ONTOLOGICAL CLIQUES

Analogy as an Organizing Principle in Ontology Construction

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Abstract: Ontology matching is a process that can be sensibly applied both between ontologies and within ontologies. The former allows for inter-operability between agents using different ontologies for the same domain, while the latter allows for the recognition of analogical symmetries within a single ontology. These analogies indicate the presence of higher-order similarities between instances or categories that should be reflected in the fine-grained structure of the ontology itself. In this paper we show how analogies between categories in the same ontology can be detected via linguistic analysis of large text corpora. We also show how these analogies can be clustered via clique-analysis to create meaningful new category structures in an ontology. We describe experiments in the context of a large ontology of proper-named entities called NameDropper, and show how this ontology and its analogies are automatically acquired from web corpora.

1 INTRODUCTION

Ontologies, like languages, are meant to be shared. A common ontology allows multiple agents to share the same specification of a conceptualization (Gruber, 1993), ensuring mutual intelligibility when communicating in the same domain of discourse. But like languages, there are often many to choose from: each ontology is a man-made artifact that reflects the goals and perspective of its engineers (Guarino, 1998), and different ontologies can model a domain with differing emphases, at differing levels of conceptual granularity. Inevitably, then, multiple agents may use different ontologies for the same domain, necessitating a mapping between ontologies that permits communication, much like a translator is required between speakers of different languages.

Given the operability problems caused by semantic heterogeneity, the problem of matching different ontologies has received considerable attention in the ontology community (e.g., see Euzenat and Shvaiko, 2007). Fortunately, formal ontologies have several properties that make matching possible. Though formal in nature, ontologies can also be seen as ossified linguistic structures that borrow their semantic labels from natural language (De Leenheer and de Moor, 2005). It is thus reasonable to expect that corresponding labels in different ontologies will often exhibit lexical similarities that can be exploited to generate match hypotheses. Furthermore, since ontologies are highly organized structures, we can expect different correspondences to be systematically related. As such, systems of matches that create isomorphisms between the local structures of different ontologies are to be favored over bags of unrelated matches that may lack coherence. In this respect, ontology matching has much in common with the problem of analogical mapping, in which two different conceptualizations are structurally aligned to generate an insightful analogy (Falkenhainer, Forbus and Gentner, 1989). Indeed, research in analogy (ibid) reveals how analogy is used to structurally enrich our knowledge of a poorly-understood domain, by imposing upon it the organization of one that is better understood and more richly structured. Likewise, the matching and subsequent integration of two ontologies for the same domain may yield a richer model than either ontology alone.

If we view ontology-matching and analogical-mapping as different perspectives on the same structural processes, then it follows that matching can sensibly be applied both between ontologies (to ensure inter-operability) and within ontologies (to increase internal symmetry). When applied within a single ontology, matching should allow us to identify pockets of structure that possess higher-order similarity that is not explicitly reflected in the
ontology’s existing category structure. As such, these analogies should permit the creation of a new layer of structure in the ontology, to better reflect human intuitions about the pragmatic similarity of different categories and entities.

This paper has several related goals. First, we demonstrate how analogical mappings can be derived from corpora for large ontologies that are themselves induced via text analysis. Second, we show how this system of analogical mappings can itself be subjected to further structural analysis, to yield cliques of related mappings. Third, we show how cliques can act as higher-level categories in an ontology, to better capture the intuitions of end-users (as reflected in their use of language) about which categories and entities are more similar than others.

We begin in section 2 with a consideration of the clustering role of categories in ontologies, and how the graph-theoretic notion of a clique can also fulfil this role, both at the level of instances and categories. In section 3 we describe the induction of our test ontology, called NameDropper, from the text content of the web. In section 4 we then show how analogical mappings between the categories of NameDropper can also be extracted automatically from web content. This network of analogical mappings provides the grist for our clique analysis in section 5, in which we show how analogical cliques – tightly-knit clusters of mappings between ontological categories – can be created to serve as new upper-level categories in their own right. We conclude with some final thoughts in section 6.

