Promoting Cooperation and Fairness in Self-interested Multi-Agent Systems

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Abstract: The issue of collaboration amongst agents in a multi-agent system (MAS) represents a challenging research problem. In this paper we focus on a form of cooperation known as coalition formation. The problem we consider is how to facilitate the formation of a coalition in a competitive marketplace, where self-interested agents must cooperate by forming a coalition in order to complete a task. Agents must reach a consensus on both the monetary amount to charge for completion of a task as well as the distribution of the required workload. The problem is further complicated because different subtasks have various degrees of difficulty and each agent is uncertain of the payment another agent requires for performing specific subtasks. These complexities, coupled with the self-interested nature of agents, can inhibit or even prevent the formation of coalitions in such a real-world setting. As a solution, an auction-based protocol called ACCORD is proposed. ACCORD manages real-world complexities by promoting the adoption of cooperative behaviour amongst agents. Through extensive empirical analysis we analyse the ACCORD protocol and demonstrate that cooperative and fair behaviour is dominant and any agents deviating from this behaviour perform less well over time.

1 INTRODUCTION

Coalition formation is one of the fundamental research problems in multi-agent systems (Wooldridge, 2011). Coalition formation represents an important means of MAS cooperation, which has associated benefits such as enabling agents to take advantage of their complementary capabilities, resources and expertise.

Multi-agent coalition formation represents a fundamental means of MAS cooperation. We consider the problem of coalition formation in a dynamic real-world context. The real-world problem domain that we address consists of a marketplace populated by self-interested agents, where each agent represents an individual firm. In this marketplace, a task consisting of multiple subtasks is proposed to all agents. We assume that no agent is capable of individually performing an entire task. Therefore, in order to successfully perform a task, agents must cooperate by forming a coalition.

Successfully forming a coalition in such an environment represents a significant research challenge. Firstly, an agent must determine the optimal set of agents with whom to enter into a coalition. Secondly, if a coalition of agents is to successfully form, its member agents must reach a consensus on the amount to charge for completion of the task as well as the distribution of the required workload.

As we have done in previous work (Scully and Madden, 2014), we incorporate a number of real-world difficulties into our problem domain, to ensure its practical applicability. We assume that agents do not possess perfect information about one another; rather, each agent is unsure of the value (monetary or otherwise) that other agents place on specific subtasks. An emergent difficulty is that agents may artificially inflate the financial reward they require for performing a subtask within a coalition.

We incorporate an additional real-world complexity into our problem domain with the assumption that subtasks may have various levels of difficulty. It is realistic to expect that agents performing the more difficult subtasks will expect to receive a higher financial reward. This may lead to an increased level of competition for the more difficult subtasks, which in turn could lead to a scenario where agents are unable to reach agreement on the distribution of tasks within a coalition. We refer to the occurrence of such a scenario as deadlock.
We propose that the occurrence of deadlock and the artificial inflation of financial rewards can be avoided if the agents involved were to act in a fair and cooperative manner. In the context of this work, an agent exhibits fair behaviour if it honestly calculates the financial reward for all member agents of a coalition (including itself) on the basis of its personal beliefs. An agent is cooperative if it agrees to participate in any coalition proposal irrespective of the subtask it is asked to perform, assuming the financial reward it receives for performing that subtask is adequate. Cooperation allows us to avoid deadlock as an agent will participate in a coalition, even though it may not be optimal from that agent’s perspective. While the adoption of cooperative and fair behaviour would allow agents to successfully form coalitions, the difficulty remains that such agents are self-interested and have to be motivated to adopt these behaviours.

We progress our previous research (Scully and Madden, 2014) by considering two variations of the ACCORD protocol:

1. Public ACCORD, in which each agent is required to reveal to all others how much it would charge for each subtask; this is analogous to an open cry auction

2. Private ACCORD, in which agents do not have to reveal monetary information; this is analogous to a sealed bid auction.

2 ACCORD

In this section, we describe the ACCORD (An Auction Integrated Coalition Formation Protocol For Dynamic Multi-Agent Environments) protocol, which will enable agents to form coalitions while simultaneously governing agent behaviour by promoting the adoption of cooperative and fair behaviour. We consider two variants, Public ACCORD and Private ACCORD.

