On the Security of the XOR Sandwiching Paradigm for Multiple Keyed Block Ciphers

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Abstract: While block cipher design is relatively mature, advances in computational power mean that the keylength of block ciphers, upon which the security relies entirely, becomes less resistant to cryptanalysis over time. Therefore, the security for a block cipher with a particular keylength typically is seen to last for at most some decades. One common approach to strengthen a block cipher’s security is based on increasing its keylength. In the literature, two strategies have emerged: multiple keyed multiple encryption and multiple keyed XOR sandwiching. Known attacks on these such as Meet-in-the-Middle (Merkle and Hellman, 1981; van Oorschot and Wiener, 1991; Lucks, 1998) and Related-Key (J. Kelsey and Wagner, 1996; Choi et al., 1996; Vaudenay, 2011; Phan, 2004) attacks, show that Triple Encryption is significantly weaker than a brute-force attack would suggest, especially for block ciphers with small keys, such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES). This paper provides a comprehensive analysis on the security of the XOR sandwiching paradigm against known attacks for the case of multiple keyed triple encryption, without loss of generality, using DES as the underlying block cipher. In particular, we focus on DES-XEXEXEX variants, based on 2-Key and 3-Key Triple-DES, which involve performing the XOR for key-whitening before and after each encryption with an additional 64-bit key. One of the conclusions to be drawn from this work is the increased strength obtained from the XOR sandwiching paradigm while requiring little in terms of additional computational resources.

1 INTRODUCTION

Work on the Data Encryption Standard (DES) in the areas of Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks and Related-Key Attacks have revealed 2-Key and 3-Key Triple DES to be much weaker than a naïve attack would suggest. We therefore hope to strengthen such encryption by increasing key-length.

Perhaps the most obvious response would be to increase these Triple Encryption DES variants to Quadruple Encryption DES variants. However, a quick calculation by a traditional Meet-in-the-Middle attack will reveal that both Triple-DES and Quadruple-DES can be attacked with a time complexity of $2^{113}$, an ominous sign suggesting that the extra computational time of the added DES encryption is both needlessly cumbersome and insufficient to increase security.

1.1 Our Contribution

What we propose is to use an XOR-sandwiching paradigm to include an additional 64-bit key into a multiple encryption scheme. Specifically, we propose an XEXEXEX model (Figure 1) as an extension to both 2-Key-Triple-Encryption and 3-Key-Triple-Encryption, by XORing an additional 64-bit key in between each encryption call. These are also easy to implement in existing triple-encryption systems. As in DES-EXE and DES-X, the use of the XOR function for key-whitening strengthens the encryption scheme with negligible computational overhead.

We present recent attacks to justify the choice of such an encryption scheme. As far as we know, major

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*K A part of this research was done while the author was at DSO National Laboratories.

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2 MEET-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK

The traditional MITM attack is described diagrammatically (Figure 2) below, comparing the original Triple-Encryption with the one which we propose.

Figure 2: Traditional MITM attack on Triple-DES and DES-XEXEXEX variants.

For 3-Key Triple-DES, we obtain \((P, C)\), a known Plaintext-Ciphertext (PT-CT) pair, and consider the possible \(K_1\) separately from possible \((K_2, K_3)\), seeking \(E_{K_1}(P) = E_{K_2}(E_{K_3}(C))\). Note that we accept values of \((K_1, K_2, K_3)\) satisfying the above equation if the encryption is true for \(\log_2 65536 = 3\) PT-CT pairs. Notice that this attack requires a time complexity in the order of \(2^{111}\) encryptions and a memory complexity of \((64 + 56)2^{56} \approx 2^{63}\) bits.

A very similar search for \(E_{K_2}(P \oplus K_1) \oplus K_1 = E_{K_3}(E_{K_1}(C \oplus K_1) \oplus K_1)\) can be carried out for our 4-Key DES-XEXEXEX model. However, to remove significant memory complexity we consider this attack individually for each value of \(K_1\) since that is constant in the encryption scheme. We accept values of \((K_1, K_2, K_3, K_4)\) if the results are consistent over \(\log_2 65536 = 4\) PT-CT pairs. This attack will have a time complexity in the order of \(2^{177}\) and a memory complexity of approximately \(2^{63}\).

