Keywords: Multi agent systems, Self interest, Cooperation, Cost of cooperation.

Abstract: Many real world Multi Agent Systems encompass a large population of self interested agents which are connected with one another in an intricate network. If one is willing to accept the common axioms of Game Theory one can assume that the population will arrange itself into an equilibrium state. The present position paper proposes to use a mediating cooperative distributed algorithm instead. A setting where agents have to choose one action out of two - download information or free-ride their neighbors’ effort - has been studied recently. The present position paper proposes a method for constructing a Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (DCOP) for a Network Game. The main result is that one can show that by cooperatively minimizing the constructed DCOP for a global solution all agents stand to gain at least as much as their equilibrium gain, and often more. This provides a mechanism for cooperation in a Network Game that is beneficial for all participating agents.

1 INTRODUCTION

A key attribute of any Multi Agent System (MAS) is the level of collaboration that agents are expected to adopt. When agents share a common goal it is natural for agents to follow a fully cooperative protocol. A common goal can be the election of a leader, finding shortest routing paths, or searching for a globally optimal solution to a combinatorial problem (Meisels, 2007). When the involved parties (agents) have different and conflicting goals, competition and self interest are the natural behaviors one expects to find.

In its most basic form, a fully cooperative model involves a set of agents attempting to satisfy or optimize a common global objective. The most important aspect of such a model is that the actions taken by the agents do not bring into consideration the impact of the globally optimal solution on the state of the individual agent (Maheswaran et al., 2004; Grubshtein et al., 2010; Meisels, 2007).

In a fully competitive scenario it is common to assume that participants are only willing to take actions which improve (or do not worsen) their gains. In some situations agents can reach an equilibrium state from which no agents would care to deviate (Roughgarden, 2005; Meir et al., 2010). The efficiency of equilibria states with respect to the global objective has been studied intensively in the last decade (Roughgarden, 2005).

The central question that is at the focus of the present study is the interplay between the self-interests of agents and their cooperation towards a common goal. Specifically, towards the increase of some global gain. A rich and applicable framework for this study is the domain of Network Games (NGs) (Jackson, 2008; Galeotti et al., 2010). File sharing and ad hoc P2P networks are good examples of network games. The existence of a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) for the NG introduced in Section 2 was shown by (Galeotti et al., 2010). The present paper proposes a method for securing cooperation among agents in a network game, by guaranteeing improved gains to each agent. This approach is related to former work on Cooperation Games (Grubshtein and Meisels, 2010). The proposed method is based on the construction of an Asymmetric Distributed Constraints Optimization Problem (ADCOP) (Grubshtein et al., 2010) from the given network game and cooperatively solving it.

Former attempts to introduce cooperation into competitive games fall into several categories. Strong empirical evidence to the benefits and emergence of cooperation in the iterated prisoners’ dilemma tournament was reported in (Axelrod, 1984). Petcu et al. present a cooperative distributed search algorithm which faithfully implements the VCG mechanism for the problem of efficient social choice by self-interested agents in DCOP search (Petcu et al., 2008). An approach for achieving cooperation among competitive agents is described in (Monderer and Tenn-
COOPERATION MECHANISM FOR A NETWORK GAME

2 Download/Free-Ride Network Game

Consider a set of users wishing to download large amounts of information from a remote location. Users may receive the information from other users in their local neighborhood (if these neighbors have it) or directly download it from a central hub. The process of downloading data from the hub requires significant bandwidth and degrades performance (resource consumption, battery, etc.). In contrast, sharing information with peers does not result in any significant impact on the users. Information exchange between users is limited to directly connected peers only (no transfer of information to second degree neighbors).

The entire interaction can be captured by a graph $G = (V, E)$ where each edge $e_{ij}$ specifies a neighborhood relationship and a vertex $i \in V$ represents a user. $x_i$ denotes the action (e.g., assignment) made by user $i$, and $x_N(i)$ is the joint action taken by all of $i$’s neighbors. The degree of $i$ will be denoted by $d_i$.

While the network itself (the graph $G = (V, E)$) is not known to all agents, the total number of participants $n = |V|$ is known and so is the (fixed) probability $p$ for an edge to exist between any two vertices. Such graphs $G = (n, p)$ are known as Poisson Random Graphs or an Erdős - Rényi network (Jackson, 2008). Figure 1 is an example of such a network with $n = 8$ and $p = 0.45$ (8 participants and 13 edges).