2.1 Motivation for Two Versions of ACCORD Protocol

At a fundamental level, the ACCORD protocols are a type of auction, which are extended specifically for the purpose of facilitating coalition formation. Before presenting the ACCORD protocols in detail we consider the issue of information privacy. Should agents be allowed to retain as much private subtask information as possible or should they be required to divulge some of this information to the other agents in the environment? It is interesting to note that an auction protocol can be categorised on the basis of its approach to the issue of information privacy. An auction can be classified as either an open cry auction, where participants divulge private information to the public, or a sealed bid auction, where information remains relatively private and is only shared with the auctioneer. Consequently, from the perspective of providing a coalition formation protocol, we propose that both approaches (public and private) constitute valid solutions depending on the prevailing view of information privacy. Therefore, we provide two versions of ACCORD. One version requires the public revelation of private monetary information while the other allows each agent to retain a significant amount of their private information.

The first approach, which we refer to as Public ACCORD, requires each agent to reveal the monetary amount it would charge for completion of each subtask that it is interested in performing (see Section 2.3).

While in certain environments agents may be willing to reveal private information, it is also reasonable to assume that in some scenarios agents would prefer not to divulge a full price list to competing agents. Therefore, our second approach requires an interested agent to propose a monetary amount to another agent on the basis of its own private information. We refer to this protocol as Private ACCORD, which is presented in more detail in Section 2.4.
would receive for performing its specified subtask(s) within the coalition is \( \text{palloc}(a_i) \).

2.3 Protocol Description of Public ACCORD

Public ACCORD can be subdivided into the following eight stages:

1. **Task Submission.** A customer submits a task \( T \) consisting of multiple subtasks to the auctioneer, such that \( T \subseteq S \). Subsequently, the auctioneer will send notification of \( T \) to each agent \( a_i \).

2. **Bidder Participation.** Each agent \( a_i \) will inform the auctioneer of whether or not it is willing to participate in the protocol. It is logical that \( a_i \) will participate iff:

\[
\exists s_x : s_x \in S_{a_i} \land s_x \in T
\]

In order for \( a_i \) to indicate its willingness to participate in the protocol it must submit its offers to the auctioneer. The subtask and monetary offers from \( a_i \) in relation to \( T \) are denoted by the set \( B_{a_i}^T = \{S_{a_i}^T, P_{a_i}^T\} \). The set \( S_{a_i}^T = \{s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_n\} \) contains the subtasks in \( T \) that \( a_i \) is capable of performing.

The set \( P_{a_i}^T \) contains \( a_i \)'s private monetary valuation for each subtask specified in \( S_{a_i}^T \). Therefore, \( P_{a_i}^T = \{mn(i, s_1'), \ldots, mn(i, s_q')\} \).

3. **Auction Commencement.** The auctioneer maintains a record, \( B^T \), of the subtask and monetary capabilities of all agents willing to participate in the protocol. When the auctioneer receives a reply, \( B_{a_i}^T \), from \( a_i \) it adds it to the record \( B^T \). Once all replies have been collected the auctioneer will commence a first-price sealed bid auction for \( T \). Subsequently, the auctioneer sends notification of the auction deadline coupled with \( B^T \) to each agent \( a_i \) that is willing to participate in the protocol.

4. **Coalition Proposal.** Agents participating in the protocol will propose coalitions to each other in a peer-to-peer manner. Therefore, an \( a_i \) will initially perform coalition calculation in order to determine the optimal coalition proposal \( CP_{a_i} = \langle C, \text{alloc}, \text{palloc} \rangle \). In order to construct such a coalition proposal, \( a_i \) must consider both the monetary demands and subtask capabilities of all agents. Fortunately, on receipt of \( B^T \), \( a_i \) is aware of the subtasks in \( T \) that all other agents can perform as well as the monetary amount each agent will charge for completion of these subtasks.

We also assume that \( a_i \) maintains a private estimation of the level of cooperation exhibited by other agents. It is reasonable to expect that \( a_i \) will incorporate these cooperation ratings into its coalition calculation process. For example, it would be less likely to include an agent that constantly refuses all coalition proposals compared to an agent that regularly demonstrates a high willingness to accept proposals.

Once \( a_i \) has determined the optimal member agents \( C = \{a_1', a_2', \ldots, a_n'\} \) it can construct and send \( CP_{a_i} \) to each member agent in \( C \).

