Trusted Community
A Trust-based Multi-Agent Organisation for Open Systems

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Abstract: In this paper, the multi-agent organisation Trusted Community is presented. Trusted Communities are formed and joined by self-organised by agents with strong mutual trust relations and the purpose to increase their personal utility. Trusted Communities are maintained by management actions delegated by a designated member called Trusted Community Manager, having the goal to preserve and optimise the composition and stability of this organisation. This organisation provides performance benefits for their members by improving interaction efficiency, information sharing and cooperation between the agents. In the work presented here, Trusted Communities are conceptually defined and the application in an open Desktop Grid System is discussed.

1 INTRODUCTION

When realising technical systems based on an open multi-agent system model, we face challenges through agents that join and leave the system arbitrarily and show various types of behaviours ranging from cooperative to selfish or even adversary (in terms of having the aim to disrupt the operation of the system). In previous work, it has been shown that in systems with these characteristics, trust can be applied to model the relationships between agents and that these trust relations can be used to improve the performance and robustness (towards misconducting agents) of these systems. In this work, we take a step further and present an approach where enduring and mutual trust relations lead to a self-organising process resulting in a higher form of organisation between trustworthy agents. This organisation is referred to as Trusted Community (TC) and is characterised by a decentralised, yet hierarchically managed, operation that provides performance benefits for their members by improving interaction efficiency, information sharing and cooperation. The management allows for optimisation of the composition and directed actions to preserve the stability of the organisation. This is essential, as composition and stability of an organisation consisting of self-interested members can easily become issues in similar approaches, esp. when leaving agents generate feedback effects.

This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 defines the system model, Section 3 outlines the application. Section 4 lays out the evaluation concept, while related work is presented in Section 5. The paper is concluded in Section 6.

2 SYSTEM MODEL

The Trusted Community is an organisation for agents that have persistent mutual trust relations which allow to establish a subsystem inside a hosting multi-agent system as depicted in Figure 1. In this organisation, interaction partners are mainly chosen among members (we refer to this as inbound or kinship-motivated interactions). Agents in the examined systems are self-interested, that is, they will only consider forming and participating in such a subsystem when the

Figure 1: System view on Trusted Communities.
benefit provided is measurably higher than in an unassociated state (ignoring or being unable to join an existing Trusted Community). A TC thus does not postulate an explicit group goal, as for example a coalition. To apply a TC in a hosting system, the following requirements have to be met: The system needs to be open, i.e. agents can join and leave at will. All agents commit to using some standardised mechanics (production engine) of the (technical) hosting system. The respective performance is measurable via a globally defined utility function for an agent \( i \) of the form \( U_i(r_i,c_i) \), contrasting a reward function \( r_i \) with a function \( c_i \) quantifying the cost to reach the reward. The hosting system provides methods to discern trustworthy from untrustworthy agents through interactions, assigning trust values to each agent and providing reputation information. The following design pattern depicted in Figure 2 formalises the requirements on the underlying agent model:

\[ \text{Agent} \rightarrow \text{Direct Trust Value} \rightarrow \text{Trust and Reputation System} \]

As shown here, a TC is composed of at least 2 member agents of which exactly one is the TC Manager. The agents are able to assign direct trust values to each other based on the outcomes of their interactions and by contacting a reputation provider, they make these trust values available to other known agents. The reputation provider is not further specified (central entity or realised as broadcast to other agents to retrieve direct trust values), but the TC itself is also a reputation provider meaning that members can share a TC wide reputation.

