Using Reputation Systems to Cope with Trust Problems in Virtual Organizations

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Abstract. The concept of virtual organizations (VO) denotes a relatively new organizational approach. It should allow especially small- and medium-sized firms to rapidly cooperate by forming ad-hoc organizations in order to exploit business opportunities that would otherwise not be manageable for the participants alone. VOs will span enterprise and national borders. This paper addresses the trust problem inherent in virtual organizations and proposes reputation systems as a solution which already proved functionality in many domains of computer science. We finally present a reputation system for VO marketplaces that pays special attention to the privacy requirements specific to this scenario.

1 Introduction

Modern information technology provides the opportunities for new inter enterprise integration concepts like virtual organizations. Referring to [1–3] we define a virtual organization to be a temporal alignment of (globally dispersed) multiple organizations, combining the complementary core competencies of its participants in an ad-hoc network-like structure to produce and deliver customized demand, which the individual participants cannot produce and deliver individually, by exploiting modern information and communication technologies (ICT). The concept of virtual organizations is especially interesting for small- and medium-sized companies. It opens new business opportunities primarily by offering possibilities to effectively specialize on core competencies (thereby allowing to gain competitive advantages in certain areas), causing synergetic effects by the combination of those core competencies and allowing to exploit business possibilities that are not manageable for a single company.

However, there are also significant threats linked to this concept: Customers usually prefer a single company being liable for products and services. Well established brands have major influence on purchase decisions. Severe trust problems may arise in such structures and superior managerial skills and tools are needed for setting up and running VO’s [4, 5].

This paper focuses on the trust problem just mentioned and proposes the usage of reputation systems as one possible solution. The concept of virtual organizations itself suggests that many issues between the cooperating partners can’t be settled by means of ex ante contracts, be that because of time restrictions (remember that rapidly exploiting
business opportunities is one of the main goals of VO’s) or because of the fact that complete contracts (i.e., contracts specifying actions for all possible states of the world) are infeasible (at least in the case of VO’s). Organization Theory, Incomplete Contract Theory and Game Theory have given us interesting insights into those situations. One of the solutions proposed by those theories is inducing trust by the usage of reputation information. Reputation systems are already used in many areas of computer science to solve similar problems. They provide information as the basis of a trust decision and give a continuous motivation to behave trustworthy. We will present a reputation system that makes use of cryptographic techniques to meet the privacy requirements of a VO scenario. Most current approaches to implement reputation systems completely neglect privacy aspects. In our scheme reputation information is controlled by its owner and it stays hidden who has submitted the feedback.

The paper is structured as follows: We start with a sketch of a possible lifecycle of a VO in Section 2. This lifecycle will be used as a tool for illustration purposes in the following chapters. Section 3 discusses the usage of reputation systems and presents our reputation management approach. Section 4 finally concludes our work.

2 Lifecycle of a Virtual Organization

In the following we will concentrate on a simple, idealized lifecycle for virtual organizations; this model is used in the following sections to discuss how processes have to be adapted in order to provide reputation-based trust. We divide the lifecycle into three characteristic phases of a virtual enterprise, namely the foundation phase, the operation phase and the liquidation phase. Those three phases will be briefly presented in the next few subsections; we finish this chapter with a small example practically illustrating our lifecycle model.

2.1 Foundation Phase

The main result of the foundation phase is a network of independent firms (a virtual organization) that is willing to deliver a product or service (in the following abbreviated by “good”) to a customer. However, one should keep in mind that regarding the foundation of a virtual enterprise as a distinguished phase is idealized: Usually the network will evolve and continually change throughout the production process – new business partners might get involved whereas others drop out (due to finishing their part of the contract or not obeying the rules of the contract). As a consequence there is no static network but a steadily changing web of relations between the participating firms. Nevertheless this assumption simplifies further reasoning and as we’ll see our approach (applying a reputation system to induce trust among the parties) does not rely on a clear separation of the different phases.

This organization has furthermore settled (by means of a contract) on a set of transactions that should take place inside the network (e.g. certain parts of the good are delivered, money is paid etc.) and between the network as a whole and the customer (the final good is delivered to the customer). We will discuss this set of transactions in the next subsection.
How does such a network evolve, i.e., how do customers and virtual organizations meet, and how do business partners meet in order to establish a network? It seems reasonable to expect some kind of marketplace to address this issue; in fact this topic is already under investigation [6]. However, many questions still remain unanswered: Do for example customers ask for certain goods (pull-approach), are they offered by virtual organizations (push-approach) or will a combined approach be taken? Furthermore, are virtual organizations founded by a business integrator (a distinguished party with a coordinating role establishes a VO by searching for business partners and negotiating with them; pseudo-hierarchical approach), or are they founded on a peer-to-peer basis? The complexity increases further if one considers nested virtual organizations, i.e. VO’s where business partners founding the enterprise might theirselves be virtual, too. In fact a huge variety of different approaches seem plausible, nevertheless these aspects are out of the scope of this paper – for the sake of applying a reputation system we can safely assume that parties (i.e., customers and virtual organizations on the one hand and business partners that form a VO on the other hand) ”somehow” meet by means of the marketplace.

