REVERSING THE TREND OF COMMODITIZATION
A case study of the strategic planning and management of a call center

Brad Poulson, Jimmy Huang
Nottingham University Business School, Jubilee Campus, Nottingham NG8 1BB, England

Sue Newell, Robert D. Galliers
Bentley College, 175 Forest Street, Waltham, MA 02452, USA

Keywords: Commodity process, Core competence, Call center, Case study

Abstract: The paper challenges the prevalent paradigm that differentiates between the management of a core competence and commodity processes. A case study is conducted to examine the strategic planning and management of a call center to illustrate that a commodity process, such as handling customers’ complaints and enquiries, can be transformed into a core competence, if a clear strategic intent is articulated and adequate management approaches are followed. Findings derived from this study suggest that a call center can provide substantial added value to the business and be managed differently through devising an appropriate intellectual capital management approach.

1 INTRODUCTION

Firms are increasingly competing on the utilization of unique and intangible resources, such as the intellectual capital of their workforce and the distinctive value this can add, as a means of attracting and retaining customers. To achieve this goal, a growing number of firms are choosing to be specialists, focusing on areas where they can differentiate themselves from their competitors. For instance, Nike has transformed itself into a cutting edge innovator through OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturing) and partnerships (Cho & Chu, 1994), while Cable & Wireless has redirected itself into a marketer of telecommunication services by outsourcing its IT function to IBM and laying off other businesses that are no longer perceived as part of the core.

The above indicates a distinction that firms purposefully make between core, value-adding competencies (seen as essential to competitiveness) from commodity operations and processes (seen as being uniform across the players in the industry). The result of such a distinction is reflected in the strategic direction that guides and initiates firms’ actions, i.e. continuously investing in core competencies to enhance competitiveness, or outsourcing commodity processes to achieve a higher level of cost efficiency (Kern, et al., 2002). This seemingly logical thought process contains some hidden assumptions that require clarification.

First, to derive competitiveness from commodity operations and processes is perceived as infeasible or unnecessary. Second, there is no need to introduce differentiation in areas where industrial standards, such as returning purchased good or obtaining information through customer helplines, are prevalent.

To challenge the above assumptions, we use a case study to explore whether commodity processes can be value-adding, if some modifications are injected. If such modifications are introduced, can the uniqueness and characteristics of a firm’s intangible resource be reproduced? The focus of our research is the examination of the strategic planning behind the setup of a call centre in one of the largest retailers in the UK. As we will see, particular emphasis was placed upon one of the organization’s core intangible resources, notably brand equity. In other words, this study explores how some characteristics of the case organization’s brand image was reproduced in its call center operation as a means of adding value to a commodity process.

Evidence derived from the analysis confirms that the business process underlying the examined call center has the characteristics of a commodity
process, as defined in the current literature. However, in the case company the intent was to re-create the experience that customers expect during their visit to any of the stores and building. Thus, the call-center experience, while a commodity process, was revitalized to provide strategic value to the business. Our findings are crucial not only to emphasize the need to re-examine the value of commodity processes, but also to highlight the fact that the significance of branding has been largely neglected by the IS strategic planning literature.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section Two outlines debates and perspectives related to two main areas, notably core competencies and commodity processes. Section Three highlights the methodological issues and concerns considered in this study. Section Four reports the findings by illustrating the evidence collected, as well as through comparing these with findings generated by other studies. The final section concludes the paper by addressing the contributions and implications of this study.

2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

Authors (e.g. Drucker, 1999) suggest that the emergence of the knowledge economy calls for a new way to compete that is unique in the deployment of resources and focused on the selection of segments and/or markets. The rationale for the former is based on the need to innovate and differentiate, while the latter is rooted in the belief that emphasizing the core, rather than all, areas of business facilitates the generation and maximization of added value. The need to differentiate and focus has increasingly led firms to select, prioritize and set apart areas that have the scope for enhancing competitiveness from areas which are perceived as cost centers (Fjeldstad & Haanaes, 2001; Pelham, 1999). As a result, areas that are identified as cost centers are managed based on the principle of cost-efficiency and become the primary targets for cost cutting. For instance, areas like warehousing and fulfillment are often perceived by retailers as cost centers and are subject to cost reduction, because of their limited potential for adding value to the business. This distinction has led to the emergence of two categories that form the basis of contemporary organizations, notably core competencies and commodity processes.

