Keywords: Robustness, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Bayesian Belief Network (BBN), Jacobson’s analysis.

Abstract: Time pressure and quality issues represent important challenges for those who develop web-based systems. The ability to analyze a system’s quality and implement improvements early in the development life cycle is of great practical importance. For our study we have considered robustness as a critical quality issue. Our objective is to propose a general framework for conducting robustness analysis of web-based systems at an early stage of software development, providing a tool for evaluating failure impact severity and supporting trade-off decisions during the development process. The framework makes use of Jacobson’s analysis method to decompose a system in its functional components, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis to identify all failure modes that characterize each component, and Bayesian Belief networks to deal with failure cause-effect relationships and evaluate the uncertainty of their impact.

1 INTRODUCTION

Market pressures of web-based applications lead to the demand for new features ever more rapidly. The challenge is to meet those demands while increasing, or at least not sacrificing, quality. For this reason, web-based applications have to be developed through a robust and well-understood process.

Software today is more complex than ever. In order to understand complex things we need to break them down into manageable pieces before modelling them. In (Conallen, 2003) the author points out that one of the key activities is to examine and prioritize requirements according to perceived risk and benefit. Addressing and targeting critical components is therefore crucial. High quality improvement early in the process results in fewer defects to be found and repaired later in the process. At an early stage of the development life cycle there is still time to accommodate modifications and to implement them in an inexpensive way.

Communication is also a fundamental part of the process. Building software is often about decisions. To help structure and communicate decisions, artefacts documenting the work are created during the development process. A software development process has to provide, among other things, criteria for monitoring and measuring the project’s products and activities (Conallen, 2003). On the other hand, we have to consider that web application development is a rather informal practice and is often carried out through an incremental process (Ziemer and Stålhane, 2006).

In this paper we focus our attention on robustness as described in (Zhou and Stålhane, 2004). We consider a system or component to be robust if it is totally correct with a complete specification and its behaviour is predictable for all possible operational environments. In this paper a framework for system robustness analysis that can be employed at an early stage and throughout the development life cycle is presented. The proposed approach provides a method for design teams to reason on system failure cause-effect relationships and the uncertainty of their impact; it supports trade-off decision and evaluation of remedial actions. This method is applicable to all kind of IT systems, but this paper focuses on web-based system where a robust development process and a robust final product have top priority.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we discuss related work, with Section 3
presenting the proposed framework and a short introduction to the methods we are using. Section 4 illustrates the approach by applying it to a simple web-based application example. In Section 5 we conclude the paper and discuss future research directions.

2 RELATED WORK

It is difficult to find works related to robustness analysis applying BBN or other probabilistic models during software development. BBNs have been used, however, in reliability analysis; here we briefly present some related works.

In (Yacoub et al., 1999) the authors introduced a reliability analysis technique based on execution scenarios to identify critical components and interfaces. They constructed a probabilistic model called “Component - Dependency Graph” which incorporates components, their reliabilities, and interaction probabilities. A sensitivity analysis is carried out to investigate the relation between application reliability and changes in components’ reliabilities. In our investigation we have also focused on scenarios to deal with different kinds of failure, and a sensitivity analysis allowed us to analyze which factors contribute to the most critical effects.

In (Singh et al., 2001) an approach to reliability analysis of component-based systems fully integrated with the UML is proposed. Use case diagrams have been used to give a functional description of the system, while sequence diagrams are used to depict interactions within a use case. Use case diagrams represent a powerful tool to decompose systematically a system into its components. Furthermore, a Bayesian reliability prediction has been applied to derive a posterior probability of each failure using available prior probabilities and data from test failure.

In (Beaver et al., 2005) a model to capture the evolution of the quality of a software product is proposed. The final quality of the software being developed is reliably predicted using a Bayesian Network. The quality, in terms of product suitability, was estimated by taking into account development team skill, software process maturity and software problem complexity. Our intent is to represent the system through a lower level of abstraction than the one proposed there.

