Exploiting Capacity Planning of Cloud Providers to Limit SLA Violations

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Abstract: Automatic negotiation of Service Level Agreements (SLAs) is a promising way to stipulate contracts in the Cloud market, where the high dynamism of customers' requirements and providers' resources availability make it very difficult to statically define Quality of Service (QoS) level and pricing. To achieve high satisfaction levels for both parties, the negotiation decisions about stipulation conditions (or rejection) of contracts should be guided both by an overall strategic business policy and by dynamic information. In this paper, we propose to exploit capacity planning to support bilateral negotiation processes with the aim of optimizing the overall utility for service providers, by avoiding contracts that could incur in SLAs violations, keeping, at the same time, competitive service prices. In particular, the proposed technique exploits a heuristic algorithm to automatically evaluate a non-additive utility function and the acceptable region, taking into account QoS, resources availability, costs and penalties. The technique is compared with static approaches by using some simulations.

1 INTRODUCTION

In the Cloud context, legal contracts between customers and services providers are typically defined by means of Service Level Agreements (SLAs) (Wu and Buyya, 2012). They allow to formally describe the offered functions, the QoS levels the provider promises to meet and the parties’ responsibilities. Platform as Service (PaaS) providers (e.g. Google App Engine and Force.com), often offer a pool of differentiated services with pre-fixed prices related to the complexity of the deployed applications, measured through metrics such as the number of applications and database objects. For these services, SLAs are currently used to define the granted service availability (uptime) level and a credit-based penalty system in case of violation. However, they do not offer, yet, the possibility to define fine-grained and custom SLAs that take into account specific performance parameters and related service pricing. To this aim, automatic negotiation of SLAs is standing out as a viable approach to stipulate contracts on a dialogue basis between the negotiation actors (providers and customers). It allows to resolve conflicts deriving by different and continuously changing goals, policies and preferences of customers and providers (Czajkowski et al., 2005).

A negotiation process is distinguished in unilateral, if an actor (typically the provider) makes a SLA proposal and the other actor can only decide to accept or reject it, and bilateral, if both the actors have an active role in proposing SLAs. The main features of an automatic negotiation process are: the negotiation protocol, which formalizes the rules for message exchange among the negotiation actors, the SLA proposal, made of a SLA template, representing the fixed part of all the proposals exchanged among the actors during the negotiation process, and a set of values for the negotiable (variable) parameters, and the negotiation strategy, that is the reasoning model adopted by each actor to guide negotiation decisions and actions.

Bilateral negotiation strategies driven by time-based decision functions (Raiffa, 1982), widespread because of their simplicity and effectiveness, adopt a decision model made of a utility function, representing the satisfaction level received by a SLA proposal, and a region of acceptable offers (called acceptable region), containing the proposals with a utility value included between the reservation and the maximum value. The agreement is reached in the
region mutually acceptable by both the actors, called negotiation space. Time-based decision functions allow to make time-dependent concessions with respect to an initial utility value (e.g. the maximum one) with the aim to reach an agreement within the maximum negotiation time. In particular, when a proposal is received, the related utility value and belonging to the acceptable region are computed.

On the basis of such evaluations, and of elapsed time, the strategy decides on the acceptance or rejection of the proposal, the counter-proposal generation or negotiation termination. In literature, typically, the decision models are represented by multi- and independent-attribute utility functions, instantiated by a set of statically and manually defined parameters. On the other hand, in a realistic Cloud market, negotiable parameters, such as price and QoS levels, can not be considered independent for utility definition. In fact, the service price depends on resources cost, that, in its turn, depends on the agreed QoS terms. Moreover, we argue that the utility definition, in order to lead to proper decisions about the stipulation or rejection of contracts, should be guided by an overall strategic business policy and dynamic information about the negotiation context, such as the market trend, the effective customers’ requirements and providers’ capacity availability. As an example, a provider could accept (refuse) an offer with low price during a high (low) competitive market phase. Analogously, an offer with the same QoS level and price could be accepted or refused on the basis of different service usage conditions (e.g. the forecasted daily load peak).

In this work, we focus on bilateral SLA negotiation of PaaS services for hosting Web applications. Cloud is becoming a widespread solution for hosting Web applications, especially when they are used by a growing number of users. We define a utility model non-additive with respect to negotiation parameters, that represents the overall provider economic profit deriving by a new contract, net of resources’ costs and penalty for QoS guarantees violations and eventual variation in profits of already signed SLAs. We take into account the penalty payment both as direct and indirect (due to reputation level degradation) profit losses. We propose a dynamic evaluation of the utility model based on a capacity planning technique that suggests the best profitable resources allocation plan by avoiding (or reducing) violations of QoS guarantees.

The following section introduces related work. Section 3 describes the SLA model for the PaaS service and the capacity model. Section 4 and 5 presents respectively the proposed utility model and an evaluation technique based on capacity planning. Section 6 shows the benefit of the proposed technique with respect to the static approach by using some simulations. Finally, Section 7 describes conclusion and future work.

2 RELATED WORK

Many negotiation strategies adopting time-based decision functions (Faratinet al., 1998) are based on a multi-attribute additive utility function, assuming that the negotiable parameters are independent of each other. Moreover, the utility functions and related acceptable regions are defined statically and require human intervention (Li et al., 2006), (Chhet ri et al., 2006), (Zulkernine and Martin, 2011), limiting the applicability of such approaches in highly dynamic environments, such as Cloud.