As for 2-Key Triple DES, through a similar logic as suggested above, we consider each value of \(K_1\) separately. We expect that \(\log_2 2^{112}\) = 2 known PT-CT pairs will confirm the correct value of \(K_1\) and \(K_2\) with a time complexity of \(2^{113}\) and a negligible memory requirement. The logical extension will mean that for our 3-Key DES-XEXEXEX model we consider each \((K_1, K_2)\) individually, and accept values that are consistent over \(\log_2 2^{112}\) = 3 PT-CT values. We arrive at a time complexity of \(2^{177}\) and a negligible memory complexity.

The addition of an additional key in the proposed XEXEXEX model has thus increases the time complexity of a basic MITM attack by \(2^{64}\), an identical increase to what we would expect from a naive attack.

2.1 Merkle-Hellman MITM Attack

The Merkle-Hellman MITM attack (Merkle and Hellman, 1981) is a chosen-plaintext alternative to this. The common application of this attack is in the case of 2-Key Triple Encryption (Figure 3). In 2-Key Triple-DES, we decrypt some 64-bit value \(A\) based on all \(2^{56}\) possible values of \(K_1\). For each \(A\), we make a chosen plaintext encryption query to obtain the corresponding ciphertext and decrypt each \(A\) via the guessed \(K_1\) as before. We then store these values and exhaustively search all \(K_2\) such that \(E_{K_2}(Enc(E_{K_1}(A))) = E_{K_2}(A)\) (where \(Enc\) is the chosen plaintext encryption query). We accept a value of \((K_1, K_2)\) when \(\log_2 2^{112}\) = 2 PT-CT pairs are consistent with those keys. This attack has a time complexity of \(3(2^{56} \approx 2^{57.6})\) Encryptions (neglecting that of obtaining the ciphertexts of \(2^{56}\) chosen-PT) and a memory complexity of \(2^{63}\).

Figure 3: Merkle-Hellman MITM attacks on 2-Key Triple-DES and both DES-XEXEXEX variants.

As for our 3-Key variant of the above attack, we consider combinations of \((K_1, K_2)\) separately from \(K_3\), as represented diagrammatically above (Figure 3). Specifically, the equality we search for is \(E_{K_3}(Enc(E_{K_2}(A \oplus K_1) \oplus K_1) \oplus K_1) = E_{K_3}(Enc(E_{K_2}(A \oplus K_1) \oplus K_1) \oplus K_1) \oplus K_1 =\)
3 PT-CT pairs are consistent with those keys. This has a time complexity of $2^{121.6}$ and a memory complexity of $2^{63}$. This also requires the entire codebook of PT-CT pairs.

For the original 3-Key Triple-DES and 4-Key DES-XEEXEXEX algorithm, this gives us no advantage over the original MITM attack. Note that while the attack, with the entire codebook of PT-CT pairs, we can consider possible $K_2$ separately from the remaining keys, this gives negligible time advantage.

Therefore, similar to the original MITM attack, our variant of 2-Key Triple DES has succeeded in increasing the complexity of a chosen plaintext MITM attack by a factor of $2^{64}$.

### 2.2 Van Oorschot - Wiener MITM Attack

Van Oorschot and Wiener’s proposal to extend Merkle-Hellman’s chosen plaintext attack to a known-plaintext attack is applicable to the case of 2-Key Triple DES, where the Merkle-Hellman attack gives us a significant reduction in complexity on the original MITM attack (van Oorschot and Wiener, 1991). We choose $2^{32}$ values of $P$. For each $P$, we calculate all $2^{56}$ possible values of $E^{−1}_K(C)$ and check these against the $2^{32}$ PT-CT pairs. For the matches we find, we compute $B = E^{−1}_K(C)$ and store $(K_1, B)$ using at most $2^{56}$ memory entries. On each of these, we conduct an exhaustive search of $K_2$ and test resultant candidate $(K_1, K_2)$ pairs with additional PT-CT pairs. We repeat this process for different values of $P$ until the correct key is found. With $2^{32}$ known PT-CT pairs, this attack has time complexity of $2^{89}$ encryptions and a memory complexity of $(64+56)2^{56} \approx 2^{63}$.

