Lightweight Trust Model with High Longevity for Wireless Sensor Networks

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Abstract: Due to their inherent features Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are vulnerable to many security threats. Moreover, traditional security mechanisms cannot be directly used in WSNs as they present constrained resources in terms of communication, computation and energy. Trust management models have recently been suggested as an effective security mechanism for WSNs. The already found solutions are very expensive in terms of energy and memory, which seriously affects the lifetime of such networks. In this paper, we will present a lightweight trust management model, which guarantees the reliability and robustness of the network, seeking to increase its lifetime compared to existing models.

1 INTRODUCTION

The use of sensor networks is increasing more and more in many areas, such as scientific, medical, domestic, military, etc. However, this type of networks still suffers from an energy autonomy limitation that restricts the network lifetime. Energy is a vital component for WSNs. Namely, trust and energy are the two most critical axes vitally affecting the efficiency and lifetime of the network. Trust has been the focus of researchers for a long time. The general idea of trust in WSNs is to observe the behaviour of the sensors. Our trust model must take into account the hardware and software requirements of these networks and their specificities. It is simple, not expensive in terms of energy. This model is designated for domestic, environmental and medical applications that do not require a massive security rates. To ensure a high confidence, we seek to analyze the different actions of a sensor node and order these actions depending on the detected behaviour. If the behaviour is normal, node is confident. However, if the behaviour of the node is not normal, node will be penalized. A detected bad behaviour is not always caused by a malicious node, it may be caused by the hardest environment in which the network operates or by a transmission error. All the aforementioned is considered by our model. This paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the related work, section 3 describes our proposed scheme, section 4 presents simulation results, and finally section 5 concludes the paper.

2 RELATED WORK

Trust has been the focus of researchers for a long time. It started in social sciences where trust between humans was studied. Trust was used in the context of e-commerce (Yoon and Occena, 2015), peer-to-peer networks system (Boutaba and Marshall, 2006) and ad-hoc networks (Cheikhrouhou, 2015). From 2004, trust and reputation systems have been adapted for WSNs (Chen et al., 2007). These systems must be light enough to ensure proper operation without harming the functionality of the systems (Ozdemir, 2008). The general idea of trust in WSNs is to observe the behaviour of the sensors, their compliance with respect to what is expected, and to calculate and assign confidence values to different participating nodes (Ganeriwal et al., 2004). The first trust management system used in the field of WSNs is the Beta reputation system that has been proposed by Josang & Ismail in 2002 (Josang and Ismail, 2002). This system was created to integrate...
the notion of reputation in the e-commerce context. Some researches like Ganeriwal and Srivatava in RFSN (Reputation-based Framework for high integrity Sensor Networks) (Yao et al., 2008) used the work of Josang & Ismail presented in 2002 (Ganeriwal et al., 2004) based on the probability beta function in the creation of their trust models for wireless sensor networks. This work is the first model of trust and reputation exclusively developed for wireless sensor networks. Authors in ATSAN (Agent-based Trust Model in Wireless Sensor Networks) (Chen et al., 2007) propose an agent model based on trust to detect malicious nodes. ATSAN runs in the middleware of each agent node that uses the watchdog scheme to monitor the behavior of nodes in the radio range. Unlike RFSN (Ganeriwal et al., 2004), using a single watchdog for all nodes. Some researches use a security mechanism to ensure confidence like PLUS (Parameterized and Localized Trust Management Scheme) (Yao et al., 2008). PLUS may not be suitable for WSNs with high traffic rates. NBBTE (Node Behavioural strategies Belief theory of the Trust Evaluation algorithm) (Feng et al., 2011) is another trust model based on direct observation. It use the fuzzy theory to measure how the confidence value of a node belongs to his confidence. Another model specially developed for WSN is the GTMS (Group-Based Trust Management Scheme) (Deng et al., 2009). In this model, only one trust value is calculated for each group. Because the vulnerabilities of wireless transmission channels, an intruder can easily attack the information transmitted via the transmission channel. For that, many researches focus on data transmission evaluation like DFDI (Distinguish Forged Data Illegal) (Hur et al., 2005). Recently, some hybrid models like (Na et al., 2014), (Kumar et al., 2014) integrate both confidence of data and communication. In (Na et al., 2014), the authors propose a trust model that provides both, communication security and data security with the integration of encryption. The real problem experienced by trust management models is the large amount of energy dissipated in order to maintain trust. Similarly most of the existing models in the literature are probabilistic models such RFSN (Ganeriwal et al., 2004), ATSAN (Chen et al., 2007), GRSSN (Momani and Challa, 2010). The mathematical methods usually used to obtain more precise values of trust as PLUS (Yao et al., 2008) which includes hashing. Despite the performance that the existing models have, they suffer from a great amount of dissipated energy and some of them need a specific type of nodes that have more performers like ATSAN (Chen et al., 2007). The sensor network is a rapidly developing area that requires more confidence models, more reliable, more secure and less expensive. For this purpose, we design a new model named LTMHL: Lightweight Trust Model with High Longevity. We demonstrated that LTMHL is a powerful model that guaranties reliability, robustness and high longevity.