Macias and Guitart (2010) propose the adoption of non-additive multi-objective utility functions for satisfying both business and performance goals in unilateral negotiation of Cloud services for Grid. The utility function takes into account various objectives (economic revenue maximization and reputation, priority to tasks or services executed in off-peak hours). When a provider receives a proposal, the utility function is maximized, taking into account economic factors and resources availability information, to propose an offer to the customer. In a similar way, we propose a non-additive utility function and a maximization problem to define the utility function and the acceptable region for a bilateral negotiation processes.

Spilln er and Schi ll (2009) propose the semi-automatic adjustment of SLA templates, published by providers in an advertisement service registry and adopted as starting point of negotiation processes. It is based on a performance prediction model, that exploits both run-time and historical monitoring data, to define the sustainable QoS level before reaching the resource limit and eventually incurring in SLA terms’ violations. Whilst in this approach the adjustment of SLA templates has to be performed manually by providers’ operators, we define a capacity-planning driven negotiation to fulfill a business policy automatically.

Capacity planning of IT infrastructures, both for optimized short-term resource management and long-term investment plans, can be employed by service providers to manage SLAs and promised QoS levels in the most profitable way (Alls p aw, 2008). The problem of a self-adaptive capacity
planning for optimizing SLA economic profits for Internet Services was investigated considering a set of signed SLAs. Some approaches leverage the queuing theory to solve an optimization resource allocation problem under constraints on the service rate. In particular, Almeida et al. (2006) take into account the profit with respect to the penalty and Abrahao et al. (2006) the reward in case a surge workload is supported. As in our proposal, resource virtualization for performance isolation and dynamic resource allocation (Graupner et al., 2003) is exploited in both the solutions. Liu, Squillante and Wolf (2001) analyze the resource allocation problem to maximize the profit for a Web server farm attained in the hosting of e-commerce sites subject to different classes of QoS requirements, related, in particular, to the delays experienced by customers. The optimal or near-optimal solution to this problem is based on methods derived from probability theory, queuing theory and combinatorial optimization.

3 PAAS SERVICE NEGOTIATION

3.1 SLA Model

In the following, the analysis is referred to a PaaS service for Web application hosting, called Virtual Web Platform (VWP) service. A VWP service offers a virtual platform used to host a Web application. It is composed of multiple components, deployed on the provider resources according to a multi-tier architecture. The SLA model, to formally define the contract aspects which the customer and the provider come to an agreement on, is structured in four sections: (1) service description, (2) QoS target, (3) measurement and (4) penalty/reward system.

The service description defines the application components, the contract validity period, denoted as \( D \), the price, denoted as \( P \), based on an “una-tenant” payment model, and the service usage conditions under which the provider is responsible for the QoS terms. Service usage conditions are defined through the workload plan expected for the Web application in different moments of a business day, modelling the typical fluctuations of Web application-generated traffic (Chase and Anderson, 2001). It is given by \( W = \{ w_1, ..., w_K \} \), where \( w_k \), \( k = 1, ..., K \) represents the number of incoming requests received and completed in the \( k \)-th time slot of a day.

The QoS target section defines the QoS guarantee terms. It states that the response time has to not overcome a maximum value, denoted as \( T \), and the service availability has to not decrease under a prefixed percentage value called \( \text{MinAvail} \).

The measurement section defines the measurement process adopted for monitoring QoS targets. The maximum response time \( T \) is influenced by various delay components, some of them are not under the provider responsibility (such as data transfer delay outside the data center performed on public networks used without contract regulation). For this reason, we define \( T \) as the time interval beginning from the HTTP request receipt on the provider infrastructure to the HTTP response completion and transfer beginning. Moreover, since the response time depends on the processing time of the specific invoked Web component, in order to obtain comparable measures, we introduce a customized Web component, called Benchmarking Web Component (BWC), defined by the customer to characterize the Web application in terms of typical operations load. Finally, we define as measurement sample the average of a set of single measurements retrieved during a small interval time, called monitoring time unit. This approach avoids to detect, as QoS violation, isolated performance degradations during transitory situations, typical of adaptation actions on resource allocation.

The penalty/reward system section defines the monetary penalty the provider has to pay when the QoS targets are not satisfied, and the monetary bonus the customer has to pay when an additional/not mandatory condition or QoS term is reached by the provider.

We consider a penalty directly proportional to contract price, QoS violation degree and duration. In particular, it is expressed as the summation of penalty amounts derived from each monitoring time unit, as follows:

\[
\text{Pen} = \sum_{d=1}^{D} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sum_{j=1}^{J} \text{Pen}_{d,k,j}.
\]

\( \text{Pen}_{d,k,j} \) depends on the difference between the measured response time and \( T \), denoted as \( \Delta t_{d,k,j} \), and on the price related to a monitoring time unit, denoted as \( p \), as follows:

\[
\text{Pen}_{d,k,j} = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } \Delta t_{d,k,j} \leq 0 \\
p \frac{\Delta t_{d,k,j}}{\Delta t_{\text{max}}} & \text{if } 0 < \Delta t_{d,k,j} < \Delta t_{\text{max}} \\
p & \text{if } \Delta t_{d,k,j} \geq \Delta t_{\text{max}}
\end{cases}
\]

Moreover, the penalty system specifies that, in case
the service is available in a number of monitoring time units less than the percentage \( \text{MinAvail} \), the customer has the right to recede from the contract and to receive a refund. We state that a service is available in a monitoring time unit when the difference between the related measurement sample and \( T \) is less than a maximum value permitted, indicated with \( \Delta t_{\text{max}} \).