### 2.1 Trusted Community Lifecycle

Trusted Communities are formed self-organised by unassociated agents in a hosting systems. Regarding TCs, this system can be in one of the following three phases depicted in Figure 3:

- **Pre-organisation Phase.** The system is in a phase where all agents are unassociated and no organisation exists. The agents have to apply safety measures because of uncertainty about other agents’ behaviour and constantly rate their interactions according to the trust mechanics of the system. With time passing, trustworthy agents develop mutual trust relations. At this time they consider forming a Trusted Community in hope to improve their utility. This decision is based on an analysis of their current utility \( U_i \) and the expected utility \( \text{predictUtility}(i, TC_j) \) when being a member of the TC \( j \), formalised by formation criteria. Mutual trust alone does not initiate TC formation, as this would force the formation of TCs per design. Instead we want to apply TCs only when beneficial (increase in \( U_i \)) and adaptive towards the hosting system state. When a critical number of agents decide to initiate the formation process, the next phase is reached.

- **TC Formation Phase.** The formation phase is characterised by negotiations of the potential members about membership of additional agents. This is necessary as not all agents have had the same interaction partners. Finally, in this phase the manager of the TC is elected, starting the maintenance phase.

- **TC Maintenance Phase.** This is the main phase in the TC lifecycle. Here, the TC is already assembled, having a TC manager that can assign roles to members and release norms, as well as agents that actively work together in an organised fashion. As the agents joined in order to improve their utility \( U_i \), they execute periodic checks that are related to the initial analysis \( \text{predictUtility}(i, TC_j) \) in the pre-organisation phase (but can be performed with more information at hand). If members discover that their utility \( U_i \) did not improve (comparing to their utility when being unassociated), they leave the TC. If a critical number of members leave, the dissolution of the organisation is initiated and the pre-organisation phase restored.

Apart from the members of the Trusted Community, the unassociated agents continue to interact with each other and with the TC members (constrained by interaction rules of the TC). These agents may then reach a state where they find joining the TC beneficial, as well as acceptable from the point of view of the TC. As we are considering a dynamic system, the threshold to joining a TC can be reached at different
phases of the system: Consider for example an agent joining late and thus having no trust relations to the initial members of the TC, thus being unable to be an initial member itself.

These mechanics are referred to as lifecycle of the Trusted Community as we have transitions from the maintenance phase where a TC exists, to the pre-organisation phase. In this phase, another TC can form if the trust requirements and formation criteria are met again by agents. A TC thus emerges dependent on significant criteria and the state of the hosting system. In the following, we focus on the operation of a TC in the maintenance phase.

2.2 Organisation Benefit Strategies

Forming/joining a Trusted Community is an act of self-interest for agents because TCs provide benefits that increase the utility $U_i$ of member agents. Obviously, the nature of these benefits depends on the underlying application: Still, member agents have the same utility definition $U_i$ as unassociated agents, benefits must therefore be directed at improving the exact interactions that unassociated agents have, increasing the same reward function $r_i$. Despite their application-dependency, we can affirm that the organisation benefit strategies are part of the following classes:

**Interaction Efficiency.** Interactions that are executable within the hosting system but profit from being executed between agents with high mutual trust, thus TC members. This refers mainly to subadditive costs or superadditive benefit interactions. Consider for example the search for a suited interaction partner, or the execution of interactions without the necessity to apply additional safety measures.

**Cooperation.** This class represents strategies that cannot be executed in an environment with uncertainty about the trustworthiness of the involved interaction partners, because of safety considerations. Hence, strategies here are exclusive to member agents. Examples are the delegation of the execution of fundamental tasks to a central entity (e.g. the TC Manager) or the cooperative detection of collusion (relying on the absence of colluding agents in the composition).

**Information Sharing.** In general, sharing information is necessary in order to perform other organisation benefit strategies. Additionally, agents will not share certain information in the hosting system when the trustworthiness of the recipient is in doubt. The TC provides a structure where this information can be shared and processed safely and in scale (among TC members). An example of sensitive information, with access restricted to members, are personal observations (local world model) which could be abused by untrustworthy agents.

By providing adequate organisation benefit strategies, the additional overhead of being a member of a TC (contributing to $c_i$) is marginalised and the formation of a TC a worthwhile goal for self-interested agents. In the following, the Trusted Community Manager is described and the mechanics of the Trusted Community (which produce the overhead) are detailed.

