A TRAFFIC COHERENCE ANALYSIS MODEL FOR DDOS ATTACK DETECTION

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Abstract: Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is a critical threat to the Internet by severely degrading its performance. DDoS attack can be considered a system anomaly or misuse from which abnormal behaviour is imposed on network traffic. Network traffic characterization with behaviour modelling could be a good indication of attack detection which can be performed via abnormal behaviour identification. In this paper, we will focus on the design and evaluation of the statistically automated attack detection. Our key idea is that contrary to DDoS traffic, flash crowd is characterized by a large increase not only in the number of packets but also in the number of IP connections. The joint probability between the packet arrival process and the number of IP connections process presents a good estimation of the degree of coherence between these two processes. Statistical distances between an observation and a reference time windows are computed for joint probability values. We show and illustrate that anomalously large values observed on these distances betray major changes in the statistics of Internet time series and correspond to the occurrences of illegitimate anomalies.

1 INTRODUCTION

Distributed Denial of Service attacks, which aim at overwhelming a target server with an immense volume of useless traffic from distributed and coordinated attack sources, are a major threat to the stability of the Internet (D. Dittrich). But, for four reasons, it is difficult to detect an ongoing DDoS attack: Firstly, because a DDoS attack has to be detected on-line, there is little time to detect and confirm an ongoing DDoS attack. Normally the system administrators or security experts have to ascertain the attacks or trace back the attackers in less than one hour. Secondly, some Internet worms’ propagation may also directly result in DDoS, which makes DDoS detection much more complex. Thirdly, normal defence measures such as rate-limiting, packet-filtering, tweaking software parameters or equipping more servers are all useful but limited in their capabilities. Finally, the exact distinction between DDoS attacks and flash crowds remains an open issue. It is essential that we be able to detect DDoS attacks fast, accurately and in real time. DDoS attacks exhaust host resources or the network bandwidth. It is consequently important to detect resource usage changes and reduce the detection time. Such abnormal changes could be detected statistically. For example, the entropy method in (L. Feinstein, D. Schnackenberg, 2003) uses frequency-sorted distributions of selected packet attributes in a time window to compute entropy and use the entropy changes to indicate the anomalies. (C. Manikopoulos, S. Papavassiliou, 2002) Demonstrates how Aderson-Darling statistical method is used to detect network traffic changes. The adaptive sequential and batch sequential methods in (R. B. Blazek et al., 2002) employ statistical analysis of data from multiple layers of network protocols to detect very subtle traffic changes. On the other hand, recent results obtained in modelling by different projects of metrology have however allowed envisaging new intrusion detection strategies. Even if still in the course of development, the published results using statistical characteristics are nevertheless very interesting. Hence, for example, Ye proposed a Markovian model for the temporal behaviour of the traffic (N. Ye, 2000) and generating alarms when the traffic gets significantly distant from the model. Other authors (J. Yuan and K. Mills, 2004) showed that DoS attacks augment...
the correlation in the traffic; which may represent a robust detection technique. Hussain et al. use the spectral power density to identify the signatures for different attacks (A. Hussain et al., 2003). Li and Lee used wavelet-based system to calculate energy distribution. They noticed that this distribution presents peaks in the traffic which contains attacks that do not exist in regular traffic (L. Li et G. Lee, 2003). Finally, A. Scherrer et al. proposed a detection approach based on a non Gaussian and multiresolution traffic modelling (A. Scherrer et al., 2007). Anomalously large values observed on calculated distances correspond to the occurrences of illegitimate anomalies such as DDoS attacks.

The method proposed in this paper is also a statistics-based method that utilizes traffic modelling for DoS/DDoS detection. We aim at analyzing the impact of anomalies on the statistical traffic characteristics and to bring to evidence the traffic characteristic signals containing legitimate and illegitimate anomalies. We propose a bi-level study of Internet traffic based on the couple packet IP, address IP. By measuring the degree of coherence between the number of packets and the number of IP connexions first obtained in regular traffic, then in traffics presenting a large variety of anomalies including mainly legitimate anomalies, we can differentiate traffic changes caused by legitimate actions or by illegitimate actions. It will be shown that the evolution of the estimated model’s parameters allow to differentiate the traffic with or without anomalies which minimises false alarms. Other, our proposal does need to inspect only the source IP address fields of each packet. This makes it simpler and more practical for real-time implementation.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the real traffic traces used in this work. Section 3 illustrates the theoretical basis of a traffic coherence analysis model for DoS detection. In section 4 we propose a stochastic modelling of Internet traffic used to calculate the degree of coherence. Section 5 discusses the performance of our proposal. Finally concluding remarks and future work are presented in Section 6.