2 CATEGORIES AND CLIQUES

The taxonomic backbone of an ontology is a hierarchical organization of categories that serves to cluster ideas (both sub-categories and instances) according to some intrinsic measure of similarity. In the ideal case, ideas that are very similar will thus be closer together – i.e., clustered under a more specific category – than ideas that have little in common. It follows that ontologies which employ more categories can thus make finer distinctions that better reflect the semantic intuitions of an end-user (e.g., see Veale, Li and Hao, 2009).

Compare, for instance, the taxonomy of nouns used by WordNet (Fellbaum, 1998) with that of HowNet (Dong and Dong, 2006). In WordNet, the category of \{human, person\} is divided into a few tens of sub-types, which are themselves further sub-divided, to hierarchically organize the different kinds and roles of people that one might encounter.

In HowNet, however, every possible kind of person is immediately organized under the category Human, so that thousands of person-kinds share the same immediate hypernym. For this reason, WordNet offers a more viable taxonomic basis for estimating the semantic similarity of two terms, as used in various ways by Budanitsky and Hirst (2006).

Nonetheless, it is important to distinguish between semantic similarity and pragmatic comparability. The measures described by Budanitsky and Hirst (2006) estimate the former, and assign a similarity score to any pair of terms they are given, no matter how unlikely it is that a human might every seek to compare them. Comparability is a stronger notion than similarity: it requires that a human would consider two ideas to be drawn from the same level of specificity, and to possess enough similarities and differences to be usefully compared. There is thus a pragmatic dimension to comparability that is difficult to express in purely structural terms. However, we can sidestep these difficulties by instead looking to how humans use language to form clusters of comparable ideas. This will allow us to replace the inflexible view of ontological categories as clusters of semantically-similar ideas with the considerably more flexible view of categories as clusters of pragmatically-comparable ideas.

It has been widely observed that list-building patterns in language yield insights into the ontological intuitions of humans (e.g., see Hearst, 1992; Widdows and Dorow, 2002; Veale, Li and Hao, 2009). For instance, the list “hackers, terrorists and thieves”, which conforms to the pattern “Nouns, Nouns and Nouns”, tells us that hackers, terrorists and thieves are all similar, are all comparable, and most likely form their own sub-category of being (e.g., such as a sub-category of Criminal). We can build on this linguistic intuition by collecting all matches for the pattern “Nouns and Nouns” from a very large corpus, such as the Google n-grams (Brants and Franz, 2006), and use these matches to create an adjacency matrix of comparable terms. If we then find the maximal cliques that occur in the corresponding graph, we will have arrived at a pragmatic understanding of how the terms in our ontology should cluster into categories if these categories are to reflect human intuitions.

A clique is a complete sub-graph of a larger graph, in which every vertex is connected to every other (Bron and Kerbosch, 1973). A k-clique is thus a complete sub-graph with k vertices; a clique is maximal if it is not a proper-subset of another clique in the same graph. In ontological terms then, a clique
can represent a category in which every member has an attested affinity with every other, i.e., a category in which every member can be meaningfully compared with every other. Since all ontologies are graphs, the idea of a clique thus has a certain semantic resonance in ontologies, leading Croitoru et al., (2007) to propose cliques as a graph-theoretic basis for estimating the similarity of two ontologies.

Figure 1: Cliques of different sizes in the graph of coordinated nouns found in the Google n-grams corpus.

Clique analysis also indicates similarity within ontologies. Figure 1 shows the distribution of maximal clique sizes that we find when using the “Noun and Noun” pattern in the Google n-grams to mine coordinated pairs of capitalized terms. In general, the cliques correspond to proper subsets of existing categories, and mark out subsets whose members are more similar to each other than to other members of the larger category. For instance, we find this 11-clique:


This clique seems to cluster the key societal themes around which governments typically structure themselves, thus suggesting an ontological category such as Government_Ministerial_Portfolio.