2.3 Trusted Community Manager

The **Trusted Community Manager (TCM)** is the elected leader of the Trusted Community. As such it acts as an active representative of an institution releasing norms and sanctioning infringement. Main goals of this entity are to regulate access to the organisation, improve the experience of the members, and most importantly to preserve the existence of the TC.

The according function blocks (depicted in Figure 3 in the maintenance phase) are composed of mainly recurring tasks that can be delegated to members or executed by the TCM itself. Examples of tasks are the gathering of data through observation or specific interactions with non-member agents. In the following, the function blocks are detailed:

**Active TC Expansion Strategies.** The initial composition of a Trusted Community is based on the forming agents. Due to connectivity and dynamics aspects of the hosting system, possibly not all suited agents were involved in the formation process. The task of the Trusted Community Manager is therefore to find, observe and evaluate potential members with the goal to optimise the composition of the Trusted Community and in order to improve its effectiveness.

**Membership Evaluation Strategies.** Agents join the Trusted Community with the expectancy to experience a higher utility $U_i$. Therefore members periodically check whether their membership satisfies this by evaluating $c_i$, the overhead (through delegated tasks, kinship commitment etc.), and $r_i$, here the interaction efficiency. Members leaving the TC as a result of these examinations are degrading the efficiency of the TC, as they reduce the number of available member interaction partners and thus $r_i$ of remaining members. Besides, management tasks delegated by the TCM have to be distributed among less agents, increasing $c_i$ of single members leading to the threat of a positive feedback effect. The TC Manager is therefore obliged to try and improve the utility $U_i$ of a potentially leaving member $i$. This can e.g. be realised by means of (short-term) reduction of the overhead of this agent via re-delegation of its management tasks, increasing its benefits by means of prioritisa-
general form of compensation is to assign all sys-
terest of the agent being TCM, compen-
self-interested agents and dynamic systems, a
lead to various forms of misconduct. Consider for example agents with a strategy
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produce benefits without committing themselves to any tasks. The TC Manager is given the capability to observe
behaviour of member agents. The requirement to ob-
method of tasks and the Trusted Community Man-
be adaptive to short-term relief of single agents as
process was an implicit Trusted Community (iTC), a
account for the general uncertainty. With regard to the self-interest of the agent being TCM, compen-
the system as: egoistic, volatile, distributed over the internet,
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system, a
uty considerations) or the system as such. This election is performed analogously to the
initial election at formation phase.
3 APPLICATION SCENARIO
In this section we describe how Trusted Communities
deployed in an exemplary hosting system from the
desktop grid computing domain: We assume an
open, distributed and volunteer-based desktop grid
with central control (p2p) and the applications regarded
produce bag-of-task jobs, i.e. they are composed of
tasks (work units) that are independent of each other.
and thus are in high demand of computing resources. Ad-
considering agents that are in charge of
of the grid client on the machines and make decisions
on behalf of their users (especially about resource sele-
open nature of the system, we have to deal with agents that show various types of be-
haviour (from altruistic to untrustworthy) in order to
achieve their self-interested goal of scheduling their
own jobs as efficiently as possible. According to the
taxonomy of (Choi et al., 2008) and taking the re-
source perspective, we therefore classify the poten-
tially participating agents of this desktop grid sys-
am as: egoistic, volatile, distributed over the internet,
dynamic, faulty and heterogeneous.
In previous work, for example (Bernard et al.,
2011), we have shown that by using a trust and reputa-
tion mechanism combined with techniques from orga-
nic computing, cf. (Müller-Schloer and Schmeck,
2011), we are able to isolate uncooperative agents and minimise their influence on the system perfor-
ance in systems like this. The result of the isolation
process was an implicit trusted community (ITC), a
lose coupling of interaction partners without global
membership function. ITCs, despite being successful,
leave room for improvement, as unassociated agents
miss essential opportunities to increase their utility,
because they have to account for the general uncertainty. By applying the MAS organisation trusted
community (as detailed in section 2), we plan to ac-
count for these opportunities and further raise the util-
tion. However, the TCM needs to balance the costs of
preserving the membership of this agent with the ad-
Additional overhead introduced for other members. The
key of this function block is therefore an opportunity
cost analysis for under-performing members.
Member Control Strategies. This function block re-
gards the necessity to observe and influence the beha-
vour of member agents. The requirement to ob-
serve member behaviour despite their (proven) trust-
worthiness stems from the fact that we are dealing
with self-interested agents and dynamic systems, a
combination that can lead to various forms of mis-
conduct. Consider for example agents with a strategy
that lets them behave trustworthy until membership in
a TC is accomplished, only to start to defect: reaping
benefits without committing themselves to any tasks. The TC Manager is given the capability to observe
the behaviour of member agents, be it at random, pe-
riodically or in case of suspicion. This can be realised
by utilising a light-weight version of the reputation
mechanism of the hosting system. Again, the over-
head of introducing safety measures needs to be care-
fully balanced in order to preserve the effectiveness
of the TC. Finally, when detecting misconduct, the
TCM will sanction the agent, the exclusion from the
TC being the ultimate form of punishment.
Task Delegation Strategies. All function blocks are
composed of tasks and the Trusted Community Man-
ger cannot execute all these tasks itself - this would
reduce its utility $U_i$ and imply leaving the TC, intro-
ducing a high membership fluctuation and render the
TC unmanageable. Consequently, the TCM has to
apply a task delegation model with the requirement
of fairness, as an unbalanced delegation would lead
to under-performing agents and thus to leaving mem-
ers. Besides being fair, the task delegation needs to
be adaptive to short-term relief of single agents as
mentioned in the description of the membership eval-
uation function block. The supervision of task execu-
tion is subject to member control strategies.