Core competencies represent a firm’s unique abilities and characteristics in developing, coordinating and integrating available resources to create a source for differentiation (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). By contrast, commodity processes symbolize a set of activities performed by firms that offer limited scope to generate differentiation or make this uneconomical (Poulson, 2002). Distinguishing core competencies from commodity processes offers a convenient classification for managers, prescribing appropriate actions in relation to each. Thus, as Bowman and Faulkner (1997) suggest, firms engaged in competition are providing ‘hygiene value’ capable of satisfying the basic needs of customers. These ‘hygiene value’ activities are identical to other competitors. However, to acquire and retain customers, firms need to generate and promote ‘motivator value’ as a source of attraction. In other words, the ‘motivator value’ is the source of differentiation that influences customers’ decisions. The distinction between hygiene and motivator values is crucial for the following two reasons. First, it offers an explanation as to why it is important to distinguish between core competencies and commodity processes. Second, it suggests that a commodity process to one firm might not necessarily mean the same thing to another. For instance, the process of producing and assembling PCs is perceived by IBM as a commodity process which is carried out through an OEM arrangement. By contrast, the same function of assembling PCs for Dell is a core competence (Eisenhardt & Brown, 1999). One of the key points derived from this discussion is that the difference between a core competence and a commodity process can be very ambiguous, arbitrary and subjective.

Due to the belief that a commodity process provides limited added value to the business, options available to firms in managing these commodity processes are largely driven by and rationalized based on the principle of cost-efficiency. Firms’ sensitivity towards cost, in particular in relation to those involved in performing commodity processes, has restricted the opportunity to invest in or reinvent areas that might potentially be able to provide additional competitive advantage. For commodity process areas, who should perform the process is seen as unimportant. In other words, it makes little or no strategic difference whether the commodity process is performed by the firm or by its service providers. Hence, when firms can obtain the required function with less cost through outsourcing, the motivation for continuing to perform the function in-house becomes less attractive. In situations where performing the commodity process in-house is necessary, firms often benchmark other competitors to streamline their operation, so that cost can be reduced to the same level as the competition. As a result, some processes and functions performed by firms are increasingly becoming identical, and the ability to differentiate is very limited.
The ambiguity and difficulty of differentiating core competencies from commodity processes surfaces the question of whether, in practice, this differentiation has created unnecessary limitations on the selections and choices which managers perceive. In other words, could firms generate added value, if a so-called commodity process were transformed or performed differently? As an illustration, Gilmore and Pine (2002) consider the example of a wakeup call in the hospitality industry. They demonstrate how traditionally there has been little difference between hotels in the way this service is delivered. However, they also identify how some hotels have focused on delivering even such a commodity service in a ‘magical’ way so that guests cannot help but talk about it after. Their study provides examples of hotels, like the MGM Hotel & Casino in Las Vegas and resort hotels at Walt Disney World, which take a more innovative approach by waking up their guests with recorded voices from celebrities or the Disney characters. By so doing, these hotels are able to upgrade this routine service into an unforgettable experience. Their study not only provides interesting examples of how commoditization can result in no or little differentiation across an industry, but also suggests the possibility of transforming a commodity process into a value added core competence.

