RESOURC BOUNDED DECISION-THEORETIC BARGAINING WITH FINITE INTERACTIVE EPISTEMOLOGIES

Paul Varkey and Piotr Gmytrasiewicz

Department of Computer Science, University of Illinois at Chicago, 851 S. Morgan St., Chicago, U.S.A.

Keywords: Bilateral bargaining, Decision theory, Interactive epistemology, Bounded rationality, Memoization.

Abstract: In this paper, we study the problem of bilateral bargaining under uncertainty. The problem is cast in an interactive decision-theoretic framework, in which the seller and the buyer agents are equipped with the ability to represent and reason with (probabilistic) beliefs about strategically relevant parameters, the other agent’s beliefs, the other agent’s beliefs about the current agent’s beliefs, and so on up to finite levels. The inescapable intractability of solving such models is characterized. We present a realization of the paradigm of (resource) bounded rationality by achieving a trade-off between optimality and efficiency as a function of the discretization resolution of the infinite action space. Memoization is used to further mitigate complexity and is realized here through disk-based caching. In addition, the inevitability of model extinction that arises in such settings is dealt with by indicating an intuitive realization of the absolute continuity condition based on maintaining an ensemble model, for e.g., a random model, that accounts for all actions not already accounted for by other models. Our results clearly demonstrate an operationalizable scheme for devising computationally efficient anytime algorithms on interactive decision-theoretic foundations for modeling (higher-order) epistemic dynamics and sequential decision making in multi agent domains with uncertainty.

1 INTRODUCTION

In strategic multi agent interactions under uncertainty, modeled in a decision-theoretical framework, it is important for an agent to reflect upon its (partial) knowledge of the strategically relevant parameters of the interaction and the (partial) knowledge of the opponents as it deliberates about what course of action is best (i.e. attains highest expected utility). The phenomenon of an interactive epistemology of mutual beliefs naturally arises – an agent may form beliefs about the parameters to represent its uncertainty, beliefs about other agents’ beliefs, beliefs about other agents’ beliefs about others’ beliefs, and so on. Then, (Bayesian) probability calculus provides a flexible and powerful means of representing and reasoning about the resultant epistemic dynamics.

An immediate difficulty that arises in this framework is the potential infiniteness of the interactive epistemology. In game theory, esp. in the literature on games under incomplete information, beginning with John Harsanyi’s seminal work on this problem (Harsanyi, 1968), there is a long tradition of work that has been systematically addressing this issue. See, for e.g., (Zamir, 2008) for a survey.

The game-theoretic approach centers around the notion of an equilibrium. Particular epistemic assumptions (Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995) are necessary in order to achieve equilibrium – such as may never be the case in an actual interaction. In addition, many games, especially under incomplete information, exhibit the phenomena of a multiplicity of equilibria, with no means of uniquely identifying “the” rational choice from among them. Therefore, the game-theoretic approach is limited in its ability to prescribe a generally applicable control paradigm for the design of intelligent autonomous agents.

A purely subjective approach of dealing with this issue in a decision-theoretical framework was recently proposed and has led to definition of a finite interactive epistemological decision theoretic model (DT-FIE, from here on) called the Finitely Nested I-POMDP ((Gmytrasiewicz and Doshi, 2005) and (Doshi and Gmytrasiewicz, 2005)). In that work, the standard POMDP model (Lovejoy, 1991) and (Kaelbling et al., 1998) is extended by equipping an agent with the ability to maintain interactive (i.e. higher-order) beliefs, up to some finite level. The standard theory of sequential decision making is then extended to this model to produce optimal policies. The analy-
ses in this paper are inspired by that work.

The problem of bilateral bargaining under uncertainty is a well-known example of a multi agent sequential decision-making problem under uncertainty and is well-studied in game-theoretic literature: see, in order, (Rubinstein, 1982), (Rubinstein, 1985), (Sobel and Takahashi, 1983), (Cramton, 1984), (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1983), (Grossman and Perry, 1986), (Perry, 1986) and (Cho, 1990).

