Affinity-based Interpretation of Triangle Social Scenarios

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Abstract: Computational interpretation of social scenarios is a critical step towards more human-like artificial intelligence. We present a model that interprets social scenarios by deducing the affinities of the constituent relationships. First, our model deploys Bayesian inference with an action affinity lexicon to infer probabilistic affinity relations characterizing the scenario. Subsequently, our model is able to use the inferred affinity relations to choose the most probable statement from multiple plausible statements about the scenario. We evaluate our approach on 80 Triangle-COPA multiple-choice problems that test interpretation of social scenarios. Our approach correctly answers the majority (59) of the 80 questions (73.75%), including questions about behaviors, emotions, social conventions, and complex constructs. Our model maintains interpretive power while using knowledge captured in the lightweight action affinity lexicon. Our model is a promising approach to interpretation of social scenarios, and we identify potential applications to automated narrative analysis, AI narrative generation, and assistive technology.

1 INTRODUCTION

Given a brief social scenario, healthy humans experience a number of social percepts; we infer beliefs, goals, emotions, and social relationships seemingly effortlessly (Rutherford and Kuhlmeier, 2013). Similar social perception is essential for future artificial intelligence systems meant to interact with or emulate humans.

Logic-based automated social inference can provide rich interpretations of social scenarios but comes with the steep cost of carefully curating large, rich knowledge bases of psychology and sociology axioms (Davis and Morgenstern, 2005; Gordon and Hobbs, 2011; Gordon 2016). Standard sentiment analysis of social scenarios makes use of simpler knowledge: easily obtained sentiment lexicons; but standard sentiment analysis only captures scenarios' evolving positivity/negativity, precluding rich interpretations (Reagan et al., 2016). For computational interpretation of social scenarios to become more useful and generalizable, novel approaches must be developed, able to conduct relatively rich interpretation using relatively lightweight knowledge.

Studies from psychology reveal that one-year-old infants recognize the underlying difference between

helping relationships and hindering relationships and make assumptions about subsequent behaviors (Premack and Premack, 1997; Kuhlmeier et al., 2004). Motivated by these studies, we introduce a model for interpreting social scenarios by deducing the affinities of the constituent relationships. In comparison to logic-based automated social inference, our model for affinity-based automated interpretation of social scenarios uses simpler knowledge, like that of sentiment analysis, while maintaining significant interpretive power.

2 FURTHER BACKGROUND

The term *social perception* is most closely associated with the social psychologist Fritz Heider (Rutherford and Kuhlmeier, 2013). Heider and Simmel (1944) famously demonstrated that subjects presented with a short film of geometric shapes moving in relation to one another interpreted the film in social terms.

The Triangle Choice of Plausible Alternatives (Triangle-COPA) challenge problems by Maslan et al. (2015) constitute a development test set, akin to training data, for computational interpretation of behavior. Each Triangle-COPA problem contains a

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question describing a brief scenario in the style of the Heider-Simmel film: two triangles and a circle perform various actions in and around a room with a door. Each question is accompanied by a correct answer and an incorrect answer, where correctness has been established by perfect agreement among human raters. The task is to computationally determine which is the correct answer. An example Triangle-COPA challenge problem is as follows:

Question 10. A triangle and circle are arguing. The circle turns around and leaves the room. Why does the circle leave? (Correct: The circle is annoyed with the triangle. Incorrect: The circle is happy with the triangle.)

Triangle-COPA is an attractive framework for developing computational interpretation of social scenarios. Each Triangle-COPA problem is provided in two forms, an English form and a logical literal form using a fixed vocabulary. Researchers using the logical form are free to concentrate on interpretation while circumventing many natural language processing challenges. Additionally, the multiple-choice structure of Triangle-COPA enables straightforward assessment of success.

Gordon (2016) presents a Triangle-COPA solver that models interpretation of behavior as a probabilistic logical abduction process: the model identifies sets of assumptions that would account for the behavior specified in a question and chooses the answer associated with the more probable set. Identifying assumptions that may account for specified behavior relies on a hand-authored knowledge base of 252 axioms, which explicitly encode all necessary knowledge and probability estimates based on the authors' intuitions. While the approach by Gordon correctly solves the large majority (91) of 100 Triangle-COPA problems, Gordon notes that this success relies on the laborious task of hand-authoring the exact axioms and probability estimates necessary to solve these questions correctly.

