A VIEWPOINTS MODELING FRAMEWORK BASED ON EPISTEMIC LOGIC

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Abstract: The approach of viewpoints-oriented requirement engineering hopes that stakeholders in a complex system should describe it from their own perspectives and then generate a more complete requirement specification. Just because of this characteristic, several stakeholders may describe a same problem. These overlapping requirements are the source of inconsistency. This paper puts forward a requirements modeling framework based on problem-domain and viewpoints. We interpret and reason it with epistemic logic in order to make requirements more structured and help stakeholders formally discover those inconsistent overlapping requirements.

1 INTRODUCTION

The approach of viewpoints-oriented requirement engineering intends to capture the stakeholders’ requirements in a more comprehensive way. All the people related to the target system describe the system’s properties independently in their familiar way according to their responsibilities, experience and skills. Just because of this characteristic, it unavoidably leads to the tangled and scattered requirements. If stakeholders have different understanding of those requirements, inconsistency will emerge. So the essential problem of the viewpoints method is to ensure that the present is of consistency or coherence.

Recently, many researchers propose kinds of methods to solve inconsistency of viewpoints-based requirements specification. Typical work on this topic is that by A. Finkelstein et al. for action-based temporal logic; Zave & Jackson propose the composition of partial specifications as a conjunction of their assertions in a form of classical logic. S. Easterbrook and M. Chechik use an underlying multi-valued logic to describe each viewpoint, propose the framework for merging and reasoning about multiple, inconsistent state machine models, and implement the multi-valued logic checker. M. Sabetzadeh and S. Easterbrook propose a category-theoretic approach to representation and analysis of inconsistency in graph-based viewpoints.

However, what requirement specification reflects are stakeholders’ knowledge, belief and intention, which are all related to epistemic properties. When participants have different understandings or interpretations about those properties among them, inconsistency and incompleteness will occur. Therefore, it is necessary to solve the inconsistency from epistemic perspective. But the existing approaches are insufficient.

After studying these approaches, we propose Problem-Domain-based Viewpoints Modeling Framework (PDVMF) and use epistemic logic to interpret it. Through reasoning those epistemic logic formulas we can transform the problem of discovering absolute inconsistency into solving SAT problem, and common knowledge can be used to help stakeholders deal with relative inconsistency.

2 PROBLEM-DOMAIN-BASED VIEWPOINTS MODELING FRAMEWORK

In the real world different people play different roles in large-scale software development and they consider problems from different levels. They are grouped into different teams. Member of a team interact each other and form the team’s specification, meanwhile, different teams influence mutually and
present final one. Whether the requirements of every stakeholder are reasonable depends not only on himself but on which team he belongs to when he proposes the requirements and other team members’ requirements.

In view of the above problems, the viewpoints model we are going to propose should reflect the following aspects:

1) Viewpoints model should be 2-dimension, i.e. software system should consist of some problem domains. A team in the real world corresponds to a problem domain. And one problem domain has some viewpoints, which means that it needs different kinds of people’s cooperation to solve one problem.

2) The relationship among goals, FRs and NFRs must be explicitly expressed and treated as a whole so as to make stakeholders’ requirements more structured.

Viewpoint represents stakeholders’ requirements for the target system in specification. Whether the target system satisfies stakeholders’ requirements during capturing requirements depends upon whether goals are achieved. The achievement of goals is supported by FRs and these two are linked by NFRs. When FRs and NFRs related to a certain goal are fulfilled, the goal is considered to be achieved, i.e. \( FR, NFR \models Goal \). Through tracing a goal, we can reason out the related FRs and NFRs, that is, \( Goal \models FR, NFR \). Figure 1 shows the relationship among the three kinds of entities.

![Figure 1: Requirement block with refine relationship.](image)

We call the combination of the three entities a requirement block, considered as the core of PDVMF. Based on the former viewpoints’ researches (B. Nuseibeh et al., 1994), PDVMF collects and expresses stakeholders’ requirements using templates.