Call centers are becoming increasingly popular as an alternative channel to streamline the customer interface (Silvestro & Silvestro, 2003). A manager must make various decisions about call center design, so that studying the strategic planning process should be interesting. While there is little consensus about how to manage call centers, it is clear that call centers are perceived and conceptualized as a commodity process. Given this context, in order to explore the possibility of revitalizing a commodity process, the focus of this study is on the strategic planning behind the setup of a call center – a service that is typically seen as a commodity service that is often outsourced. The commoditization of call centers is reflected in various practices that are frequently documented and reported in the literature. For instance, the emphasis is typically on deskilling the call center workforce, justified by the need to overcome the high turnover rate (Batt, 2002). Also, focusing on efficiency at the expense of effectiveness exemplifies the belief that a call center represents a cost to the firm, not a place where value can be added (Dean, 2002). Essentially, the underlying principle used to manage a call center resembles a Taylorist methodology where low cost and high quantity are the key (Bain, et al., 2002; Peaucelle, 2000). The issue of underinvestment and mismanagement in call centers has called for a new approach that can potentially turn a call center workforce into idea hunters (Arussy, 2002). Moreover, based on the above idea that it is possible to turn a commodity process into a core competence, it seems vital to examine the fundamental beliefs that determine how a call center is planned and managed. In particular, it is vital to take into account issues, such as how the value proposition of a firm can be reproduced in any new communication channels (Rayport & Jaworski, 2001), in this case a call center. And how ‘motivator value’ (Bowman & Faulkner, 1997) can be built into the operation of call centers.

3 METHODOLOGY

The research illustrated here is characterized as an interpretive case study (Walsham, 1993), and formed part of a larger and ongoing research project investigating the strategic planning and management of call centers in the UK retailing starting in 1997. The strengths of the interpretivist approach in IS research have been documented in a number of studies, notably Klein and Myers (1999) and Walsham (1993). In particular, the interpretivist approach assumes that meanings, as something fluid, ambiguous and context dependent, are defined and redefined by actors through the social construction and reconstruction of information systems (Mohrman & Lawler, 1984). As Klein and Myers (1999; 69) explain, interpretive research “attempts to understand phenomena through the meanings that people assign to them”.

Four sources of evidence were collected from 20 semi-structured face-to-face interviews, informal dialogues with the researched, on-site observation, and examining documentation. The latter included all written information that could be freely accessed by one of the researchers who is employed by the case organization. Typically, interviews lasted more than 90 minutes and were tape-recorded, with the prior permission of the interviewee. The rationale behind adopting multiple data collection methods was not merely for the process of triangulation (Denzin, 1988), but also for the purposes of enhancing the richness of findings through the process of reflexivity (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000). Data collected from the various sources were analyzed based on the coding techniques proposed by Miles and Huberman (1994) and Strauss and Corbin (1990).
4 CASE DISCUSSION

BeingWell is one of the best known and trusted brands in the UK. BeingWell’s primary business is retailing, manufacturing and marketing healthcare, beauty and leisure products. More than 80,000 employees and over 1400 stores in the UK and Irish Republic have generated approximately £5.3 billion turnover for the year ending 31st March 2002. The provision of friendly and caring services has long been perceived by the customers as well as the company as the major strength that differentiates BeingWell from its competitors. Currently, the Customer Service (CS) function is processing approximately 1,000 phone calls and 500 letters, faxes and emails daily to address a wide range of enquiries and complaints. Enquiries can be as general as store opening hours and product availability to as specific as the use of hair colorants and skin preparations. Complaints can range from the quality of purchased products and services received to issues, such as nudity in television adverts and the grammar used in literature.

A strategic and systematic effort to reach the current state of capability and capacity in providing customer service started in 1996 when a few reviews related to BeingWell’s existing CS were carried out. Many factors were found to trigger the initiation and formalization of the CS function. First, an internal review indicated that, compared to other major competitors who had invested heavily in CS, the methods, processes and systems did not support BeingWell’s strategic intent. Second, there was a perceived need to enhance BeingWell’s personal service and after sales service as a means of creating differentiation. Third, there was a recognized inconsistency in dealing with customers’ enquiries and complaints, due to the decentralized approach then adopted and the inadequacy of staffing. At this time it was noted that staff operating CS units were not necessarily selected for their customer service skills, and their approach was characterized as “anything for a quiet life”. For instance, when a customer called the head office to complain about being trapped in an elevator in a store, the call would thoughtlessly be put through to an engineer. As stated in the ‘Customer Service Complaint Handling Review’ (Interim Report, August 1996), the strategic intent for the Customer Service function is: “to maximize customer relationship opportunities thereby driving customer loyalty and increasing sales and profit”. To actualize this goal, two distinctive yet related phases were set. First, it is “the effective management of customer complaint handling within BeingWell”. Second, it is “the development and execution of a customer relationship strategy to include care lines, expert help lines and BeingWell store card customer contact handling”.