For simplicity, the gain from receiving information is unity and the cost of downloading it is $c$. Users are only aware of their immediate peers and are known to be self interested. That is, users decide to either download the relevant information from the hub (take action $D$) or wait for one of their neighbors to download it (take action $F$), and do so in a way which maximizes their own utility function:

$$u_i(x_i, x_N(i)) = \begin{cases} 1 - c & \text{if } x_i = F \\ 1 & \exists j \in x_N(i) \text{ s.t. } x_j = D \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

That is, if the user exerts effort and downloads the information her gain is $1 - c$. If, on the other hand, she does not download but one of her peers does, her gain is 1. Finally, if neither her nor any of her peers download the information her gain is 0. We assume that the interaction between users is a one shot interaction (i.e., users are assumed to be at some decision crossroad).

2.1 The Game Theoretic Approach

As mentioned in section 1, the common approach taken when self interested entities are present, is to invoke Game Theory (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). By accepting the fundamental axioms of game theory one is able to predict possible outcomes of an interaction. These outcomes are standardly assumed to be equilibrium points (in terms of agents’ actions) from which no agent is willing to deviate. The best known solution concept is the Nash Equilibrium (NE) point, but there are many other equilibrium points which fit different aspects of the interaction (cf. (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994)). For example, in the above D/F network game the equilibrium concept used is the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE). The BNE captures the incomplete information of all participants (each knows only its own neighbors).

This is the approach taken in a recent work by Galeotti et. al (Galeotti et al., 2010) for a similar interaction. They describe our example of a network game and cast it to many other types of interactions: vaccinate or not, research new technology or wait for the competitors to do it, etc. In the domain of computer science one can think of remote rovers belonging to different agencies exploring the same area, of ad-hoc network participation, and of P2P networks.

Let us describe the network game that is at the focus of the present study in more detail. From the point of view of each participant in the game (i.e., a user) there are two possible strategies: $D$ (download),
\[ Q(k; p) = \frac{(n-2)}{(n-1)} p(k-1)(1-p)(n-k-1) \]

Galeotti et al. use this information to find a threshold degree \( k \): \[ 1 - \left(1 - \sum_{k=1}^{t} Q(k; p)\right) \geq 1 - c \]

In the unique BNE that they find for the network game, any participant of degree \( k \leq t \) selects strategy \( D \) and any participant of degree \( k > t \) selects \( F \).

![Figure 2: The strategies of all participants in the BNE and the corresponding gains.](image)

For example, consider the graph \( G = (8, 0.45) \) illustrated in Figure 1 and a cost value of \( c = 0.7 \). From the above equation, we calculate the threshold \( t = 2 \). As a result, in the BNE, \( a_1 \) and \( a_3 \) will select strategy \( D \) while all others will assign \( F \). The BNE assignments and gains are depicted in Figure 2.

### 3 COOPERATIVE MECHANISM FOR SELF INTERESTED AGENTS

Despite the success game theory has had in many MAS problems and applications, it suffers from two important drawbacks:

1. It often fails to predict human behavior (e.g., the iterated prisoners’ dilemma (Axelrod, 1984)).
2. Results are often inefficient (i.e., equilibria points are not necessarily Pareto efficient) (Nisan et al., 2007).

The former point induces interesting research (often related to psychology) which may produce new solution concepts (Halpern and Rong, 2010). The present paper focuses on the latter point. More specifically, we follow the ideas presented in (Grubeshtein and Meisels, 2010) which define the Cost of Cooperation and Cooperation Games:

**Definition 1.** An agent’s Cost of Cooperation (CoC) with respect to a global objective function \( f(x) \) is defined as the difference between the lowest gain that the agent can get in any equilibrium of the underlying game (if any, otherwise zero) and the lowest gain an agent receives from a (cooperative) protocol’s solution \( x \) that maximizes \( f(x) \).

**Definition 2.** A game is a Cooperation Game (CG) if there exists a solution for which the CoC (with respect to some \( f(x) \)) of all agents is non positive.

In other words, it is beneficial for all agents to cooperate in search for an optimal solution, rather than play their NE strategy (as competitive agents are expected to act) (Grubeshtein and Meisels, 2010).

For a game that satisfies the above two definitions, one can propose a mechanism which will provide the following guarantee: if all participants agree to follow the mechanism, they are each expected to gain at least as much as they would have gained had they played their NE strategy.

The present study focuses on Network Games and on the D/F game in particular. The main result of the paper is a proof that the D/F game is a Cooperation Game (CG). This enables a clear mechanism that solves a generated Asymmetric DCOP (ADCOP) (Grubeshtein et al., 2010) and can act as a natural choice of strategy for all participants of the game. An ADCOP is an extension to the DCOP paradigm which addresses individual agent’s gains and captures game-like interactions between agents. An ADCOP can be viewed as a form of a cooperative graphical game.