Problem domains are divided by domain experts and system analysts. Then after affirming the relationship among sub-problem domains, that are involved and the cooperative relationship among those participants, stakeholders can describe their requirements using a viewpoints template, according to the sub-problem domain which they are concerned with. In general, problem domain level is concerned with the global and abstract description, while viewpoint level is related to the partial and concrete one. Figure 2 shows the overview of PDVMF.

![Figure 2: Viewpoints modeling framework based on problem domains.](image)

### 3 REASONING ABOUT INCONSISTENCY IN PDVMF

“Knowing” is an important research object in epistemic logic, which formalizes the meaning of “knowing”. In the real world, the cognitive subject is not a single person, or human beings with unified cognition, but a group of individuals with different knowledge. Halpern and Moses[6] analyze epistemic logic and indicate that Kripke’s possible world model is an effective tool to study.

Let \( \Phi \) be a set of atomic propositions. A kripke structure \( M \) over \( \Phi \) is a \( m+2 \) tuple \( M = \langle W, R_1, R_2, ..., R_m, \nu \rangle \), where \( W \) is a finite set of possible worlds, \( \nu \) is a function that labels each possible world with the set of atomic propositions true in that possible world. For every \( i \), \( R_i \) is a binary relation over \( W \), which means that if \( \alpha R_i \beta \) is true, in the view of Agent \( i \) in the possible world \( \alpha \), the possible world \( \beta \) is an accessible realistic world.

\[ K_i p \]

is a modal operator. The formula \( K_i p \) is read “agent \( a_i \) knows \( p \)”, which means that \( p \) is true in all accessible possible worlds of \( a_i \). On the contrary, if \( p \) is false at least in one accessible possible world, “agent \( a_i \) doesn’t know \( p \)”, represented by \( \neg K_i p \). If \( p \) is false in all accessible possible worlds, “agent \( a_i \) knows \( \neg p \)”, represented by \( K_i \neg p \).
From the technical perspective, we adopt the system named $S_5$ [6]. The system having $m$ agents consists of the following axioms and rules:

(A1) All proposition tautologies

(A2) $(K_i \phi \land K_i (\phi \rightarrow \phi)) \rightarrow K_i \phi$, $i = 1,...m$

(A3) $K_i \phi \rightarrow \phi$, $i = 1,...m$

(A4) $K_i \phi \rightarrow K_i K_i \phi$ (Positive introspection)

(A5) $K_i \phi \rightarrow K_i \neg \neg \phi$ (Negative introspection)

(R1) \[ \phi \rightarrow \phi \]

(R2) \[ \phi \rightarrow K_i \phi, (i = 1,...m) \]

We briefly explain epistemic logic using an example. Let $M$ be a Kripke structure $\{, , , \}$, $\{s_1, s_2, s_3\}$, $A=\{\text{Alice, Bob}\}$ is a set of agents, $\Phi = \{ p \}$, $R_{\text{Alice}}$ (real line) and $R_{\text{Bob}}$ (dashed) are an accessible relation. $M$ is shown in Figure 3.

3.1 PDVMF and Epistemic Logic

PDVMF is viewed as a double-layer structure: every sub-problem domain or every viewpoint is regarded as a possible world. The requirements presented by stakeholders are sets of epistemic logic propositions. Whether it is true or not lies on the truth value of the accessible possible world.

Viewpoints level is represented by 3 tuple $M=VD_\pi, \pi, \mathcal{R}_i >$, where $VD_\pi = \{vd_1, vd_2, ..., vd_n\}$ is every viewpoint in sub-problem domain $pd_i$, $\pi_i : VD \rightarrow (P \rightarrow \{true, false\})$ stands the labelling function of atomic propositions in every viewpoint, and $\mathcal{R}_i \subseteq VD \times VD$ is called the accessibility relation and means the dependency relation between every pair of participants in the same problem domain. Over this structure we define two modal operators: $K_i \phi$ (“viewpoint $i$ knows $\phi$”) and, $M_\phi$ which is equal to $\neg K_i \neg \phi$ (“viewpoint $i$ does not know if $\phi$ is true or not”). In order to reason over our model conveniently, we add some rules intuitively.