Summarizing, an SLA signed by a provider, denoted as \( \text{SLA}_i \), \( i=1,...,N \), is represented by the following parameters:

\[
\text{SLA}_i = (P_i, T_i, W_i, BWC_i, \text{beg}_i, \text{end}_i, D_i)
\]

where \( \text{beg}_i \) and \( \text{end}_i \) represent, respectively, the starting and ending day of the contract validity period and \( D_i \) its duration. In the following, we consider the same time slot partitioning and contract validity period, with duration \( D_i \) for all SLAs. During the negotiation process of a new SLA, called \( \text{SLA}_{N+1} \), we consider the exchange of SLA proposals. Each proposal is a SLA template with specific parameters.

### 3.2 Capacity Model

To meet the QoS terms we adopt a replication schema to the application server tier, while the Web server is used as a load balancer and a unique database server is shared. Replication is handled by virtual machines (each one hosting an application server) allocated on a set of hardware resources (see Figure 1). Under these assumptions, we model the overall system capacity as a set of \( M \) independent virtual machines with the same hardware characteristics and performance. We denote as \( N_i = [n_{id}, i=1,...,N, d=1,...,D, k=1,...,K] \) the resource allocation plan for each \( \text{SLA}_i \) composed of the number of virtual machines assigned to the related VWP service in the time slots of each contract day.

### 4 Utility Model

The proposed utility model evaluates the profit that the provider achieves by accepting a new SLA taking into account QoS targets, usage conditions, the current capacity availability, the resource allocation plans and utility deriving from each already signed SLA.

The utility, denoted by \( U(P_{N+1}, T_{N+1}) \), deriving by a new contract, \( \text{SLA}_{N+1} \), with negotiable parameters \( (P_{N+1}, T_{N+1}) \), is defined as the difference between the overall profit accommodating the new contract (denoted as \( V' \)) and the one gained by the already signed SLAs, \( \text{SLA}_i, i=1,...,N \) (denoted as \( V \))

\[
U(P_{N+1}, T_{N+1}) = V' - V.
\]

Both \( V' \) and \( V \) are evaluated by means of the overall profit function \( v' \) related to a generic set \( S \) of \( K \) SLAs

\[
v'((\text{SLA}_i)_{K'}, (N_i)_{K}),
\]

indicating the dependency on SLA parameters in (3) and resource allocation plans.

Adopting an additive model with respect to the profit deriving from a single SLA, (5) becomes

\[
v' = \sum_{i=1}^{K} U_i((\text{SLA}_i, N_i)),
\]

where \( U_i \) is the contract utility deriving by a contract \( \text{SLA}_i \in S \), and \( N_i \) the related resource allocation plan.

Indicated by \( P \) the set of \( N \) already signed SLAs, and by \( Q \) the set \( P+\text{SLA}_{N+1} \), (4) becomes

\[
u(P_{N+1}, T_{N+1}) = \sum_{i=1}^{N+1} U_i((\text{SLA}_i, N_i)) - \sum_{i=1}^{N} U_i((\text{SLA}_i, N_i)).
\]

Varying price and response time, the utility defined with (7) changes, and its value, typically adopting a normalized form, is used by the negotiation strategy to decide if a proposal can be accepted, to generate a counter-offer, and so on.

Contract utility \( U_i \), expressing the profit gained by a contract \( SLA_i \), is defined as the following:

\[
U_i((\text{SLA}_i, N_i)) = P_i - \text{Cost}_i - \text{Pen}_i,
\]

where \( \text{Cost}_i \) is the cost of \( \text{SLA}_i \), and \( \text{Pen}_i \) is the provisioned penalty. Both \( \text{Cost} \) and \( \text{Pen} \) depends on SLA parameters and by the resource allocation plan.

In order to adjust the price in response to the changing market supply and demand, we propose a dynamic market-based price function, proportional with the cost of the resource allocation plan. In
particular, $P_l$ is defined as
\[
P_l = \text{Cost}_l((\rho \text{des} + (1 - \rho \text{des})g)),
\]
where $\rho$ is a factor defined by market historical data analysis and $\text{des}$ represents the interest level of the provider in signing a new contract. It is calculated on the basis of the probability for a provider to be chosen by a customer among the available ones (higher is the interest level and lower is the price). Finally, $g$ is a factor useful during the negotiation process to vary the price between the reserved price (e.g. the service cost) and the maximum one (e.g. the maximum allowed under well-defined market conditions).

$\text{Cost}_l$, under the assumption of a fixed cost for virtual machine usage per time slot, denoted by $c$, is modeled as
\[
\text{Cost}_l(N_l) = c \text{base} + c \sum_{\theta} \sum_{k=1}^{n_{\text{idk}}} n_{\text{idk}},
\]
where $c_{\text{base}}$ is a fixed cost for the virtual platform management.

The penalty incurred during the contract validity depends on the application performance provisioned adopting both the resource allocation plan, and the workload provisioned for the service. We take into account the workload plan declared by the customer, but a more accurate provisional model, based on monitoring data during service operation and/or Web workload modeling techniques, will be adopted in the future in order to reduce costs (e.g. energy consumption of under-exploited resources). The proposed performance forecasting mechanism is based on a benchmarking technique that uses the measurement process described in Section 3.2. A function, that will be useful for utility evaluation, is the performance function $t(n, w)$, that relates the response time of $BWC$ to number $n$ virtual machines and to workload $w$.

The acceptable region, indicated as $V_S^Q$, represents the region of negotiable parameters $(P_{N+1}, T_{N+1})$ for the proposals of the new contract, whose utility $U$ is acceptable. For the utility model with independent parameters proposed by Raiffa (1982), the acceptable region is defined by means of the static minimum and maximum value of each parameter. As a consequence, it is composed of all proposals whose parameters values are within their respective acceptable intervals. On the contrary, for the proposed utility model, the interval of acceptable prices depends on the cost of the resource allocation plan, that, on its turn, depends on the response time.