The incompleteness of the theory, from a predictive as well as a prescriptive perspective, motivates this work, in which our main objective is the realization of an operationalizable automated DT-FIE bargaining agent.

The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce notation and set up the model. In the following sections, we introduce and study seller and buyer agents of successively increasing sophistication and present our various results in their appropriate contexts. Our main result regarding the realization of bounded rationality is presented in Section 5.2, where we discuss the L2Seller type.

2 PRELIMINARIES

In this paper, we investigate a seller-offers bargaining mechanism where, at every turn, the seller makes offers and the buyer indicates whether or not a particular offer is acceptable. The game ends when an offer is accepted unless the game has a finite horizon, in which case it ends, possibly without agreement, when the horizon is encountered. Delay in reaching agreement is costly to either party – realized by applying a multiplicative discount factor $\delta$ to the payoffs ($\$1$ today is worth only $\$\delta^n$ dollars $n$ days from now).

The agents ascribe a valuation to the item bargained over – say $c$ for the seller and $v$ for the buyer. Assume also that trade is feasible, i.e. $c \leq v$. If agreement is reached on the $n$-th stage at some price, say $x$, where $c \leq x \leq v$, the payoffs to the seller and the buyer are $(x-c) \cdot \delta^{n-1}$ and $(v-x) \cdot \delta^{n-1}$, respectively.

It is assumed throughout that $c = 0$ and $c \leq v \leq 1$ (i.e. $v \in [0, 1]$) and that $0 \leq \delta \leq 1$. All this is assumed to be commonly known; while, $v$ itself is assumed to be the buyer’s private information. Agents may maintain other relevant beliefs and higher-order beliefs; for e.g. the seller may maintain a belief about the buyer’s valuation, the buyer may maintain a second-order belief about the seller’s first-order belief about its (i.e. the buyer’s) valuation, etc. There is nothing special about this particular informational setting; the conclusions easily generalize to settings where the basic strategically relevant uncertainty is about something, or, set of things, other than the buyer’s valuation.

Here, we recall and adopt notations from (Gmytrasiewicz and Doshi, 2005) to describe the agents’ interactive epistemological sophistication. An $L_i$-type (class) for $i = 1, 2, ...$, where type is either Buyer or Seller, denotes an agent type (class) that can model and reason about agents of $L_j$-type (class), where $0 \leq j < i$. For e.g., the L2-type agent can represent and reason about L0-type and L1-type agents, etc.

2.1 Definitions

In the following, we introduce additional notation and definitions to make certain notions precise:

- $n^{\text{LiAgentA}}$ \quad The number of possible (Li-)AgentA types (or, type classes, as should be clear from the context) in the support of the Li-AgentB’s initial prior belief. For e.g., $n_{L1Buyer}$ represents the number of L0-Buyer type classes in the L1-Seller’s prior support, and $n_{L2Buyer}$ represents the number of L1-Seller types in the L2-Buyer’s prior support.
- $|V|$. The cardinality of the discretized space of possible buyer valuations.
- $\text{mpd}$. The minimum profit demanded by the buyer.

**Schedule.** A (possibly finite) sequence of offers \{x1, x2, x3, ...\}, where each successive offer is made after the rejection of the previous one. We assume a discretized space of possible offers, $O$. We also assume that offer schedules are monotonically decreasing. These ensure, usefully, the finiteness of the space of possible offer schedules.

**An optimal schedule** is one that achieves the maximum expected utility with respect to some (implicit) initial prior belief.

- $|O|$. The cardinality of the discretized space of possible actions (offers).

**Terminal Belief.** A state of belief that need not be explored (i.e. deliberated upon) further and can be trivially assigned a value; for e.g. the belief state of the (seller) agent upon encountering the horizon of the game or after the lowest possible potentially profitable offer was just rejected, etc.

**Belief-state Graph.** A labelled directed graph where all possible belief states of an agent constitute the nodes (or, vertices) and where there is a directed edge from a node $u$ to a node $v$ labelled with offer $a$ if the agent’s belief state changes from $u$ to $v$ after performing Bayes’ belief update conditional on the event that offer $a$ was rejected.
3 L0-TYPE AGENTS

L0-type agents, the least sophisticated in this study, have the capability to model the world and may have preferences and intentions (to realize them). They do not explicitly model other similarly intentional agents (though, their presence may be ‘modelled’ as environmental artifact or noise). The classic POMDP would be classified as an L0-type model.