(R3) Goal $\bot$
SubGoal $\land Sub_2Goal \land ... \land Sub_nGoal$, if it is the AND relation between goals and sub-goals;

(R4) Goal $\bot$
SubGoal $\lor Sub_2Goal \lor ... \lor Sub_nGoal$, if it is the OR relation between goals and sub-goals;

(R5) Goal $\bot$
\[(\text{Fin}_1 \land ... \land \text{Fin}_n \land \text{NFR}_1 \land ... \land \text{NFR}_n) \lor (\text{Fin}_1 \land ... \land \text{Fin}_n \land \text{NFR}_1 \land ... \land \text{NFR}_n)\]
, indicating that a certain goal can infer the related FRs and NFRs.

Thus the requirement block in viewpoint template can be translated to epistemic logic formulas.

In the same way, problem domain level is also a Kripke structure $S=\langle PD, \pi, R, >$

PD $= \{pd_1, pd_2, ..., pd_n\}$ is a set of sub-problem domains;

$\pi : PD \rightarrow (P \rightarrow \{true, false\})$ is the labelling function of rational propositions viewed as by all stakeholders in a certain problem domain.

$\mathcal{R} \subseteq PD \times PD$ refers to the dependency relation between sub-problem domains.

We can translate the requirements verified on the viewpoints level into the epistemic logic propositions again, and then reason them on the upper problem domain level to discover inconsistency among those requirements and finally form the final requirements specification.

3.2 Common Knowledge in PDVMF

Common knowledge refers to some facts several stakeholders know. Overlapping requirements are common knowledge existing among stakeholders. When stakeholders have different understanding about these requirements, inconsistency will occur.

For the sake of reasoning about common knowledge, we introduce two operators: $E^{pd}$ and $CK^{pd}$. $E^{pd} \phi$ is read “every viewpoint knows $\phi$
in the problem domain \( pd \), “ and \( \text{CK}^{pd} \) \( \varphi \) is read “ \( \varphi \) is a common knowledge in the problem domain \( pd \).” They can be represented as follows:

\[
E^{pd} \varphi = K^{pd}_{\varphi} \land K^{pd}_{\varphi} \land \ldots \land K^{pd}_{\varphi} \\
\text{CK}^{pd} \varphi = \varphi \land E^{pd} \varphi \land E^{pd} \varphi \land \ldots \land (E^{pd})^f \varphi
\]

To explain the semantic of two operators, suppose \( M \models \pi \) is a viewpoint level model, and let \( s, t \in S \).

a) \( s \rightarrow t \) represents that \( s \) can access \( t \) within one step through \( R \);

b) \( s \rightarrow t \) represents \( (s,t) \in \mathcal{R} \);

c) \( s \xrightarrow{\mathcal{R}} t \) represents the reflexive transitive closure of one-step-accessibility relation.

The semantics of two both operators is:

\[
\text{E}^{pd} \varphi \iff \text{for every } t \text{ satisfying } s \rightarrow t,
\]

\[
\text{CK}^{pd} \varphi \iff \text{for every } t \text{ satisfying } s \xrightarrow{\mathcal{R}} t, \text{ (M,}t\text{) } \models \varphi \text{ is hold.}
\]

Through the two newly introduced operators, we can reason about stakeholders’ requirements expressed by epistemic logic formulas and judge if the requirements are known by all stakeholders or if they are common knowledge.

### 3.3 Identifying Inconsistency

In the requirement modeling process, inconsistency can be divided into two types:

1) Absolute inconsistency. E.g. viewpoint A thinks “log” is necessary, while the related viewpoint B unnecessary.

2) Relative inconsistency. E.g. viewpoint A thinks “log is necessary and it must finished within one second”, while viewpoint B “log is necessary, but it need not be finished within one second”.

