Modeling Deceptive Action in Virtual Communities*

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Abstract. Trust and shared interest are the building blocks for most relationships in human society. A deceptive action and the associated risks can affect many people. Although trust relationship in virtual communities can be built up more quickly and easily, it is more fragile. This research concentrates on analyzing the Information Quality in the open rating systems, especially studying the way deceptive data spread in virtual communities. In this paper, we have proposed several novel ideas on assessing deceptive actions and how the structure of the virtual community affects the information flow among subjects in the web of trust. Furthermore, our experiments illustrate how deceptive data would spread and to what extent the deceptive data would affect subjects in virtual communities.

1 Introduction

Trust aggregation and propagation are attracting much attention in research in open rating systems [1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 12]. We consider the problem of modeling deceptive action in the web of trust, which forms the base for the online virtual community. In such a community, a rumor or deceptive data may affect a group of people with the spreading of the data. The situation can become worse, when an adversary subject accumulates reputation gradually and later deliberately releases some deceptive data, say a rumor about some merchandise. The deleterious effect may not only be contained in a small range of the network. It may spread among many other individuals in web of trust. A rumor circulated in a grocery store in a small town may slowly affect local patrons, while the communication speed and the number of affected people for the same information in an online community can be much higher.

One can think of web of trust as a big network as well as a labeled directed graph where the numerically labeled edges indicate the trust levels between two corresponding subjects. Although the web of trust can generally be considered as a connected graph, it has its own characteristics. For example, if we consider all trust relationships among all subjects in epinions.com as the web of trust, we would find many different communities based on people who are interested in different categories of merchandises and who express ratings on them.

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Evaluation of the effect of deceptive data in order to prevent the trust network from becoming unusable is critical for the normal operation of the semantic web or simply an e-commerce website. This paper addresses the analysis model based on the structure of the web of trust and shared interest among people. In this paper, we assume that information flow network is the same as the web of trust. The reason is that, although generally speaking, information flow network can be totally different from the web of trust network, the information flow policy then becomes too broad and less useful in practice. For example, although a rumor releaser can send email to anyone in the web of trust (in this case unrestricted information flow policy), if people do not know him personally they will simply discard the email without even further investigation. Although there’s an exception to this, for example, if the system administrator of an online community sends out some rumor, almost every user will believe him. But in this case, it is a role-based trust relationship. In this research, we do not consider role-based trust or information flow. Interested users may refer to the research on restricted lattice-based information flow policy [6].

2 Structural Property of the Web of Trust

In order to analyze the spread of deceptive data in the web of trust, a web of trust and the information flow policy/network are needed. To quantitatively decide the exact range of the spread of deceptive data, a full specification of web trust is needed. That is, for each trust relationship, we need to know the exact trust rating. Even this information is available, because different people have different trust propensity and trust scales, for instance, “subject A trusts subject B 70%” does not mean the same degree of trust as “subject C trusts subject D 70%”, it’s very difficult for trust ranking on an information flow path.

In this paper, we propose a model for qualitatively estimating different affected areas of the web of trust under the effect of deceptive data. The model only needs the structural properties of web of trust and shared interest; subjective parameters of web of trust such as trust ratings and individual trust thresholds are not used.

2.1 The Hierarchical Structure of the Web of Trust

The idea of trust hierarchies is based on the real-word relationship among human beings. In web of trust, the most trusted ones are his acquaintance, i.e., family members, close friends, coworkers, etc. They share many common interests. Also, each individual may belong to some community. For example, people from one country may have their own community. All users belonging to the member of an online forum compose the virtual community. Some people in the same community share common interests. Each subject in the community has an interest circle for each topic he is interested in (and we say this subject is the owner of the interest circle). This interest circle contains all subjects in the community that are interested in this topic and a message on this particular topic can be flowed to all these subjects directly or indirectly from the owner of the interest circle. Outside the community, each individual may belong to some meta-community. For example, people interested in
digital camera discussion (digital camera community) may belong to the meta-community of home electronics. Figure 1 illustrates the hierarchical structure of the web of trust. In the following subsections, we will discuss how to extract these structural properties of the web of trust from the graphical representation of the web of trust.

In online virtual communities, a group of people who have common interests often have direct trust ratings on many other individuals in the same communities because of frequent direct communications among them. Thus the sub-graph that represents the trust relationships among these people is a densely connected graph. Some researches [8, 9] on finding community structure have been done in social and biological networks; we adapted these ideas to the model of web of trust.

One important characteristic of the community structure is that nodes within the community are often densely connected with each other whereas the connections between nodes in different communities are less dense [8]. For example, in epinions.com, people interested in rating and discussing digital cameras can be considered as a community in the web of trust. Figure 2 shows a sample of communities in the web of trust. (In this example, we do not show the weights of edges, i.e., trust ratings.) In this figure, there are four communities. Three communities have connections between pairs of them, which are represented by gray lines.