Specifically, this customer relationship strategy aimed to promptly and effectively resolve complaints; ensure consistency in performance and communication; generate feedback that could help to increase sales and profit; and protect and enhance BeingWell’s reputation. The need to invest in the CS function is reflected in the following statements. From the CS manager, customer service is perceived as “A necessity, you have to recognize that customers want to contact you.”

For the corporate Telecommunication Client manager: “CS was born out of a need to gather together in one place the complaints that were received via the switchboard, which was inconvenient for them and the caller. We also lost lots of information. Switchboards are about ‘speed’ and ‘volume’ and passing on the call as speedily as possible. It is not necessarily about chatting with the customer. The principle of taking a call live and dealing with it at the first attempt, then that’s the most productive way of dealing with any complaint or problem.”

In April 1997, the CS Department was formed from the disparate ‘Complaint Handling’ units run by various business centers or product units. A CS call center was established. A system called ‘Customer Q®’ was installed that included computer telephony integration software and applications for customer relationship management, email response management, Web and e-commerce integration. It captures, stores and retrieves critical information instantly through an interface and accesses information from multiple knowledge bases. All calls are logged to ensure quality and consistency. Also, to make sure that customers’ enquiries and complaints are handled as carefully and professionally as possible, the CS Department’s aim is that “it matches the experience you get in a BeingWell store.”

To reproduce the experience of ‘visiting a BeingWell store’ in the call center environment, some thoughts that were incorporated during its planning were outlined as follows:

First, they determined the approach to setting up the call center. Issues addressed at this stage included its structure and how to obtain or acquire the required capability that can best leveraged BeingWell’s brand equity. In terms of its structure, the final decision was to centralize the call center to ensure that consistency in service quality across different parts of the business could be achieved. Despite the fact that there were numerous service providers who could provide the capacity in handling customers’ phone calls, the decision was to
have the CS function in-house, simply because it was believed by the managers that only staff of BeingWell would know how to deliver the service in a ‘BeingWell way’. As the CS manager explained: “If we can’t give you an answer we commit to come back to you with the answer. In contrast to outsourced call centers you are able to escalate the complaint, unlike call centers where you’re not even talking to the people with whom you do the business. A third party hasn’t got the incentive to do what we do.”

Second, they thought about the selection of personnel. Considerable emphasis was placed upon the importance of the BeingWell brand during the selection of call center personnel. In addition, to evaluate how candidates would respond to calls, various tests, such as an in-tray exercise, a personality test, interpersonal and problem solving skills, were used. Many staff recruited to work in the call center had many years’ experience working in stores. In addition to the product knowledge they possessed, their experience in dealing with customers was a vital source to recreate the ‘in store experience’ that the call center aimed to achieve. As the call center manager noted: “The advisors are the voice of BeingWell, and customers look upon us as custodians of the nation’s morals. We need to ensure that the ‘music on hold’ is sensible; that we adopt a semi-formal style; that correspondence is free of grammatical errors; and that adverts are free of naked ladies.”

Third, they had to devise the approach to managing the call center after it was established. Issues, such as establishing service level agreements (SLA’s) like those used in stores, linking SLA to performance, continuously developing call center staff and leveraging sales through the information gathered from the call center, were taken into account and various actions were taken. Based on the principle of ‘making people feel valued’, the commitment from the top management was to ensure that members of staff who worked for the CS function in general and the call center specifically were continuously motivated. An open plan office was selected not only to create a mutually supportive environment during the peak hours, but also to lessen the boredom when call rates and energy level were low. Maximizing the relationship with customers was reflected in the belief that the call center was established to do more than just handle the issues raised by the customer. Rather, the call center was to be treated as an opportunity to understand more about the customer. For instance, customer’s personal information is now considered useful in gauging effectiveness of advertising, understanding if special interest groups are adequately catered for, and building an even stronger relationship between the customer and BeingWell.