Many probabilistic automated reasoning systems, including the previous Triangle-COPA solver by Gordon (2016), rely on being fed absolute prior dissimilar probabilities of many events. Mathematically, absolute prior probabilities are minimally constrained. Conceptually, absolute prior probabilities are ill defined and may have multiple, mutually contradictory meanings for different members of the public (Gigerenzer et al., 2005). As a result, non-arbitrary, non-biased absolute prior probabilities are problematic to obtain. We are motivated to formulate a model for interpretation of social scenarios that uses lightweight knowledge and that does not use absolute prior probabilities.

3 COMPUTATIONAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Deduction of Affinity Relations

Given a social scenario, our model deploys Bayesian inference with an action affinity lexicon to infer probabilistic affinity relations characterizing the scenario. Given a finite set of agents A and a finite sequence of actions (s_n) , we define a social scenario as the finite sequence of events (e_n) , where each event e_t consists of an agent completing the action s_t , which is optionally directed at an object or another agent.

3.1.1 Affinity Relation

According to our formulation, between any two agents $a_1, a_2 \in A$, there exists a mutual affinity, which takes on a discrete affinity state $f \in \{Unpleasant, Neutral, Pleasant\}$. For the agent pair (a_1, a_2) , the probability b(f) denotes the model's belief that the affinity state f is the true affinity of the pair. We underscore that these beliefs are meant to represent those of an impartial observer; our formulation does not currently represent the subjective beliefs of agents. For the agent pair (a_1, a_2) , the belief set, b(Unpleasant), b(Neutral), and b(Pleasant) sums to 1; we refer to this belief set as the affinity relation linking a_1 and a_2 .

3.1.2 Action Affinity Lexicon

Our model relies on a static probabilistic action affinity lexicon, which links actions to corresponding affinities. For example, the lexicon may capture that *arguing* commonly corresponds to an *unpleasant* affinity. Formally, each entry in the lexicon links an action s to the *relative observation distribution* of s:

$$\left\{\frac{P(s|f)}{P(s)}: f \in \left\{\begin{array}{c} Unpleasant\\ Neutral\\ Pleasant \end{array}\right\}\right\}$$
(1)

Intuitively, each entry contains an action and the relative likelihood of witnessing that action in the context of each affinity state. Table 1 presents a sample action affinity lexicon. We note that our model relies on relative observation distributions and never relies on absolute prior probabilities.

Table 1: Sample action affinity lexicon that may be used to interpret Triangle-COPA question 10 (presented in Section 2). The lexicon consists of each action in the logical literal form of question 10 and its relative observation distribution over the affinity state space.

Action	Relative Observation Distribution			
	Unpleasant	Neutral	Pleasant	
argue_with	.50 (high)	.25 (low)	.25 (low)	
turn	.40 (high)	.40 (high)	.20 (low)	
exit	. 3 (high)	. 3 (high)	. 3 (high)	
annoy	.50 (high)	.25 (low)	.25 (low)	
be_happy	.25 (low)	.25 (low)	.50 (high)	

3.1.3 Modified Bayesian Belief Updates

For the agent pair (a_1, a_2) , until our model observes interaction between a_1 and a_2 , the respective affinity relation is uninformed and is accordingly represented as a discrete uniform distribution:

$$b(f) = \frac{1}{3}, f \in \begin{cases} Unpleasant\\ Neutral\\ Pleasant \end{cases}$$
(2)

Upon observing agent a_1 direct the action s_t at agent a_2 (e.g. *Patti pokes Alex*), the model queries its action affinity lexicon for the relative observation distribution of action s_t (e.g. the relative observation distribution of *poke*) and uses this knowledge to update the affinity relation linking a_1 and a_2 (e.g. between *Patti* and *Alex*).