2 CAIDA DATA COLLECTION

It is very hard to obtain anomaly-causing data mainly when these flows are sensible and susceptible to be used in real attacks as is the case with DoS attack. The most part of works dealing with DoS attacks use flows realized in laboratories by means of traffic generator or by DDoS tools. All along this work, we used a variety of real Internet traffic traces collected in 2007. The DDoS traces are issued from “The CAIDA Backscatter-2007 Dataset” (https://data.caida.org/datasets/security/backscatter-2007/). This collection groups the backscatter datasets that were created from the massive amount of data continuously collected from the UCSD Network Telescope. These backscatter datasets contain traces with packet headers for unsolicited TCP and ICMP response packets sent by denial-of-service attack victims. When a denial-of-service-attack victim receives attack traffic with spoofed source IP addresses, the attack victim cannot differentiate between this spoofed traffic and legitimate requests, so the victim replies to the spoofed source IP addresses. These spoofed IP addresses were not the actual sources of the attack traffic, so they receive responses to traffic they never sent. By measuring this backscatter response traffic to a large portion of IP addresses (in our case, roughly a /8 network), it is possible to estimate a lower bound for the overall volume of spoofed source denial-of-service attacks occurring on the Internet. The normal traffic traces are issued from “The CAIDA Anonymized 2007 Internet Traces Dataset” (https://data.caida.org/datasets/passive-2008/) This dataset contains anonymized passive traffic traces from CAIDA's AMPATH monitor on an OC12 link at the AMPATH Internet Exchange during the DITL 2007 measurement event. Figure1 shows examples of network packet arrival process for legitimate and illegitimate traffics. We can notice a great variance in the aggregate traffic in accordance with time. In figure (b), we signal an important augmentation in the number of packets. This is legitimate and is caused by a strong augmentation in the number of IP connexions. However, in the figure1 (c) the large scale augmentation is illegitimate and is caused by DoS attack using one sole zombie. The peak at the second 6500 corresponds to the appearance of a second zombie.

3 DETECTION SYSTEM

Our detection system is based on the following hypothesis: a permanent large scale augmentation in the number of packets received by a network is the consequence of the augmentation in the number of IP connexions. An IP connexion corresponds to an
IP traffic exchanged between two IP addresses during a period of time T. Knowing the objective of attackers to saturate as soon as possible the resources of the target, this would engender a disproportion between the number of received packets and the number of IP connexions. However, in the case of flash crowd, the augmentation of the number of packets is always accompanied by an augmentation in the number of IP connexions. In this situation the flow keeps coherence between the aggregated debit and the number of IP connexions. The main goal of this work is to detect in real time a DDoS attack by measuring the degree of coherence between the total number of packets received by the network and the number of IP connexions. This task subdivides into three main parts:

- To study the network characteristics by generating the histogram of the number of packets sent by one sole IP address during a time interval T;
- Integrate the result in a statistical model allowing to measure the degree of coherence between the number of IP connexions and the received traffic volume;
- Use a statistical distance to calculate the divergence between the traffic target and a normal traffic prototype.

We define \( \{X_T(n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) as the stochastic process of the number of IP connexions in successive time windows of the size T. \( X_T(n) \) is then the random variable that defines the number of IP addresses that transmitted at least one packet to the target network and the instant of arrival which is comprised between \( nT \) and \( (n+1)T \). We also define \( \{Y_T(n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) as the stochastic process of the number of packets transmitted in the successive time windows of the size T. \( Y_T(n) \) is then the number of packets whose arrival instant is contained between \( nT \) and \( (n+1)T \). In this paragraph, we try to establish a type of relation linking the time series \( X_T \) and \( Y_T \) for different types of traffic (regular, DDoS and flash crowd). Given that the aggregated flow of the Internet traffic is very variable (the variance being very often superior to the mean), it is very difficult to establish a simple relationship (linear, quadratic…) between these scales. To study this relation, we used scatterplot graphics. The x-axis indicates the number of IP addresses and the y-axis indicates the number of IP packets. Figure 2 (a) and figure 2 (b) show that during normal traffic the scatterplot stretches on a compact sphere representing the field of coherence. This is not the case in the presence of DDoS attacks and the figures (c) show clearly that the scatterplot is divided into spheres corresponding respectively to the normal traffic target and a DDoS attack.
traffic and to DDoS traffics. The first sphere represents the coherence domain while the other spheres correspond to different levels of attack. The more the attack is strong, the more the spheres are distanced from the domain of coherence. These different distances translate a disproportion that is growing between the processes $X_T$ and $Y_T$.