We consider a class of L0-Seller types equipped with a simple offer generation rule: Decrement the most recently rejected offer, if any, by some (fixed or random) amount. We assume a smallest discretization unit for the action space, denoted as $d$ and a multiplicative factor, denoted by $m$. The L0-Seller starts with some initial offer and then decrements the currently outstanding offer by some constant amount $md$, or some random amount sampled uniformly from all possible offers that are lesser than the outstanding one by some multiple of $md$, denoted respectively as L0-Seller$(md)$ and L0-Seller$(mdr)$. Offers cease as soon as one is accepted, or, if continuation is detrimental.

Example 1. Let $d = 0.05$. Let the outstanding offer be $0.4$. Then, for instance, an L0-Seller$(2d)$ would next offer $0.3 (= 0.4 - 2 \times 0.05)$ and an L0-Seller$(3d)$ would select some offer uniformly in $\{0.05, 0.2, 0.35\}$.

We consider L0-Buyer types with equally simplistic decision behavior: a buyer with valuation $v$ accepts the outstanding offer $x$ if (and only if) $v - x \geq \text{mpd}$. An L0-Buyer type is, therefore, characterized by its valuation and mpd. We group together L0-Buyer types with the same mpd into a type class.

4 L1-TYPE AGENTS

4.1 L1-seller

At every stage, the seller can compute the probability that a given offer will be rejected, based on its current belief. If the offer is indeed rejected, the seller updates its beliefs in a Bayesian manner, and the deliberation continues, until a terminal belief is encountered. This mechanism induces a directed deliberation tree as the connected subgraph of the belief state graph, where the root node is the initial prior belief and every leaf node is a terminal belief. A particular offer schedule, therefore, corresponds to a particular set of paths on this tree from the root node to a terminal node. An expected probability may be computed for each path, which induces an expected utility for each offer schedule. The seller’s task is to choose an optimal schedule, with respect to its prior beliefs.

The complexity of the straightforward optimal top-down traversal approach, is equal to the total number of nodes in the deliberation tree, namely, $2^{|O|}$. This result is obtained as a consequence of the fact that, at every stage, the seller need not again consider offers greater than or equal to rejected offers.

In the bottom-up approach, the seller first solves all terminal belief states, followed, successively, by solving all belief states that have a directed edge in the belief state graph to some previously solved state. This process is complete when the root belief state is encountered and solved. The associated complexity depends on the number of unique belief states and can be shown to be $|V|^{\text{depth}_{\text{L1Seller}}}$.

Therefore, the running-times of both approaches are exponential; the top-down approach in the dimension of the action space and the bottom-up approach in the dimension of one component of the state space. These values are not directly comparable; therefore, there does not, a priori, seem to be a natural better alternative among the two approaches.

It turns out that, in the particular case of the L1-Seller, it is possible to elegantly characterize reachable belief states which is then used to devise a polynomial-time algorithm for the bottom-up approach. Due to space limitations, this is outlined only in our technical report (Varkey, 2010). However, such characterizations are not simple to achieve in general. In Section 5.2, we analyze the L2-Seller and present, as our main contribution, a boundedly rational top-down scheme that is applicable to general Li-type sellers.

4.2 L1-buyer

A buyer with valuation $v$ accepts an offer $x$ if the immediate sure profit ($= v - x$) is greater than the discounted expected profit from the next stage. It calculates this expected profit from what it expects to be the next offer based on its beliefs, updated after seeing the current offer $x$, about the seller.

This online decision-making computation is linear in the number of mental models maintained by the buyer, i.e. $O(|\text{L1Buyer}|)$. Two examples follow.