2.2 Operation Phase

During the operation phase the product or service is produced by the members of the virtual organization. The expected exchanges taking place in the operation phase can be conveniently visualized by the $E^3$ value decomposition methodology [7, 8]: Briefly summarizing the most important elements for our topic, we can distinguish between actors, value objects, value ports, value interfaces and value exchanges. Actors are the business partners forming the virtual organization; they are exchanging value objects (e.g. products, services or money) in processes called value exchanges. For receiving or sending value objects every actor has a certain amount of value ports; the set of all value ports of an actors is called value interface.

However, for the purpose of our paper a small enhancement will prove helpful: the set of actors forming a virtual organization will be enclosed by a dashed circle. As in
business processes single points of entry are the norm, the virtual organization itself gets its own value interface; the value ports act as an abstract port hiding the encapsulated actors inside the enterprise. The concepts just explained are visualized in Figure 1.

### 2.3 Liquidation Phase

At the end of the operation phase the final good is delivered to the customer, thereby fulfilling the contract between customer and VO. As a result the virtual organization is liquidated.

Again we have to note that the assumption of a possible clear distinction between the phases simplifies reality: Up to now it still seems to be uncertain when exactly virtual organizations are liquidated: Does this happen when the good is delivered or when all possible liabilities are sorted out? At first glance one might think that only legal entities (and not the virtual organization as a whole) should be held liable – however customers probably don’t want to be confronted with the internals of the virtual organization (in fact the business partners might have an incentive to hide their relationships, too). Put in other words, at least for the customer the VO still exists (or has to be recoverable) for liability and support issues. (This leads to problems as soon as some of the companies originally forming the VO do not exists anymore.)

### 3 Applying Reputation Systems to VO Marketplaces

The goal of this chapter is to discuss how trust can be induced among partners in the context of virtual organizations by means of a reputation system. We start by briefly summarizing the development of reputation systems in computer science. Afterwards we show what needs to be done in order to apply a reputation system in a VO marketplace (with focus on the lifecycle processes described in Section 2). Finally we present a reputation system that uses cryptographic techniques to meet the privacy requirements of a VO scenario.

#### 3.1 Reputation Systems in Computer Science

Reputation systems [9] collect, aggregate and distribute feedback about an entity’s former transactions. Feedback is usually collected at the end of each transaction. The authority responsible for reputation management asks the participants to submit a rating. Aggregation of feedback means that the available information about an entity’s transactions is evaluated and condensed into a few values that allow users to easily make a decision. Feedback finally is distributed to the participants, i.e. it has to be made available to everyone who wants to use it for making decisions on whom to trust.

Applications of reputation systems range from electronic marketplaces, peer-to-peer networks, virtual and agent societies to more exotic areas like wearable communities. eBay’s feedback system [10] is a famous example of a working reputation system. It is often stated that the feedback system plays a crucial role in their success story (empirical experiments [11] have shown that a seller’s reputation in fact significantly increases the buyer’s willingness to pay auction price premiums).
Although the variety of existing reputation systems in computer science is huge, they are all based on the three principles explained above. However, many variations are possible: Feedback can for example be collected, aggregated, and distributed in a centralized (i.e., a single server is responsible for reputation management) or distributed fashion. The later is often the case in peer-to-peer networks. In this context distribution usually takes place by ”gossiping”. Furthermore, many variations of feedback aggregation are discussed nowadays (e.g., how should different values be aggregated, to what extend do old feedback values play a role etc.). Schlosser et al. [12] give an overview of different aggregation algorithms.

[13] discusses the role of privacy in reputation systems. Reputation information can contain sensitive private data that allows detailed profiling. eBay’s feedback report for instance, contains not only the received ratings but also links to the auction details. Thus it is visible to everybody what you have bought or sold. The context of a rating (e.g. information about the traded goods or used services) and the transaction partner should not be disclosed in every situation. Especially in a VO scenario the business partners of a company can represent a valuable secret for competitors. Additionally, an entity should have control over its own reputation information to prevent profiling.

3.2 Reputation Systems in the Context of Virtual Organizations

This subsection discusses how the processes explained above have to be changed in order to support reputation management. The adaptation of the VO lifecycle turns out to be very straightforward: The participating parties have to make a trust decision in the foundation phase. Reputation information will support this decision. Reputation only plays a minor role in the operation phase, and the liquidation phase is enhanced by the process of giving mutual feedback. We will now briefly discuss those adaptations.