To quantify statistically the degree of coherence, we used the joint density of probability between processes $X_T$ and $Y_T$. That is the probability so that $x$ IP addresses transmit to the target link $y$ IP packets within the time interval $T$:

$$f_{X,Y}(x, y) = P(X_T = x, Y_T = y)$$ (1)

To calculate $f_{X,Y}$ we proceed as follows. We first define $W_T(n)$ as the stochastic process of the number of packets received by various IP address during time window of the size $T$. Thus $W_T(n)$ is random variable of the number of IP packets that were transmitted by the $n$th IP address during time window of the size $T$. $Y_T$ is therefore the aggregation of the $X_T$ process of the type $W_T$. The time series $X_T$, $Y_T$ and $W_T$ are then related by the following relation:

$$Y_T(k) = \sum_{i=1}^{X_T(k)} W_T(i)$$ (2)

The random variables $W_T(i)$ are independent identically distributed (IID). The equation (1) turns:

$$f_{X,Y}(x, y) = P(\sum_{i=1}^{X_T} W_T(i) = y)$$ (3)

Figure 3 illustrates the results obtained on the trace “ampath-oc12.20070109.dag0.20070110-1200.anon” and “ampath-oc12.20070109.dag0.20070109-1700.anon”. Identical conclusions were found for all the other analyzed traces. They superpose the empirical marginals to the exponential theoretical distribution for real data. These figures show that the exponential distribution describes in a very satisfactory way the marginals of the $W_T$ process. In fact, the adjustment of the empirical histograms is very satisfactory. Similar results were obtained on all the flows considered and for a large range of aggregation levels. We observed that the modelling is valid for $T$ ranging from the millisecond up to the second. This model offers then a valid and flexible modelling for a large range of aggregation levels.

We note that our hypothesis concerning the stability of the size of the flow is fully justified. Figure 3 (b) shows that during legitimate anomaly the distribution of the flow size is almost identical despite a large increase in the total volume of traffic. Note also that during DoS attack distribution will change drastically despite the number of flows involved in the attack is low. The expected value and the variance of the of IP-flow size process.
before and after the attack are very different. These results are completed by those of the following section within the framework of anomalies’ detection.

4.2 The Gamma Distribution

The objective of this paragraph is not to model the aggregated traffic by the gamma distribution but to calculate the value on every time T interval. The gamma distribution is a two-parameter family of continuous probability distributions. It has a rate parameter \( \lambda \) and a shape parameter \( \alpha \). If \( \alpha \) is an integer (Erlang distribution) then the distribution represents the sum of \( \alpha \) independent exponentially distributed random variables, each of which has a mean of \( \frac{1}{\lambda} \). That explains the fact that the gamma distribution is very used to describe the Internet aggregated traffic [9, 10, 11]. The density probability of gamma distribution takes the form:

\[
\Gamma_{\alpha,\lambda}(z) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{\lambda^\alpha z^{\alpha-1} e^{-\lambda z}}{\Gamma(\alpha)} & z > 0 \\
0 & z \leq 0
\end{cases}
\]

where \( \Gamma(u) \) is the standard Gamma function. The equation (3) becomes then:

\[
f_{X,Y}(x,y) = \Gamma_{x,\lambda}(y)
\]

4.3 The Central Limit Theorem

However, in the practical case when the number of IP connexions is big enough (the shape parameter \( \alpha \)) it is impossible to calculate the density probability of a gamma distribution. To resolve this problem, we used the central limit theorem.

Let \( n \) independent and identically distributed random variables each having finite values of expectation \( \mu \) and variance \( \sigma^2 \). The central limit theorem states that as the sample size \( n \) increases, the distribution of the sample average of these random variables approaches the normal distribution with a mean \( \mu \) and variance \( \frac{\sigma^2}{n} \) irrespective of the shape of the original distribution. The equation (3) becomes:

\[
f_{X,Y}(x,y) = N(x\mu, \sigma \sqrt{x}, y)
\]

5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Building on the experimental results described in the previous section, a detection method of DDoS attacks is put at work, known as follows. The trace is cut in adjacent blocks of the size \( \Delta \). A block \( \Delta \) is equal to \( NT \) (\( T \) is the chosen aggregation level) and represents a minimal time detection. For the nth block (beginning at \( n\Delta \)), we calculate first the number of IP connexions \( x_i \) and the number of received packets \( y_i \) on each interval \( iT \) (\( i \) varies from 1 to \( N \)). This very operation is applied on a reference window that is a block of \( T_{ref} \) minutes (taken before attacks and that can be therefore assimilated to a regular traffic). For every block \( T_{ref} \), we calculate the parameter of the exponential distribution \( \lambda \), the value of expectation \( \mu \) and the standard deviation \( \sigma \) (variance = \( \sigma^2 \)). Then, as previously explained, we calculate the joint density of probability \( f_{X,Y} \) of the time series \( X_T \) and \( Y_T \) for the block reference and for the real traffic by using either the density probability of the gamma distribution or the central limit theorem.