Further, our model can extract additional information from object-directed and undirected actions. Suppose, slightly later, a_2 directs the action $s_{t'}$ at an object (e.g. Alex slams the door) or agent a_2 's action $s_{t'}$ is undirected (e.g. Alex yelps). Humans intuitively interpret $s_{t'}$ as a reaction to a_1 , (e.g. a reaction to Patti's poke) despite the fact that s_{t} is not explicitly directed at a_1 . In order to glean more social information from a given social scenario, we provide our model with a baseline formulation for handling these implicitly directed actions: upon observing an object-directed or undirected action such as s_{tt} , our model proceeds as though the action is implicitly directed at the lastmentioned agent (in this case, a_1). As in the explicitly directed case, our model then goes on to update the affinity relation linking agents a_1 and a_2 .

We formulate a modified Bayesian belief update function. Standard Bayesian belief updates place equal weight on each piece of evidence encountered. Yet, social descriptions often begin by describing many minor events intended to set up subsequent major events. Moreover, human judgment of an experience tends to be inordinately affected by the experience's end (Kahneman et al., 1993). On these grounds, our model uses a recency-weighted reformulation of Bayesian belief updates, in which recently observed actions have greater impact on the model's beliefs than earlier observed actions. Each updated belief $b_t(f)$ is a deterministic, recency-weighted Bayesian function of the previous belief $b_{t-1}(f)$, the action s_t , and the timestep t:

$$b_t(f) \propto b_{t-1}(f) \left(\frac{P(s_t|f)}{P(s_t)}\right)^t \tag{3}$$

In Figure 1, we present a demonstrative example of our model's capacity to deduce affinity relations from a brief social scenario.




Figure 1: Deduction of the affinity relation between the Circle and the Big Triangle during Triangle-COPA question 10. Before the first event, the observer believes *Unpleasant, Neutral, and Pleasant* affinities are equally probable. As events unfold, the observer increasingly believes that an *Unpleasant* affinity is the most probable.

3.2 Multiple-choice Question Answering

In order for our model to solve multiple-choice problems about social scenarios such as the Triangle-COPA problems, our model must be able to interpret a descriptive question, evaluate a finite set of plausible descriptive answers (choices) C, and choose the best answer in C. We describe a method for answer selection: having deduced a finite set of underlying affinity relations B from the question, our model calculates the conditional probability for each descriptive answer $c \in C$ given B; our model then chooses the answer with the highest conditional probability. We assume each answer *c* is an interpretation such that *c* is itself a (possibly high-level) social scenario in our sense. Our model calculates the conditional probability of *c* given *B* by calculating the joint conditional probability of the events in *c* given *B*. When observing e_t of answer *c*, in which a_1 explicitly or implicitly directs action s_t at agent a_2 (e.g. *Patti annoys Alex*), our model queries its action affinity lexicon for the relative observation distribution of s_t (e.g. the relative observation distribution of *annoy*), queries *B* for the relevant affinity relation (e.g. the affinity relation linking *Patti* and *Alex*), and generates an expression for the conditional probability of e_t given *B*:

$$P(e_t|B) =$$

$$P(s_t) \times \sum_{\substack{f \in \binom{Unpleasant}{Neutral} \\ Pleasant}} \left(\left(\frac{P(s_t|f)}{P(s_t)} \right) b(f) \right)$$
(4)

As our model maintains no knowledge of absolute prior probabilities of actions, at this point, the conditional probability of event e_t remains in terms of $P(s_t)$.

We adopt the simplifying assumption that events are conditionally independent. Thus, the joint probability of the conjunction of events in c can be expressed as the product of the probabilities of the events in c. We must control, however, for the effect of the number of events, so that longer answers are not penalized. The normalized conditional probability of each answer c given B is expressed as follows:

$$P_{Norm}(c|B) = \prod_{i=1}^{i=n_c} P(e_i|B) \prod_{j=n_c}^{j=N} \bar{P}_c$$
(5)

where n_c denotes the number of events in answer c, N denotes the maximum number of events of any potential answer in answer set C, and \overline{P}_c denotes the average conditional probability of the events in c.

Finally, the model should select the answer *c* that has the highest normalized conditional probability (maximizing $P_{Norm}(c|B)$). Recall, however, that these expressions remain in terms of several prior probabilities of actions, precluding immediate comparison. Rather than engaging in the difficult task of obtaining non-arbitrary, non-biased prior probabilities, we assume a discrete uniform distribution across action priors, allowing these priors to fall out of the necessary inequalities. Our model is thus able to choose the answer *c* with the highest normalized conditional probability.