Since the notion of a clique is founded on a social metaphor, an example concerning proper-named entities can be illustrative. Using the Google n-grams and a named-entity detector, we can build an adjacency matrix of co-occurring entities and derive from the resulting graph a set of maximal cliques. One such clique is the following 4-clique:

\{Steve_Jobs, Bill_Gates, Michael_Dell, Larry_Ellison\}

In an ontology of proper-named entities, such as the NameDropper ontology described in the next section, we would expect these entities to all belong to the category CEO. However, this category is likely to have thousands of members, so many additional sub-categories are needed to meaningfully organize this space of CEOs. What makes these particular CEOs interesting is that each is an iconic founder of a popular technology company; thus, they are more similar to each other than to CEOs of other companies of comparable size, such as those of GE, Wal-Mart or Pfizer. In the ideal ontology, one would expect these entities to be prominent members of a more specific category such as TechCompany-CEO.

Figure 2: Cliques of different sizes from the graph of coordinated proper-names in the Google n-grams corpus.

As shown in Figure 2, large cliques (e.g., \(k > 10\)) are less common in the graph of co-occurring proper-named instances than they are in the graph of co-occurring categories (Figure 1), while small cliques are far more numerous, perhaps detrimentally so. Consequently, we find many partially overlapping cliques that should ideally belong to the same fine-grained category, such as Irish-Author:

\{Samuel_Beckett, James_Joyce, Oscar_Wilde, Jonathan_Swift\}
\{Samuel_Beckett, Bram_Stoker, Oscar_Wilde, Jonathan_Swift\}
\{Samuel_Beckett, Seamus_Heaney\}
\{Patrick_Kavanagh, Brendan_Behan, James_Joyce\}

This fragmentation presents us with two possible courses of action. We can merge overlapping cliques to obtain fewer, but larger, cliques that are more likely to correspond to distinct sub-categories. Or we can apply clique analysis not at the level of category instances, but at the level of categories themselves. In this paper we shall explore the latter option.

In the next section we describe the creation of a large ontology of proper-named entities with a fine-grained category structure. These fine-grained categories expose enough of their semantic structure to permit analogical mapping between categories, using a corpus-based approach described in section 4. This network of analogical mappings between categories will then allow us to form cliques of similar categories in section 5.
3 NAMEDROPPER ONTOLOGY

As a test-bed for our explorations, we choose a domain in which the notion of a clique has both literal and metaphoric meaning. NameDropper is an ontology of the proper-named concepts – such as people, places, organizations and events – that one would expect to find highlighted in an online newspaper. NameDropper is used to semantically annotate instances of these entity-kinds in news-texts and to provide one or many analogically-linked categorizations for each instance.

Categories in NameDropper are semantically-rich, and serve as compressed propositions about the instances they serve to organize. For instance, rather than categorize Steve Jobs as a CEO, we prefer to categorize him as Apple_CEO or Pixar_CEO; rather than categorize Linus_Torvalds as a developer, we categorize him as a Linux_developer and a Linux_inventor; and so on. In effect then, each category is more than a simple generalization, but also encodes a salient relationship between its instances and other entities in the ontology (e.g., Linux, Apple, etc.). These categories use corpus-derived intuitions to augment, rather than replace, the rich categories offered by an online resource like Wikipedia (www.wikipedia.org). As we show in the next section, this use of a rich-naming scheme for categories also means that analogies between different categories can be identified using simple linguistic analysis of the structure of category labels.

The NameDropper ontology is extracted from the text of the Google n-grams in a straightforward manner. Simply, we use apposition patterns of the following form to obtain category/instance pairs:

1. Mod Role Firstname Lastname
2. Mod1 Mod2 Role Firstname Lastname
3. Mod Role Midname Lastname
4. Mod1 Mod2 Role Firstname Midname Lastname
5. Role of Mod1 Mod2  (Æ)
6. the Role of Mod1 Mod2  (Æ)
7. the Role of Mod1 Mod2 Role (Æ)
8. the Role of Mod  (Æ)

Here Mod, Mod1 or Mod2 is any adjective, noun or proper-name, Firstname, Midname, and Lastname are the appropriate elements of a named entity, and Role is any noun that can denote a position, occupation or role for a named-entity. A map of allowable name elements is mined from WordNet and Wikipedia, while a large list of allowable Role nouns is extracted from WordNet by collecting all single-term nouns categorized as Workers, Professionals, Performers, Creators and Experts. Since pattern (4) above can only be extracted from 6-grams, and Google provides 5-grams at most, we use overlapping 5-grams as a basis for this pattern.