Similarly, we apply this to the Merkle-Hellman attack on our 3-key DES-XEEXEXEX variant as described in Section 2.1. Starting with $2^{32}$ PT-CT pairs, we accept a value of $(K_1, K_2, K_3)$ when $[\log_{2^{56}}2^{176}] = 3$ PT-CT pairs are consistent with those keys. This attack expects a time complexity of $2^{153}$ and memory-complexity of $2^{53}$.

Therefore, in the case of 2-Key Triple DES and its variant, we have shown that the time complexity increase in the implementation of the XEEXEXEX variant is $2^{63}$, similar to the attacks discussed above.

### 2.3 Lucks MITM Attack

As for 3-Key Triple DES, Lucks proposes an optimization which reduces the time complexity with increased memory (Lucks, 1998). He presents a variety of attacks, however, we select the attack with comparable requirements to other attacks we present and which considers DES as an ideal cipher, for fair comparison. His most efficient attack involves a set $2^{32}$ PT-CT pairs $(p_1, c_1),...,(p_{32}, c_{32})$ and a second set $S \subset \{0, 1\}^{64}$ and $|S| = 2^{33}$. Due to the complexity of his attack, we paraphrase his attack below:

1. For $a \in S$, we define the set $M_a = \{(i, K_1) \in \{1,\ldots,2^{32}\} \times \{0, 1\}^{56} | E_{K_1}(p_i) = a\}$, which requires time-complexity of $2^{32} \times 2^{56} = 2^{88}$.
2. For $b \in \{0, 1\}^{64}$, $i \in \{1,\ldots,2^{32}\}$, we define $N_{b,i} = \{K_3 \in \{0, 1\}^8 | E_{K_3}(b) = c_i\}$. It can be computed with complexity $2^{32} \times 2^{56} = 2^{88}$, by computing $b = E_{K_3}^{−1}(c_i)$ for all $2^{32}$ $c_i$ and all $2^{56}$ $K_3$, and placing $K_3$ into the corresponding set $N_{b,i}$.
3. For $K_2 \in \{0, 1\}^{56}$, $a \in S$, search for $N_{b,i}$ such that $E_{K_2}^{−1}(a) = b$. Then, for $(K_3, a, b)$ where $(i, K_1) \in M_a$, $K_3 \in N_{b,i}$, enter $(K_1, K_2, K_3)$ into a hash table.
4. When some $(K_1, K_2, K_3)$ has entered the hash table twice, we test the set of keys with the other values of $(p_i, c_i)$. Notice that this is sufficient since we accept the keys when $[\log_{2^{56}}2^{168}] = 3$ PT-CT pairs are consistent with them.

We refer the reader to (Lucks, 1998) for detailed calculations to derive the requirements of the attack. $2^{33}$ values of $a \in S$, $2^{32}$ PT-CT pairs, $2^{88}$ encryptions and $2^{88}(56) \approx 2^{23.8}$ memory-complexity are required.

We then attempt to apply this to our 4-Key DES-XEEXEXEX variant. We considered two possible methods of adapting the attack. The first is to simply repeat the attack by guessing values of $K_1$, and repeating this for all values of $K_1$. This would mean that the time complexity would simply be $2^{90} \times 2^{56} = 2^{154}$ single encryptions and memory complexity, reusable for each $K_1$, will be $2^{93}$ bits. Note, though, that as $[\log_{2^{56}}2^{176}] = 4$, “tripletest” will now need to test the candidate keys on two additional PT-CT pairs.

The second method involved, for an arbitrary $(P, C)$ pair, define $a = E_{K_1}(p \oplus K_1)$ and $b = E_{K_3}^{−1}(c \oplus K_3)$. Then we calculate $M_a$, and $N_{b,i,k_1}$, sets identical to that which we studied before, but restricted to each $K_1$. The rest of the attack proceeds by considering each value of $K_1$ individually then searching for values to “tripletest” (searching for $E_{K_1}^{−1}(a \oplus K_1) = b \oplus K_1$). However, this would come at the cost of $2^{64}$ times more memory and would wind down to a comparable time complexity because each $K_1$ would still be considered as an individual case. Therefore, with the first method preferable, we can once again report an additional $2^{64}$ increase in time complexity of an attack with the addition of the 64-bit $K_1$ key.