We will now relate the two concepts of trust a reputation by integrating them into what we call the trust decision: Imagine two marketplace participants $A$ and $B$ (e.g. a customer and a business integrator or two business partners), that don’t know each other, have the possibility to engage in a business transaction in the foundation phase. They have to decide whether they want to engage in a transaction at all (participation decision) and – if this is the case – how much monitoring will be needed during the operation phase, how the conditions of the contract should be designed etc. (cover decision). As those decisions are based on trust, we refer to them in their entirety as trust decision. A rational agent will base this decision on the information he either already has or can get (for reasonable cost). Reputation plays an important role here as it says something about how the transaction partner has performed in the past. This is especially true on a marketplace with a huge number of participants, because the probability to meet the same partner again is low. Without own experiences one has to rely on judgements made by others.

The operation phase is not only characterized by the production processes, but also by continuous monitoring of the involved business partners. Although reputation does not directly support the monitoring process, it gives valuable information on how much monitoring might be needed (i.e., partners with very good reputation values might not need to be monitored to the same degree as new marketplace participants) and gives
strong incentives for all parties to behave honestly (because of the above-mentioned shadow of the future).

Finally, the parties involved in a virtual organization (i.e. the end-customer and all participating business entities) will be asked to give feedback about the other entities’ behavior in the liquidation phase. This feedback will be aggregated and distributed, thereby helping other parties in the foundation phase.

3.3 Credential-Based Reputation System

This subsection presents our proposal for a reputation system that fulfills the privacy requirements mentioned above. We first talk about the parties involved in that system. Afterwards we discuss who has the right to rate whom. Obviously only parties that somehow interact with each other should have the right to give feedback about the other party’s behavior. Finally, we show how the rating process and reputation distribution can be implemented in a secure and privacy-preserving way.

**Involved Parties** The reputation system we envision consists of three different types of involved parties:

- **End-Customers and Business Partners:** Those are the entities that actually have a reputation. In the following we will assume that the business partners forming the VO are represented by a single VO administrator (in the following abbreviated by VOA). This is automatically the case in VO’s that have a business builder (the business builder is the VOA). Peer-to-peer style VO’s, however, are not necessarily represented by a single VOA – for ease of notation (and without limitation of generality) we consider them to internally sort out issues and speak with a single voice in the protocol below.

- **Marketplace Controllers (MPC):** As already discussed in 2, we assume interactions between end-customers and possible VO’s on the one hand and business partners possibly forming a VO on the other hand to take place in a marketplace environment. The MPC is the authority running this marketplace. We don’t expect a single universal marketplace to evolve – rather multiple marketplaces will presumably exist simultaneously.

- **Reputation Authorities (RA):** Running the reputation system is not necessarily done by the MPC – rather an RA may offer this service to several marketplaces. However more than one RA might be established, too, so that transferability of reputation from one RA to another becomes a crucial issue.

**Rating Permissions** Reputation values represent aggregated feedback, i.e. they consist of a bunch of feedbacks given by the agents a party interacted with in the past. A company participating in VO’s can get feedback from other companies he forms VO’s with (giving information about whether he behaved honestly in the VO) and from end-customers (informing whether the VO as a whole delivered on time and with reasonable quality).
We propose to use the $e^3$ value decomposition methodology as explained in Section 2 for determining who has the right to rate whom. Obviously only parties that interacted with each other in some way should have the right to do so. Accordingly, every value object deliverance arrow implies a backward rating permission arrow. There are two exceptions to this rule: First, we do not deal with the question whether end-customers should receive feedback or not, since our focus are VOs. The second exception is caused by the VO value interface: If more than one VO company is linked to this interface (peer-to-peer style VO), the feedback of the end-customer should affect all companies connected to the interface. However, this would imply that those customers have greater influence on reputation which doesn’t seem to make sense – we propose that in this case the feedback is normalized (i.e., if $n$ companies are connected to the interface, each individual feedback gets a weight of $\frac{1}{n}$ – note that all individual feedbacks are the same, though, as end-customers just rate the VO as a whole, not the individual parties forming the VO). However, how the collected reputation information is interpreted by an entity is out of scope of this paper.