When applied to the Google n-grams corpus, these patterns yield category/instance pairs such as:

a. Gladiator director Ridley Scott
b. Marvel Comics creator Stan Lee
c. JFK assassin Lee Harvey Oswald
d. Science Fiction author Philip K. Dick

Of course, not all pattern matches are viable category/instance pairs. Importantly, the patterns Mod Role or Mod1 Mod2 Role must actually describe a valid category, so partial matches must be carefully avoided. For instance, the following matches are all rejected as invalid:

*e. Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy
*f. Vinci code author Dan Brown
*g. Meeting judge Ruth Bader Ginsberg
*h. The City star Sarah Jessica Parker

The n-grams in examples *e, *f and *h are clearly truncated on the left, causing a necessary part of a complex modifier to be omitted. In general this is a vexing problem in working with isolated n-grams: it is difficult to know if an n-gram stands alone as a complete phrase, or if some key elements are missing. In example *g we see that Meeting is not a modifier for judge, but a verb that governs the whole phrase. Nonetheless, we can deal with these problems by performing the extraction and validation of category labels prior to the extraction of category/instance appositions. The following patterns are thus used to extract a set of candidate category labels from the Google n-grams:

5. the Mod Role
6. the Mod1 Mod2 Role
7. the Role of Mod1 Mod2  (Æ)
8. the Role of Mod  (Æ)

The patterns allow us to identify the strings the CEO of Sun Microsystems (via 7) and the Supreme Court judge (via 6) as yielding valid categories, but not the Meeting judge or the Microsystems CEO (which are not attested). Thus, only those collocations that can be attested via patterns 5 – 8 in the Google n-grams are allowable as categories in the patterns 1 – 4.

Overall, the intersection of patterns 1–4 and 5–8 extracts almost 60,000 different category/instance pairings from the Google n-grams corpus, ascribing an average of 2 categories each to 29,334 different named-entity instances. Because the Google corpus contains only those n-grams that occur 40 times or more on the web, the extraction process yields remarkably little noise. A random sampling of NameDropper’s contents suggests that less than 1% of categorizations are malformed.
4 ANALOGICAL MAPPINGS

These patterns lead NameDropper to be populated with many different complex categories and their proper-named instances; each complex category, like Apollo_11_astronaut, is a variation on a basic role (e.g., astronaut) that serves to link an instance (e.g., Neil_Armstrong) to this role in a specific context (e.g., Apollo_11). There is some structure to be had from these complex categories, since clearly, an Apollo_11_astronaut is an Apollo_astronaut, which in turn is an astronaut. But such structure is limited, and as a result, NameDropper is populated with a very broad forest of shallow and disconnected mini-taxonomies. The ontology clearly needs an upper-model that can tie these separate category silos together, into a coherent whole. One can imagine WordNet acting in this capacity, since the root term of every mini-taxonomy is drawn from WordNet’s noun taxonomy. Yet, while WordNet provides connectivity between basic roles, it cannot provide connectivity between complex categories.

For instance, we expect Apollo_astronaut and Mercury_astronaut to be connected by the observation that Apollo and Mercury are different NASA programs (and different Greek Gods). As such, Apollo_astronaut and Mercury_astronaut are similar in a different way than Apollo_astronaut and American_astronaut, and we want our ontology to reflect this fact. Likewise, Dracula_author (the category of Bram_Stoker) and Frankensteiin_author (the category of Mary_Shelley) are similar not just because both denote a kind of author, but because Dracula and Frankensteiin are themselves similar. In other words, the connections we seek between complex categories are analogical in nature. Rather than posit an ad-hoc category to cluster together Dracula_author and Frankensteiin_author, such as Gothic_monster_novel_author (see Barsalou, 1983, for a discussion of ad-hoc categories), we can use an analogical mapping between them to form a cluster.