2.2 Detecting the Community Structure

The method used to find the community structure is generalized from that developed by Girvan and Newman [8]. In order to find a community structure, we need to first find the edges between communities. By gradually removing these edges from the web of trust, the communities will emerge as connected sub-graphs. For this purpose, we use the notion of edge betweenness as defined by Girvan and Newman. The edge betweenness of an edge is defined as the number of shortest paths between pairs of vertices that run along it. If a network contains communities or groups that are only loosely connected by a few inter-group edges, then all shortest paths between

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different communities must go along one of these few edges. Thus, the edges connecting communities will have high edge betweenness.

Fig. 2. Communities in the Web of Trust.

The method for finding the community structure as defined by Girvan and Newman can only reflect the hierarchical relationship of the vertices in the graph. It cannot derive the number of communities present in the graph and, thus, is not ideal for large complex graphs. We observed that the edge betweenness of an inter-community edge is significantly greater than that of any edge inside the communities. Based on this property, we designed the following algorithm for detecting the communities in the web of trust. By using different thresholds, we can also identify meta-community structures.

**Algorithm:** Find_Communities
1. Calculate the edge betweenness for all edges in the web of trust.
2. IF there is any edge deleted during community finding procedure
3. \hspace{1cm} Pvalue = the edge betweenness of the deleted edge
4. \hspace{1cm} Cvalue = the highest edge betweenness of the current graph
5. \hspace{1cm} IF (Cvalue/Pvalue > threshold)
6. \hspace{2cm} Delete the edge with the highest edge betweenness
7. \hspace{1cm} ELSE
8. \hspace{2cm} Return connected sub-graphs as communities
9. \hspace{1cm} ELSE
10. \hspace{2cm} Delete the edge with the highest edge betweenness
11. GOTO Step 2.

3 Model for the Spread of Deceptive Data

In the web of trust, when a malicious subject releases any deceptive data, we propose to identify the spread of the data qualitatively as follows. The first step is to find out the community/meta-community the malicious subject belongs, this can be achieved based on the algorithm Find_Communities which is based on the edge betweenness. By using different threshold in the algorithm, we can identify communities and meta-communities. Once this structural information is available, we can identify the spread range of the rumor as per following four hierarchies.
1. **The acquaintance**: The subjects who most easily would be affected are the acquaintance, which are immediate neighbors of the rumor releaser in the web of trust. They have the highest possibility of being affected.

2. **The interest circle**: Rumors with different topics have different spread range. How the structural property of the web of trust and different topics affect the spread range is our main concern. We will illustrate this in detail in the following subsections.

3. **The community**: The community represents the group of densely connected nodes in the web of trust. Because the formation of trust is based on shared interests among human beings, the more densely nodes are connected, we can imagine that more interests they share with each other. Thus the community is the next possible range for the spread of the rumor.

4. **The meta-community**: The meta-community represents connected sub-graphs each of which itself is densely connected. Very often, people in these sub-communities share interests at a higher level. For example, home electronics meta-community has digital camera community, home theater community, and others in it. Thus, rumor can be spread to meta-community, but with the least likelihood.

![Fig. 3. Information Flow Based on Interest Propagation.](image)

According to the study of information flow in social groups [5], while viruses tend to be indiscriminate in infecting any susceptible individual, information is selective and passed by its host only to individuals the host thinks would be interested in it. Based on this observation, we propose that in the web of trust, the spread of deceptive data/rumor is different from the spread of epidemic disease or computer virus. It is also different from the random walker phenomenon used in many trust ranking algorithms. For example, in Figure 3, $\alpha_1$ releases a rumor to $\theta$, in reality $\theta$ will not blindly send information to all of $\beta_1$, $\beta_2$, and $\beta_3$, nor will he forward this rumor randomly to one of them. When $\theta$ receives this information, he may only forward the information to the subject that is interested in it provided that $\theta$ thinks this rumor might be true. Say $\theta$ knows that only $\beta_1$ is interested in this topic, in real world most likely $\theta$ will propagate this information to $\beta_1$ only.

### 3.1 Interest Propagation and Dynamic Interest Vector Tables

Since information is selective, in case some rumor releaser releases deceptive data in the web of trust, this rumor will seldom be spread and as well trusted by every subjects in the community where the rumor releaser belongs to. In this research, one of our primary goals is to find out to what extent the rumor spreads in the community.
In order to estimate the worst-case scenario in spread of the rumor, following data structures are employed.