Example 2. Suppose that the buyer, assumed to have a valuation of 0.9, believes, with probabilities 0.7 and 0.3, respectively, that the seller is one of two types—a subintentional automaton with a fixed schedule of offers, say $\{1.0, 0.8, 0.7, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1\}$, or an L0-Seller$(2d)$ type. Call these Model 1 and Model 2, respectively. Suppose that the actual seller follows
the schedule \( \{1, 0.08, 0.6, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1\} \). Also assume that \( \delta = 0.1 \) and \( \delta = 0.7 \).

The buyer’s belief updates and decisions at every stage are recorded in Table 1.

Both seller models may be used to rationalize the first two offers. In these cases, Bayesian belief update simply preserves the prior. The buyer rejects both these offers because the discounted expected profit from the next stage is greater. The next offer, 0.6, is only rationalizable using Model 2. Therefore, the updated belief concentrates the entire probability mass on this model. The discounted expected profit from the next stage is still greater – therefore, 0.6 too is rejected. Finally, offer 0.4 is accepted.

### 4.2.1 Model Extinction and ACC

Example 2 usefully demonstrates the necessity and sufficiency of the absolute continuity condition (ACC) (Kalai and Lehrer, 1993) in an interactive decision-making framework. Both models thought possible by the buyer are wrong (in the sense that neither of them represents the true seller). In fact, after the buyer receives offer 0.6, it (correctly) deems that the seller cannot possibly be Model 1, and, therefore, removes this model from the support of its beliefs. However, it turns out that Model 2 accounts for the buyer’s observations all the way until the termination of the interaction (which happens when the buyer accepts offer 0.4). But note, in particular, that Model 2 is also a wrong model of the true seller. Interestingly enough, had the negotiations continued for one more round, the next offer of 0.3 would have led the buyer to conclude that not even Model 2 could be the true model of the seller, leading to the extinction of all models in the buyer’s prior belief space. None of the prior models it thought possible to begin with could successfully explain (rationalize) reality; it realizes that it was completely mistaken in its beliefs.

How should Bayesian decision-theoretic agents prepare for such contingencies in multi-agent environments where it is uncertain about the type of agent(s) with which it is interacting? As in our example, consider an agent that starts with a prior belief over a non-exhaustive set of possible models of the opponent agent. If one of these models happens to be the true model of the opponent, then our agent will never be taken by surprise. In fact, after sufficient interaction and observation, its beliefs will converge to the true model (Kalai and Lehrer, 1993). If, on the other hand, its beliefs do not contain the true model in its support, then, barring a fortuitous satisfaction of ACC, the agent will eventually be completely surprised (an eventual extinction of all models in its belief support).

### Realization of ACC through Random Models

A closer understanding of such an agent’s beliefs yields a way out of this quandary. If an agent is so completely mistaken in its beliefs that the true model is not even possible a priori, it is only natural that it eventually faces inexplicable situations. A more realistic approach calls for a cautious agent that includes, in the support of its beliefs, one more model – a random model – which would make all actions (here, offer every possible offer) plausible with some positive probability, and, thereby, account for all contingent behavior (not already modeled by the other models). Such a prior belief will always satisfy ACC. The following example illustrates the usefulness of this approach.

#### Example 3

Consider a buyer, with valuation 0.7, who believes, with probabilities 0.5, 0.4 and 0.1, respectively, that the seller is one of three possible types – a subintentional automaton with a fixed schedule of offers, say \( \{1, 0.09, 0.7, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1\} \), or an L0-Seller(d) type, or an L0-Seller(dr) type. Call these Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3, respectively. Suppose that the actual seller follows the schedule \( \{1, 0.09, 0.8, 0.7, 0.5, 0.3, 0.1\} \). As before, assume that \( d = 0.1 \) and \( \delta = 0.7 \).

The buyer’s belief updates and decision-making at every stage are recorded in Table 2.

We observe that Model 1 is removed (from the support of beliefs) when offer 0.8 is received. Model 2 is removed when 0.5 is received – leaving only the random model, Model 3. Since this model rationalizes every possible offer, the buyer is able to continue interacting and eventually accepts 0.3.