As a starting point for our work we have used the methodology proposed in (Lee, 2001). Lee combined FMEA with BBNs to provide a language for design teams developing mechatronic systems to articulate physical system failure cause-effect relationships, and to evaluate the uncertainty of their impact. The author proposed to represent failure scenarios as belief network chains and determine end-effect failure probabilities by assuming probabilistic dependency down and across the failure causal chains, assigning conditional probabilities between intermediate and final events and states. He then employed these conditional probabilities to propagate root cause probabilities down the failure chain. Instead of applying the Risk Priority Number (RPN) to rank failure severities, Lee defined a severity standard to be applied across all scenarios and extended the belief network formalism by connecting a severity variable to each failure event. In this way his method provides a level of analytical granularity otherwise unavailable in traditional FMEA spreadsheet formalism.

In (Zhou and Stålhane, 2004) a method to conduct early robustness assessment for web-based systems is proposed. Jacobson’s analysis method is then used to systematically decompose a system and FMEA is used to analyze the failure modes of each subsystem, their causes, and effects.

Our approach is based on the initial concepts developed in (Lee, 2001) adapted to software-based system development. The approach used in (Zhou and Stålhane, 2004) represents the first steps of our framework. It allows us to carry out the FMEA, identify the uncertain variables that are important for the system robustness, and then model them using BBN formalism as indicated by Lee.

3 ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS

The robustness analysis framework we propose is a five-step method that combines Jacobson’s analysis method, FMEA, and BBN. What we are interested in is the severity of a failure, which means that we need to define a severity ranking in order to be able to classify and compare the failures’ effects and decide if a system is robust enough or if it is necessary to take some precautions against certain events.

Step 1: A severity ranking is specified and applied across all failure scenarios. An event is defined to be not critical when no failure occurs and invalid input is recognized and adequately processed, the system prompts the user without saving invalid inputs, or the invalid input is changed to default values and saved in the system without prompting the user. An event is considered to be critical when a failure prevents further use
of the system, such as abnormal behaviour of the system, or when invalid input are not recognized and thus saved in the database without prompting the user.

Step 2: Jacobson’s analysis method is used to capture system behavioural aspects at an early stage of the development life cycle when little information about the system structure is available, and to identify boundary objects, also known as interface objects; entity objects, such as databases; and control objects which capture application logic and manage all interactions between boundary and entity objects. See Figure 1. In our investigation we are particularly interested in control objects since they serve as natural placeholders for robustness assessment using FMEA (Zhou and Stålhane, 2004).

Step 3: FMEA is carried out for each control object. FMEA is a technique used to examine potential failures in products and processes, and identify their possible causes and effects. See Table 1. Failure events, causes, and effects represent the uncertain variables to be used in our BBN model. FMEA also helps us to select remedial actions that reduce the consequences from a system failure.

Step 4: The BBN model of the system is created. A BBN representation requires first a construction of a BBN topology and elicitation of probabilities for nodes and edges. The variables identified using FMEA are connected with arcs to represent the cause-effect relationship between the nodes. A severity variable is added to the model to take into account the failure impact on the system, see Figure 2. Prior and conditional probability tables as well as severity utility tables are defined as discrete probability tables. Making computations with BBNs is easy when applying computerized tools, such as MSBNx (Kadie et al., 2001).

Step 5: We can now evaluate our belief about a specific node by entering evidence about the state of a variable, and then use the rules for probability calculation backward and forward along the edges from the cause nodes to effect nodes to determine the severity of failure impact on the system’s robustness. Hence, we can identify critical components in the system, and modify them or implement the remedial actions selected during the FMEA in order to reduce the effect of a failure and to verify their effectiveness by running the computations once again after modifications have been implemented.

4 DAIM

We conduct our investigation on the DAIM system (http://newdaim.idi.ntnu.no/), developed at our university for archiving and submitting master’s theses and to facilitate the administration of theses, mainly by letting the students do most of the work themselves.

In this paper we consider only one function of the DAIM system, the log-in function. DAIM distinguishes between several types of users: internal (students and administrators) and external. The internal users need to be logged on in order to use the system, while the only part available to all users is a search function to search the archive of theses.

4.1 Log-in Function

In this section we will illustrate the proposed method by giving an example and applying the severity classification defined in Section 3.

In the DAIM system each internal actor, such as a student, has to be logged on before performing any other tasks. Figure 1 shows the result of using Jacobson’s analysis to represent the “Log-in” use case. The user types in the username and password in the “Login Page”. The “Login/Control” object checks the username and password by interacting with the “Database”, and the result is displayed on the “Default Page” by the module “Show result”.

