even when they are at office. After decades, the government finally renovated the institutional policy regulating Muslim policewomen's dress code.

More importantly, a several number of communities were also established to support the development of hijab-fashion industry in Indonesia. However, since late 1990s and early 2000s, the sophistication of Islamic clothing designs has even started and subsequently an association of Indonesian fashion designers named APPMI (the Association of Indonesian Fashion Designing Entrepreneurs) was built in 1993 aimed at stimulating sophistication of Muslim clothing manufactures. This body comprised intellectuals and business networks to identify pertinent strategies to develop design of Muslim fashion. Growing number of young Muslim fashion designers at home is critical to navigate government's orientation to become Muslim clothing center in international level. As to secure domestic market of hijab, some communities also flourished and implemented number of community based program related to hijab movements. The activities, displayed by Hijabers Community and Hijabers Mom community for example, reached attention from grass roots (Agustina 2015). They executed some programs for example religious preaching or any event related with women empowerment (Amrullah 2008).

The transformation in those two pillars, ideas and institutions, enhance the state's dominance on material resources. As Robert Cox emphasized that domination on material resources is not only based on the capability in wealth and material accumulation but also cultural leadership. In this context, the neo-liberal hegemony is in ways of



sustaining its cultural leadership by preserving the lifestyle of 'free trade will benefit everyone' as a common sense. Therefore, the neo-liberal economy restructuration at global level is also influential in accelerating Muslim hijab fashion market. Such a global restructuration requires economy restructuration at national level.

The global neo-liberal capitalism, through its agencies in national government body, coincidentally with the growing influence of global political Islam, has attempted at making the political Islam forces adapting and internalizing the values of neo-liberal capitalism. It remains a strategic challenge to the capacity of government's cultural leadership. As the government of Indonesia has repositioned its national economy to become open economy through liberalization of financial institutions, domestic market, manufactures for export, it then illuminated the presence of consumerism and capitalization of religious commodities.

The capitalization of hijab fashion in Indonesia can be seen as a product of government's capacity in practicing its cultural leadership as to identify the adaptation and internalization of neo-liberal capitalism by Muslim communities. The government of Indonesia has convincingly addressed the importance of capitalizing hijab fashion industry pertaining to some figure in Indonesia's fashion business received positive feedback at global level. For instance, Dian Pelangi was one of Indonesia's fashion designer named amongst 500 most influential persons in the fashion industry by *Business of Fashion*, a magazine based in UK. As hijab fashion continuously receives positive response from domestic and global market, Itang Yunaz – one of prominent male designers – decided to move into the fabrication of Muslim fashion (Global Business Guide Indonesia, 2016). Those two business intellectuals help the state convinced Muslim society in Indonesia concerning why capitalization of hijab matters. The on-going capitalization of hijab permeates Muslim communities' consciousness in adopting Western values that spread commodity cultures and increase consumption. Former thoughts on Islamic economies suggested Muslim communities adhering to "...Islamic virtues..." such as "...modesty, thrift, spiritualism, and communitarianism..." and preventing the materialism, individualism and conspicuous consumption..." (Gokariksel and McLarney 2010: 4). With reference to the rising trend of hijab consumption and trend, it seems to be relevant that such virtues are not well implemented.

At this stage, the state's hegemony nested in neo-liberal capitalist power is displaying its cultural leadership to enforcing Muslim communities adopting the value of neo-liberal capitalism.

By means of such cultural leadership, the state manages to maintain its dominance over material resources. According to data revealed by Indonesian Ministry of Industry, approximately 80% of Muslim clothing products are sold domestically and 20% remaining sold for export. A report from BPS (Central Body of Statistic) in 2013 also notified the hijab fashion production has helped number of companies in the fashion sector significantly enlarged and reached 1,107,955 units, by which 10% of them are large companies, 20% are medium and 70% are small enterprises. Around 30% of 750,000 small medium enterprises operated in the fashion manufactures are producing Muslim clothing (Global Business Guide Indonesia, 2016). On the other hand, at global level, Muslim fashion market sector is inviting attention and investment as global Muslim consumers spending on fashion was worth USD 230 billion in 2014. It means that Muslim fashion market earned as much as 11% of global fashion expenditure. Given this trend, several major actors in world fashion industry – ranging from Uniqlo to Mango, from DKNY to Tommy Hilfiger, and from ZARA to H&M – have decided to invest in this trend. However, a report rather indicated that Indonesia was the fifth major Muslim clothing fashion market in 2014. Knowing this competitive market, the government of Indonesia is in ways of optimizing its trading activity and productions domestically and globally. Therefore, the government decided to enlarge its vision making Indonesia a global hijab fashion capital by 2020 as its manifesto.

