SPECIFYING AND COMPILING HIGH LEVEL FINANCIAL FRAUD POLICIES INTO STREAMSQL

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Abstract: Fraud detection within financial platforms remains a challenging area in which criminals continue to thrive, breaching security mechanisms with increasingly innovative and sophisticated system attacks. Following the migration from reactive to proactive screening of transactional data to reduce an organisations fraud detection latency, fraud analysts now find themselves responsible for the maintenance of extensive fraud policy sets and their implementation as complex data stream processing procedures. This paper presents a Financial Fraud Modelling Language and policy mapping tool for high level expression and implementation of proactive fraud policies using stream processors. A key aspect of the approach is reduction of the complexity and implementation latency associated with proactive fraud policy management through abstraction of policy functionality using a conceptual level modelling language and innovative policy mapping tool. This paper focuses upon the rule based language model for high level expression of financial fraud policies and the associated compiler tool for specifying and mapping policies into StreamSQL.

1 INTRODUCTION

Banking institutions have a strong interest in increasing the speed at which fraudulent activity can be detected due to its direct relation to financial loss, customer service and the organisations status as reputable financial provider. Existing research into fraud detection mechanisms based upon data mining has a limited capability to address the expanding number of ubiquitous electronic delivery channels for financial services due to the alerting latency incurred through post transactional analysis over a finite data store (reactive fraud management) (Kou, Lu et al. 2004; Phua, Lee et al. 2005). Accordingly, emerging technologies are employing real-time processing models for continuous monitoring of streaming service channel data and triggering of a preventive response prior to transaction completion, minimising the potential fraud deficit (proactive fraud management) (Entrust 2008; Fair Isaac 2008; StreamBase 2008). Despite the successful shift of fraud analytics from ‘post’ to ‘pre’ data storage, many current proactive solutions are capable of fraud management only upon a single channel, with no support for fraud analysis over multiple incoming data delivery channels. More crucially, few systematic methods exist for assisting fraud analysts in the modelling and enforcement of anti-fraud policies using stream processors, with many solutions based upon code implementation for low level stream application programming interfaces (Chandrasekaran 2003; Arasu, Babu et al. 2006) and other low level imperative event languages (Luckham 2005).

This paper outlines the development of a Financial Fraud Modelling Language (FFML) and policy mapping architecture for the conceptual level modelling and implementation of fraud policies using StreamSQL, an emerging standard for...
processing real-time data streams. Specifically it
details the development and implementation of a
compiler component for the automated parsing of
FFML policy definitions and generation of the
required stream processing representation. A key
element of the work is abstraction of low level
stream processing syntax through conceptual level
Event-Condition-Action policies to reduce the
complexity and implementation latency associated
with proactive fraud policy enforcement.

The remainder of this paper is organised as
follows: Section 2 presents a background on
proactive fraud management and the FFML policy
management framework. Section 3 describes the
FFML policy definition language. Section 4
presents the design and implementation of the FFML
compiler tool. Section 5 illustrates a sample FFML
to StreamSQL mapping. Section 6 details the key
contributions of the work. Section 7 presents a
summary of the work and outlines future research.

2 BACKGROUND

Financial Fraud Modelling Language (FFML)
provides a conceptual level modelling and fraud
prevention architecture using a rule based modelling
syntax to assist fraud analysts in the expression and
assembly of proactive fraud policy sets prior to
representation within target stream processing
solutions (Edge, Sampaio et al. 2007).

![Figure 1: FFML Policy Mapping Approach.](image)

Figure 1 illustrates the FFML policy mapping
approach for translation of fraud policies into the
required stream processing syntax. Fraud policy set
definition is undertaken through a front end GUI
component for the conceptual level management of
complete fraud policy sets using FFML. Automated
parsing validates assembled policy sets against the
FFML language specification to ensure defined
policies are well formed from which the
corresponding stream processing syntax is generated
using the required target platform code generation
component. Target platform adaptors are
implemented in a plug and play architecture
facilitating the mapping of FFML policies into
multiple stream processing implementations,
leveraging a dynamic and extensible policy
management architecture.