But as can be seen in these examples, analogy is a knowledge-hungry process. To detect an analogy between Apollo_astronaut and Mercury_astronaut, a system must know that Apollo and Mercury are similar programmes, or similar gods. Likewise, a system must know that Dracula and Frankensteiin are similar books to map Dracula_author to Frankensteiin_author. Rather than rely on WordNet or a comparably large resource for this knowledge, we describe here a lightweight corpus-based means of finding analogies between complex categories.

Two complex categories may yield an analogy if they elaborate the same basic role and iff their contrasting modifier elements can be seen to belong to the same semantic field. The patterns below give a schematic view of the category mapping rules:

1. ModX_Role → ModY_Role
2. ModX_Mod_Role → ModY_Mod_Role
3. Mod_ModX_Role → Mod_ModX_Role
4. ModA_ModB_Role → ModX_ModY_Role

E.g., these rules can be instantiated as follows:

1. Java_creator → Perl_creator
2. Apple_inc._CEO → Disney_inc._CEO
3. Apollo_11_astronaut → Apollo_13_astronaut
4. Man_United_striker → Real_Madrid_striker

Clearly, the key problem here lies in determining which modifier elements occupy the same semantic field, making them interchangeable in an analogy. We cannot rely on an external resource to indicate that Java and Perl are both languages, or that Apple and Disney are both companies. Indeed, even if such knowledge was available, it would not indicate whether a human would intuitively find Java an acceptable mapping for Linux, say, or Apple an acceptable mapping for Hollywood, say. What is an acceptable level of semantic similarity between terms before one can be replaced with another?

Fortunately, there is a simple means of acquiring these insights automatically. As noted in section 2, coordination patterns of the form Noun1 and Noun2 reflect human intuitions about terms that are sufficiently similar to be clustered together in a list. For instance, the following is a subset of the Google 3-grams that match the pattern “Java and *”:

Java and Bali Java and C++ Java and Eiffel Java and Flash Java and Linux Java and Perl Java and Python Java and SQL Java and Sun

Coordination typically provides a large pool of mapping candidates for a given term. To minimize noise, which is significant for such a simple pattern, we look only for the coordination of capitalized terms (as above) or plural terms (such as cats and dogs). Much noise remains, but this does not prove to be a problem since substitution of comparable terms is always performed in the context of specific categories. Thus, Perl is a valid replacement for Java in the category Java_creator not just because Java and Perl are coordinated terms in the Google 3-grams, but because the resulting category, Perl_creator, is a known category in NameDropper. As a result, James_Gosling (Java_creator) and Larry_Wall (Perl_creator) are analogically linked. Likewise, Linux_creator and Eiffel_creator are valid
analogies for Java creator, but not Bali creator or Sun creator, since these are not known categories.

Since categories can have multiword modifiers (e.g., King Kong director, Harry Potter star), we run a range of patterns on Google 3-, 4- and 5-grams:

1. ModX and ModY
2. ModA ModB and ModX ModY
3. ModA ModB and ModX
4. ModX and ModA ModB
5. ModX and ModY PluralNoun

E.g., these patterns find the following equivalences:

1. Batman and Superman
2. James Bond and Austin Powers
3. Sin City and Gladiator
4. Microsoft and Sun Microsystems
5. Playboy and Penthouse magazines

These patterns show the scope for noise when dealing with isolated n-grams. We might ask, what makes the 4-gram Sin City and Gladiator a valid coordination but the 3-gram City and Gladiator an invalid one? Quite simply, the latter 3-gram does not yield a pairing that can grounded in any pair of complex categories, while the 4-gram yields the analogies Sin City writer → Gladiator writer, Sin City director → Gladiator director, and so on. Likewise, the substitution Apples and Oranges is not sensible for the category Apple CEO because the category Orange CEO does not make sense.