## 6 CONCLUSION

This study has investigated several critical points by employing the case of Indonesia's global goal becoming the world hijab fashion capital by 2020 as a point of departure. First, it has elucidated the changing relationship between the hegemonic power of state nested in neo-liberal capitalism and the practice of hijab in Indonesia. The state's dominance has undermined the practice of hijab in three forms; alienation, compromise, and capitalization. Previously, hijab remained a state's symbolic gesture in opposing and alienating the political Islam in Indonesia. As to secure the body of secular nationalist regime in Indonesia, any religious symbol

particularly hijab was strongly prohibited. However, as Suharto's regime faced continuous pressure from political Islam at grass root level which demanded the state to abolish its restriction on hijab, the state eventually to lesser extent downgraded its policy by allowing the use of hijab at public schools with some limitation. However, the fall of Suharto's authoritarian ruling elites led to the open democracy which hugely allowed Muslim women practicing the veiling in some public spheres.

The culmination of hijab practices in Indonesia critically marked a state of transformation from alienation to massive production of hijab. The case of publicizing Indonesia becoming the next global capital of hijab fashion market and industry evidently showed the state's transformative behavior. It leads to the last form of state's changing relations with the hijab practice that is the capitalization of hijab. The power of capital helps increase hijab trend significantly. In this vein, the analyst managed to question whether or not the political Islam force was the reason of the rising hijab trend.

To substantiate this question, with reference to neo-Gramscian perspectives, this study has figured out the political economy of Indonesia's global hijab fashion goal by arguing that such a grandiose end does not necessarily justify the influence of political Islam and its manifesto. The capitalization of hijab rather signifies the reconciliation between neo-liberal capitalism and Islamic economy. It is widely known that one of political Islam goals is to recall the saga of Islamic economy domination – during the Ottoman Empire – to replace the hegemony of neo liberal capitalism. As the hegemonic power of neo-liberal capitalism requires the strong cultural leadership of states at national level it does force Muslim community – including the hijab movements – to adopt and internalize the values of free trade making Islamic lifestyle as potential commodity to accumulating sources of wealth and material with larger results. Such a hegemonic power eventually creates superficial religiosity which is formed and maintained on the basis of social class. Given the fact that hijab sophistication creates bourgeoisie class of Muslim women with high consumer behavior and lifestyle, this capitalization of hijab has led to the decrease of virtues and the increase of capitalist class in Muslim society. It then recalls Robert Cox's concern on hegemony and global political economy, that the civil society's ambition to challenge the body of neo-liberal capitalism remains an uneasy task. Neither does the political Islam and Islamic

economy discourse eventually challenge the body of neo-liberal capitalism hegemony.

## REFERENCES

- Agustina, Hiqma Nur. "Hijabers: Fashion Trend for Moslem Women in Indonesia." *International Conference on Trends in Social Sciences and Humanities (TSSH-2015)*. Bali, 2015. 1-5.
- Akou, H. "Building a New World Fashion: Islamic Dress i the Twenty-first Century." *Fashion Theory Vol 11 No 4*, 2007 : 403-421.
- Amrullah, Eva. "Indonesian Muslim Fashion Styles and Designs." *ISIM Review*, January 2008: 20-23.
- Apeldoorn, Bastiaan van. *Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration*. London: Routledge, 2002.
- Arthur, L. *Religion, Dress and the Body*. Oxford: Berg, 1999.
- Baudrillard, J. *Symbolic Exchange and Death*. London: Sage, 1993.
- Baudrillard, Jean. *The Consumption Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999.
- Borsuk, Richard. "Markets: The Limits of Reform." In *Indonesia Beyond Suharto, Polity, Economy, Society Transition*, by Donald Emmerson, 136-167. New York: East Gate Book, 1999.
- Budiat, Atik Catur. "Jilbab: Gaya Hidup Baru Kaum Hawa (Jilbab: A Women's New Lifestyle)." *Jurnal Sosiologi Islam (Vol.1 No.1)*, 2011: 59-70.
- Candraningrum, Dewi. "Jurnal Perempuan." *Jurnal Perempuan Web Site*. October 9, 2015. <http://www.jurnalperempuan.org> (accessed November 12, 2017).
- Corrigan, Peter. *The Sociology of Consumption*. New Delhi: Sage Productions, 1997.
- Cox, R.W. "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method." In *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*, by Stephen Gill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Cox, R.W. "Social Forces, States, and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory." *Millenium Vol. 10. 2*, 1981.
- Cox, Robert. "Critical Political Economy." In *International Political Economy. Understanding Global Disorder*, by B. Hettne, 31-46. London & New Jersey: Zed Books, 1995.
- Cribb, Robert. "Nation: Making Indonesia." In *Indonesia Beyond Suharto, Polity, Economy, Society Transition*, by Donald Emmerson, 3-38. New York: East Gate Book, 1999.
- D., Plehwe., B.J.Walpen., G.Neunhoffer. *Neoliberal Hegemony: A Global Critique*. Routledge, 2006.
- D'Attoma, J. "Academia." [www.academia.com](http://www.academia.com). 2011. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/284284551\\_hegemony\\_or\\_Dominance\\_A\\_Gramscian\\_Analysis\\_of\\_US\\_Ascendancy](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/284284551_hegemony_or_Dominance_A_Gramscian_Analysis_of_US_Ascendancy) (accessed May 21, 2018).