**Implementation** To ensure that the identity of a rater cannot be linked to the rating we use the following cryptographic building blocks:

*Anonymous credentials* [14] allow an authority to issue rights to a user in such a way that the receiver can prove possession of a credential to other authorities without making the issuing and multiple demonstrations of an anonymous credential linkable to each other. Showing such an credential preserves the anonymity of its owner. One-time or one-show credentials can be used exactly once. *Blind signatures schemes* [15] allow to sign a document without revealing its contents to the signer. For illustration one can imagine to put a document with a piece of carbon copy paper into an envelope (blinding). The signer signs the envelope on the outside. The envelope is removed by the receiver of the signature afterwards (unblinding procedure). Result is a signature on a document the signer has not seen before. A partially blind signature allows the signing entity to encode some fixed data into the signature that is still available after unblinding. This can be used to encode some additional attributes into the signature. For simplicity reasons we do not give any further technical details here.

We start our following description with the rating protocol that is executed in the liquidation phase: The single steps of this protocol are the following (see also figure 2):

1. The administrator of the VO registers with the marketplace controller (MPC). Details about the participants and their relationships (i.e., the structure of the VO) are communicated. Note that this has to take place anyway (also if we would not use a reputation system) as private marketplaces will probably take transaction fees or something similar. Furthermore the structure of the VO has to be known for liability and tax reasons.

2. (In the following we assume that $A$ gets feedback from $B$, i.e. $A$ is target of a rating and $B$ acts as a rater.) $B$ requests a credential from the MPC that contains the right to submit a rating for $A$. The MPC checks if there is an according relationship in the registered VO and issues a credential and a signed context object that contains
some details about the context of this relationship (e.g. the type of service and values concerned)\(^1\)

3. \(A\) and \(B\) interact with each other and with other members of the virtual organization. Monitoring is used both to assure the other partners deliver in time and to collect information as a basis for a later rating.

4. \(B\) wants to submit a rating for \(A\). Therefore, it contacts the reputation authority (RA) via an anonymous channel and proves the possession of a credential that allows to rate \(A\).

5. \(B\) blinds the rating and the context object and transfers both to the RA.

6. The RA uses a partially blind signature function to sign the blinded information. In the non-blinded part the identity of the rating’s target (i.e. \(A\)) is encoded. To ensure integrity and non-repudiation of \(A\)’s ratings RA increments \(A\)’s total of received ratings. RA returns the signed data to \(B\).

7. \(B\) verifies the signature and unblinds the contained information.

8. Finally, the signed rating is returned to \(A\). (If \(B\) wants to hide its identity it uses an anonymous channel.) The signed rating consists of the context object and the rating value, but it contains no information about the rater \(B\). Additionally, MPC and RA are not able to link this information to \(B\).

Now that we know how parties receive feedback, we can explain how an entity \(A\) shows its reputation to an entity \(C\) in the foundation phase: \(A\) does so by disclosing the list of collected ratings. As we know from above this list contains no information about the raters of \(A\) (this is important in order to preserve privacy). \(C\) checks the signatures of the single ratings and assures integrity of this listing by asking RA for the number of ratings.

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\(^1\)To prevent that the MPC encodes some additional (side channel) information into the context object, that can be used to identify the rater, the allowed types and values should be well specified.
issued ratings. As an offline alternative RA can issue short-lived certificates that contain the number of ratings a ratee has received. If this number is bigger than the number of entries in the list $C$ may assume that $A$ tries to hide some (negative) ratings. However, what happens if $B$ cheated $A$ in step 8 by not forwarding a received signed rating? If $A$ recognizes such a case she can try to find out whose rating is missing and then contact $B$ for clarification. If this is not possible because the system uses anonymous channels to hide raters, there should be no real incentive for $B$ to do so since there is no reason to fear discrimination.

Transferring reputation between reputation systems is easy because $A$ keeps all received ratings with her. The only requirement is that the source reputation authority is accepted to be trustful.

Ismail et al. [16] propose a similar reputation system but do not use blinding techniques to prevent the reputation authority from learning the contents of a single rating. Additionally, the RA stores all submitted ratings and creates a certificate containing the processed reputation information. This means that the target of a rating has no control over its reputation information.

4 Conclusion

It’s seems to be commonly agreed that the concept of virtual organizations will play a crucial role in the future, especially for small- and medium-sized firms. However, for this to become reality some problems still have to be fixed; a major issue seems to be the lack of trust between partners engaging in VO-type businesses. In this paper we proposed the use of reputation systems to alleviate this trust problem. This seems to be a reasonable approach as reputation systems have already proved effectiveness in many application domains. Privacy is an aspect neglected by many existing approaches. The presented reputation system places special emphasis on the rater’s privacy and gives the owner control over his reputation information. Nevertheless, there is a need for further refinements; for example how customer’s ratings are evaluated. In our approach the structure of the VO must be known to the MPC. This allows the MPC to gain much valuable knowledge and therefore leads to another trust problem: Can business partners completely trust in the honesty of the MPC? We will have to investigate those problems further.

References