We define the acceptable region as follows: indicated with $[T_{\text{min}} \ T_{\text{max}}]$ the interval of acceptable response times, called acceptable performance interval, a proposal $(P_{N+1}, T_{N+1})$ belongs to the acceptable region $V_S^Q$ if $T_{N+1}$ is contained within the acceptable performance interval and if $P_{N+1}$ belongs to the interval of acceptable prices related to $T_{N+1}$, called acceptable price interval, indicated with $[P_{\text{min}}(T_{N+1}), P_{\text{max}}(T_{N+1})]$. Within the acceptable region the utility is included between the reservation value, called $U^Q_{\text{res}}$, and the maximum allowed one, called $U^Q_{\text{max}}$. Summarizing $V_S^Q$ is given by
\[
V_S^Q = \{(P_{N+1}, T_{N+1}): T_{N+1} \in [T_{\text{min}}, T_{\text{max}}], P_{N+1} \in [P_{\text{min}}(T_{N+1}), P_{\text{max}}(T_{N+1})]\}.
\]

5  UTILITY BASED ON CAPACITY PLANNING

The hosting of a new service is guided by the principle of optimizing the gained utility (7). To this aim, the problem of utility definition for the negotiation strategy is expressed as the following: given a proposal for the new service with certain values for price and response time, a capacity planning problem is performed in order to find the optimal resource allocation plan that allows to obtain the best utility value, taking into account the available resources in various time slots of contract period and the utility gained by the already signed SLAs. Moreover, it is necessary to define the conditions under which such utility is considered acceptable. We consider two resource allocation policies, the progressive and the conservative ones. With the former, the hosting of a new service takes into account changes in the resource allocation plan for the already signed contracts, so potentially causing a variation in their cost and penalty. With the conservative policy the resource allocation plan for the new contract is spread out on effective available resources and does not affect the resource allocation of the already signed services.

The problem of the best resource allocation plan $n_{\text{idk}}^Q$ related to the new contract $S_{N+1}$, characterized by negotiation parameters $(P_{N+1}, T_{N+1})$, is formulated as follows:

\[
\max(U(P_{N+1}, T_{N+1})),
\]
subject to
\[
\sum_{i=1}^{N_{\text{idk}}} n_{\text{idk}}^Q \leq M, \quad \forall d, v_k, \tag{13}
\]
\[
n_{\text{idk}}^Q \leq n_{\text{idk}}^{\text{opti}}(T_i), \quad \forall i, \forall d, v_k, \tag{14}
\]
than the optimal one that, for each contract, the number of assigned resources and to offer competitive services. It states for the new contract, allowing to avoid waste of minimum cost, allows to obtain a response time less that \( T_i \) in each time slot. Each \( n_{idk}^{opt} \) is given by the minimum between the minimum number of virtual resources necessary to reach a response time within \( T_i \) (under the related workload plan \( w_i \)) and the maximum number of assignable resources, indicated with \( n_{max} \):

\[
n_{idk}^{opt} = \min(\min(n_i: t(n_i, w_k) \leq T_i), n_{max})
\]  

(16)

This optimization problem finds the resource allocation plans for all SLAs that maximize utility in (7), taking into account the overall capacity (constraint (13)) and SLAs. (15) states that \( n_{idk} \) must be integer numbers and less than \( n_{max} \).

Constraint (14) maintains at minimum the cost for the new contract, allowing to avoid waste of resources and to offer competitive services. It states that, for each contract, the number of assigned resources, in each time slot, must be less or equal than the optimal one \( n_{idk}^{opt}(T_i) \).

In addition to constrains (13), (14) and (15), if a progressive resource allocation policy is adopted, additional constraints can be formulated to limit re-allocation actions that could cause uncontrolled reduction of each contract profit, related performance and reputation. Such constraints are, for example, limitations on the maximum number of virtual resources that can be added/subtracted to the already signed SLAs in the new resource allocation plans \( N_i^0, i = 1, ..., N \) and on the maximum performance degradation.

The utility optimization problem in (12) can lead to negative and positive values, in case proposal \( (P_{N+1}, T_{N+1}) \) leads to a loss of profit for the provider, or to an effective gain respectively. In general, the overall business policy can dynamically guide the decision whether a proposal is satisfying or not, leading to a more competitive or conservative approach.

To define the acceptable region, we adopt the following conditions under which a proposal \( (P_{N+1}, T_{N+1}) \) is defined acceptable:

- **Response time acceptability condition:** the utility for the proposal \( (P_{N+1}, T_{N+1}) \) has to be greater than a percentage, indicated as MaxPMinU, of the utility that can be gained with the optimal resource allocation plan, \( N_{N+1}^{opt}(T_{N+1}) \), and the related maximum price. \( P_{max}(T_{N+1}) \), representing the maximum price with respect to \( T_{N+1} \), is obtained adopting (9) with \( g=0 \).
- **Price acceptability condition:** the utility for response time \( T_{N+1} \) must be included between the minimum allowed utility and the maximum one. In particular, the maximum utility, \( U_{max}^Q \), is the one corresponding to the maximum allowed price, and the minimum utility, \( U_{res} \), is a percentage, \( MinPMinU \), of \( U_{max}^Q \).
- **Service availability condition:** the percentage of \( n_{N+1}^Q \) whose response time overcomes \( T_{N+1} \) more than \( \Delta t_{max} \) must be less than \( MinAvail \).