3 DESCRIPTION OF OUR MODEL

3.1 Metrics of Trust

Confidence factors that will be used in our work are: Direct observation, indirect observation, reputation, aging, and finally the updates. In our work, direct observation is based on the experience of the node itself, its observations and direct interaction with its neighbours. Indirect observation is based on recommendations received from other trusted node on the network. The reputation in our context is the behaviour of a node towards its neighbours. Ageing means that a node with an exhausted energy will be excluded from the network. The nodes in interactions with an exhausted energy node will be informed to limit identity usurpation attack. In fact, a node can spy the identity of an excluded node and communicate in the network without being detected. Finally, the updates are essential in order to remain able to any changes on the network.

3.2 Establishment of the Trust

The establishment of trust between nodes in a wireless sensor network is the most important dynamic aspect that ensures network efficiency. Establishing of trust is generally based on the two most important sources for calculating, the direct trust and indirect trust. In our model, the establishment of trust is based on direct observation, indirect observation, updating and ageing. The calculation of confidence is based on the direct and indirect observation. These observations affect the decision of allowing a node to enter or refusing to communicate with another node. Aging and update are factors that ensure efficiency and robustness of our model. The figure below describes the establishment of trust in our model.
3.3 General Model of Trust

In our model, we consider a hierarchical network, where the collection station is considered trusted. Initially, upon deployment, all nodes are considered trusted view that an adversary can be integrated in the network and compromise a node after 10 seconds of deployment according to (Anderson and Kuhn, 1996). This time is enough sufficient for the network to take place where each node can communicate in its surrounding trustfully. We assume that the data transfer is done periodically. Nodes must send their data every time slot. Before deployment, a node is preloaded by the identity of its neighbouring nodes which will communicate with them based on the value of direct observation. Initially, each node is confident and has a confidence value equal to 1. In our model, a confidence threshold is set at 0.5. A node is considered confident if its confidence is greater or equal to 0.5. When node A sends a message to node B for the first time, B creates a trusting table for node A. The confidence value is the same for each success transmission. Each time the node observes an untrusted node, it performs directly a trusted decrease of the confidence value of the node and sends a message to inform the cluster head to update its trusted table. When a node is considered untrusted in a transmission, its value will be reduced by 0.1 from its neighbour node which detects this malignancy. After minimizing the trust value of this malicious node, the neighbour node sends a message to its cluster head to update its confidence table regarding this malicious node. If the confidence value record in the cluster head will be less or equal to 0.4, this malicious node will be excluded from the network. Each time a cluster head detect an untrusted node, it removes it from the table and sends a broadcast message to all nodes to exclude it. Then the cluster head sends a message to inform the sink about the change. It updates its confidence table. Similarly, the cluster head is in the trusted table of all neighbouring nodes. If a cluster head will be detected as untrusted in a transaction, the node detecting this malicious sends a message to the nearest cluster head that informs the sink. Subsequently the sink updates its confidence table. In case of detection of a malicious cluster head with a trust lower than 0.5, the node which detect this malice send a message to a nearest node of a neighbour group in its communication range that transmit this information to the sink. The base station sends a broadcast to all group nodes to inform them of the exclusion of their leader. In our network communication, trust value of node j decreases by referring to the table below:

Table 1: Nodes behavioural evaluation metrics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nº</th>
<th>Cause of trust decreases</th>
<th>Penality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>If the identity of the sending node i = identity of the receiving node.</td>
<td>Trust (i) = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>A node i stop sending messages during a transmission</td>
<td>Trust (i) = trust (i) - c and c = 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>If the message received by j is returned multiple times. Node i wants to communicate with node j and i is not a direct neighbour of j.</td>
<td>Trust (j) = trust (j) - c and c = 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>If Trust(i)&gt; threshold Then communication established Else communication rejected Trust (i) = 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the first rule cited in Table 3, the reduction must be drastic. This assessment is based on direct observation and it concerns only neighboring nodes. In order to know the identity of a malicious node, the node must make listen to different messages exchanged between its neighbor nodes and detect which one has usurped its identity. Similarly a node which uses a false identity will stop sending its own messages with its real identity, so it will be detected as malicious and penalized (according to rule 2). In the second rule, as the transmission of data is performed periodically, each node must send its data in its corresponding transmission slot. A stop of transmission can be directly detected. This can be done by transmission error caused by the hardest environment or by a malicious behavior (selfish behavior). The minimization of trust does not cause the elimination of the network node, but if the fault occurs several times it is considered that it is made by an intruder. The choice of the minimization of trust every malicious event seeks to differentiate between a real attack and a simple transmission error, and for that we avoid increasing the value of trust when the node behaves well. In the third case,
fake nodes can use old message. This message can be resend by false nodes that aims to exhaust the energy of honest nodes. For that, a nonce value is used to verify the message freshness. A node always saves the value of the last received nonce. At each new forwarding this value must be incremented by 1. If this is not the case, a malice is detected. In rule 4, when node j receives a message from node i, and node i is not a direct neighbour. In this case, node j decision to accept communication will be based on the indirect observation trust value. For this purpose node j send a request message to its cluster head. The cluster head searches if it has a trust value for node i, if yes and this value exceeds the threshold, communication can be done securely else the cluster head contact the collection station to see the confidence value of the nodes involved. If the value exceeds the threshold, the node will be considered trusted, otherwise it is untrusted and communication will be rejected.

3.4 Trust Calculation Process

The general idea of the process of trust calculation is to verify if a node is confident or not. For that, a confidence value is fixed by our model ‘S’ that represents the minimum level of confidence. For further explanation of this process, we take the example of two nodes i and j that want to communicate. If a node i wants to communicate with a node j, then j will appear in its confidence table if it has an old experience with i, so it is based on the value of direct observation ‘A’. If the value ‘A’ is superior than the value of the required threshold, which is the minimum value for node to be able to communicate with another node, the communication cannot be achieved, otherwise, the two nodes can communicate safely. If there are no direct observation, node i must contact the cluster head and see if there was a recommendation on node j, it’s the indirect trust ‘B’. The direct trust value ‘A’ is defined by the following mathematical expression at a given moment t:

\[ T_i(j,t) = T_i(j,t-1) - x \]  

Where \( x = 0 \) if there is no malice, \( x = 0.1 \) in cases of malice detection and \( x = T_i(j,t-1) \) in cases of identity usurpation (see Table 1). The expression \( T_i(j,t-1) \) represents the direct trust value of node j in base of node i at t-1. This value can be changed after a transaction at time t. If a transaction is performed without any failure the confidence value remains the same and x is set to 0. The value of indirect trust ‘B’ is defined by the following mathematical expression at a given moment t:

\[ T_{CH}(j,t) = T_{CH}(j,t-1) - \sum_{i \in S_j} X \]  

Where \( T_{CH}(j,t) \) is the node j trust value recorded in the cluster head database. It represents the value of indirect observation ‘B’, which will be subsequently transferred to the nodes that want to interact with j at time t and is not in direct communication with it. The value n represents all the nodes in direct interaction with j and sent a negative recommendation to cluster head in a specific time t. More precisely, the confidence value \( T_{CH}(j,t) \) is the result of aggregation of different observations of communicating nodes with j in the same area.

3.5 Energy Trust

A node with depleted energy can be exploited by the wrong nodes. A malicious node can spy the identity of a node with exhausted energy and place itself as an authorized node enjoying the good reputation record in trusted tables of nodes. Eventually, it begins to cause damage in the network by modifying and sharing false data in the network. To limit this kind of attack, a check in the amount of power remaining is performed. A node with energy below than 10% sends a request to its cluster head to inform it of its critical energy state. Eventually the cluster head informs the neighbouring nodes and the base station.