To summarize then, the process of generating inter-category analogies is both straightforward and lightweight. No external knowledge is needed, e.g., to tell the system that Playboy and Penthouse are both magazines of a somewhat sordid genre, or that Batman and Superman are both comic-book superheroes (interestingly, WordNet has entries for all four of these words, but assigns them senses that are utterly distinct from their pop-culture meanings). Rather, we simply use coordination patterns to formulate substitutability hypotheses in the context of existing ontological categories. Thus, if a substitution in one existing category yields another existing category, then these two categories are held to be connected by an analogy. We note that one does not have to use Google n-grams to acquire coordination patterns, but can use any corpus at all, thereby tuning the analogical mappings to the sensibilities of a given corpus/context/domain.

When applied to the complex categories of NameDropper, using coordination patterns in the Google n-grams, this approach generates 218,212 analogical mappings for 16,834 different categories, with a mean of 12 analogical mappings per category.

5 ANALOGICAL CLIQUES

These analogical mappings provide a high degree of pair-wise connectivity between the complex categories of an ontology like NameDropper, or of any ontology where category-labels are linguistically complex and amenable to corpus analysis. This connectivity serves to link instances in ways that extend beyond their own categories. Returning to the Playboy example, we see the following mappings:

Playboy publisher → Penthouse publisher
Playboy publisher → Hustler publisher
Hustler publisher → Penthouse publisher

All mappings are symmetric, so what we have here is an analogical clique, that is, a complete sub-graph of the overall graph of analogical mappings. Such cliques allow us to generalize upon the pair-wise connectivity offered by individual mappings, to create tightly-knit clusters of mappings that can act as generalizations for the categories involved. Thus, the above mappings form the following clique:

{Playboy publisher, Penthouse publisher, Hustler publisher}

A corresponding clique of modifiers is also implied:

{Playboy, Penthouse, Hustler}

In turn, an analogical clique of categories also implies a corresponding clique of their instances:

{Hugh Hefner, Bob Guccione, Larry Flynt}

It is worth noting that this clique of individuals (who are all linked in the public imagination) does not actually occur in the cliques of proper-named entities that we earlier extracted from the Google 5-grams in section 2 (see Figure 2). In other words, the analogical clique allows us to generalize beyond the confines of the corpus, to create connections that are implied but not always overtly present in the data.

The cohesiveness of an ontological category finds apt expression in the social metaphor of a clique. No element can be added to a clique unless that new element is connected to all the members of the clique. For instance, since Playboy magazine is a rather tame example of its genre, we find it coordinated with other, less questionable magazines in the Google n-grams, such as Sports Illustrated, Vanity Fair, Rolling Stone and Maxim magazines. Thus, we also obtain mappings like the following:

Playboy publisher → Rolling Stone publisher
This, in turn, implies a correspondence of instances:

\[ Hugh_Hefner \rightarrow Jann_Wenner \]

All this is as one might expect, but note how the association of *Playboy* and *Rolling Stone* does not influence the structure of our earlier analogical clique: *Rolling_Stone_publisher* does not join the clique of *Playboy_publisher*, *Penthouse_publisher* and *Hustler_publisher* because it lacks a connection to the latter two categories; *Jann_Wenner* thus avoids membership in the clique of *Hugh_Hefner*, *Bob_Guccione* and *Larry_Flynt*.

Analogical cliques allow us to turn pair-wise analogical mappings between categories into cohesive superordinate categories in their own right. Thus, \{*Playboy_publisher*, *Penthouse_publisher*, *Hustler_publisher*\} acts as a super-ordinate for the categories *Playboy_publisher*, *Penthouse_publisher* and *Hustler_publisher*, and in turn serves as a common category for *Hugh_Hefner*, *Bob_Guccione* and *Larry_Flynt*. Because analogies are derived in a relatively knowledge-lite manner from corpora, these cliques act as proxies for the kind of explicit categories that a human engineer might define and name, such as *publisher_of_men’s_magazines*.