### 5.1 A Heuristic

Since the negotiable parameters are not independent, the utility model evaluation has a combinatorial complexity. In order to be computationally feasible, we propose a heuristic to find an approximation of the acceptable region and of the utility function adopting (12) for a limited number of cases and an interpolation technique. The algorithm consists of the following steps:

- Evaluation of \( T_{max} \) of the acceptable price interval, \([P_{min}(T_{max}), P_{max}(T_{max})]\) and of utility for the boundaries of such interval;
- Evaluation of \( T_{min} \) of the acceptable price interval, \([P_{min}(T_{min}), P_{max}(T_{min})]\) and of utility for the boundaries of such interval;
- Evaluation of utility for the maximum and minimum prices of a certain number of response times within the acceptable performance interval.

The algorithm starts with the definition of \( T_{max} \), which represents the maximum response time provisioned in the \( K \) time slots, characterized by workloads \( \{w_1, ..., w_K\} \), adopting the minimum number \( n_{min} \) of virtual machines that can be assigned to a service, (e.g. one virtual machine):

\[
T_{max} = \max(t(n_{min}, w_k))_K
\]  

(17)

The acceptable price interval for \( T_{max} \) is evaluated through an iterative approach. The first step is to solve (12) adopting a conservative resource allocation policy. In this case, (7) becomes:

\[
U(P_{N+1}, T_{N+1}) = P_{N+1}(T_{N+1}) - C_{cost_{N+1}} - P_{n_{N+1}}
\]  

(18)

In order to maximize (18), we adopt a “best effort” capacity planning approach. Considering constraints (13), (14) and (15), the resource allocation plan \( N_{N+1}^Q \) is determined as following:
Then, the service availability condition for \( N_{n+1}^q \) is checked. If it is satisfied, \( P_{n+1}, \text{Cost}_{n+1} \) and \( \text{Pen}_{n+1} \) are evaluated adopting respectively (8), (9) and (2). If the response time acceptability condition is satisfied, the acceptable price interval for \( T_{\text{max}} \) is evaluated exploiting the price acceptability condition:

\[
P_{\text{max}}(T_{\text{max}}) = \text{Cost}_{n+1}(P_{\text{des}} + (1 - P_{\text{des}})g)_{g=0} = \text{Cost}_{n+1}\text{prices}.
\]

\[
P_{\text{min}}(T_{\text{max}}) = P_{n+1}; \text{Cost}(P_{\text{max}}(T_{\text{max}})) = \text{U}(P_{\text{max}}(T_{\text{max}}))\text{OptPrice}.
\]

Considering only the conservative resource allocation approach, different prices do not influence the best assignable resource allocation plan. In this case, the minimum price, \( P_{\text{min}}(T_{\text{z}}) \) is given by:

\[
P_{\text{min}}(T_{\text{max}}) = \frac{\text{MinPrice}(P_{\text{des}} - 1 - \delta P_{\text{des}}) + 1}{\text{Cost}_{n+1}}
\]

with \( C = \frac{\text{Pen}(P_{\text{max}}(T_{\text{max}}))}{P_{\text{max}}(T_{\text{max}})} \)

If the service availability and the response time acceptability conditions are not satisfied, the progressing resource allocation policy is taken into account. The basic idea is the following: for each time slot in which the number of allocated resources, \( n_{n+1}^q \), is less than both \( n_{\text{max}} \) and the optimal number \( n_{n+1}^\text{opt} \), we find a re-allocation plan, involving the already signed SLAs, that causes the best utility increase. The process is stopped when the acceptability conditions is satisfied. If the re-allocation actions, performed in each time slot, do not lead to satisfy the acceptability conditions, this means that the new SLA, under the required workload and contract validity period, does not lead to an acceptable utility for any value of price and response time. In this case the negotiation request is refused.

\( T_{\text{min}} \) is evaluated adopting an iterative approach aiming to find the minimum response time that satisfies the service availability and response time acceptability conditions. At the beginning, \( T_{\text{min}} \) is defined as the minimum response time obtained exploiting the resources actually available in each time slot and the conservative resource allocation policy:

\[
T_{\text{min}} \equiv \min \left\{ \frac{\text{COST}_{n+1}(P_{\text{des}} + (1 - P_{\text{des}})g)_{g=0}}{\text{Cost}_{n+1}\text{prices}} \right\}
\]

\[
T_{\text{min}} = \min(t(n_{dk}, w_k))_{d,k}, n_{dk} = \min((M - \sum_{k=1}^N n_{dk}), n_{\text{max}}), y_d, y_k
\]

If the acceptability conditions are not satisfied, the progressing resource allocation policy is exploited. If, also in this case, the acceptability conditions are not satisfied, less values of \( T_{\text{min}} \) are attempted. A attempt value is obtained summing to the previous one a little amount \( \delta > 0 \), until the acceptability conditions are satisfied or \( T_{\text{max}} \) is reached. If a \( T_{\text{min}} \geq (T_{\text{max}} + \epsilon) \), \( \epsilon > 0 \), is found, and the related acceptable price interval satisfies the acceptability condition, the heuristic proceeds to the next step. On the contrary, it stops and the negotiation request is refused.

Because of non-linearity of the model, the utility function is evaluated for a certain number of response times internal to the acceptable performance interval \( [T_{\text{min}}, T_{\text{max}}] \). In particular, called \( T_z, z=1,\ldots,Z \) the response times in which the interval is partitioned, a simple technique to define them is based on the partition of the interval into equal-length parts:

\[
T_z = T_{\text{min}} + ((z - 1) + \sigma), \quad \text{with} \quad \sigma = \frac{T_{\text{max}} - T_{\text{min}}}{Z - 1}
\]

For each \( T_z, z=2,\ldots,Z-1 \) the acceptable price interval, \([P_{\text{min}}(T_z), P_{\text{max}}(T_z)]\), and utilities for \( P_{\text{min}}(T_z) \) and \( P_{\text{max}}(T_z) \) are evaluated.