Every subject has a list of topics that he is interested in and as well as his acquaintances are interested in. We use $I_i < t_{i1}, t_{i2}, \ldots, t_{im}>$ to represent all the topics that subject $i$ and $i$’s acquaintances are interested in. $I_i$ is maintained for each subject in the web of trust. Dynamic Interest Vector Table $T_i< v_{i1}, v_{i2}, \ldots, v_{im}>$ is a table in which $v_{ik}$ is an interest vector which lists all subjects that are interested in $t_k$ and a message on topic $t_k$ can be flowed to them directly or indirectly from node $i$. All nodes in $v_{ia}$ form an Interest Circle of node $i$ on topic $t_k$. Thus, for each topic $t_k$, node $i$ has a corresponding interest circle. Table 1 illustrates dynamic interest vector tables of the nodes in Figure 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\alpha_1$</th>
<th>$\alpha_2$</th>
<th>$\theta$</th>
<th>$\beta_1$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>InterestVec($\alpha_1$, 1)</td>
<td>InterestVec($\alpha_2$, 1)</td>
<td>InterestVec($\theta$, 1)</td>
<td>InterestVec($\beta_1$, 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>InterestVec($\alpha_1$, 2)</td>
<td>InterestVec($\alpha_2$, 2)</td>
<td>InterestVec($\theta$, 2)</td>
<td>InterestVec($\beta_1$, 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\cdots$</td>
<td>$\cdots$</td>
<td>$\cdots$</td>
<td>$\cdots$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>InterestVec($\alpha_1$, m)</td>
<td>InterestVec($\alpha_2$, n)</td>
<td>InterestVec($\theta$, i)</td>
<td>InterestVec($\beta_1$, j)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We assume that every node trusts its acquaintance 100% in order to get a maximum possible spread range. We also assume that every node will send information only to its acquaintances that are interested in it. It must be noted that for the same rumor, the spread range will be different for different sender nodes.

The following algorithm is proposed to find out the interest circle, which is actually the interest vector corresponding to a particular topic. Since each node, $N_i$, only communicates with its acquaintance, in its dynamic interest vector table against each topic it lists all its neighboring nodes that are interested in that topic; if $N_i$ itself is also interested in the topic, $N_i$ is also added to the list. In order for node $N_i$ to know what topics other nodes are interested in directly or indirectly, our algorithm will propagate its interested vector table to all its neighboring nodes. It must be noted that the whole table need not be propagated; only the topics that the neighboring node interested in will be propagated. After its neighboring nodes get this table, each of them will update their local interest vector table by adding subjects interested in certain topic in its interest list. This procedure runs for every node periodically, thus after a certain period, node $N_i$ will know which other people can be reached if $N_i$ sends out a message on topic $t_k$. Also, we expected that each node’s interests may change over time, i.e., each node may develop more interests on some other topics, or lose interest in some previous topics. Following is the algorithm for finding out the interest circle.

**Algorithm: Find_Interest_Circle**

1. Initialize $I_i < t_{i1}, t_{i2}, \ldots, t_{im}>$ for node $i$ to contain a list of topics $t_{i1}, t_{i2}, \ldots, t_{im}$ that $i$ is interested in.
2. Initialize $T_i< v_{i1}, v_{i2}, \ldots, v_{im}>$ for node $i$, where $v_{it} = <i>$ for $1 \leq t \leq m$.
3. Broadcast $I_i< t_{i1}, t_{i2}, \ldots, t_{im}>$ to all neighboring nodes of node $i$.
4. Broadcast $T_i< v_{i1}, v_{i2}, \ldots, v_{im}>$ to all neighboring nodes of node $i$.
5. Wait for incoming $I_j< t_{j1}, t_{j2}, \ldots, t_{jn}>$ and $T_j< v_{j1}, v_{j2}, \ldots, v_{jn}>$ sent from any node $j$ of node $i$’s neighboring node.
6. After node $i$ received $I_j< t_{j1}, t_{j2}, \ldots, t_{jn}>$ and $T_j< v_{j1}, v_{j2}, \ldots, v_{jn}>$ from node $j$, do operation:

   //add $j$’s interested topic to $I_i$
   $I_i< t_{i1}, t_{i2}, \ldots, t_{im}> = I_i< t_{i1}, t_{i2}, \ldots, t_{im}> \cup \{ t_{jk} \mid t_{jk} \in I_j - I_j \cap I_i \text{ and } j \in v_{jk} \}$.

