ATTACK GRAPH GENERATION WITH INFUSED FUZZY CLUSTERING

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Abstract: Modern networks have been growing rapidly in size and complexity, making manual vulnerability assessment and mitigation impractical. Automation of these tasks is desired (Obaidat and Boudriga, 2007; Bhattacharya et al., 2008). Existing network security tools can be classified into the following two approaches: proactive (such as vulnerability scanning and use of firewalls) and reactive (intrusion detection system). The modus operandi of proactive approaches have an edge over the reactive ones as they have threat information prior to the attack. One approach, viz., generation and analysis of attack graphs, in this class has gained popularity. In this paper, we present an algorithm to automatically generate attack graphs based on the prevalent network conditions. The nodes in the graph that are generated by executing our proposed algorithm have been grouped based on logical graph paradigm which helps in visualizing the dependencies among various initial and generated network configurations towards obtaining the attacker’s goal. In addition, fuzzy logic based clustering has been applied on the generated data corresponding to each such group. This form of clustering is beneficial, because in the real world the boundaries between clusters are indistinct. This form of clustering leads to better visualization of the attack graph.

Our goal is to design and develop an efficient approach for automatic attack graph generation and visualization. The approach uses attack graph generation algorithm, and requires network initial conditions as input. Fuzzy logic based clustering, Fuzzy C-Means (FCM) (Bezdek, 1981), is applied at the output of attack graph generation algorithm to improve visualization. Our approach helps network administrator to visualize attack graph in an efficient way. This reduces the burden of network administrator to a larger extent.

1 INTRODUCTION

In the recent years, the volume of network traffic has increased monotonically. The proliferation of the Internet has made organizations vulnerable to cyber attacks. Along with this, the sophistication levels of contemporary cyber attacks as well as their severity and anonymity have also increased.

Present day security technology can broadly be classified as proactive (such as vulnerability scanning and use of firewalls) and reactive (intrusion detection system). Proactive technology aims at identifying vulnerabilities, which a malicious attacker can exploit, and mitigating the risk involved before these vulnerabilities can be exploited. On the other hand, the reactive technology bases on the analysis and mitigation of network attacks after the attacks are detected. To overcome the passive nature of reactive risk management approach, the proactive methods are favored.

Proactive methods are extensively used in enterprise networks spanning several hosts and subnets. Such networks typically span multiple platforms, software packages and employ several modes of connectivity (Sheynar, 2004). Furthermore, organizational perimeters have been rapidly increasing as a consequence of globalization. Such diversified configurations present a multitude of vulnerabilities, which can be exploited by attackers. Existing vulnerability scanners are able to detect such
attack graph. Attack graphs, which are largely used to represent possible attack paths over a given network, form an attack path. Combination of all possible such a correlation (Sheynar, 2004). Such a logical approach for an administrator who needs to consider the interactions of local isolated vulnerabilities and find global security holes due to such a correlation (Sheynar, 2004). Such a logical approach for an administrator who needs to consider the interactions of local isolated vulnerabilities and find global security holes due to such a correlation (Sheynar, 2004). Such a logical approach for an administrator who needs to consider the interactions of local isolated vulnerabilities and find global security holes due to such a correlation (Sheynar, 2004).

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vulnerabilities in isolation, i.e., they detect vulnerabilities present per service per host. Normally, an attacker will typically break into a network, by exploiting a sequence of vulnerabilities and their corresponding exploits, where the post-condition of each exploit satisfies the pre-condition for subsequent exploits and forms a causal relationship among them (Sheynar, 2004).

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2 RELATED WORK

An attack graph of a network is a representation of all possible attack paths on the networks, given an initial set of capabilities to an attacker. It can be used as a tool for qualitative and quantitative analysis of security attributes and vulnerabilities. One of the earliest works of the attack graph was done by Moskowitz and Kang (Moskowitz and Kang, 1997), in which the authors used a graph-based approach to identify the possible loop-holes, using probability, in a network and represents insecurity flow. The algorithm proposed by them runs in exponential time. Phillips and Swiler (Phillips and Swiler, 1998) provided a formal definition of attack graphs. They designed a tool, founded on graph-based approach to network vulnerability that identifies the set of attack paths having high probability of success for an attacker. Their approach represents attack states and transitions between them, and was based on attack graphs. However, the attack graph of realistic size was not generated by them. Swiler et al. (Swiler et al., 2001) also described an attack graph generation tool for assessment of security attributes and vulnerabilities in computer networks. The input provided to the tool includes pre- and post-conditions, network information and attacker capabilities. The tool was used to build shortest path (s) to the specified goals. It also provided grouping of hosts representing similar network conditions (e.g., grouping of hosts on a LAN), and handling of unknown values (default values, if some missing values exist). The tool has some drawbacks such as poor scalability, and manual input (Lippmann and Ingols, 2005). Ou et al. (Ou et al., 2006) presented a logical attack graph algorithm using formal methods. The nodes in the graph can be classified as fact nodes and derivation nodes. The fact nodes can be further be divided into primitive fact nodes and derived fact nodes. Each fact node is labeled with a logical statement, which represents a network configuration such as services running, privileges, and connectivity. A derivation node takes as input one or more fact nodes, which together satisfy the pre-conditions of the rule representing the derivation node. This node serves as a medium between the set of conjunctive pre-conditions and post-conditions which occur as a result of exploiting the vulnerability corresponding to that rule. The node corresponding to the post-
condition is a derived fact node. The algorithm has asymptotic CPU time between $O(n^2)$ and $O(n^3)$, where $n$ represents the number of hosts in a network. However, their algorithm requires one to express network condition as a propositional formula (Sheyner et al., 2002).