Absolute inconsistency can be found through checking whether the formula

\[
\neg K_t p \land \neg K_i p
\]

is satisfiable or not. The formula means that “viewpoint \( t \) knows \( p \) is false in some related viewpoints and true in some other viewpoints”. If the formula is true, then absolute inconsistency exists. For instance, in the Kripke structure shown in Fig. 3, we can infer:

\[
(M, s_i) \models \neg K_{Alice} p \land \neg K_{Alice} p
\]

because in the possible worlds \( s_1, s_2 \), Alice knows \( p \) is true, but in the possible world of \( s_2 \), the conclusion is the opposite. So Alice can infer that \( s_1, s_3 \) and \( s_2 \) have inconsistent views of \( p \). In this way, we can transform the problem of discovering absolute inconsistency into solving a SAT problem.

Due to its speciality, relative inconsistency is difficult to discover relative inconsistency in the way of complete formalization. The approach we find and solve relative inconsistency is to find out all common knowledge using operator \( \text{CK} \). Part of it may be relatively inconsistent, so all stakeholders need to discuss all common knowledge together to see whether they have different understandings about it. This method can help stakeholders to discuss possible inconsistent requirements in a confined scope.

### 4 A SIMPLE EXAMPLE

We take an example of a simplified online-library system to explain our approach. For simplicity, we only study the stakeholders in a certain problem domain and simplify their requirements. Suppose reader Alice, librarian Bob, and supplier Cart are involved in problem domain D. The relationship between them is shown in Fig. 4.
propositions. Similarly, $G_3$ is “readers’ information’s management”; $G_4$ is “catalogue’s management”; $G_5$ is “all the books can be borrowed”; $f_{r_1}$ is “query readers’ information”; $f_{r_2}$ is “modify or delete readers’ information”; $f_{r_3}$ is “add new catalogue”; $f_{r_4}$ is “modify the present catalogue”.

So we have:

(M, Bob)$ \models \neg G_4$

(M, Bob)$ \models \neg K_{Bob} G_4$

(M, Alice)$ \models G_4$

(M, Bob)$ \models \neg K_{Bob} \neg G_4$ (According to the relation with Bob)

(M, Bob)$ \models \neg K_{Bob} G_4 \land \neg K_{Bob} \neg G_4$

Namely, in the view of Bob, $G_4$ is an absolutely inconsistent requirement, which require further negotiation between Bob and other stakeholders.

(M, Alice)$ \models \neg G_4$

(M, Alice)$ \models \neg f_{r_2}$ (Completeness)

$G_4 \models f_{r_2}$ (R5)

(M, Alice)$ \models f_{r_2}$

in the same way (M, Bob)$ \models \neg f_{r_2}$

so (M, Alice)$ \models \neg K_{Alice} f_{r_2}$ and

(M, Alice)$ \models K_{Bob} f_{r_2}$

Then we can infer

(M, Alice)$ \models K_{Alice} f_{r_2} \land K_{Bob} f_{r_2}$

i.e. if Alice and Bob know $f_{r_2}$, then $f_{r_2}$ may be relatively inconsistent whose existence depends on their discussion. If they discover relative inconsistency after discussion, then they can take methods to solve it.

Likewise, we find $f_{r_2}$ is a common knowledge with operator $CK$, so Cart must join discussion.

5 CONCLUSION

The rationality of the requirement presented by a stakeholder is related to its domain as well as whether other stakeholders in the same domain agree with him. Stakeholders’ different interpretations about overlapping requirements will induce inconsistency. However, the existing methods of handling inconsistency are rarely concerned with these epistemic attributes. So we hope to find and solve inconsistency from the epistemic perspective through proposing PDVMF and interpreting it with epistemic logic.

Our approaches can not express the characteristic of knowledge that it has timeliness. For example, in the same problem domain D, agent i knows $\phi$ at time $t$, but he knows $\phi'$ at time $t'$. If we can’t overcome this weakness, to handle the changing requirements and trace the requirements is impossible.

In addition, just like temporal logic, epistemic logic is a variety of modal logic. There are lots of model checkers based on temporal logic. Now we are implementing a model checker for PDVMF through adapting SMV which is a well-known model checker based on temporal logic.

REFERENCES