Figure 1: Jacobson analysis diagram of Log-in.

The application logic of this use case is captured by “Login/Control” and “Show result” control objects. The FMEA worksheet is shown in Table 1 where the names of the control objects are listed together with all identified robustness-related failure modes, possible causes, main effects on the system and its subsystems, and possible ways to prevent, or at least reduce, these effects.

The variables for the BBN are selected from the FMEA worksheet, Table 1. Cause and failure event variables can be identified in the “Possible cause” and “Failure mode” columns respectively. The variables identified in this use case, their symbol and their states \{State0, State1\} are listed below.
Possible causes:
- User Input  \text{UI} \{\text{Correct}, \text{Error}\};
- Database Data  \text{DD} \{\text{Correct}, \text{Error}\};
- Login/Control  \text{LG} \{\text{Correct}, \text{Error}\}.

Failure end-event (FEE):
- Response  \text{R} \{\text{Correct}, \text{None}\};
- Severity  \text{S} \{\text{NotCritical}, \text{Critical}\}.

Once the variables have been identified, the Bayesian model can be constructed. In order to do this and efficiently deal with calculations and topology modifications, we have used the Microsoft Bayesian Network Editor and Toolkit (MSBNx) (Kadie et al., 2001) which supports the creation, manipulation, and evaluation of Bayesian probability models.

In the BBN representation, possible causes come before the nodes they influence. In Figure 2, User Input and Database Data are the variables that come first; they represent the parent nodes of Login/Control, which in turn influences the outcome of the FEE Response node. The Severity node is eventually specified as the child of the FEE; it is represented with a rectangular shape since the dependence between Response and Severity is due to the severity ranking defined across all scenarios and presented in Section 3.

The prior and conditional probability tables as well as the severity utility tables are defined as discrete probability tables. The advantages of a discrete form are that it becomes conceptually easier to use for judgment to assign discrete values, and that it makes the computation simpler.

The method we have used to define the probability tables is the same as the one proposed in (Gran, 2002). We have assessed two conditional probabilities: \( P(\text{good\_measurements}|\text{good\_quality}) \) and \( P(\text{bad\_measurements}|\text{bad\_quality}) \). The prior probabilities that have been set for this scenario are specified in the appendix. However, since the objective of this work is to investigate the usefulness of applying the BBN methodology to robustness analysis, the tables have not been validated.

With MSBNx, the evaluation of the Bayesian model, given the prior and conditional probabilities, is straightforward. The results are shown on the left-hand side of Figure 3. To evaluate the impact of an observed event we entered evidence into the BBN in the form of hypotheses, see the right-hand side of Figure 3. For instance, when evidence of user input \( \text{UI} = \text{Error} \) (grey) is entered into the BBN of the Log-in function, the \text{Critical} severity \( \text{S} \) (grey) jumps to a probability equals to 1, because the system will not produce any response and probably will prevent further use of the system.

![Figure 2: BBN for Log-in function.](image)

![Figure 3: Probabilities of the BBN model before and after evidence is entered.](image)
4.2 Evaluating Preventive Actions

The severity of the Log-in failure scenario can be reduced by implementing the preventive actions proposed in the FMEA worksheet in Table 1. For the Log-in function example, this might mean to prompt the user in case of erroneous input and allow him to enter a new username and password. In this way the probability of getting a correct response can be increased but the system and, consequently, our model have to be modified.

Figure 4 shows the new BBN. New components are introduced: User Re-Input, a duplicate of Login/Control, Response2 similar to Response, and Final Response. A duplicate of Login/Control has been included in order to keep the graph acyclic. The Final Response (FR) variable results to be correct if at least one of its parents, Response1 or Response2, is correct. With these modifications the user has the opportunity to re-enter the data. In successive attempts, the probability of entering correct data ought to increase. Thus, the probability of entering correct data during the second attempt is set to be higher than the probability of entering correct data on the first attempt. The prior probabilities that have been set for this scenario are specified in the appendix.

Figure 4: BBN for the modified Log-in function.

Figure 5 shows, on the left-hand side, the evaluation of probabilities in the modified BBN of the Log-in function. The probability of a correct final response FR (black) is increased compared to the original response R probability in Figure 3. On the right-hand side of Figure 5 we also show the evaluation of the modified BBN for the Log-in scenario when evidence of user input UI = Error is entered. Even if the initial user input is erroneous (grey), the possibility to re-enter a correct input with a second attempt raises the possibility of getting a correct final response FR (black) and hence also the probability of a non-critical severity S (black) rises to more than 0.7.