Visualization plays an important role in attack graph readability and analysis. The readability of an attack graph can be increased by employing data mining approaches (such as traditional clustering or FCM (Bezdek, 1981)), as well as maintaining information. In FCM, mentioned in Section 1, each data point can belong to a cluster specified by a membership grade, between 0 and 1 (both inclusive). The FCM partitions a collection of $n$ data points into $c$ fuzzy clusters (where $c<n$), and simultaneously seeking the best possible locations of these clusters. For example, 200 data points can be partitioned into 4 clusters. The number of clusters is user defined. The distance measure that forms the usual FCM algorithm is Euclidean distance. FCM can help in deciphering patterns in the attack graphs.

We proposed an attack graph generation algorithm which can be used on large networks. The output obtained by applying our attack graph generation algorithm is clustered using the FCM algorithm. Moreover, our algorithm runs in $O(n^3)$.

3 PROPOSED ALGORITHM

In this Section, we propose the algorithm to automatically generate an attack graph when the initial network conditions are provided. Our proposed algorithm works with nodes of type base & derived fact nodes, and rule nodes (Ou et al., 2006).

The proposed algorithm, described in Section 3.1, requires the following inputs: Privilege-matrix (privilege level over machine), Connection-matrix (machine connectivity for services). In addition, the following data structures are used: Ruleset (pre-condition and post-condition privilege levels for each service), and Label (nodes in the graph). The nodes set can be of three types: Base-fact nodes (initial network conditions), derived-fact nodes, and rule-nodes. The derived-fact node and rule-nodes are dynamically created and populated as algorithm advances.

The graph generation module relies on many matrices which need to be maintained throughout the run and change dynamically as per requirements to generate new nodes which are classified into types mentioned earlier.

Once an attack graph has been generated, different matrix operations can be performed on the final graph’s adjacency matrix for various IDS-based integration related work, as mentioned in Section 1. Along with this, as mentioned already, there is a need to increase the readability of the generated graph, since they can be extremely large in size and complexity. We have focused on increasing the readability of the output graph by employing clustering methods. We have used, FCM (Bezdek, 1981) (Section 3.2), a fuzzy logic-based clustering method for the purpose. This method has been applied to represent clusters. Clustering can greatly reduce overhead by reducing the amount of data to be visualized. The output of the graph generation algorithm is fed as input to FCM. This result in clustering the attack graph generated data set into user defined clusters.

3.1 Graph Generation Algorithm

Initialization:
Number of hosts in the network: $n$
Number of attackers in the network: 1

1) Initialize Privilege-matrix (Priv), which is a $(n+1)$ field row vector. Fill it up with values 0 for no privilege, 1 for user privilege and 2 for root privilege. The $(n+1)$ values have been used as one machine is the attacker itself. Initially, the attacker has root privilege only over his own machine.

2) Fill in Connection-matrix (Conn), which is one $n$x$n$ binary matrix for each of the s services. Each $n$x$n$ matrix is to be filled with a 1 if there exists a machine connectivity over that service.

3) Make a Ruleset (Ruleset) for each service and fill it up with pre-condition and post-condition privilege levels for each service. We assume that each service is vulnerable.

4) A null set Label (Label) is added to identify nodes of the graph.

5) Three node sets are initialized. Base fact nodes contain initial network condition. This will have one label each for every service running on every machine. Attacker privilege is also to be added here. Derived fact nodes and rule nodes are dynamically created when the algorithm runs.

6) An empty set of edges also needs to be fed to the algorithm as input.
Input:
1) Priv\[n+1\][n+1] \(\leftarrow\) Has Values 0(none), 1(user), 2(root). Init: Priv[i][i] \(\leftarrow\) 2, rest 0.
2) Conn[i][j][k] \(\leftarrow\) Is 1 if machine j can connect to k via service i.
3) Ruleset[i] \(\leftarrow\) Rules for each service
   Ruleset[i] \(\leftarrow\) Struct with 2 fields pre (int) and post (int) privilege levels for service i.
4) Label \(\leftarrow\) Label to identify node
5) Node sets:
   a) Base \(\leftarrow\) Contains labels of base fact nodes
   b) Derived \(\leftarrow\) Contains labels of derived fact nodes
   c) Rule \(\leftarrow\) Contains exploit labels
6) Edges \(\leftarrow\) of form (i,j) for edge from node i to j

Output:
1) Graph nodes and edges

Algorithm:
1) Loop over each service s
   a) Check for each node i:
      If attacker has precondition privilege level or above on machine i and machine i can
      connect to service s running on machine some machine j, then do the following:
      i.) Priv(k) \(\leftarrow\) max(current value of Priv(k), postcondition privilege level as per
         Ruleset).
      ii.) Put the label of the new privilege in derived fact node set.
      iii.) Make edge from service node corresponding to s
            and old privilege node to rule node (for this service s on machine j from machine i).
      iv.) Make and edge from that rule node to new privilege node
   2) Go to line 1 if any new node is added.