Summarizing, the utility function and related acceptable region are defined as follows:

- The acceptable performance interval \([T_{\text{min}}, T_{\text{max}}]\);
- The acceptable price interval for \( Z \) response times \( T_z \) in the acceptable performance interval, \([P_{\text{min}}(T_z), P_{\text{max}}(T_z)]\), \( z=1,\ldots,Z \);
- Utility evaluated for each \( T_z \) and the related minimum and maximum acceptable price, \( U(P_{\text{min}}(T_z); T_z), U(P_{\text{max}}(T_z); T_z), z=1,\ldots,Z \).

The normalized form of the utility function can be defined normalizing the utility values between the absolute maximum and the minimum values, denoted respectively by \( U_{\text{max}} \) and \( U_{\text{min}} \).

6 EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS

In this section, we present the results of the evaluation of the proposed heuristic for utility evaluation in terms of estimation error with respect to the actual gained utility varying the price and response time of a SLA proposal.

We discuss about the benefit the dynamic approach introduces with respect to the static one in
terms of satisfaction level for both provider and customer. In the following, the price and response time of a SLA proposal for a new contract are indicated respectively with P and T.

The simulation results have been obtained by adopting the conservative resource allocation policy, and under the following conditions:
- workload plan \( W = \{w_1, w_2\} \) defines the workloads as number of requests/second (r/s) in two time slots in which a day is subdivided (each time slot has a duration of 12 hours);
- the contract validity period (the same for all the contracts) has a duration of \( D = 180 \) days (about six months);
- static competitive market conditions, characterized by a provider interest level \( \delta = 0.5 \); 
- \( \rho = 4 \) (see (9) for price definition);
- \( c_{base} = 0 \text{€} \), \( c = 0.5 \text{€} \), for the resources cost;
- regarding the service availability condition, \( \text{MinAvail} = 100\% \) and \( \Delta_T = T \), that means the service is always available, and, in particular, that a proposal is not acceptable if there is a time slot in which the number of assignable resources leads to a response time that overcomes 2\( T \). In this case, (15) becomes
  \[
  n_{d,k} \leq T \left( n_{d,k} - T \right) \leq T
  \]  
  \( n_{d,k} \in N, \forall i, \forall d, \forall k \).

- Parameters for acceptability conditions are:
  - \( \text{MaxPMinU}=45\% \) (the utility gained adopting the maximum price has to be at least the 45% of the maximum utility that could be gained in case the optimal resource allocation plan would be assignable);
  - \( \text{MinPMinU}=10\% \) (the utility reserve value has to be at least the 10% of the utility that could be gained adopting the maximum price);
  - \( \delta = 5 \text{ ms}, c_{res} = 10 \text{ ms} \), for \( T_{min} \) definition;
  - \( n_{max} = 10, n_{min} = 1 \);
  - the number of response time evaluations \( Z = 20 \);
  - the initially available capacity in each time slot is \( M = 100 \).

### 6.1 Utility Model Analysis

The experimental results for the utility model analysis refer to a SLA proposal characterized by \( W = \{100 \text{ r/s}, 300 \text{ r/s}\} \) and a linear trend of the application performance, varying the number of assigned resources from \( n_{min} (= 1) \) to \( n_{max} (= 10) \), and the workload from 100 to 300 r/s. The performance function \( t(n, w) \), as defined in Section 4, is given by:

\[
t = \frac{(63w - 2200n + 28300)}{180}.
\]  

Moreover, we assume a capacity availability greater than \( n_{max} \) for each time slot. Figure 2 shows the acceptable region in the bi-dimensional space response time-price and Figure 3 the normalized utility intervals (from the minimum to the maximum price adopting respectively (21) and (20)) evaluated for \( Z = 20 \) response times within the acceptable performance interval. Starting from the worst response time, 250 ms, until 135.8 ms, the width of acceptable price intervals and the maximum normalized utility increase, because of an increasing cost of the best assignable resource allocation plans and lack of penalty. For best performance levels, and, in particular, from 135.8 ms to 95 ms, the width of acceptable price intervals and the maximum normalized utility decrease, because of increasing cost of the best assignable resource allocation plans and an increasing penalty provisioned in the second time slot characterized by a huge workload plan (300 r/s).

By observing Figure 2, the proposed model leads to different acceptable regions from the ones produced by multi and independent attribute utility functions (Raiffa, 1982). In particular, for such model, the acceptable region has a rectangular shape and the maximum utility is gained with respect to the best value for each negotiable parameter, that corresponds to the worst response time (250 ms) and to the maximum price 3240 € (a combination of values that does not reflect a SLA proposal in a realistic Cloud market). On the contrary, the proposed model reduces the acceptable region to the proposals with feasible performances and competitive prices. We state that the proposed model can be effectively leveraged by a negotiation strategy to quickly reach an agreement with high satisfaction levels for both the provider and the customer. Figures 4 and 5 show, respectively, the influence of the workload plan and the capacity availability on the intervals of utility values (varying the price) for each response time \( T_z \).

Figure 2: Acceptable region with \( W = \{100 \text{ r/s}, 300 \text{ r/s}\} \).
Figure 3: Normalized utility in the acceptable performance interval with $W = \{100 \text{ r/s}, 300 \text{ r/s}\}$.