4 SOLVING Triangle-COPA PROBLEMS

In order to provide a baseline evaluation of our approach, we implemented our model in a software system, we fed the system Triangle-COPA problems containing social scenarios, and we fed the system a hand-authored action affinity lexicon of the Triangle-COPA actions.

Our hand-authored action affinity lexicon contained entries corresponding to each of the 119 standard first-order logical predicates used in Triangle-COPA problems We completed this handauthoring task based on author intuition, and we acknowledge that this approach comes with the risk of systematic bias (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982).

We fed the software system the Triangle-COPA problems in their logical literal form. The system cast each logical literal as an event by extracting the critical arguments from the literal: the actor, the action, and the optional argument encoding who or what the action was directed towards. Some Triangle-COPA problems contain additional notation encoding nested literals, concurrent literals, or negation of literals (Maslan et al., 2015). It is not obvious how these three cases (nested literals, concurrent literals, and negation of literals) might be simply interpreted. To provide our baseline approach without having to solve many natural language processing challenges, we handled these three cases as follows. First, we serialized nested literals: we cast the outer directed literal to an undirected literal, and we included both the outer and inner literals in the scenario description. Second, we serialized concurrent literals: we removed special literals distinguishing between in-sequence events and inparallel events, and we interpreted all literal sequences as event sequences. Third, we removed Triangle-COPA problems containing negation: 11 Triangle-COPA problems containing the special literal not were removed from our Triangle-COPA test set. Additionally, in order to use Triangle-COPA to evaluate interpretation of social scenarios, we removed the 9 Triangle-COPA problems that describe only one character, on the grounds that they contain no social relationships. Our final Triangle-COPA test set contained 80 Triangle-COPA problems.

For each of these Triangle-COPA problems, the system first observed the ordered literals in the

Triangle-COPA question and, using our handauthored action affinity lexicon, deduced the underlying affinity relations. Then, the system observed the ordered literals in each of the two Triangle-COPA plausible answers, and, using our hand-authored action affinity lexicon and the deduced affinity relations, the system chose the most probable answer.

5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Of the 80 problems in our Triangle-COPA problem set, our approach correctly answers 59 problems (73.75%) and incorrectly answers 8 problems (10.00%). On the remaining 13 problems (16.25%), our approach is unable to determine the better choice between the two possible answers and accordingly leaves these problems unanswered. Table 2 presents the performance of our approach and the performance of the previous Triangle-COPA solver by Gordon (2016).

Table 2: Performance of our affinity-based approach and the approach by Gordon (2016) on 80 Triangle-COPA problems depicting social scenarios.

	Correctly answered	Incorrectly answered	Unanswered
Affinity-	59	8	13
based	(73.75%)	(10.00%)	(16.25%)
Gordon	71	8	1
(2016)	(88.75%)	(10.00%)	(1.25%)

The authors of Triangle-COPA have emphasized that it is a development test set and is not valid for competitive evaluations. Indeed, Gordon (2016) credits the relative success of his Triangle-COPA solver to laborious hand authoring of event probabilities and axioms that target the correct answers. In contrast, our affinity-based model relies on a relatively lightweight action affinity lexicon; so the relatively better performance of Gordon (2016) is largely uninteresting to us. Instead, we are primarily interested in examining our system's performance on specific problems to gauge how automated deduction of affinity relations and related strategies might facilitate aspects of computational social perception.

The problems that our system answers correctly

span a wide range of social scenarios. For example, the system correctly answers the following questions:

Question 7. A circle examines a small triangle from across the room. Why does the circle do this? (Correct: The circle is curious. Incorrect: The circle is angry.)

Question 10. A triangle and circle are arguing. The circle turns around and leaves the room. Why does the circle leave? (Correct: The circle is annoyed with the triangle. Incorrect: The circle is happy with the triangle.)

Question 12. Two triangles are playing with each other outside. How do they feel? (Correct: They feel happy. Incorrect: They feel angry.)

Question 31. Two triangles talk to each other and then hug. Why? (Correct: The triangles are friends. Incorrect answer: The triangles are enemies.)