5. **Proposal Response.** An agent \( a_v \) will assess any coalition proposal \( CP_{a_i} \) that it receives. It will issue either an accept or reject notice to the proposing agent. ACCORD does not control the means by which \( a_v \) evaluates a coalition proposal. However, it is reasonable to assume that \( a_v \) will consider both the subtask(s) and the monetary award it is offered in \( CP_{a_i} \). It is also reasonable to expect that \( a_v \) will assess the value of participating in a coalition with the other member agents in \( C \).

6. **Coalition Proposal Result.** After sending a proposal \( a_i \) must await the replies from the potential member agents of the coalition. The two possible outcomes of this stage are:

- The failure to form the proposed coalition \( CP_{a_i} \). If \( a_i \) receives one or more rejections from the member agents in \( C \) the coalition cannot be formed. It must subsequently inform all agents in \( C \) of the unsuccessful completion of coalition formation. If adequate time remains before the auction deadline expires \( a_i \) can recommence the coalition proposal stage and attempt to form another coalition.

- The successful formation of the proposed coalition \( CP_{a_i} \). If \( a_i \) receives an acceptance from each of the potential member agents then the coalition formation process has been successful. It subsequently notifies each member agent that the proposed coalition has been successfully formed.

7. **Bid Submission.** If \( a_i \) successfully forms the proposed coalition \( CP_{a_i} \) it will subsequently enter the coalition as a bid in the auction. Each agent is limited to submitting a single bid. Therefore, after \( a_i \) has submitted a bid, it can only participate in the proposal response stage. That is, it can only accept or reject coalitions proposed by other agents.

Once the auctioneer receives \( CP_{a_i} \), it calculates the total monetary reward required by the coalition to perform \( T \) as \( \sum_{d=1}^{e} \text{palloc}(a_d') \). Subsequently, the
auctioneer records this as a sealed-price bid in the auction.

8. Winner Notification. Once the auction deadline expires, the auctioneer calculates the lowest monetary bid. The member agents of the corresponding coalition are notified that they have been successful in obtaining the contract to collectively perform $T$.

2.4 Protocol Description of Private ACCORD

Private ACCORD facilitates agent-based coalition formation while also placing emphasis on the retention of private information. Private ACCORD can be subdivided into the same eight stages used to illustrate Public ACCORD. However, only two of these stages differ from the formal description of Public ACCORD. We confine our description of Private ACCORD to these two stages.

(2) Bidder Participation. In order for an agent $a_i$ to indicate its willingness to participate in the Private ACCORD protocol it must submit a list of its subtask capabilities to the auctioneer. The agent does not provide its private monetary valuation to the auctioneer.

The subtask capabilities of $a_i$ for $T$ are denoted by $B^T_{a_i} = \{S^T_{a_i}\}$. As before, the set $S^T_{a_i} = \{s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_{T'}\}$ denotes the subtasks that $a_i$ can perform.

(4) Coalition Proposal. Agents participating in the protocol will propose coalitions to each other in a peer-to-peer manner. Each agent $a_i$ must first perform coalition calculation in order to determine its optimal coalition proposal $CP_{a_i} = \langle C, salloc, palloc \rangle$.

In order to construct such a coalition proposal, $a_i$ will need to consider both the monetary demands and subtask capabilities of other agents. On receipt of $B^{T'}_{a_i}$, $a_i$ is aware of the subtasks in $T$ that all other agents can perform. However, because perfect information is not available, $a_i$ is uncertain of the monetary amount each agent will require as payment for performing a given subtask.

Each agent $a_i$ must maintain a matrix of expected payments for each subtask for each agent. Initially $a_i$ may base the monetary price of a sub-task to other agents as equal to its own cost for performing that sub-task. However, we also assume that $a_i$ has basic learning abilities that allow it to improve the accuracy of its estimations through repeated interaction with other agents.

It is also reasonable to assume that $a_i$ will maintain a private estimation of the level of cooperation exhibited by other agents. Therefore, the cooperation rating of all participating agents is also considered when performing coalition calculation.

Once $a_i$ has determined the optimal member agents $C = \{a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n\}$ it can construct and send $CP_{a_i}$ to each member agent in $C$.