5 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The initial stage of analysis aimed to unravel the activities performed by the call center. Derived from the analysis, five sequential steps were identified that characterize all activities performed. The five steps are to ‘receive inbound calls’, ‘identify customer and information’, ‘handle the complaint or enquiry’, ‘initiate other processes’ and ‘close the call’. The stage ‘initiate other processes’ occurs when the complaint cannot be resolved to the customer’s satisfaction or the severity requires a more experienced advisor to be consulted. This suggests that activities performed by BeingWell’s call center are very similar or virtually identical to those outlined by other studies (e.g. Aksin & Harker, 2003; Houlihan, 2002).

Referring to the process of the call center, it seems clear that handling a customer’s complaint or enquiry efficiently is essential for creating the hygiene value that satisfies the basic requirement of the customer (Bowman & Faulkner, 1997). The question then becomes whether a successfully handled complaint or enquiry only means a seamless hygiene satisfying operation, or whether it can have some added ‘magic’ so that customers cannot stop talking about it with their family or friends (as in Gilmore and Pine’s, (2002) study) In other words, the question is whether this commodity process can be operated differently by building in ‘motivator value’ (Bowman & Faulkner, 1997).

Guided by the above question, our second stage of analysis looked for elements that contribute to the creation of the motivator value in BeingWell’s call center. Our findings suggest that to recreate the in-store experience in a call center environment was a crucial starting point that influenced other decisions subsequently made. The results indicated that the need to recreate such experience was considered by many stakeholders involved in the strategic planning as more important than the concern about cost. Various issues that were prioritized during the planning stage indicated that ‘prompt and effective resolution of complaints’, ‘consistency of delivery in performance and communication’, ‘opportunity for information feedback contributing to increased sales and profit’, ‘protection and enhancement of BeingWell’s reputation’ and ‘maximizing customer relationship opportunities’ were far more important than cost. The decision to have an in-house call center with very experienced members of staff was seen by those involved as a sensible way to deliver
the level of service that BeingWell’s customers would expect. The intention, then, was to build a stronger customer relationship through leveraging the existing brand equity (Keller, 1999).

The centralized approach adopted by BeingWell was argued by the management to be effective in ensuring the consistency of service performance and quality. However, the case analysis also suggested that to effectively manage the call center, in particular with the intensity of maximizing relationship building with customers, relied on more than just putting control mechanisms in place. Rather, the success of the operation was seen to depend heavily on recruiting a dedicated workforce who had crucial understanding and experience in the services and products offered by BeingWell, as well as the ‘life skills’ to yield trust from any irate callers. The intensive effort to select the call center personnel from a pool of very experienced staff was thus considered by the interviewees to be crucial. Compared to the recruitment approach commonly outlined in the call center literature (i.e. deskilling), the approach taken by BeingWell was clearly very different. The call center staff were treated as one of the most crucial frontiers of BeingWell and they were motivated with various rewards. Furthermore, BeingWell’s approach to capitalizing on the information gathered reflects Arussy’s (2002) notion that a call center can be more than just an organizational setting where complaints and enquiries are dealt with. Rather, it can be developed into an idea hunting ground as evident in the case of BeingWell’s call center.

6 CONCLUSION

Our findings support the notion that the difference between a commodity process and a core competence can be very ambiguous and misleading. Even though the operation of BeingWell’s call center characterizes a commodity process, in the sense that many retailing organizations operating in this arena have adopted such a center, it clearly shows that such a commodity process can be turned around and made into a core competence. Instead of seeing a call center as merely a channel to streamline communication with customers, evidence yielded from the case indicates that a call center can be a place where added value can be generated. As argued by Prahalad and Hamel (1990), firms often fail to identify their core competence and worsen the situation by under-investing it. Our findings reinforce their argument and highlight the fact that to recognize what processes to invest can be a tricky and difficult decision. Our findings challenge not only the prevalent paradigm in operating call centers largely driven by the principle of cost efficiency, but also the effectiveness of building customer relationship through a Taylorist approach or outsourcing the call center operation to a third party. In addition to the theoretical contribution which addresses the ambiguity between a commodity process and a core competence, this paper also provides some new insights to managers who are or will be involved in the planning and/or management of call center operations. Future research is needed not only to explore how customer relationships can be leveraged through call centers, but also to examine the nature of commodity processes in more detail.

REFERENCES