Question 49. The circle nods at the triangle. Why? (Correct: The circle agrees with the triangle. Incorrect: the circle disagrees with the triangle).

Question 88. A small triangle kisses a big triangle. Why does the small triangle do this? (Correct: The small triangle loves the big triangle.) Incorrect: The small triangle hates the big triangle.)

These successes indicate that our system is able to answer questions about unpleasant affinities (question 10), pleasant affinities (question 12), and neutral affinities (question 7); and our system is able to answer questions about single-event scenarios (question 12) and multi-event scenarios (question 10). Further examining the correctly answered questions (momentarily treating our system as a black box), our system seems to demonstrate significant social knowledge, including regarding emotions such as happiness (questions 10 and 12), social conventions such as nodding in agreement (question 49), relationship types such as friends and enemies (question 31), and complex constructs such as love and hate (question 88).

These rich results are in stark contrast to the simplicity of our model. These results demonstrate that knowledge appropriately grounded in the affinity states *Unpleasant*, *Neutral*, and *Pleasant* can concisely encode significant social knowledge applicable to many social scenarios. Future work might benefit from a direct comparison between affinity-based interpretation (reasoning about positivity/negativity of relationships), valence-based interpretation (reasoning about positivity/nega

of individuals), and sentiment analysis (reasoning about overall/authorial positivity/negativity). A direct comparison might elucidate whether the moderate success of our affinity-based model derives more from the positivity/negativity framework or the relationship-level focus of affinity.

We note that, in order to provide a baseline evaluation of our system, we hand-authored the action affinity lexicon of the Triangle-COPA actions. While hand-authoring is simple and fast to complete, careful design decisions have been made to guarantee that hand-authoring will never impede the generalizability of the system: for future use of the system, the simple, numerical, and intuitively meaningful content of the action affinity lexicon is well-suited for crowd-sourcing or automated learning. Further, unlike many probabilistic automated reasoning systems, our model does not rely on being fed absolute prior probabilities, thus avoiding the difficult task of obtaining non-arbitrary, non-biased absolute prior probabilities. Also in order to provide a baseline evaluation of our system, we serialized all logical Triangle-COPA literals, including nested literals and literals indicated to occur in parallel. Future work may investigate strategies for more true-to-intention interpretation of complex literal notation.

We now consider questions that were not correctly answered. In two problems (questions 35 and 37), the possible Triangle-COPA answers are of similar affinity, but only the correct answer is consistent with certain nonsocial knowledge. For example:

Question 35. A circle and a small triangle are running alongside of each other. The circle slows down and then stops. Why? (Correct: The circle is exhausted from running. Incorrect: The circle is sleepy.)

Human solvers access nonsocial commonsense knowledge: for example, the knowledge that one may be exhausted after one exerts oneself. Our affinity-based model cannot capture this nonsocial commonsense knowledge and, appropriately, leaves these questions unanswered.

Two unanswered problems (questions 72 and 89) depict the transitivity of affinity. For example:

Question 72. A big triangle and little triangle are strolling together. A circle runs towards them, picks up the little triangle and runs away. How does the big triangle feel? (Correct: The big triangle is upset. Incorrect: The big triangle is happy.)

Our model correctly interprets that the Big

Triangle's feelings (expressed in the possible answers) are implicitly directed at the Circle. Yet, the model believes the Big Triangle and the Circle have not had any meaningful interactions and finds the affinity relation between the Big Triangle and the Circle to be uninformed. Consequently, our model considers the Big Triangle's negative feelings (in the first answer) and the Big Triangle's positive feelings (in the second answer) to be equally probable, and the question is left unanswered. We note that our model readily perceives that the affinity between the Big Triangle and Little Triangle is pleasant and that the affinity between the Circle and the Little Triangle is unpleasant; but, unlike humans, our model does not conclude that the affinity between the Big Triangle and the Circle is therefore also unpleasant. This performance suggests that in order to foster more human-like interpretation our model should incorporate reasoning about the transitivity of affinity. Social Balance Theory mathematically characterizes the transitivity of affinity in human social networks, and is well suited to be incorporated into our system in future work (Heider, 1946; Cartwright and Harary, 1956).