Analogical cliques can serve a useful structural role in an ontology without being explicitly named in this fashion, but they can also be extremely useful as part of semi-automated knowledge-engineering solution. In such a system, analogical cliques can be used to find clusters of categories in an ontology for which there is linguistic evidence – as mined from a corpus – for a new super-ordinate category. Once identified in this way, a human ontologist can decide to accept the clique and give it a name, whereupon it is added as a new first-class category to the ontology.

Recall from section 2 that mining the Google n-grams for coordination among proper-named entities yields a highly fragmented set of instance-level cliques. In particular, Figure 2 revealed that clustering instances based on their co-occurrence in corpora produces a very large set of relatively small cliques, rather than the smaller set of larger cliques that one would expect from a sensible categorization scheme. In contrast, Figure 3 below shows that the graph of analogical mappings between categories produces a wider distribution of clique sizes, and produces many more maximal \( k \)-cliques of \( k > 10 \).

Figure 4 presents a side-by-side comparison of the results of Figures 2 and 3. It shows that while the analogical level produces less cliques overall (42,340 analogical cliques versus 72,295 instance-level cliques, to be specific), analogical cliques tend to be larger in size, and thus achieve greater levels of generalization than cliques derived from instances directly.

To appreciate the greater connectivity that a layer of analogical cliques can provide to an ontology, we must ask two important questions. What percentage of the 72,295 instance-level cliques that are induced from Google coordination patterns represent a clustering of instances that all belong to one or more of the same categories? In other words, what percentage of these cliques can be unified under the same analogical clique? For the first question, the answer is 33% – just 1 in 3 instance-level cliques are proper subsets of a single ontological category. For the second question, the answer is 56%. Clearly, analogical cliques of categories offer a much better model of the way that speakers intuitively cluster their ideas in a text than do the categories alone.
6 CONCLUSIONS

Word usage in context often defies our best attempts to exhaustively enumerate all the possible senses of a word (e.g., see Cruse, 1986). Though resources like WordNet are generally very useful for language-processing tasks, it is unreasonable to assume that WordNet – or any print dictionary, for that matter – offers a definitive solution to the problem of lexical ambiguity. As we have seen here, the senses that words acquire in specific contexts are sometimes at great variance to the official senses that these words have in dictionaries (Kilgarriff, 1997). It is thus unwise to place too great a reliance on dictionaries when acquiring ontological structures from corpora.

We have described here a lightweight approach to the acquisition of ontological structure that uses WordNet as little more than an inventory of nouns and adjectives, rather than an inventory of senses. The insight at work here is not a new one: one can ascertain the semantics of a term by the company it keeps in a text, and if enough inter-locking patterns are employed to minimize the risk of noise, real knowledge about the use and meaning of words can be acquired (Widdows and Dorow, 2002). Because words are often used in senses that go beyond the official inventories of dictionaries (e.g., recall our examples of Playboy, Penthouse, Apollo, Mercury, Sun and Apple), resources like WordNet can actually be an impediment to achieving the kinds of semantic generalizations demanded by a domain ontology.

A lightweight approach is workable only if other constraints take the place of lexical semantics in separating valuable ontological content from ill-formed or meaningless noise. In this paper we have discussed two such inter-locking constraints, in the form of clique structures and analogical mappings. Clique structures winnow out coincidences in the data to focus only on patterns that have high internal consistency. Likewise, analogical mappings enforce a kind of internal symmetry on an ontology, biasing a knowledge representation toward parallel structures that recur in many different categories.

We have focused here on our own ontology, NameDropper, created to annotate online newspaper content. Our subsequent focus will expand to include other, larger ontologies extracted from web-content, including DBpedia and other Wikipedia-derived resources (see Auer et al., 2007; Fu and Weld, 2008). The category structure of Wikipedia is sufficiently similar to that of NameDropper (in its use of complex labels with internal linguistic structure) that the analogical techniques described here should be readily applicable. We shall see.

REFERENCES