Note that the Lucks’ attack is inefficient when the...
first and third DES encryption make use of the same key since much recalculation would be done. To this end, the Merkle-Hellman or Van Oorschot-Wiener attack is much more efficient. Therefore, we did not consider an application of Lucks’ attack on 2-Key Triple-DES and our 3-Key variant of it as part of our study.

3 RELATED-KEY ATTACKS

We also consider their security under Related-Key attacks, something which is posited to be not as purely theoretical as it seems in recent years (Phan, 2004).

3.1 Kelsey-Wagner-Schneier Related-Key Attack

We begin with the original Kelsey-Wagner-Schneier Related-Key Attack (J. Kelsey and Wagner, 1996). This attack on Triple-DES involves a known PT-CT pair, \((P, C)\) encrypted on unknown keys \((K_1, K_2, K_3)\) and the resultant ciphertext being decrypted under keys \((K_1 \oplus \Delta, K_2, K_3)\), where \(\Delta\) is known, to arrive at \(P'\). Then, an exhaustive search can be done for \(K_1\) since \(E_{K_1}(P) = E_{K_1 \oplus \Delta}(P')\). From here, a MITM attack can be performed on the remaining two keys, similar to that which is performed on double-DES. Notice that this will require approximately \(3^{256} \approx 2^{79.6}\) encryptions and \(2^{63}\) memory complexity. Note that since \([\log_{2^{64}} 2^{168}] = 3\), we would also need to test resultant pairs against 2 other known PT-CT values.

A similar attack can be arranged for 4-Key DES-XEXEXEX, given related keys \((K_1, K_2, K_3, K_4)\) and \((K_1 \oplus \Delta, K_2, K_3, K_4)\). A known PT-CT pair is encrypted on the former and the resultant ciphertext decrypted on the latter. This allows us to do an exhaustive search on combinations of \((K_1, K_2)\), and conduct a MITM attack to find possible \((K_3, K_4)\) for each candidate \((K_1, K_2)\). Notice that we will accept a combination of keys if it is consistent over \([\log_{2^{64}} 2^{312}] = 4\) PT-CT pairs. We expect a time complexity of \(2^{111}\) encryptions and a memory complexity of \(2^{56} (56 + 64) = 63\). This attack is not applicable to 2-Key Triple-DES and our 3-Key DES-XEXEXEX variant.

3.2 Choi et al. Related-key Attack

Given that a chosen-plaintext attack is considered unfeasible at present (van Oorschot and Wiener, 1991), a chosen-CT attack is even less useful. In this regard, most studies look to the known PT-CT attack presented by Choi et al (Choi et al., 1996) as diagrammatically represented below (Figure 4).

With \(2^{32}\) known PT-CT pairs encrypted under the keys and another \(2^{32}\) known PT-CT pairs encrypted under the Related-Keys, we search for collisions as indicated by the arrows. For 2-Key Triple DES, we search for \((P, C), (P', C')\) and \(K_1\) such that \(E_{K_1}(P) = E_{K_1 \oplus \Delta}(P')\) and \(E_{K_1}^{-1}(C) = E_{K_1}^{-1}(C')\) are both satisfied. For 3-Key Triple DES, we search for \((P, C), (P', C')\) and \(K_1\) such that \(E_{K_1}(P) = E_{K_1 \oplus \Delta}(P')\) and \(C = C'\). We expect to exist by the Birthday Paradox. With these candidates, we do a MITM search for the remaining keys. We will accept the keys when they are consistent across \([\log_{2^{64}} 2^{168}] = 3\) PT-CT pairs for Three-Key Triple-DES and \([\log_{2^{64}} 2^{112}] = 2\) PT-CT pairs for Two-Key Triple-DES.

![RK attacks on 2-Key Triple DES and 3-Key Triple DES](Image)

Figure 4: RK attacks on 2-Key Triple DES and 3-Key Triple DES.

This has an expected time complexity of \(2^{89}\) encryptions and a memory complexity of \(2^{39}\) for 2-Key Triple-DES. For 3-Key Triple-DES, this is a time complexity of \(2^{57.6}\) single encryptions and \(2^{60}\) of memory complexity (Choi et al., 1996).