2.5 Motivating Cooperation and Fairness in the ACCORD Protocols

Cooperation is not an intrinsic attribute of a self-interested agent. Therefore, for successful coalition formation to occur, it is necessary to motivate a self-interested agent to cooperate. The proposed coalition formation protocols impose the restriction that each agent can only submit a single bid to the auction for a task. However, throughout the duration of the auction, an agent may receive numerous coalition proposals, originating from other agents, for the same task. Upon receipt of such a proposal an agent has the opportunity to participate in another coalition by issuing an acceptance. If the coalition is successfully formed, the agent increases the probability that it will be a member of the winning coalition. Therefore, we hypothesise that a higher probability of success provides the agents participating in the ACCORD protocols with the motivation to cooperate.

Self-interested agents attempt to maximise their own profit. Therefore, ACCORD must ensure that agents are fair and will not artificially inflate their own financial rewards. Agents are provided with two disincentives against acting selfishly. Firstly, by acting selfishly, an agent reduces its probability of winning the auction, since the more an agent inflates its financial reward the less probable it is that its bid will win the auction. Secondly, by acting selfishly, an agent reduces its appeal to others as a potential coalition partner. When performing coalition calculation it is logical to assume that an agent will attempt to minimise the total price charged by the coalition. Therefore, selfish agents with inflated monetary requirements are less probable to be chosen as coalition partners. Therefore, we hypothesise that a lower probability of success provides agents participating in the ACCORD protocols with a disincentive against acting selfishly.


3 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION

The objective of this empirical evaluation is to undertake a comparative analysis between Public and Private ACCORD. We have developed a simulation testbed to evaluate the protocols. Each experiment measures the performance of agents adopting different behaviours in the ACCORD simulation environment. Section 3.2 presents a brief summary of the results of Public ACCORD. A more comprehensive analysis of the Public ACCORD results can be found in (Scully and Madden, 2014). Section 3.3 and 3.4 assess the impact of adopting uncooperative and selfish behaviour in Private ACCORD and contrast this with the results observed from the Public ACCORD protocol.

3.1 Experimental Methodology

Each experiment is run on 10 randomly generated datasets. A dataset is comprised of 50 tasks, which are auctioned in sequential order. Each task consists of 8 subtasks, chosen randomly from a set of 20 possible subtasks. The duration of each auction is 4 minutes. If two bids of equal value are submitted, a winner is chosen randomly.

We referred to deadlock a situation where a subset of agents, attempting to form a coalition, are unable to reach agreement due to a high level of competition for performing specific subtasks. There may be one or more subtasks that multiple agents are capable of performing and they are unable to find a resolution. We simulate such an environment by ensuring that each agent is capable of performing a large number of the possible subtasks. For each new dataset a population of 20 service agents is generated. Each agent is capable of performing 8 subtasks. By allowing each agent to perform 8 out of the possible 20 subtasks, a high level of competition and consequently deadlock regularly occurs in our simulation environment.

The monetary amount each agent will charge for subtask completion must also be generated. For each subtask $s_i \in S$ (where $S$ is the set of all possible subtasks), we have randomly selected a mean cost, $V_{s_i}$, with a uniform distribution between 10 and 99. To simulate uncertainty of information, each agent chooses the monetary amount it will charge for completion of $s_i$ by using a Normal distribution with a standard deviation of 2 and a mean equal to $V_{s_i}$.

For each of the 10 datasets generated, the performance of 4 differing behaviour types (described later) is contrasted. Within the simulated marketplace of 20 agents, each agent will exhibit 1 of the 4 behaviours (5 agents for each behaviour). The subtask capabilities are also represented equally amongst agents exhibiting differing behaviours. This allows us to compare the performance of different behaviour types in an unbiased manner.

The result of a single experiment is arrived at by combining the results obtained from 10 randomly generated datasets. After each task in a dataset is auctioned, the accumulated financial reward obtained by each agent type is recorded. Therefore, the results of a single experiment are derived by summing the accumulated financial reward received by each agent type across the 10 datasets.

We characterise each agent with a function accepting two parameters, $\lambda(\alpha, \beta)$. The level of cooperation exhibited by an agent is denoted by $\alpha$, such that $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$, $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$. The level of selfishness displayed by an agent is defined by $\beta$, such that $0 \leq \beta \leq 4$, $\beta \in \mathbb{Z}$.