### 5 L2-TYPE AGENTS

#### 5.1 L2-buyer

The L2-Buyer “pre-solves” all its L1-Seller mental models offline, incurring, in the process, an (offline) polynomial time cost of

\[
O_L^{L1Seller} \times (|O|^2 \times n_{L0Seller}^{L2Buyer})
\]

Following this, its online operation is similar to that of the L1-Buyer. Whenever an offer is received, it updates its beliefs and decides whether or not to accept by comparing the immediate profit with the expected profit from the next stage – both of which are linear time computations in the number of mental models – namely, \( O_{L2Buyer}^{L1Seller} \).
Table 1: Example 2: L1-Buyer’s belief update and sequential reasoning; \( \nu = 0.9, \delta = 0.7 \).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offer</th>
<th>Belief Update</th>
<th>Expected Next Offer</th>
<th>Expected Profit On Rej</th>
<th>Accept/Reject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Both models survive</td>
<td>0.7 - 0.8 + 0.3 - 0.8 = 0.8</td>
<td>0.7 - (0.9 - 0.8) = 0.07 &gt; -0.1 (= 0.9 - 1.0)</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>Both models survive</td>
<td>0.7 - 0.7 + 0.3 - 0.6 = 0.67</td>
<td>0.7 - (0.9 - 0.67) = 0.161 &gt; 0.1 (= 0.9 - 0.8)</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Only Model 2 survives</td>
<td>1 - 0.4 = 0.4</td>
<td>0.7 - (0.9 - 0.4) = 0.35 &gt; 0.3 (= 0.9 - 0.6)</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>Model 2 survives</td>
<td>1 - 0.2 = 0.2</td>
<td>0.7 - (0.9 - 0.2) = 0.49 &lt; 0.5 (= 0.9 - 0.4)</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Example 3: L1-Buyer that includes random L0-Seller model in support of prior beliefs; \( \nu = 0.7, \delta = 0.7 \).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offer</th>
<th>Belief Update</th>
<th>Expected Next Offer</th>
<th>Expected Profit On Rej</th>
<th>Accept/Reject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>All models survive</td>
<td>0.5 - 0.9 + 0.4 - 0.9 + 0.1 - 0.5 = 0.86</td>
<td>&lt; 0</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>All models survive</td>
<td>0.5 - 0.7 + 0.4 - 0.8 + 0.1 - 0.45 = 0.715</td>
<td>&lt; 0</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>Model 2 and Model 3 survive</td>
<td>0.8 - 0.7 + 0.2 - 0.4 = 0.64</td>
<td>0.7 - (0.7 - 0.64) = 0.042</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Model 2 and Model 3 survive</td>
<td>0.85 - 0.6 + 0.8 - 0.2 - 0.35 = 0.35</td>
<td>0.7 - (0.7 - 0.35) = 0.105</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Only Model 3 survive</td>
<td>1 - 0.25 = 0.25</td>
<td>0.7 - (0.7 - 0.25) = 0.315</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Model 3 survives</td>
<td>1 - 0.13 = 0.15</td>
<td>0.7 - (0.7 - 0.13) = 0.30</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Column index symbol legend for Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>The discretization unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \tau )</td>
<td>Time horizon ( \in {1, 2, 3, \ldots } ) int</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>optimal schedule</td>
<td>The optimal schedule of offers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \theta )</td>
<td>The optimal number of actual computations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \theta )</td>
<td>The optimal number of expected profits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \bar{\theta} )</td>
<td>Maximum number of computations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \hat{\theta} )</td>
<td>Executions times (in secs)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2 L2-seller

We note first that a straightforward bottom-up dynamic programming is optimal but incurs a time complexity of an order equal to the number of possible belief states, which is doubly exponential in the dimension of the state space.

5.2.1 Memoization using Disk-based Caching

This extreme intractibility leads to a reexamination of the top-down approach, which, as noted previously, incurs an exponential time-complexity of \( O(2^n) \). An immediate enhancement that may used to mitigate this complexity involves caching the computed results on disk. This caching scheme is called memoization and works best when there are many redundancies. In the worst-case, there are no redundancies, and the entire computation tree will be stored on disk.