In one incorrectly answered problem (question 36) and seven unanswered problems (questions 2, 26, 40, 41, 54, 57, and 98), the Triangle-COPA possible answers reflected similar underlying affinity relations but differing underlying dominance relations. For example:

Question 2. The triangle saw the circle and started shaking. Why did the triangle start shaking? (Correct: The triangle is scared. Incorrect: The triangle is upset.)

Both answers are consistent with the negative affinity relation between the Triangle and the Circle; but only fear (the correct answer) is also consistent with the Triangle's submissiveness and the Circle's dominance in the Triangle-Circle relationship. The significant number of questions requiring interpretation regarding dominance suggests future work should broaden the relationship model to include the existing (undirected) affinity relation and a novel directed dominance relation.

In order to more formally characterize the deficiency in our model, we consider emotional dimensions our model cannot currently capture. We consider the three emotional dimensions proposed by the Pleasure Arousal and Dominance (PAD) emotional state model, which is often used for emotion modeling and emotion measurement (Mehrabian, 1996). In our current model, the PAD dimension Pleasure, is captured by the skew of the

affinity relation (towards *Pleasant* or *Unpleasant*). The PAD dimension Arousal is implicitly captured by the centrality of the affinity relation (towards or away from *Neutral*). The PAD dimension Dominance is, however, not captured. This reinforces our hypothesis that a broader relationship model including an affinity relation and a dominance relation may facilitate more human-like interpretation of social scenarios.

6 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK

In this paper, we present affinity-based interpretation of social scenarios. Logic-based automated social inference requires carefully curating large, rich knowledge bases. In contrast, our model conducts affinity-based interpretation of social scenarios using a relatively lightweight action affinity lexicon and maintains significant interpretive power. First, our model deduces affinity relations from a social scenario. Then, using the deduced affinity relations, our model is able to choose the more probable statement from multiple plausible statements regarding the social scenario. This model, in whole and in part, may be developed for future applications.

We evaluated a baseline implementation of our approach on Triangle-COPA multiple-choice problems describing social scenarios. Using our hand-authored action affinity lexicon of Triangle-COPA actions, the implemented system solves the majority of problems, successfully answering questions about behaviors, emotions, social conventions, relationships, and complex constructs. These rich results draw our attention to how knowledge appropriately grounded in the affinity states *Unpleasant*, *Neutral*, and *Pleasant* can concisely encode significant social knowledge applicable to many social scenarios.

By closely analyzing our model's performance on Triangle-COPA, we have identified key steps towards model augmentation: incorporation of Social Balance Theory and incorporation of a directed dominance relation. Simultaneously, potential applications have emerged. Our model is well poised to enrich automated narrative analysis, to guide AI narrative generation, and to assist individuals suffering from impaired social cognition.

As large text corpora have become increasingly available online, the demand has grown for computational narrative analysis. Particularly dominant is Social Network Analysis of literature, vet standard character network extraction is based only on character co-occurrence (Bonato et al., 2016: Moretti, 2011). These character networks represent familiarity, while disregarding many other aspects of characters' relationships. Affinity relations deduced from literature may provide an alternative to standard character networks. Combining deduction of affinity relations with extraction of character networks may produce representations that are richer still. The challenge will be adapting our model to features of longer works (e.g. longer-range dependencies between actions); yet our model will also benefit from the significantly larger source material, as the task will become more robust and fault-tolerant, and currently sparse social interactions will be abundant.

Our model also has potential for guiding AI narrative generation. Narrative generation may be cast as repeatedly selecting an event to continue a given context (a partial draft of a story) (Gervás, 2009). If a partial draft of a story can be considered a social scenario in our sense, then our model could be used to select continuations that are interesting and believable.

Finally, certain individuals, including many individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), experience impairment of social cognition. Reading comprehension is critical for academic and professional success, and these individuals struggle to comprehend pervasive social aspects of texts (Brown et al., 2013). As our model operates on text to deduce affinities and to interpret social scenarios, our model lays promising groundwork for easing the difficulties these individuals face when reading. Future work will aim to develop our model into an autonomous service for these individuals, supporting digital inclusion and accessibility.

Given the performance of our affinity-based model and given the requisite lexicon is simple and well suited for automated learning, we believe our model is a promising approach for interpretation of social scenarios and is well-poised for application.

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