A fair coalition proposal offers an agent an adequate financial reward for performing a specific subtask. An adequate financial reward is greater than or equal to the true reward the agent would expect to receive for performing the subtask. If an agent receives a fair coalition proposal, it must subsequently decide whether it will cooperate and join the proposed coalition. It bases this decision on its value of $\alpha$. The parameter $\alpha$ represents the minimum fraction of the most financially rewarding subtask that an agent is willing to accept. For example, consider the task $Tr(A, D)$, which consists of the sub-tasks $Sr(A, B)$, $Sr(B, C)$ and $Sr(C, D)$. Assume that agent $t_1$ with an $\alpha$ value of 0.5 expects a monetary reward of 15 units for performing $Sr(A, B)$ and 40 units for performing $Sr(C, D)$. Therefore, its $\alpha$ value dictates that it will not accept a coalition proposal that offers less than 20 (0.5 * 40). Higher values of $\alpha$ imply lower cooperation. If $t_1$ in our above example had an $\alpha$ value of 0.8 then it would only accept a coalition proposal that offered it greater than or equal to 32 (0.8 * 40).

An agent can exhibit selfish behaviour by artificially inflating its own financial rewards. The value of $\beta$ signifies the amount by which an agent increases its financial reward. For example, assume the agent $t_1$ with $\beta = 0$ expects a financial reward of 40 units for performing $Sr(C, D)$. If the configuration of $t_1$ is changed so that it has $\beta = 1$, it would now expect a financial reward of 41 units for performing $Sr(C, D)$. Agents with $\beta = 0$ exhibit fair behaviour because they do not artificially inflate their own financial rewards.

3.2 Fair and Cooperative Behaviour in Public ACCORD

We initially present the effect of different levels of selfishness ($\beta$) in Public ACCORD. We perform 4
experiments that contrast the performance of fair (β = 0) and selfish (β > 0) agents. In Experiment 1 we contrast the performance of selfish agents where β = 1 with fair agents (β = 0). The 4 agent types that populate the marketplace are Cooperative Fair (λ(0,0)), Cooperative Selfish (λ(0,1)), Uncooperative Fair (λ(1,0)) and Uncooperative Selfish (λ(1,1)).

The details for Experiments 2 — 4 are the same, except that selfish agents use β = 2 in Experiment 2, β = 3 in Experiment 3 and β = 4 in Experiment 4.

An overview of the results obtained by cooperative agents in the Experiments 1 — 4 are presented in Figure 1. The performance of the Cooperative Fair λ(0,0) agent type over Experiments 1 — 4 is normalised as 100%. Figure 1 measures the performance of the Cooperative Selfish agent types (λ(0,1), λ(0,2), λ(0,3), λ(0,4)) in the Experiments 1—4 as a percentage of the performance of the Cooperative Fair agent type. The Cooperative Fair λ(0,0) agent type exhibits the best performance. It is evident that an increase in the value of β corresponds to a decrease in performance.

To investigate the effect of different levels of cooperation (α), Experiments 5 — 8 are performed. The objective of these experiments is to contrast the performance of cooperative (α = 0) and uncooperative (0 < α ≤ 1) agents. In Experiment 5, we examine the performance of uncooperative agents that use α = 0.25 with cooperative agents (α = 0). The 4 agent types that populate the marketplace for Experiment 5 are Cooperative Fair λ(0,0), Cooperative Selfish λ(0,2), Uncooperative Fair λ(0.25, 0) and Uncooperative Selfish λ(0.25, 2). The details for Experiments 6 — 8 are the same, except that uncooperative agents use α = 0.5 in Experiment 6, α = 0.75 in Experiment 7 and α = 1 in Experiment 8.

Figure 2 contains an overview of the results obtained by fair agents in the Experiments 5 — 8. As a fair agent reduces its value of α it experiences a corresponding degradation in performance. This result demonstrates the dominance of cooperative behaviour (α = 0) in Public ACCORD.

3.3 Fair/Selfish Behaviour in Private ACCORD

The experiments undertaken in this section investigate the effect of different levels of selfish behaviour (β) amongst agents participating in Private ACCORD. Experiments 9 — 12 are executed in the Private ACCORD environment. As in Section 3.2 these experiments contrast the performance of fair (β = 0) and selfish (β > 0) agents. The agent population setup for Experiments 9 — 12 is the same as the setup used for Experiments 1 — 4 respectively. For example, selfish agents use β = 1 in Experiment 9, β = 2 in Experiment 10, β = 3 in Experiment 11 and β = 4 in Experiment 12.