3 FRAUD POLICY
SPECIFICATION USING FFML

FFML provides a domain specific language of
constructs and operators to facilitate the expression
of rule-based financial fraud policies which may
span multiple service channels, time windows and
transaction event types, without the restrictions and
extensive programming requirements of the
employed target platform. FFML policies are
assembled as Event-Condition-Action (ECA)
definitions using a domain specific language of
constructs and operators to support the conceptual
level expression and management of proactive fraud
policy controls (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Parameter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POLICYID</td>
<td>policy reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ON</td>
<td>event statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IF</td>
<td>condition statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEN</td>
<td>action statement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.1 Event Statement

Policy event triggers define the click stream data
patterns to which policies continually monitor
incoming transaction service channels for invocation
of defined evaluative functionality. Table 2
illustrates the expressiveness of the FFML event
model using the following sample fraud policy
definition: “if there is an online banking session
containing a password change event followed by
funds transfer, or a session containing a failed
logon phase 1 attempt, a failed logon phase 2
attempt and a funds transfer, require two factor
authentication for transaction completion”. Channel
selectors are first declared specifying the
incoming data stream to which the policy applies,
followed by the event, or event sequence upon
which evaluation of defined conditions should be
performed. Event sequences support the matching
of chronological data stream events using the FFML
“SEQ” operator for specifying time window
durations during which defined behaviour will be
matched following occurrence of the initial sequence
event. The policy definition in Table 2 illustrates
the use of 5 minute time windows (300 seconds) for
matching of the specified online user behaviour.
Table 2: Simple Online Fraud Policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Online Fraud Policy</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POLICYID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the specification of event statements and sequences, the following principle is applied: the occurrence of particular events implicitly assumes the occurrence of any prerequisite events. This achieves syntax reductions by eliminating the need for definition of events which maybe implicitly assumed based upon preceding sequence events. For example, in Table 2 “passwordchange” implicitly assumes the user has completed a successful logon process. Similarly, definition of the “transfer” event following “failed_logonphase2” also assumes that a successful logon has taken place between these two event occurrences. Table 2 also illustrates how multiple event trigger specification is supported using the disjunctive “OR” operator providing that a common final channel event exists, eliminating the need for multiple policy definitions which require the same evaluative functionality.

Conjunction between event instances has been restricted due to the window based processing model of underlying stream processing technologies. Matching of event/event sequences between user transaction sessions would open extensive time windows spanning several hours, or even days for matching of specified event instances, which is clearly unfeasible in a global user service and would have significant performance ramifications within the supporting business platform. For example, Table 3 specifies the following sample fraud policy definition: “if there is over £500 of Card Not Present transactions in the last 24 hours, followed by an online banking session containing a failed logon phase 1 attempt, a failed logon phase 2 attempt and a transfer with value greater than or equal to £1500, trigger an alert”.

Table 3: FFML Online Policy Definition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Online Fraud Policy Definition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POLICYID</td>
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<tr>
<td>ON</td>
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<tr>
<td>IF</td>
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<tr>
<td>THEN</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Preceding transactional account behaviour is traced through implementation of stored data operators within the defined condition, using the latter policy event for triggering of condition evaluation. Accordingly, policy evaluation is only performed upon matching of the specified transfer transaction, rather than opening of extensive time windows following each CNP transaction for detection of the subsequent online event sequence. Table 3 illustrates the use of the ‘TOTALDEBIT’ query for retrieval of all CNP transactions within the last 24 hour period.

Table 3 also illustrates how the developed modelling language supports multi-channel risk models through policy triggering in response to events within one streaming data channel, while supporting condition evaluation over account transactions performed through other service channel provisions. FFML therefore facilitates definition of sophisticated policies which encompass fraud evaluation over all delivery service channels towards the deployment of increasingly integrated and holistic fraud detection frameworks.