Extending this to our XEXEXEX variants, we make use of the key-relation \((K_1, K_2, K_3, K_4)\) and \((K_1, K_2 \oplus \Delta, K_3, K_4)\) or \((K_1, K_2, K_3)\) and \((K_1, K_2 \oplus \Delta, K_3)\). As before, there is the solution of simply repeating the entire attack for all guesses of \(K_1\), modifying the collision search to include the relevant XOR functions. This will leave us with identical memory complexity for both attacks and a time complexity of \(2^{153}\) encryptions for 3-Key DES-XEXEXEX and \(2^{121}\) for 4-Key DES-XEXEXEX. Notice, however, that we would only accept a set of keys after \([\log_{2^{64}} 2^{152}] = 4\) PT-CT pairs are consistent with the results. However, we present an alternative here, which might occur as...
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3.3 Vaudenay RK Attack

The RK attack proposed by Vaudenay (Vaudenay, 2011) on Three-Key Triple-DES notes that if we were to encrypt a plaintext, \( P \), according to keys \((K_1, K_2, K_3)\) then decrypt the ciphertext according to Related-Keys \( \phi(K_1, K_2, K_3) = (K_2, K_1, K_3)\) to give a second ciphertext, \( C \). This allows us to yield the following relation: \( (E_{K_1} \circ E_{K_2}^{-1})(P) = C \). From this, we streamline a list of plaintexts, \( x \), which yield “fixed points” where \( E_{E_{K_1}^{-1}(E_{K_2}(x))} = x \) under keys \( K_1, K_2 \). With candidate \( K_1, K_2 \) proposed, and the respective \( x \), we can then do an exhaustive search for \( K_3 \).

Vaudenay presents an attack based on known PT-CT pairs and another based on Broadcast Known Plaintexts (BKP). However, since we are more interested in comparing Triple-DES to our variants, and not so much on comparing the results of various attacks, we will study the BKP variant and acknowledge that our results can be trivially adapted to the known Plaintext variant of Vaudenay’s attack.

We refer the reader to Vaudenay’s report (Vaudenay, 2011) for the exact procedure of Vaudenay’s rather complex attack and calculations of complexity. For 3-Key Triple-DES, he propose \( n = 3 \) (number of pairs of Related-Keys), meaning we will encrypt known PT-CT pairs under \( K, \phi(K), K \oplus \Delta_1, \phi(K \oplus \Delta_1), K \oplus \Delta_2, \phi(K \oplus \Delta_2) \) with known \( \Delta_1, \Delta_2 \). Thus, we require \( 2^{57} \) BKP and \( R_n \), the expected number of wrong keys that are considered in the second part of the attack, is approximately \( 2^{-1.72} \), yielding an expected time complexity of \( 2^{57.3} \approx 2^{58.6} \) and an expected memory complexity of approximately \( 2^{63} \).

As for Two-Key Triple-DES, we instead consider Encryption of some plaintext \( P \) by keys \((K_1, K_2)\) and decryption of the ciphertext by Related-Keys \((K_2, K_1)\) to give \( C \). This yields the equation \( (E_{K_2} \circ E_{K_1}^{-1})(P) = C \). Fixed points of the same form as above are sieved out. However, wrong key-guesses are easily discarded by a consistency check, meaning \( n = 1 \). This requires \( 2^{65} \) BKP and yields a time complexity of \( 2^{57.6} \) single encryptions and a memory complexity of \( 2^{63} \).

The purpose of finding fixed points in this attack is to be able to consider the behaviour of a subset of the keys. In this case, it is that of \( K_1 \), by requiring that the plaintext which enters the encryption scheme be identical to the ciphertext before it is encrypted by \( K_3 \). In the case of 2-Key Triple DES, the same thing is achieved for the last \( K_1 \). This is done by exploiting the second DES function in the encryption scheme being a decryption and the specific key relation. Notice, however, that in an XEXEXEX variant, if we hold the guessed \( K_1 \) constant, whether we perform iterations of encryptions, decryptions or some combination of the two, the identical XOR function performed after the triple-encryption and the start of the second triple encryption will cancel out. However, the XOR functions between the encryptions are not affected. This means that the resultant function will not be repeating in the way that we were able to achieve in Vaudenay’s attack since the encryptions can no longer take on a consistent pattern.