   //add a new interest vector containing $j$ to $T_i$ for each of $j$’s interest topic is not yet in $T_i$
   For each row $v_{ik} \in T_i< v_{i1}, v_{i2}, \ldots, v_{im}>$ where $1 \leq k \leq m$
   If ($t_{ik} = t_{jl}$), then $v_{ik} = v_{ik} \cup v_{jk}$, where $1 \leq k \leq n$

   //add a subject that’s not $i$’s neighbor but interested in $i$ or $j$’s interest topics
   For each row $v_{ik} \in T_i< v_{i1}, v_{i2}, \ldots, v_{im}>$ where $1 \leq k \leq m$
   If ($j \in v_{ik}$) and $t_{ik} \not\in I_j< t_{j1}, t_{j2}, \ldots, t_{jn}>$
   $v_{ik} = v_{ik} - \{ j \}$.

7. Goto step 3

Note: At any run time of the algorithm, $v_{ik}$ contains all currently found subjects in the interest circle of node $i$ based on topic $t_{ik}$. This interest circle is the maximum possible spread range for the rumor on topic $t_{ik}$ sent by node $i$.

3.2 Experimental Results

Our experiments are conducted in a web of trust testbed which models trust and interest decay among the nodes. The interest decay represents the average percentage of interests not shared between a node and its neighboring nodes. That is, if node $j$ to node $i$’s interest decay is 15%, then node $i$ shares 85% interest topics with node $j$. In order to observe the extent to which the different community structure and interest decay affect the spread of deceptive data, we use some baseline parameter in Table 2 for modeling our base model of web trust. By changing one parameter at a time, we got some interesting results on spreading of deceptive data.

Our experiments proceeded as follows. In each test, a node is randomly selected as rumor releaser. It knows its neighbors’ interest topics and only sends the rumor to its neighbors that might be interested in the rumor. Once a neighbor receives the rumor, he will give it a trust ranking. If the trust ranking is above the trust threshold, the rumor will be sent to his neighbors that are interested in the rumor. Otherwise, he will discard it. In order to estimate the maximum spread range, in our simulation, we assume that each subject fully trusts its neighbors.
Table 2. Baseline Parameters for Our Web of Trust Test Bed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>indegree</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>outdegree</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interest-decay</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>outdegree of rumor releaser</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Nodes</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 4. Relationship between Number of Nodes Affected and Outdegree of Rumor Releaser.

**Misconception 1**: In order to **significantly** increase the spread of the deceptive data, simply send the rumor to as many people as you know. The number of people affected by the rumor increases **linearly** with the increase in the number of the neighbors of the rumor releaser.

Our experiment proved that the above misconception is not true. Although increased outdegree of the rumor releaser can contribute to the augment of affected nodes, the result depends on the **average degree** of the nodes in the web of trust. In Figure 4, when the outdegree of the rumor releaser increases from 1 to average node outdegree (which is 5 in our experiment), it does cause the affected nodes to increase almost linearly (actually, this also depends on interest decay). However, if the outdegree of the rumor releaser continues to increase, the spread range only increases very slowly. For example, the difference in the number of affected nodes from 10-outdegree and 100-outdegree rumor releasers is only 18 for a 1000-node community.

**Misconception 2**: The number of affected nodes increases linearly with the increase of the number of nodes in the community.

Figure 4 and Figure 5 show that misconception 2 is only partially true. With all other parameters remaining the same, the increase in the number of nodes in the community only contributes insignificantly to the number of affected nodes. For instance, as Figure 4 depicts, with the outdegree of the rumor releaser being 10, the difference in number of affected nodes is only 141 between a 1000-node community and a 5000-node community. Figure 5 also shows that by simply adding number of nodes in a community without changing other parameters, the number of affected nodes change insignificantly. Figure 6 illustrates that only when interest decay is very
low, e.g. 10%, the number of nodes affected increases significantly with the increase of the number of nodes in a community.

![Graph 5](image)

**Fig. 5.** Relationship between Number of Nodes Affected and Average Outdegree of all Nodes.

![Graph 6](image)

**Fig. 6.** Relationship between Number of Nodes Affected and Interest Decay.

**Fact:** How actively each member involves in the community activity and whether they have similar interests is the number one important factor when evaluating the spread of rumor in the community.

Figure 6 shows that when the interest topics people share with each other in a community increases, i.e., the interest decay decreases, the effect of the rumor becomes more significant. It can be seen from Figure 6 that in a 5000-node community, the number of affected nodes is 1254 with the interest decay value of 20%. Whereas, when the interest decay is 10%, the number of affected nodes in the community is 4483, a 260% increase.

4 Conclusions

This paper studies the problem of evaluating the spread of deceptive data based on structural property of web of trust and the shared interest between subjects in the web of trust. Our model proposed structural characteristics of web of trust such as meta-community, community, and interest circle to illustrate how the structural analysis of
web of trust can help evaluate the effect of spreading deceptive data. Our experiments show that the amount of similar interests the members in the community have and the amount of their active involvement in the community are the primary factors in deciding the range of spread of the rumor.

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References