3.2 Condition Statement

Condition functionality is defined as a series of Boolean logic statements assembled using disjunctive (“OR”) and conjunctive (“AND”) operators for evaluation of system transactions which satisfy defined event triggers using incoming event data, stored data functions and arithmetic operators.

A key element of the FFML language is the ability to define policies which evaluate streaming values against post-transactional data from both current and past financial trading (Table 4), enabling a fraud decision to be made based upon examination of preceding account behaviour rather than through isolated queries on streaming transactional data alone. Table 5 illustrates how the developed approach maybe used to express the following sample fraud policy scenario: “If there is an ATM withdrawal that reaches the total daily £250 withdrawal limit, and the daily limit has been reached 3 times within the last 5 days, stop the transaction, raise alert and block account”.

Data parameters utilised within Boolean functions and stored data operations are associated with the last declared event in each event trigger to achieve syntax reductions within condition specification. While this principle restricts the use of the parameters associated with preceding non-transactional event instances, it is emphasised that such instances are used only to assist in the identification of suspicious transactions, and alone are unbeneficial for fraud policy definition.
Accordingly, event sequence specifications shall always feature one or more non-transactional events, followed by a concluding transactional instance for triggering of condition evaluation.

Table 4: Stored Data Retrieval Operators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Database Query</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syntax</td>
<td>QUERY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parameters</td>
<td>QUERY_NAME(parameters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Issue pre-defined queries against stored transactional data for the current financial day or cumulatively over multiple financial days if a day parameter is provided. Standard SQL maybe utilised for custom data evaluation functions. Result must return a single value to be used within a Boolean condition. (Note: Day parameters not compatible with HISTORY function – see below.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: ATM Fraud Policy.

ATM Fraud Policy

ON ATM[withdrawal]

IF

QUERY TOTALDEBIT(ATM, sortcode, accountnumber) + value >= 250.00

AND

HISTORY(4)

[QUERY TOTALDEBIT(ATM, sortcode, accountnumber) >= 250.00] >=2

THEN

BLOCK(sortcode, accountnumber)

AND

ALERT(transid, sortcode, accountnumber);

3.3 Action Statement

Actions specify the preventive response to be triggered within the supporting business platform upon successful triggering and evaluation of the defined policy instance. FFML actions are categorised into two distinct categories; active and passive. Passive actions are regarded as those actions which do not alter the current transaction path and enable the transaction to complete as normal, for example if an ‘ALERT’ or ‘FLAG’ is applied for post-transaction examination of the account by the fraud analyst. Active actions are those which cause transactions to deviate from their normal execution path, for example if a ‘BLOCK’ request is issued against a particular account or two factor authentication is initiated for confirming the identity of the initiating account holder. All active actions are implicitly assumed to apply the “DOINSTEAD” principle for transaction execution, as described in (Stonebraker, Jhingran et al. 1990). Multiple actions are applied using the conjunction operator which are mapped onto the required output stream for examination by fraud personnel and triggering of the specified preventive operations.

4 FFML GUI AND POLICY COMPILATION TOOL

The FFML tool provides fraud analysts with a suite of tools for the construction, manipulation and compilation of FFML policy sets. The developed graphical front-end component comprises a source code editor, parser, compiler and file management system, for rapid policy set construction and management of an organisations fraud policy deployment from a single point of control (Figure 2).

Figure 2: FFML GUI Tool.

4.1 Compiler Architecture

FFML policy statements are translated into the target syntax model using an automated compiler component, implemented using the JavaCC parser generator. More specifically, the compiler is specified using JJTree (a pre-processor for JavaCC), enabling the insertion of tree-building actions into the JavaCC grammar for generation of Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) definitions utilised in the validation of FFML policies and generation of target implementation code. Figure 3 demonstrates how the developed components are used for validation.
and mapping of FFML statements into the target syntax model.

Figure 3: FFML Compiler Architecture.