As before, the seller’s initial belief state and the belief state graph induces a top-down deliberation tree. At each belief state, the seller first checks to see if the solution is already available, in which case, it was previously encountered, solved and cached. Else, it proceeds to solve it by considering all and only offers less than previously rejected ones. Whenever the computation encounters a terminal belief state or whenever it evaluates all possible offers for a given belief state, it ascends up the deliberation tree. In the latter case, the belief state under consideration is completely solved, in the sense that the algorithm has evaluated all possible offers at this state and has computed the best offer (along with the expected profit associated with this offer). This solution is then cached on disk – in particular, in our implementation it is stored in a relational database\(^1\). The solution is indexed by a complete specification of the entire belief state. In Section 6 we present considerable empirical evidence for the practical usefulness of memoization.

5.2.2 Realization of Bounded Rationality

The unavailability of a general analytical solution for multiagent sequential planning under uncertainty and the infeasibility of searching through the uncountable space of all possible schedules using a discrete algorithm necessitates our discretized dynamic programming approach. It was noted earlier that the worst-case complexity incurred is exponential in the dimension of the action space (i.e. discretized space of possible offers). It is in the context of this characterization that we recast our top-down deliberation tree traversal approach under the paradigm of bounded rationality. A finer discretization considers a strict superset of the space of available policies than a coarser one. Therefore, a finer discretization, though slower, is more op-

\(^1\)sqlite3 serves as our database backend
We consider an L2-Seller Ann who believes that the buyer is uniformly one of three types – L0-Seller(1d), L0-Seller(3d) or L0-Seller(1dr).

We solve Ann’s model using the memoized top-down approach for various settings of the discretization resolution and horizon. The computations were done on a Pentium 4 3.2GHz, 1GB RAM machine. The results are indexed and presented in Table 4 according to the column index legend in Table 3. We observe the following:

**Memoization Enhancement.** The number of actual (explicit) computations performed is lesser than the total possible number of computations by many orders of magnitude.

**Bounded Rationality through Fine-tuning Action Space Discretization.** The expected profit is greater for finer discretizations than for coarser ones. The running time is also greater for finer discretizations. Therefore, quality of the solution increases with a finer resolution of the action space, while corresponding simultaneously to an increase in the running time.

In addition, we also observed that the infinite horizon case takes considerably lesser time than the finite horizon case. This is not surprising considering the fact that in the infinite horizon case, the time-to-horizon (infinity) is always the same at every node and this increases the likelihood that many more belief states would be repeated than the finite horizon case where the time-to-horizon also characterizes the horizon.
belief state. Also, as expected, larger finite horizon settings take longer than shorter ones.

6 CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we considered the problem of seller-offers bilateral bargaining – an instance of the more general problem of optimal sequential planning under uncertainty in multiagent settings. Our main contribution consisted of developing a boundedly rational approach for the seller’s problem of generating optimal offer schedules. The approach is based on achieving a tradeoff between speed and solution quality by using the discretization of the action space to fine-tune the size of the search space of available policies – a finer resolution leads to better policies (in expectation) but takes longer to compute, and vice versa. We also demonstrated how memoization may be used to exploit redundancies in belief space deliberation. Further, we also presented a natural way of avoiding the problem of model extinction (for e.g. for the buyer agent, as here) – by maintaining one random model that explains any action not already accounted for by other sophisticated models.

The work presented in this paper falls more generally under the recently formalized paradigm of decision-theoretic reasoning augmented with finite interactive belief hierarchies. We believe that the results provided in this paper serve two purposes. Firstly, it sets forth a principled prescription for achieving resource bounded rational behavior in bilateral bargaining. Detailed comparative studies of behavioral economics literature are required to understand if this model also provides a descriptive account of actual human behavior in bargaining settings, although this is only of secondary interest to us. And secondly, the specific insights gained – namely, bounded rationality through fine-tuning the resolution of the action space to exploit the resultant speed-optimality tradeoff, caching during deliberation and maintaining ensemble models to avoid model extinction – are generally applicable to other optimal sequential multiagent planning problems under uncertainty.

REFERENCES