The results obtained from Experiment 9 are depicted in Figure 3. The Cooperative Fair (λ(0,0)) agent type significantly outperforms all other agent types. The cooperative fair agents outperform all other agent types in the Experiments 10—12. These ex-
Figure 4: Overview of Fair \( (\beta = 0) \) and Selfish \( (1 \leq \beta \leq 4) \) Behaviour for Private ACCORD.

Experiments also show a reduction in the performance of the selfish agent types as the value of \( \beta \) is increased.

Figure 4 presents an overview of the results obtained by cooperative agents in Experiments 9 — 12. The results confirm that the performance of an agent type decreases as it increases its value of \( \beta \). It is also interesting to compare the overview of selfish variation in Private ACCORD (Figure 4) with that of selfish variation in Public ACCORD (Figure 1). The selfish agent types in Private ACCORD outperform their equivalent agents in Public ACCORD, confirming that selfish behaviour is more severely punished in Private ACCORD than in Public ACCORD. It can also be observed that the initial period of instability experienced by agents in Figure 1 is also present in Figure 4. However, not only is the duration of the instability experienced in Figure 4 longer than that experienced in Figure 1 but the degree of variance present is also more severe. This period of instability is attributed to the learning process that each agent must undergo. That is, each agent must learn about the other agents with whom they share the market-place. However, in Public ACCORD each agent is already aware of the price other agents require for performing specific subtasks. Therefore, an agent need only learn about the level of cooperation exhibited by other agents. However, agents participating in Private ACCORD are unaware of the financial demands of other agents and consequently face a more complicated and time consuming learning task. This is reflected in the increased instability present in Figure 4.

3.4 Cooperative/Uncooperative Behaviour in Private ACCORD

In order to assess the impact of varying levels of uncooperative behaviour in Private ACCORD, 4 experiments (numbered 13 — 16) are performed. The agent population setup for these experiments is the same as for Experiments 5 — 8. The only difference is that Experiments 13 — 16 are run on the Private ACCORD simulation environment instead of the Public ACCORD environment. Uncooperative agents use, \( \alpha = 0.25 \) in Experiment 13, \( \alpha = 0.5 \) in Experiment 14; \( \alpha = 0.75 \) in Experiment 15 and \( \alpha = 1 \) in Experiment 16.

The results obtained from Experiment 13 are depicted in Figure 5. As with the previous experiments the Cooperative Fair \( (\lambda(0,0)) \) agent type outperforms all other agent types. It is interesting to contrast the results of this experiment with those obtained from the equivalent experiment (Experiment 5) performed on the Public ACCORD simulation environment. The uncooperative agent types \( (\lambda(0.25, 0) \) and \( \lambda(0.25, 2)) \) perform better when participating in Private ACCORD (Experiment 13) than they do in Public ACCORD (Experiment 5). This indicates that uncooperative behaviour is less advantageous in Public ACCORD than it is in Private ACCORD.

The results of experiments 14 — 16 reveal that the cooperative fair agents remain dominant, while also showing a gradual degradation in the performance of the the uncooperative agents as they increase their value of \( \alpha \).

An overview of the results obtained by fair agents in the Experiments 13 — 16 are presented in Figure 6. On examination of Figure 6 it is apparent that a significant period of instability occurs at the commencement of each of the experiments. The Cooperative Fair \( (\lambda(0,0)) \) agent type is outperformed briefly by the Uncooperative Fair \( (\lambda(0.25,0)) \) agent type at the beginning of Experiment 13. The performance of each agent type stabilises over the duration of the experiment. While the initial instability in Figure 6 is an undesirable attribute of Private ACCORD, it is still necessary in order for each agent to learn about the other agents in the market-place and identify potential
partners. Apart from initially being outperformed the Cooperative Fair ($\lambda(0, 0)$) agent type still proves to be dominant. The instability present in Figure 6 is more severe than that present in Figure 2, which presents an overview of uncooperative behaviour in *Public ACCORD*. This is consistent with our previous observation that *Private ACCORD* experiences greater initial instability than *Public ACCORD* (Section 3.3).

It is also interesting to compare the instability that occurs in Figure 6 and in Figure 4, which presents an overview of selfish behaviour in *Private ACCORD*. The instability present in Figure 4 is visibly less severe than that encountered in Figure 6. This indicates that learning to identify uncooperative agents represents a more difficult task than learning to identify selfish agents. This is to be expected because of the inherent inconsistency of uncooperative behaviour. While a selfish agent behaves selfishly all the time, uncooperative agents may only exhibit uncooperative behaviour occasionally (an agent with $\alpha = 0.25$ may rarely adopt uncooperative behaviour).