- Eickelman, Dale, and James Piscatori. *Muslim Politics*. New Jersey and West Sussex: Princeton University Press, 1996.
- Emmerson, Donald. *Indonesia Beyond Suharto, Polity, Economy, Society Transition*. New York: East Gate Book, 1999.
- Gramsci, Antonio. *Quaderni del carcere, 4 Vols*. Turin: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1975.
- . *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. New York: International Publishers, 1971.
- Gurbuz, Mustafa, and Gulsum Kukuksari. "Between Sacred Codes and Secular Consumer Society: The Practice of Headscarf Adoption among American College Girls." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 2009: 387-399.
- Hadiz, Vedi R. "Indonesian Political Islam: Capitalist Development and the Legacies of the Cold War." *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 2011: 3-38.
- Hussein, Shakira. "The Limits of Force/Choice Discourses in Discussing Muslim Women's Dress Codes." *Transforming Culture*, 2007: 1-15.
- Indonesia, Global Business Guide. *gbgindonesia.com*. 2016. <http://www.gbgindonesia.com/en/manufacturig/article/2016/> (accessed January 23, 2018).
- Iseri, E. "Academia." *www.academia.edu*. 2007. [http://www.academia.edu/457956/Neo-Gramscian\\_Analysis\\_of\\_US\\_Hegemony\\_Today](http://www.academia.edu/457956/Neo-Gramscian_Analysis_of_US_Hegemony_Today) (accessed May 12, 2018).
- Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Keohane, Robert O. *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations*. Westview Press, 1989.
- Konrad, A. "E-International Relations." *www.e-r.info*. September 2, 2012. <http://www.e-r.info/2012/09/02/theorizig-realist-and-gramscian-hegemony> (accessed May 2, 2018).
- L., Arthur. *Religion, Dress and the Body*. Oxford: Berg Press, 1999.
- Langley, Paul. *World Financial Orders An Historical International Political Economy*. London, New York, Canada: Routledge, 2002.
- Liddle, R. William. "Regime: The New Order." In *Indonesia Beyond Society, Polity, Economy, Society*, by Donald Emmerson, 39-70. New York: East Gate Book, 1999.
- Moors, Annelies, and Emma Tarlo. "Introduction: Islamic Fashion and Anti-Fashion: New Perspectives from Europe and North America." In *Islamic Fashion and Anti-Fashion New Perspectives from Europe and North America Edited*, by Emma Tarlo and Annelies Moors, 17-38. London and New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013.
- Morton, Adam. *Unravelling Gramsci, Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy*. London: Pluto Press, 2007.
- Mudjito. "Pakaian Seragam: Tanggapan P dan K." *Tempo*, October 27, 1984: NA.
- Sacko, T.S. Mowle and D.H. *The Unipolar World: An Unbalanced Future*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- Scott, James. *Domination and The Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.
- Stillman, Yedida. *Arab Dress: A Short Story from the Dawn of Islam to Modern Times*. Leiden: Brill, 2000.
- Tantowi, Ali. "The Quest of Indonesian Muslim Identity Debates on Veiling from the 1920s to 1940s." *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, 2010: 62-90.
- White, Jenny. *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Widyawati, Ari. "Pengaruh Masyarakat Islam dalam Pertumbuhan Ekonomi: Analisis Industri Fesyen Muslim (The Influence of Islamic Community in Economic Growth: Muslim Fashion Analysis)." *Community Development Journal*, 2016: 1-20.