3.2 Flow Chart of the Graph Generation Algorithm

The control flow of the graph generation algorithm is elucidated in Figure 1.

3.3 Fuzzy Clustering Algorithm

The output of graph generation algorithm (Section 3.1) is used as input to the FCM algorithm
(Bhattacharya et al., 2008). The output is arranged into a matrix. The columns of the matrix are various
attributes of the attack graph. These attributes include service running on a particular machine,
source identification (I.D.) of the machine, privilege on the machine, target identification of the machine,
and privilege on target machine. The data points are grouped into various clusters (user defined). These
clusters have “fuzzy” boundaries, in the sense that each data value belongs to every cluster to some
degree.

Figure 1: Graph generation algorithm.

FCM Algorithm (adopted from (Bhattacharya et al., 2008)):

Input: (Graph nodes and edges)
1) Let \(x^k\) be the \(k^{th}\) (possibly \(m\) – dimensional vector) data point \((k = 1, 2, \ldots, n)\). In our case
\(n \leftarrow 22\), and \(m \leftarrow 5\) (Refer Table 2).
2) Membership matrix.
3) Number of clusters.

Output:
1) \(n\) data points are clustered into \(c\) fuzzy clusters where \(c<n\).
Algorithm:
1) The first phase is initialization. In initialization phase the membership matrix M, and number of clusters are initialized with random values 0 and 1.
2) The initialization phase is followed by iteration phase. In this phase cluster is computed according to the objective function until the objective function reaches a specified (user defined) threshold.
3) The termination phase is the last phase. It signifies that algorithm has reached a stable phase.

4 RESULTS

4.1 Test Network

The network shown in Figure 2 is a simulated network consisting of one attacker, one host and a screened subnet having three hosts. It has been adopted from the network considered by Sheynar (Sheynar, 2004). The network consists of four hosts; Host 0 (H0), Host 1(H1), Host 2 (H2), and Host 3(H3). The system characteristics are shown in Table 1; the Connectivity Matrix.

4.2 Connectivity Matrix

The Connectivity Matrix shown in Table 1 is the input to graph generation algorithm.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl.No.</th>
<th>Service Number</th>
<th>Source ID</th>
<th>Source Privilege</th>
<th>Target Number</th>
<th>Target Privilege</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These attributes in Table 2 include service running on a particular machine (Service number), source identification (Source ID) of the machine, privilege on the source machine (Source privilege), target identification of the machine (Target number), and privilege on target machine (Target privilege).

The various attributes in Table 2 are given some number as per the conventions mentioned below:

1) The service number can be of the following four types:
   a) IIS_Web_Service : 0
   b) ftp: 1
   c) ssh: 2
   d) squid: 3
   e) netbios: 4

2) The Source ID and Target Number can be of following four types:
   a) Host 0 : 0
   b) Host 1: 1
   c) Host 2: 2
   d) Host 3: 3
   e) Attacker : 4

3) The Source Privilege can be of following four types:
   a) No Privilege: 0
   b) User Privilege: 1
   c) Root Privilege: 2

The result of graph generation algorithm (Section 3.1) on Table 1 (Connectivity Matrix) is shown in Table 2. Each row in the table represents one run of the graph generation algorithm. Further, results shown in Table 2 are used to generate Figure 3 (Attack Graph).
4.4 Results of FCM Algorithm

The result of FCM algorithm on the output of the graph generation algorithm, Table 2 (Data Points for Clustering) results in cluster formation shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5.

As can be inferred from the clusters formed, if we use the number of clusters to be equal to the number of hosts in the network, then each cluster approximately aggregates on a per host basis. This is shown in Figure 4. On the other hand, if a different grouping is used (in case of three partitions), clusters aggregate approximately on the basis of different levels in attack paths used, such as entry level, mid level and exit level. This is shown in Figure 5.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

In this paper, we have proposed a graph generation algorithm. Our algorithm runs in \( O(n^3) \) computational time. The algorithm currently does not prevent cycles. Moreover, clustering improves visualization on attack graph. Clustering greatly reduces overhead in IDS operations by reducing the amount of data to process as in each case as it generates super nodes.

We are currently working on improving the computational efficiency of the algorithm by utilizing matrix multiplication methods so that building graphs for large network takes less time. Further on the output data set of our proposed algorithm, we intend to perform “false threat” and “missed threat” detection in context of IDS alarms.

REFERENCES