Figure 4 shows that, for uniform workload plans (e.g., $\{100 \text{ r/s}, 100 \text{ r/s}\}$), the maximum utility has a decreasing trend, since no penalty is applied. On the contrary, for non-uniform plans, the utility reaches a maximum and then decreases. Moreover, for increasing workload, the acceptable performance interval translates towards worst response times. Figure 5 shows that a decrease of the number of available resources from 10 to 5 for both time slots leads to a reduction of the best response time and of the maximum utility.

In order to evaluate the accuracy level of the proposed heuristic, we compared the provisioned utility with the actual one. The actual utility $U_{act}$ is evaluated adopting (18), cost and performance of the effective best resource allocation plan assignable to a new contract, adopting the conservative resource allocation policy and taking into account SLA parameters and the current resources availability.

In particular, we define the absolute error $E$ as:

$$E = |U_{act} - U|$$  \hspace{1cm} (25)

Error $E$ is influenced by the bi-linear interpolation technique, adopted by the heuristic to approximate the actual (non-linear) utility starting from the utility evaluations for $T_z$s, that removes the integer constraint (15) on the number of resources effectively assignable to a new contract.

The maximum absolute error $E$ between the utility provisioned (with $Z=10$) and the actual value with respect to response times $T_z$ within the acceptable region, for workload plan $\{100 \text{ r/s}, 300 \text{ r/s}\}$, is 91.9 € in correspondence of the maximum actual utility (1306 €) and response time 132.4 ms, leading to a maximum relative error of 7 %.

Moreover, with respect to all the possible SLA proposals considering 30 values of $T$ within the acceptable performance interval, and for each response time, 30 price values within the respective acceptable interval, the number of proposals with provisioned utility with error $E$ greater than 90 % of the maximum one is 23, corresponding to 2.55 % of the total number (900) of proposals.

With $Z=20$, the maximum absolute error becomes 65.1 €, while the percentage of proposals with an error greater that the 90% of the maximum one becomes 3.3%. Such results are satisfying, because in a negotiation scenario the utility provision of a SLA, performed to correctly delimit the acceptable region, can tolerate a limited degree of inaccuracy for the benefit of an acceptable performance computation.

Figure 4: Utility varying the workload plan.

Figure 5: Utility varying the number of available resources with $W = \{150 \text{ r/s}, 250 \text{ r/s}\}$.

### 6.2 Dynamic versus Static Planning

To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed dynamic approach in increasing customer satisfaction level and provider reputation, we introduce some parameters tied to the agree price $P$ and response time $T$ and the actual response time during the contract validity period. In particular, we define the price-based indicator, $U_c(P)$, as the customer satisfaction level with respect to $P$, and the
response time-based indicator, \( U_c(T) \), as the customer satisfaction level with respect to \( T \) and the actual response time. Denoted with

\[
U_c^F(P) = P - Cost_{opt}
\]  

(26)

the provider profit perceived by the customer with the awareness of the resources cost for the optimal allocation (\( Cost_{opt} \)), the customer satisfaction is maximum when \( P \) is equal to \( Cost_{opt} \) (and \( U_c^F(P) = 0 \)) while it is minimum when the maximum price, \( P_{max} \) is applied (and \( U_c^F(P) = P_{max} - Cost_{opt} \)). \( U_c(P) \) is defined as the normalized form of (26) as follows:

\[
U_c(P) = \frac{U_c^F(P) - U_c^F(P)_{min}}{U_c^F(P)_{max} - U_c^F(P)_{min}}.
\]  

(27)

(27) allows to obtain valued within the interval \([0, 1]\) for prices within \([Cost_{opt}, P_{max}]\).

Since in our experimental scenario \( P_{max} = 2 \times Cost_{opt} \) (27) becomes:

\[
U_c(P) = 2 - \frac{P}{Cost_{opt}}
\]  

(28)

For prices less than \( Cost_{opt} \), \( U_c(P) \) is greater than 1, for prices greater than \( P_{max} \) it becomes negative. As a consequence, \( U_c(P) \) is adopted as an indicator that a proposal is in the customer acceptable region and represents a potential negotiation point.

Denoted with \( T_{ak} \), \( d = 1, \ldots, N \), \( k = 1, \ldots, K \), the actual response time in the \( k \)-th time slot of \( d \)-th day with the assigned resource allocation plan, we define the following parameter \( U_c^E(T) \), useful to represent the performance degradation perceived by the customer:

\[
U_c^E(T) = \sum_{d=1}^{D} \sum_{k=1}^{K} (T - \Delta T_{ak}).
\]  

(29)

\( \Delta T_{ak} = \begin{cases} T_{ak} - T, & \text{if } (T_{ak} - T) > 0 \\ 0, & \text{if } (T_{ak} - T) \leq 0 \end{cases} \) \( \forall d, \forall k \).

When \( \Delta T_{ak} = 0 \), \( U_c^E(T) \) has the best value, on the contrary, it is at minimum level, but still acceptable, when a maximum degradation level is reached. Defining such level in a proportional way to \( T \) by means of the factor \( \text{deg} \), \( U_c(T) \) assumes values within \([0, 1]\) within these two boundary cases expressing it as the following normalized form of \( U_c^E(T) \):

\[
U_c(T) = \frac{U_c^E(T) - U_c^E(T)_{min}}{U_c^E(T)_{max} - U_c^E(T)_{min}} = 1 - \frac{\text{deg} \times \sum_{d=1}^{D} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \Delta T_{ak}}{\sum_{d=1}^{D} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \Delta T_{ak}}.
\]  

(30)

For performance equal or better than the agreed one, \( U_c(T) \) is 1, for a degradation level greater than the maximum allowed, \( U_c(T) \) becomes negative and indicates a strong discontent level and, as a consequence, a decrease of the provider reputation.