The Trusted Community Manager is a key ele-
ment in the Trusted Community concept. On the one
hand, it represents a higher-ranking level among the
otherwise equal members of the Trusted Community,
yet on the other hand, the TCM is just an agent partic-
ipating in the Trusted Community in order to increase
its own utility. This is fundamental to the concept in
order to avoid the introduction of an external element
with goals that are beyond justification. With regard to the self-interest of the agent being TCM, compen-
sation is necessary for the aforementioned tasks exe-
cuted by the TCM to balance its $r_i$ and $c_i$. The most
general form of compensation is to assign all sys-
tem interactions that do not aim at managing the TC
(but generate benefit) to other member agents - these
agents then act on behalf of their manager. Finally,
in consideration of the open nature of the system, a
trusted community manager has to be elected anew
whenever the current TCM either leaves the Trusted
Community (utility considerations) or the system as
such. This election is performed analogously to the
initial election at formation phase.
ity of the agents by providing them benefits through interaction efficiency, information sharing and cooperation.

To allow for a self-organised formation of a TC in a suited hosting system, we need to define agent utility, formation criteria and organisation benefit strategies. The remaining mechanics (lifecycle, maintenance etc.) of the Trusted Community are generic. In the Trusted Desktop Grid, agents use each others’ spare resources to process jobs generated by user applications. Their goal is to schedule single work units on available worker agents (resource selection), such that they minimise the time it takes to receive valid results. This is formalised in Desktop Grid metrics like flow time, makespan and turnaround-time, cf. for example (Zhou and Lo, 2006). On the other hand, overhead is introduced through communication with other agents and working for other agents, because although a user volunteers its machine, we assume that from the user perspective it is best to receive good performance for own jobs without having to commit resources. A utility function \( U_i \) for the TDG thus incorporates these aspects in \( r_i \) and \( c_i \).

Formation criteria for initiating TC formation are drawn from suboptimal agent states. These are for example indicated by a low submit/work-ratio, meaning that an agent has a high overhead due to commitment, or a high average number of communication acts necessary to find a suited worker that accepts own work units. Being a member of a Trusted Community is likely to improve these states, as TCs provide scalability and kinship commitment to members, therefore TC formation is aspired.