As expected, Figure 6 demonstrates that as an agent increases its level of uncooperative behaviour its performance degrades. By comparing the results of Figure 6 and Figure 2, which assesses the impact of uncooperative behaviour in *Public ACCORD*, we can conclude that agents adopting uncooperative behaviour achieve a higher level of performance when participating in *Private ACCORD* than they do in *Public ACCORD*. This confirms that uncooperative behaviour is less severely punished in *Private ACCORD* than in *Public ACCORD*.

### 4 RELATED RESEARCH

A important research objective in multi-agent systems is to enable self-interested agents to successfully form coalitions. A coalition of agents can jointly perform a complex task, which the individual member agents would be unable to complete in isolation (Ye et al., 2013). Coalition formation research in MAS’s can be broadly classified into either macroscopic or microscopic coalition formation (Vassileva et al., 2002).

The macroscopic approach examines the entire agent population and research work in this area has focused on the development of techniques to calculate the optimal coalition structure, which is the division of all agents in the environment into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions (Sen and Dutta, 2000), (Bachrach et al., 2013), (Rahwan and Ramchurn, 2009), (Iwasaki et al., 2013), (Dan et al., 2012), (Xu et al., 2013). This work typically assumes any given coalition has a fixed determinable value, which is universally known by all agents (Sandholm and Lesser, 1997). This assumption conflicts with one of the real-world difficulties we incorporated into our problem domain, namely, that agents may maintain differing values for any subtasks, which also means they may have differing values for any coalition.

In the microscopic approach to coalition formation each agent will reason about the process of forming a coalition based on its personal information and its perspective of the system. The work in this area can be divided into cooperative and self-interested multi-agent environments. Significant research attention has been focused on the development of distributed coalition formation protocols for cooperative agent environments (Tošić and Ordonez, 2012), (Ye et al., 2013), (Smirnov and Sheremetov, 2012).

Microscopic coalition formation has also been studied in the context of hedonic games. In such an environment self-interested agent achieve a specific level of satisfaction based on the coalition they join. A number of distributed protocols have been proposed to facilitate coalition formation in such environments (Ghaffarizadeh and Allan, 2013), (Aziz et al., 2011), (Genin and Aknine, 2011). A solution to a hedonic game is the exhaustive decomposition of all agents in an environment into coalitions.

Research has been carried out on the topic of coalition formation in self-interested buyers markets. One such example is the development of coalition formation protocols that enable buyers, interested in purchasing the same or similar products, to form coalitions (Tsvetovat and Sycara, 2000) (Shehory, 2000). These protocols facilitate coalition formation, however the market that they address differs significantly from that considered in this paper as the agents are not in direct competition with one another.
5 CONCLUSIONS

This paper has introduced Public and Private ACCORD to facilitate the process of coalition formation in dynamic real-world environments. In order to evaluate these protocols we developed a simulation testbed that was used to contrast the performance of agents adopting different behaviours. The results demonstrate that cooperative and fair behaviour is dominant in our empirical environment. This solves the problem of artificial inflation of financial rewards and provided a mechanism of forming coalitions that would not suffer from deadlock.

It was also found that deviant behaviour (uncooperative or selfish behaviour) was more severely punished in Public ACCORD. It was also observed that an initial period of instability was experienced in both Public and Private ACCORD, which corresponds to the duration of the agent learning process. Because Public ACCORD requires the revelation of private information, the initial instability it experienced was not as severe as that experienced in Private ACCORD.

There is a wide range of possible research avenues for the ACCORD protocols. An undesirable property of these protocols is the presence of an initial period of instability. This has been attributed to the learning process that each agent must undergo. Such instability could potentially be exploited by uncooperative or selfish agents. Sen & Dutta encounter a similar problem with their method of reciprocative-based cooperation and effectively employed a reputation mechanism as a solution. An interesting area of future work would be to incorporate a similar reputation mechanism into the ACCORD protocols. It would also be worthwhile to observe the level of instability that occurs in Public and Private ACCORD for large agent populations. For example, is it possible that the period of instability will increase in line with the size of the agent population?

REFERENCES