However, consider instead \( 2^{32} \) \( (P, C \oplus K_1) \) values, for some guessed \( K_1 \). We can then attack 3-Key DES-XEXEXEX by guessing all possible \( K_1 \). Similarly, by guessing \( K_1 \), we can compute \( 2^{32} \) \( (P \oplus K_1) \) values for each \( K_1 \) and attack 4-Key DES-XEXEXEX.

To this end, notice that now we can perform the same combination, of an encryption and decryptions, on \( P \) to arrive at \( C \), with Related Keys \((K_1, K_2, K_3)\) and \((K_1, K_3, K_2)\) for the 3-Key Variant as well as for \((K_1, K_2, K_3)\) and \((K_1, K_3, K_2)\) for the 4-Key
variant. Define a function, $x \oplus K_1 = f(x)$, then, we can arrive at equations similar to those above where $(f \circ E_{K_0} \circ f \circ E_{K_0}^{-1})^{12}(P) = C$ for the 3-Key Variant and $(f \circ E_{K_0} \circ f \circ E_{K_0}^{-1})^{12}(P) = C$ for the 4-Key Variant.

Notice then that we need to change the value of $n$ (number of pairs of $K, \phi(K)$ we consider) since key-length has been increased, in 4-Key DES-EXEXEX. We therefore have the following calculations (adapted from (Vau denay, 2011), Section 3.1, pg 5-6):

First, we calculate the expected $f$ $n^*$, the number of lists with an odd number of fixed points. Let $n = 6$,

$$E(n^*) = 1 + (n - 1)\frac{1 - e^{-2}}{2} \approx 2.94$$

Then, we have that there are $2^{2(56)+64}$ possible combinations of keys but an equation to satisfy on (2.94)(64) bits. This gives us the respective value of $R_n$ (expected number of wrong keys in $R$ given $n$ Related-Key pairs) as:

$$R_n \approx 2^{2(56)+64 - (2)(94)(64)} = 2^{-12.16}$$

Notice that the value of $n$ does not impact the choice to repeat the entire attack 2 times (i.e. $N_0$ is unrelated to $n$ so long as $a > 0$). Therefore, with an identical success rate, we require $6\cdot(2^{64}+1) \approx 2^{63}$ BKP.

The only difference in the time complexity which sees a $2^{64}$ increase in the calculations to arrive at a fixed point, since each $K_1$ must be guessed separately. Note that the XOR functions derive to each set of $(P, C \oplus K_1)$ or $(P \oplus K_1, C)$ values are assumed to be of negligible complexity. This has a time complexity of $2\cdot(2\cdot2^{56}+64 + 2^{56} \cdot 2^{-12.16}) + 2^{56} \approx 2^{122}$ encryptions. Memory can be reused for each guess of $K_1$, therefore, we have that the memory complexity is $2^{63}$.

For the Three-Key DES-XEXEXE, we can adopt the same method of finding fixed points, however, as in the original attack on Two-Key Triple-DES, take $n = 1$. This has time complexity of $4\cdot(2^{56}+64) \approx 2^{122}$ encryptions and a memory complexity of $2^{63}$.

Notice that in both these cases, the time complexities are comparable to that of the attack we considered on DES-XEXEXE. This, we realized, is because Vaudenay’s attacks on DES-EXEXEX and DES-XEXEXE involve guessing each $K_1$ in turn, returning to an attack very reminiscent of that of DES-XEXEXE. This makes the memory space $2^{64}$ times less, and reduces the required value of $n$, other indicators that the attack is identical in nature. Therefore, we have shown the robustness of our method of strengthening Triple-DES, in that, even if RK attacks such as Vaudenay’s attack could be more than trivially applied, we still achieve a $2^{64}$ complexity increase for the 64-bits of added keylength.

3.4 Phan RK Attack

Phan’s RK slide-attack can be applied to both the 2-Key and the 3-Key Triple Encryption effectively, as discussed in his paper (Phan, 2004). We refer the reader to his paper for the exact details of each attack.