4 EXPERIMENT

To evaluate the features of our model, we used the MATLAB simulator. We have created a topology composed of 25 nodes to test the performance of our model, where each node communicates directly with three neighbours. Our trust model can be applied for most sensor networks management protocols. In our work, we have applied our model to the LEACH protocol (Heinzelman et al., 2000). The choice of LEACH is based on its popularity and largest usage rates. In our work, our test dimension: 100*100 m², the nodes are static, and initial normal node energy is equal to 0.5 Joule. A percentage equal to 0.1 of advanced nodes, with an initial energy of 1 joule.

4.1 Performance of Our Life Time Model

To test and validate the performance of our proposed
solution LTMHL, we applied it to the LEACH protocol. We named it trust-LEACH.

![Figure 2: The amount of residual energy.](image)

Figure 2 shows the performance of our energy consumption perspective model. It is clear from the curve that the energy consumed by the LEACH and Trust-LEACH protocol is nearly equal and the difference has appeared near 1000 rounds. To know, a round is composed by two phases, cluster formation and cluster transmission. This clearly shows the performance of our model standpoint energy consumption. This ensures that our trust model provides very good longevity to the network. Unlike existing models in the literature that are very expensive on energy consumption causing serious affects by limiting their lifetime. To better demonstrate this performance, we calculated the number of dead nodes during 1200 rounds.

![Figure 3: Number of dead nodes.](image)

From Figure 3, we can determine very clearly the nearest quantity of dead nodes in the network at different time. We interpret that at 1200 rounds we have 11 dead nodes for both protocols. This ensures excellent durability offered by our trust model and validates its performance.

### 4.2 Resilience against Attacks

Ordinary Wireless Sensor Networks protocols such as LEACH, do not show any resilience against attacks. To show the contribution of our proposed model in terms of trust we compared LEACH and TUST-LEACH robustness against classical attacks. We created three attacks, usurpation attack of a receiver node, replication attack and collusion attack then we confronted LEACH and trust-LEACH to the three previous attacks.

![Figure 4: LEACH and Trust-LEACH facing three attacks.](image)

From the figure above, we clearly notice that the LEACH protocol has no resilience against attack and the three attacks are well detected by trust-LEACH. That’s show the performance of our model.

### 4.3 Attacks Analysis

To better show the performance of our model, we will describe the different attacks that our model has resilience against them.

**Denial of Service Attack:** A denial of service attack seeks to minimize network robustness. DoS attacks can be managed successfully in our trust model.

**Bad-mouthing Attack:** It is the risk of receiving dishonest recommendations from false nodes to report honest nodes as dishonest. Minimizing the confidence value in our model is carried out after the detecting of malicious event. A recommendation that is not justified from one node of the network cannot be considered.

**Selective Behaviour Attack:** A selective behaviour attack means that a node performs well and badly at once. In our model, each malicious action leads to a minimization of the value of trust. The bad behaviour of a node brings to eliminate it from network even if it behaves well with some others.

**Usurpation Attack:** A node tries to impersonate a legitimate node. In our model, we tried to look for a way to limit usurpation attacks. For that, we have treated two scenarios: The first scenario is the usurpation of the identity of a receiver node. In this case, the identity of attacker will be detected immediately by our model. The second scenario resides on the usurpation of neighbour identity. In
this case, neighbour cannot detect any changes because they do not have the ability to distinguish the real message sender.

Replication Attack: An adversary tries to replay old messages. A replicated message will be well detected by our model through nonce that will be checked at every message transfer to ensure the freshness of the data.

Collusion Attack: On detecting of untransferred message the trust decreases.

A comparison is presented in the table below based on a study made by (Han et al., 2014) to compare our model with some existing models in the literature.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust Model</th>
<th>Denial of service</th>
<th>Denial of availability</th>
<th>Selective behavior</th>
<th>Repudiation attack</th>
<th>Information attack</th>
<th>Replication attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPIN</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLUS</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEBT</td>
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<td>ADSS</td>
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<td>TBNF</td>
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<td>DEEM</td>
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</table>

Table 2: Comparison between models.

5 CONCLUSIONS

From experiment described above, we can clearly conclude that our proposed model LTMHL (Lightweight Trust Model with High Longevity) is lightweight in terms of energy, and is reliable, robust and resist against most of the attacks threatening wireless sensor networks. In our model, every malicious event leads to a minimization of the confidence value nodes whatever that is caused by transmission error or by a malicious behaviour. However, LTMHL cannot detect an information attack. In future work, we will seek to integrate the trust information in the trust model. To minimize the amount of energy consumed by the trust data, we will seek to integrate the cloud.

REFERENCES