The proposed framework for the mechanism makes the distinction between users and agents.
When referring to users one refers to self interested entities seeking to maximize their gain. Each of the users employs an agent - an application entity which follows a cooperative protocol on the one hand, but is expected to faithfully represent its user’s preferences. In the proposed setting agents represent the users, but are not under the users’ direct control (i.e. users’ entrust the agents with the ability to choose for them, but are unable to control or affect the agents’ decisions).

An important feature of the proposed approach is its inherent cooperation. The desired solution it seeks is not necessarily a stable one in the game theoretic sense. Nonetheless, rational, self interested users would rather let their agents choose an action for them knowing in advance that agents’ cooperation will yield results which are at least as good as they would get if they play selfishly.

The distributed cooperative protocol for the agents which will provide the above guarantee to the users solves the following ADCOP:

- A set of Agents \( A = \{ a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n \} \) - each holds a single variable and corresponds to a user.
- A set of Domains \( D = \{ D_1, D_2, \ldots, D_n \} \) for the variables held by the agents. Each domain consists of only two possible values: \( \{ D, \emptyset \} \).
- A set of asymmetric constraints \( C \). Each constraint \( c_i \) is identified with a specific agent (e.g. agent \( i \)) and defined as a \((d_i + 1)\)-arity constraint acting over all of agent’s \( i \)’s neighbors. The set of agents involved in constraint \( c_i \) is \( A_{c_i} = a_i \cup x_N(i) \). That is, the ADCOP has \( n \) constraints and each agent contributes to \( d_i + 1 \) different constraints. The costs associated with each constraint that add up to the total cost of \( c_i \) for agent \( i \) are summarized in the table in Figure 3.

Let the optimal solution to the ADCOP be denoted with \( x \). We use the term null neighborhood to define a situation in which an agent and all of its directly connected peers assign \( \emptyset \) as their action.

**Lemma 1** (No null neighborhoods). In the optimal solution to the ADCOP there exists at least one agent in the local neighborhood of each agent which assigns \( D \) (specifically, the agent itself can assign \( D \)).

**Proof.** Assume by negation that there exists an agent \( a_i \) with a null neighborhood in \( x \). This means that the cost of \( c_i \) (the constraint originating from \( a_j \)) is \( n \). Let \( x' \) be a complete assignment which differs from \( x \) in the assignment of an agent \( a_j \in c_i \). That is, \( x'_j = D \). As a result the previously null neighborhood of \( a_i \) in \( x \) is not part of \( x' \).

One can compute an upper bound on the cost of \( x' \) by assigning this change to an agent \( a_j \) with \( d_j = n - 1 \) (where \( n - 1 > t \)) which has at least one neighbor \( a_k \in x_N(j) \) of degree \( d_k \leq t \) (i.e. \( a_j \) appears in all \( n \) constraints of the problem). The resulting cost of \( x' \):

\[
\text{COST}(x') = \text{COST}(x) - n + (n - 1)n - n^2 = \text{COST}(x) - n^2
\]

which implies that \( \text{COST}(x') < \text{COST}(x) \) in contradiction to the optimality of \( x \).

An important implication of Lemma 1 is that in the optimal solution to the ADCOP none of the agents receive a payoff of 0.

**Lemma 2.** The gain of agents \( a_i \) with degree \( d_i \leq t \) in \( x \) is at least as high as its gain in the BNE.

**Proof.** In the BNE \( a_i \)’s gain is exactly \( 1 - c \) (\( d_i \leq t \) and hence \( a_i \) assigns \( \emptyset \)). The only possible lower gain is 0. However, this is the gain of an agent with a null neighborhood and hence (following Lemma 1) its gain must be at least \( 1 - c \) when cooperating (either it will assign \( D \) or one of its peers will).

**Lemma 3.** The gain of agent \( a_i \) with degree \( d_i > t \) in \( x \) is at least as high as its gain in the BNE.

**Proof.** Due to its degree, \( a_i \)’s BNE gain is never \( 1 - c \). When all its neighbors \( a_j \in x_N(i) \) are of degree \( d_j > t \) its BNE gain is 0, and when at least one neighbor is of degree \( d_j \leq t \) its BNE gain is 1. Since the ADCOP gain is always higher than 0 (Lemma 1) we only consider the case when \( a_i \)’s gain is 1 in the BNE. This is only attainable when \( a_i \) has at least one neighbor \( a_j \) with degree \( d_j \leq t \). Thus, to conclude our proof we have to show that \( a_i \)’s ADCOP gain is not \( 1 - c \).

By the problem description this gain can only occur when \( a_i \) assigns \( \emptyset \) in \( x \). This assignment incurs a
positive contribution on the ADCOP only when it prevents the existence of a null neighborhood for \(a_i\), or when it prevents it for one (or more) of \(a_i\)’s neighbors.