4.2 Code Generation

Stream processing implementations such as StreamSQL implement computational functionality through the assembly of data functions and internal streams within a data processing network. A clear requirement for mapping of policies onto stream processing language models is the need to maintain a state between node visits to facilitate the exchange of internal stream references between generated data functions. The utilised visitor design pattern addresses this requirement through the logical grouping of visit methods using a “syntax separate from interpretation” programming model for all syntax tree nodes, facilitating the use of collections and other programming data structures within each interface implementation for internal reference storage.

The visitor design pattern also supports the mapping from conceptual level policy definitions into multiple target language implementations without extensive re-engineering of the supporting compiler component. New target language implementations are supported through development and integration of the necessary visitor module for expressing the mappings from FFML grammar productions to the corresponding stream based operations. Run-time binding of target platform adaptors therefore creates a highly dynamic and extensible architecture for fraud policy management in fragmented and multiple disparate fraud management environments.

5 POLICY MAPPING EXAMPLE

Table 3 (Section 3.1) presents a sample FFML policy definition for an online banking channel. Translation of the policy statement requires construction of several StreamSQL target operators and associated internal streams for the feeding of information through the data processing network. Appendix A illustrates how implementation of the sample fraud policy scenario therefore requires a total of 52 lines of StreamSQL code. Table 3 expresses the same policy functionality using just 6 lines of FFML, resulting in over an 80% reduction in the required syntax compared to direct implementation within the target stream processing model. This is seen as a significant advancement for assisting fraud analysts in the definition and maintenance of proactive fraud policy controls using stream processors.

6 KEY CONTRIBUTIONS

Conceptual Level Specification of Proactive Fraud Policies - Poor declarative specification of complex policies often results in unorganised distribution of policy code throughout target platform implementation code, which requires significant re-engineering in subsequent development phases at a substantially escalated cost. FFML provides a domain specific language for the expression and management of proactive fraud policies over multiple streaming channels and differing time windows from a single modelling perspective. Complexity is therefore abstracted from low level implementation of fraud controls to enable conceptual level construction of complete fraud policy sets usable by both expert and non-expert users.

Automated Policy Set Implementation in a Stream Based Language – Plug and play target platform adaptors encapsulate the semantic knowledge for mapping of FFML policies to simplify the complexities associated with direct implementation of large scale policy sets within explicit low level programming formalisms. FFML therefore provides an innovative policy management architecture supporting the mapping of policies to multiple disparate target implementations and future changes to underpinning fraud technologies through simple re-mapping of an organisations fraud policy set to new target syntax models.

Improved Responsiveness and Policy Set Realignment– FFML significantly enhances an organisations responsiveness to fraud threats through reduction of the implementation latency associated with future maintenance operations to existing fraud policy sets. New policies and modifications to existing policies may be rapidly implemented through the developed GUI environment using the FFML toolset for abstraction of the complexity associated with management of policies directly within low level target language models. Furthermore, expression of fraud policies within a common conceptual level language supports the
active sharing of fraud policy data between financial sector organisations using a service oriented architecture, significantly reducing the latency associated with discovery and deployment of fraud policies in response to emerging industry threats (Edge, Sampaio et al. 2008).

7 SUMMARY

This paper presents a financial fraud policy specification language and policy mapping technology for simplifying the challenges associated with proactive fraud policy management using stream processors. Fraud policies are defined using a domain specific modelling language (FFML) and translated into a StreamSQL representation using the developed compiler component. A key element of the framework is the application of an Event-Condition-Action model for specification of proactive fraud policies which span multiple channels, time windows and events, and mapping into the required stream processing implementation. It is also illustrated using a simple example how the expression of fraud policies using FFML can result in significant syntax reductions over direct implementation within the underlying stream processing language model. Future work will include the development of a real-time customer profiling mechanism using signature-based models (Edge and Sampaio 2009) and a component for optimisation of generated StreamSQL code.

REFERENCES


APPENDIX

CREATE INPUT STREAM ONLINE_fai


gedlogon_phase1(transid string(10), sortcode string(6), accountnumber string(8), datetime timestamp, onlineid string(20), ...

ALERT; SELECT transid AS transid, sortcode AS sortcode , accountnumber AS accountnumber FROM out__Filter_4 INTO ALERT;

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