With $2^{32}$ PT-CT pairs each for the original key and the Related-Key, we can expect 1 pair with the desired relation by the Birthday Paradox. The first set of encryptions (for all possible $K$ on all values of $P$) dominates the time complexity, meaning that $2^{56} \cdot 2^{32} = 2^{88}$ single-DES encryptions are required for the attack. The memory complexity is also dominated by this step, $2^{88} \cdot (56 + 64 + 64) \approx 2^{96}$.

In the 3-Key Triple DES, we consider PT-CT pairs encrypted under the keys $(K_1, K_2, K_3)$ and $(K_2, K_3, K_1)$. We then search for $(P, C)$, encrypted under $(K_1, K_2, K_3)$ and $(P', C')$ encrypted under $(K_2, K_3, K_1)$ such that $C' = E_{K_1}(P)$ and $C = E_{K_1}(P')$. Once again, we obtain $2^{32}$ PT-CT pairs for each set of keys and create a list of candidates for $K_1$ by encrypting each $P$ and decrypting each $C$ according to each $K_1$. Those satisfying the collision conditions give candidate values for $K_1$. This, as he reports, requires $2^{88}$ DES encryptions and a memory complexity of $2^{32} \cdot (64 + 64) = 2^{99}$.

Notice that an exhaustive search for $K_2, K_3$ via a traditional MITM attack applies once $K_1$ has been determined. This can be achieved with $2^{59}$ memory complexity by partitioning the $2^{56}$ candidates for $K_1$ into sets of $2^{32}$ values, a separate MITM attack is then performed using an exhaustive key-search for $K_2$ and matching against possible ciphertext values given for each group. The total time complexity of this search should be $2^{56} \cdot 2^{32}$, making negligible in comparison to the time-complexity of the main attack.

Similar to our analysis in other sections of this paper, to achieve a time-complexity lower than $2^{64}$ times that of the original attack, the attack must segment the keys into two mutually exclusive groups. Notice that should be attempt a slide attack on either DES-XEXEXEX variant, to isolate one or more encryptions, XOR functions both inside and outside the set of encryptions (for all possible $P$). This requires $2^{32}$ single-DES encryptions and a memory complexity of $2^{32} \cdot (64 + 64) = 2^{99}$. Notice that an exhaustive search for $K_2, K_3$ via a traditional MITM attack applies once $K_1$ has been determined. This can be achieved with $2^{59}$ memory complexity by partitioning the $2^{56}$ candidates for $K_1$ into sets of $2^{32}$ values, a separate MITM attack is then performed using an exhaustive key-search for $K_2$ and matching against possible ciphertext values given for each group. The total time complexity of this search should be $2^{56} \cdot 2^{32}$, making negligible in comparison to the time-complexity of the main attack.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Encryption Scheme</th>
<th>Attack</th>
<th>PT-CT Pairs Requirement</th>
<th>Time (Encryptions)</th>
<th>Memory (bits)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3K Triple-DES</td>
<td>MITM</td>
<td>3 Known</td>
<td>$2^{113}$</td>
<td>$2^{53}$</td>
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<tr>
<td>3K Triple-DES</td>
<td>Lucks</td>
<td>$2^{12}$ Known</td>
<td>$2^{90}$</td>
<td>$2^{33.8}$</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Kelsey et. al</td>
<td>1 Chosen-Decryption 2 Known</td>
<td>$2^{57}$</td>
<td>$2^{53}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3K Triple-DES</td>
<td>Choi et. al</td>
<td>$2^{33}$ RK-Known</td>
<td>$2^{57}$</td>
<td>$2^{60}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3K Triple-DES</td>
<td>Vaudenay</td>
<td>$2^{57}$ RK-BKP</td>
<td>$2^{58.8}$</td>
<td>$2^{53}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3K Triple-DES</td>
<td>Phan</td>
<td>$2^{33}$ RK-Known</td>
<td>$2^{58}$</td>
<td>$2^{39}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4K DES-XEXEXEX</td>
<td>MITM</td>
<td>4 Known</td>
<td>$2^{177}$</td>
<td>$2^{53}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4K DES-XEXEXEX</td>
<td>Lucks</td>
<td>$2^{12}$ Known</td>
<td>$2^{154}$</td>
<td>$2^{33.8}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4K DES-XEXEXEX</td>
<td>Kelsey et. al</td>
<td>1 Chosen-Decryption 2 Known</td>
<td>$2^{121}$</td>
<td>$2^{53}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4K DES-XEXEXEX</td>
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<td>$2^{121}$</td>
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<tr>
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<td>$2^{57}$ RK-BKP</td>
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<td>$2^{53}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4K DES-XEXEXEX</td>
<td>Phan</td>
<td>$2^{33}$ RK-Known</td>
<td>$2^{152}$</td>
<td>$2^{53}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2K Triple-DES</td>
<td>MITM</td>
<td>2 Known</td>
<td>$2^{113}$</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2K Triple-DES</td>
<td>Merkle-Hellman</td>
<td>$2^{12}$ Chosen</td>
<td>$2^{138}$</td>
<td>$2^{53}$</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Oorschot-Wiener</td>
<td>$2^{12}$ Known</td>
<td>$2^{139}$</td>
<td>$2^{53}$</td>
</tr>
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<td>2K Triple-DES</td>
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<td>$2^{121}$</td>
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<tr>
<td>2K Triple-DES</td>
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<td>$2^{33}$ RK-Known</td>
<td>$2^{132}$</td>
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<tr>
<td>3K DES-XEXEXEX</td>
<td>MITM</td>
<td>3 Known</td>
<td>$2^{117}$</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
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<td>Merkle-Hellman</td>
<td>$2^{12}$ Chosen</td>
<td>$2^{117}$</td>
<td>$2^{53}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3K DES-XEXEXEX</td>
<td>Oorschot-Wiener</td>
<td>$2^{12}$ Known</td>
<td>$2^{153}$</td>
<td>$2^{53}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3K DES-XEXEXEX</td>
<td>Choi et. al</td>
<td>$2^{33}$ RK-Known</td>
<td>$2^{153}$</td>
<td>$2^{39}$</td>
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<td>Vaudenay</td>
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<td>Phan</td>
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<td>$2^{132}$</td>
<td>$2^{56}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Then, the attack can proceed as diagrammatically displayed below (Figure 6). This yields an identical memory complexity and a time complexity of $2^{144}$ encryptions for 4-Key DES-XEXEXEX and $2^{152}$ for 3-Key DES-XEXEXEX.