Finally, the most fundamental aspects to define when applying TCs are the organisation benefit strategies. Figure 4 depicts these for the TDG Scenario:

![Figure 4: Exemplary TDG organisation benefit strategies.](image)

In the TDG, interactions between agents are mainly restricted to the processing of each others’ work units, negotiations about the respective terms and the exchange of information necessary for the identification of suited partners (esp. reputation). For TC members these interactions are more efficient because of scalability and kinship commitment. A particular interaction efficiency benefit is that no work unit replication needs to be performed, as all work units can be assigned to members and thus valid results can be expected.

Information to be shared inside a TC is sensitive to trust reasoning. In the TDG, sharing the observed world model or own utility of an agent with untrustworthy agents could be abused by misconducting agents that adapt their strategies accordingly. Consider for example an agent that gets to know the exact resource selection criteria applied by an other agent. A misconducting agent could actively adapt to appear as inappropriate worker in order to avoid being requested to process a work unit and commit its resources.

Unlike interaction efficiency strategies, cooperation strategies provide interaction opportunities not readily executable by unassociated agents in the hosting system. In the Trusted Desktop Grid, centralised scheduling is a good motivation for TCs. Centralised scheduling is generally more effective than decentralised, because fairness and predictability can be incorporated into scheduling strategies more easily. However, centralised scheduling does not scale well and is therefore hardly applicable in an open, unreliable, peer-to-peer environment - in contrast to the size-constrained and trustworthy environment a Trusted Community represents. Additional cooperation opportunities for TC members in the TDG are a shared trust and reputation management (less message overhead, more information) and collusion detection by cooperative observation of untrustworthy agents.

4 EVALUATION

We will evaluate the Trusted Community concept in the Trusted Desktop Grid applying the scenario-dependent utility function, formation criteria and organisation benefit algorithms presented in the previous section. We will especially focus on showing that in an open Desktop Grid, system states arise in which agents profit from forming a TC. The reward \( r_i \) of utility \( U_i \) of the agents will be composed of standard Desktop Grid metrics like turnaround time. We will continue to show that this organisation can be made stable (low member fluctuation) and its composition optimised, by introducing a TC Manager. Especially its overhead balancing and short-time relief of management tasks capabilities are seen as promising candidates for keeping members associated. Our findings will be compared with the application of related organisation paradigms in the same system, providing additional evaluation data as contribution.
5 RELATED WORK

In the survey on multi-agent organisation paradigms by (Horling and Lesser, 2005), the MAS organisation clan proposed by (Griffiths, 2005) has been described as closely paralleling the concept of congregations by (Brooks and Durfee, 2003) but additionally incorporating trust as a key aspect. Thus we refer to clans as “congregations with trust” and in the same line of argumentation we refer to Trusted Communities as “congregations with trust and hierarchy” in regard of the role of the Trusted Community Manager. Further theoretic work on MAS organisation mechanics has also been conducted by (Mathieu et al., 2002). As for our application scenario, research on open, distributed, multi-agent-based and trust-enhanced Desktop Grid systems can for instance be found in (Domingues et al., 2007), (Shudo et al., 2005) and (Dyson et al., 2004). Additional coverage of MAS organisations in similar scenarios has also been considered in (Thabet et al., 2011), (Abdallah et al., 2004) and (Wang and Vassileva, 2004).

6 CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we have proposed a novel multi-agent organisation called Trusted Community for the use in open, distributed systems where trust considerations are important. We have defined the system model, describing the lifecycle and management mechanics of a TC. In particular, we have emphasized the necessity to balance organisation benefit algorithms and overhead introduced by membership, as agents form and join TCs out of self-interest. We have further sketched how TCs can be deployed in a Trusted Desktop Grid scenario and how we will evaluate the applicability in future work. Finally, we have stated how our research is related to similar work in the area of multi-agent organisations and agent-based Desktop Grid systems.

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