Figure 5: Probabilities of the modified BBN model before and after evidence is entered.

In a similar way, the design team can consider other function scenarios, analyze their failure modes and their impact on the system, and decide whether improvements are necessary or not in order to achieve a certain robustness of the system that will be released.

5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

In this paper we have presented the use of FMEA combined with BBNs for robustness analysis. Starting from the method described in (Zhou and Stålhane, 2004), we have moved further, proposing a framework that embeds a BBN model. In this way, the proposed framework can provide a method for design teams to articulate system failure cause-effect relationships, and evaluate the uncertainty about their impact. Furthermore, this approach can support traditional design FMEA objectives – identification of system failure modes – and provides improved knowledge representation and inferring power through BBNs application.

This framework uses well-known methods for software development, but the application of BBN and the collection of information needed can sometimes be time-consuming. For this reason an incremental approach, as pointed out in (Ziemer and Stålhane, 2006), has to be considered in future works. In this way the information available at an early stage, usually expert judgments, can be further refined throughout the development, taking into account the experience gained in the process.

The proposed approach can also be used to compare the severities and the probability of occurrence of several failure scenarios. The most critical failures can be detected and targeted for prioritized remedial actions. Furthermore, the influence of a preventive action on the system being
developed can be estimated. This can represent a powerful tool for design trade-off decisions.

However, as has been highlighted in (Houmb et al., 2005), the result of the analysis performed using BBN is strongly dependent on the observation and evidence entered, as well as the variables used and relations between them. This means that both different structure of the BBN topology and different estimation sets used as input to the topology will give different results.

Although the method presented is based on a real application, this approach has not been applied to a real assessment or development process. One task could be to test this framework, mathematically assess the robustness of a system and compare the results with other methods. Another task will be to apply the proposed approach for decision support early in the development of a system, in order to indicate where to concentrate the effort and thus realise the specific objectives of the final product.

REFERENCES


APPENDIX

The prior probabilities that have been used for the Log-in scenario are specified below. Noticed that they have been set without any expert assessment and they may thus not be accurate and/or correct.

The prior probabilities for user input UI and database data DD of being Correct or Error are P(UI) = (0.9,0.1) and P(DD) = (0.8,0.2) respectively. The remaining probabilities are listed in Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4.

For the modified Log-in scenario where preventive actions are implemented, the following prior probabilities have also been set. See Table 5.

The probabilities for the second Login/Control LC2 are equal to those of previous Login/Control LC, P(LC2|RI,DD)=P(LC|UI,DD), in Table 2. Similarly the second response R2 given the second Login/Control LC2 is equal to P(R2|LC2)=P(R|LC), see Table 3. Severity probability P(S|FR) given the Final Response FR is equal to P(S|R) in Table 4. The remaining probabilities are listed in Table 6.

Table 2: The probabilities P(LC|UI,DD) of Login/Control LC given user input UI and database data DD as parent nodes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parent nodes</th>
<th>LC=Correct</th>
<th>LC=Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DD=Correct</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD=Error</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: The probabilities P(R|LC) of Response R given Login/Control LC as parent node.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parent node</th>
<th>R=Correct</th>
<th>R=None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LC=Correct</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LC=Error</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4: The probabilities $P(S|R)$ of Severity $S$ given Response $R$ as parent node.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parent node</th>
<th>$S=$NotCritical</th>
<th>$S=$Critical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R=Correct</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R=None</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: The probabilities $P(LC_2|R_1)$ of user Re-input $R_1$ given Login-Control $LC_2$ as parent node.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parent node</th>
<th>LC2=Correct</th>
<th>LC2=Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R1=Correct</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1=Error</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: The probabilities $P(FR|R_1,R_2)$ of Final Response $FR$ given the two Responses $R_1$ and $R_2$ as parent nodes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parent nodes</th>
<th>FR=Correct</th>
<th>FR=None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R1=Correct</td>
<td>R2=Correct</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1=Correct</td>
<td>R2=Error</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1=Error</td>
<td>R2=Correct</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1=Error</td>
<td>R2=Error</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>