### 4 CONCLUSIONS

The merits of the 3-Key and 4-Key DES-XEXEXEX variants in strengthening Triple-DES against known MITM and RK attacks have been extensively shown. Due to the fact that we employ the XOR function, using the same key, across the entire encryption scheme, we have arrived at a cipher which cannot readily be partitioned into segments with independent keys to be attacked separately. These results are summarized in Table 1. For a key-extension of 64-bits, we see a strengthening of the cipher by a complexity of $2^{64}$. In addition, the XOR function involves negligible computation, thereby not affecting the implementation of the cipher. 3-Key or 4-Key Quadruple-DES is an example of an intuitive solution that does not satisfy these conditions.

Our contribution is useful to employing multiple-
encryption structures with insufficient security afforded by its key-length. Beyond DES, similar results will be obtained in application to any block cipher, meaning, for a cipher with block-size $n$, we achieve a $2^n$ increase in security for a $n$-bit key-length increase.

Recent literature, such as (Phan, 2004) and (Kilian and Rogaway, 1996) support moving away from XOR to addition modulo 64. This is because the inverse function of XOR is itself, whereas addition is not symmetrical, invalidating some attacks. However, Phan presents an attack that is applicable to DES+ and not DES-X (Phan, 2004). Our brief study into DES - +E+E+E+ models for Triple-Encryption revealed similar results to DES-XEEXEEX with the exception of the Vaudenay attack. Future work can study addition in relation to this in more detail.

Also, we considered a general $t + 1$-key DES-(XE)/X encryption scheme and we believe that similar attacks can be applied to show that a $2^{64}$ increase in security is achieved. However, more research can be done on this to study the significance of this increase as $t$ increases, as well as other schemes involving less or more than $t + 1$ keys.

REFERENCES


Vaudenay, S. (2011). Related-key attack against triple encryption based on fixed points. In SECRYPT. SCITEPRESS.