If \(a_i\) has a null neighborhood which it would like to prevent, there must be a neighbor \(a_j \in \mathcal{N}(i)\) (with degree \(d_j \leq t\)) which assigns \(\mathcal{F}\) in the ADCOP. In this case we define a new solution \(x'\), which differs from \(x\) in the assignments of \(a_i\) and \(a_j\) (i.e., \(x'_i = \mathcal{F}\) and \(x'_j = \mathcal{D}\)). \(x'\)’s cost is:

\[
\text{COST}(x') = \text{COST}(x) - (d_i + 1)(n - 1)n + d_j
\]

The highest cost \(x'\) can take will be when \(d_i = 1\) and \(d_j = n - 1\) in which case:

\[
\text{COST}(x') = \text{COST}(x) - 2(n - 1)n + (n - 1) = \text{COST}(x) - (n - 1)(2n - 1)
\]

implying that \(a_i\) does not assign \(\mathcal{D}\) to prevent a local null neighborhood in the optimal solution.

When \(a_i\) assigns \(\mathcal{D}\) to prevent the existence of a null neighborhood for one of its neighbors, we classify the neighbor’s type:

1. The neighbor \(a_j\) has at least one neighbor \(a_k\) with degree \(d_k \leq t\). We generate the assignment \(x\) in which \(x_j = \mathcal{F}\) and \(x_k = \mathcal{D}\). As before the cost of \(x'\) is lower than that of \(x\) since \(a_k\) contributes a single unit per each constraint it is involved in (at most \(n\) units) whereas the assignment change of \(a_i\) lowers the cost by at least \((n - 1)n\) units in contradiction to the optimality of \(x\).

2. The neighbor \(a_j\) has no neighbor \(a_k\) with degree \(d_k \leq t\). Assigning \(x_j = \mathcal{D}\) and \(x_i = \mathcal{F}\) to \(a_i\) lowers the resulting cost since the contribution of \(a_j\) to the cost is bounded by \(n^2\) (it incurs a cost of \(d_j\) to each of the \(d_j + 1\) constraints it is involved in), whereas the gain from changing the assignment of \(a_i\) is \((d_i + 1)(n - 1)n\).

This means that even if all neighbors are of the second type (which always incur greater costs), and they are all connected to all other agents, the cost of the modified solution is:

\[
\text{COST}(x') = \text{COST}(x) - (d_i + 1)(n - 1)n + d_j 
\]

Hence we conclude that that the gain of \(a_i\) will not be reduced from 1 in the BNE to \(1 - c\) (or 0) in the ADCOP’s optimal solution.

**Theorem 1** (Gain guarantee). The optimal solution to the ADCOP described above results in gains which are at least as high as those achieved in the BNE.

**Proof.** Directly follows from Lemmas 1-3.
proach is that it justifies the use of cooperative algorithms as mechanisms for instances where the Nash Equilibrium is not readily known.

The state of a Network Game in which agents do not fully know the whole network is natural to a distributed scenario in which information is often local. The analogous situation in ADCOPs is one in which agents only communicate with their neighbors during search and are not aware of more remote agents. The corresponding family of distributed search algorithms (local search algorithms) are not guaranteed to find optimal results but may be scaled to large populations of agents (Grubshtein et al., 2010; Maheswaran et al., 2004; Zhang et al., 2005).

It is not clear that our previous guarantee can be satisfied in a setting where agents employ a local search algorithm. Consider the interaction of Figure 1 and a set of agents participating in a stochastic search (Zhang et al., 2005). The initial assignment of all agents is \( A = \mathcal{A} \). As a result, all agents consider a change of assignment to \( D \) in the next round. Specifically, Agents \( A_2 \) and \( A_3 \) may change their assignments while the rest of the agents stochastically avoid any change. The resulting solution is a local minima from which agents will not deviate (similar to an equilibrium from which users will not deviate). In this converged solution our guarantee is violated - agent \( A_3 \)'s gain is reduced from 1 to 1 − \( c \). Nonetheless, a simple manipulation to distributed hill climbing algorithms such as MGM (Maheswaran et al., 2004) can result in solutions which provide the desired guarantee.

The framework and methods proposed in the present position paper form a mechanism that enables the self driven desires and goals of users to be solved by a cooperative system of computerized agents. We believe that this is a natural mechanism for many user applications which interact with their environment and with other users. In such settings, cooperation between agents is the natural action only if it can provide a strong and realistic guarantee regarding the expected gain to each user. A guaranteed negative CoC provides a suitable incentive for cooperation - securing a gain which is at least as high as the worst possible gain attained by the user.

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