After a SLA negotiation request is received by a provider, the negotiation strategy adopts the utility model in order to take decisions and guide the correct actions. While with the static approach the utility model is evaluated una-tantum and is the same for each request, adopting the dynamic approach, the utility model is evaluated for each request.

We conducted a comparative analysis assuming fixed market conditions, a static utility model evaluated with the workload plan \( [150 \text{ r/s}, 250 \text{ r/s}] \) and SLA negotiation requests characterized by the same contract validity period and different workload plans.

Since the aim of our experimentation does not focus on the evaluation of a negotiation strategy, we simulate the final result of a negotiation process. In particular, we analyze eight negotiation points acceptable for the static utility model, called with letters from A to H, obtained as follows:

- four response times within the acceptable performance interval, positioned at 20%, 40%, 60% and 80% of the interval;
- for each response time, we consider two different prices, positioned at 30% and 70% of the respective acceptable price interval.

As it is possible to note in Figure 6, by varying the workload plan of negotiation requests, a negotiation point can be located inner or outer the dynamic acceptable region, that means it is considered respectively a feasible or unfeasible agreement. The absolute error \( E \) (see (25)) adopting the static and dynamic approach, varying the workload plan, is reported in Figure 7. The maximum \( E \) adopting the static utility is 1123.3 €, the average error is 321 € and the standard deviation is 277.6 €. On the contrary, the maximum \( E \) adopting the dynamic utility is 39.4 €, the average error is 9.9 € and the standard deviation is 12.31 €. Such results show that the statically defined utility can lead to incorrect utility provision for workload plans both lighter and huger than the static plan and, as a consequence, to low profits and, eventually, also to low reputation levels. To better demonstrate this statement, we report in Figure 8 the static and dynamic utility under various workload plans and label with \( \text{deg} \) the negotiation points defined by the dynamic approach as not feasible agreements, because outside the acceptable region.

When a SLA proposal has a workload plan
greater than the static one, the cost of the resource allocation plan required to satisfy such workload is under-estimated by the static approach, that foresees a utility greater than the effective one. As an example, for the workload plan \{200 r/s, 300 r/s\} while for the static approach point \(E\) (174.5 ms, 1113 €) is within the acceptable region and has an acceptable utility value of 296.3 € (always the same varying the workload), for the dynamic approach such point is outside the acceptable region and has a negative utility of -38.15 € (too low price). As a consequence, adopting the dynamic approach, point \(E\) is not accepted as negotiation point, and the negotiation strategy can decide to propose a counter-offer or to stop the negotiation process. The same problem is pointed out also for other points with workload plans \{200 r/s, 300 r/s\} and \{300 r/s, 300 r/s\} (see Figure 8).

For huge workload plans, the dynamic approach allows not only to avoid profit losses, but also performance degradation when, in one or more time slots, the number of available (or assigned) resources is less than the one necessary to reach the agreed response time. To demonstrate this statement, we evaluated the response time-based indicator \(U_c(T)\) considering \(deg=0.1KD\) in (30), that corresponds to an average tolerable performance degradation of 10% with respect to the agreed one. In the majority of cases, this indicator is one, that means the customer will be totally satisfied. \(U_c(T)\) results at the limit value (zero) in two cases, in particular for points \(A\) and \(B\) (with the lowest response times), and with respect to the workload plan \{200 r/s, 300 r/s\}. With huger workload plan, (e.g. \{300 r/s, 300 r/s\}), such indicator becomes negative, in particular it is -1.1 for points \(A\) and \(B\). In these cases, unlike the static approach, the dynamic approach avoids profit loss and significant reputation decrease, by positioning such points outside the acceptable region.

For workload plans lighter than the static one (e.g. \{100 r/s, 100 r/s\}), the static approach estimates a utility lower than the actual one. This, instead, for some negotiation points can become greater than the maximum allowed utility, since the customer is required to pay a price too high with respect to the required workload plan and greater that the maximum allowed in the market conditions (assumed fixed for the experimental analysis). This happens because for the static approach the prices of negotiation points refer to an acceptable region related to a huge workload (\{150 r/s, 250 r/s\}), that requires a more expensive resource allocation plan. Differently from the static approach, this condition is detected by the dynamic approach, that for workload \{100 r/s, 100 r/s\} discards all the potential
negotiation points from \( A \) to \( H \) by positioning them outside the acceptable region. An approach that proposes such negotiation points as feasible, can lead to a high customer dissatisfaction.

Figure 9 presents the price-based indicator \( U_c(P) \) varying the workload plan. The figure shows that for workload plan \{100 r/s, 100 r/s\} \( U_c(P) \) is always negative because the customer is perceiving a too high price for the required workload plan.

7 CONCLUSIONS

We exploited capacity planning to support Cloud providers in bilateral automatic negotiation of high-level QoS parameters and prices of Paas services. The technique aims at achieving high satisfaction levels for both providers and customers. To this end, we propose a heuristic approach for the dynamic evaluation of a non-additive utility function and the acceptable region that takes into account information about application performance and the availability of resources and a cost-based price model for resources.

Through an experimental analysis we demonstrate that the proposed solution leads the provider to accurately predict the utility that can be gained by a contract and to avoid the stipulation of contracts under conditions that conduct to unprofitable revenues or customer dissatisfaction. Further research aiming to improve our approach regards the investigation of a progressive resource allocation policy based on the effective incoming workload of hosted applications and their performance in order to better exploit data center resources.

Finally, we are investigating an integrative negotiation strategy based on time-based decision functions for the proposed utility model able to quickly reach an agreement with high satisfaction levels for both providers and customers.

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