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The analyses made use of a time detection \( \Delta \) equal to one minute \( N = 60 \). The reference is fixed by using 10 minutes of traffic taken sometime before the anomaly. Figure 4 indicates that a legitimate anomaly can not be detected through the above-mentioned detection method even when it is large-scale. However, even a low-scale attack causes a significant increase in the calculated distance. The distance \( D(n) \) on every time window does not show an augmentation during legitimate anomaly because the distribution of IP connexions size is very close to that of a normal traffic. The difference observed for the \( f_{X,Y} \) values between the situation of DDoS attack and the legitimate anomaly results in the fact
that the size of a small proportion of IP connexions far exceeds those of a normal traffic.

False positives and source address spoofing are serious concerns for DoS attack detection. Since the potency of DoS attacks does not depend on the exploitation of software bugs or protocol vulnerabilities, it only depends on the volume of attack traffic. As a result, the DDoS attack traffic will look very similar to legitimate traffic. This means that any detection scheme has a high risk of mistaking legitimate traffic as attack traffic, which is called a false positive. These false positives are mainly due to two factors: (1) a large increase in the number of IP connexions; (2) a wide variation in the type of IP connexions and therefore in the IP connexions features (mainly IP connexions size distribution). Reduce the number of false positives returns to take into account these two factors. As the number of IP connexions and the total volume are largely dependent, our approach detects the occurrence of DDoS attack in the dependence (coherence) variation between these two sizes as a function of time, while updating the distribution the size of the IP connexions and using the number of IP connexions to calculate the degree of coherence. This enabled us to reduce the number of false positives which is the basic purpose of this work.

Finally, attackers frequently use source address spoofing during the attack: they fake information in the IP source address field in attack packet headers. One benefit attackers have from IP spoofing is that it is extremely difficult to trace the agent machines (compromised machines). This, in turn, brings several dire consequences. Since agent machines run a very low risk of being traced, information stored on them (i.e., access logs) cannot help to locate the attacker himself. This greatly encourages DDoS incidents. Furthermore, hiding the address of agent machines enables the attacker to reuse them for future attacks. Thus, an effective DDoS detection approach must take into consideration the factor IP spoofing, which is the case of our approach. Firstly, when agent machines send IP-flow with spoofed source IP address, the total number of IP connexions is unchanged, as does the distribution of the size of IP connexions. Secondly, when one or more agents machine send spoofed IP traffic and constantly changing IP addresses, the number of connexions becomes very large and the distribution of incoming traffic is drastically changed since the average value of the IP connexions size decreases radically. This will generate a large statistical break between normal traffic and attack traffic. However, the main purpose of this work is not IP spoofing detection; there are several mechanisms to prevent against IP spoofing. Interested readers may refer to (Zhenhai Duan et al., 2008).

6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

In this paper, we have proposed statistical approach for DDoS attacks detection. Our experiments were made on a real traffic flow issued from a “CAIDA data collection” collected in 2007. Our proposed approach is based on the evaluation of the degree of coherence between the received traffic volume and the number of IP connexions per time interval with the aim of thresholding calculated distances between a current observation window and a given reference. The main contribution of this paper is that our proposal model allows us to identify DDoS attacks...
regardless of the traffic volume size. A legitimate augmentation at large scale will not be detected through this method which minimises false alarms. The second contribution is that our proposal does need to inspect only the source IP address fields of each packet. This makes it simpler and more practical for real-time implementation.

This work will be continued by a statistical study of Internet traffic using “The CAIDA Anonymized 2008 Internet Traces Dataset” (https://data.caida.org/datasets/passive-2007/) and “The CAIDA Backscatter 2008 Dataset” (https://data.caida.org/datasets/security/backscatter-2008/) which contains traffic traces more representative of current Internet traffic. Our objective is first to apply our approach on a wide range of traffic with different types of anomalies such IP spoofing and different types of networks, then to identify and isolate the IP addresses involved in DDoS attack.

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