DESIGN OF CONTINUOUS CALL MARKET WITH ASSIGNMENT CONSTRAINTS

A. R. Dani, V. P. Gulati, Arun K. Pujari

Abstract

Today’s companies increasingly use Internet as the common communication medium for commercial transactions. Global connectivity and reach of Internet means that companies face increasing competition from various quarters. This requires that companies optimize the way they do business, change their business processes and introduce new business processes. This has opened up new research issues and electronic or automated negotiation is one such area. Few companies have tried to introduce electronic auctions for procurement and for trade negotiations. In the present paper, we propose a design of continuous call market, which can help enterprises in electronic procurement as well as selling items electronically. The design is based on double sided auctions, where multiple buyers and sellers submit their respective bids and asks. Buyers and sellers can also specify assignment constraints. The main feature of our work is an algorithm, which generates optimum matching with polynomial time complexity under assignment constraints.

References

  1. Ahuja K., Magnanti T. L., Orlin B., 1993. Network Flows,
  2. Arizona Stock Exchange, www.azx.com, ISBN 0-13-6175- 49-X, Prentice Hall.
  3. Bichler M., Kaukal Marion, Segev Arie, 1999. Multi Attribute Auctions for Electronic Procurement, In the proceedings of First IBM IAC Workshop on Internet Based Negotiation Technologies, Yorktown Heights, NY, Marz,
  4. Cheriyan J., Hagerup T., 1995. A Randomized Maximum Flow Algorithm, SIAM Journal of Computing, 25(6), Pages 1144-1170,
  5. Dani A. R. , Pujari Arun K., Gulati V. P.,2005. Continous Call Auctions With Indivisibility Constraints, To appear in IEEE International Conference in ETechnology, E-Commerce and E-Services, Hongkong, March 29-April 1, 2005
  6. Eso M., Ghosh S., Kalagnanam J., Ladanyi L., 2001. Bid evaluation in procurement auctions with piece-wise linear supply curves, IBM Research Report RC 22219
  7. Gjerstad S., Dickhaut J., 1998. Price Formation in Double Auction, Games and Economic Behavior, 22(1), Pages 1-29,
  8. Garey M.R., D.S. Johnson D.S., 1979. Computers and Intractability, A Guide to Theory of NP Completeness, W. H. Freeman and Company, New York,
  9. Kalagnanam Jayant R., Devenport Andrew J.,.Lee Ho, S, Computational Aspects of Clearing Continuous Call Double Auction with Assignment Constraints and Indivisible Demand, Electronic Commerce Research , Volume 1, Issue 3 (July 2001),Pages: 221 - 238
  10. McCabe K.A., Rassenti S. J. and Smith V. L., 1992. Designing Call Auctions Institutions: Is Double Dutch the Best? The Economic Journal, Pages 9-23
  11. Martello S., Toth P., 1989. Knapsack problem. John Wiley and Sons Limited, New York
  12. T. Sandholm, 1999. An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auction, In proceedings of IJCAI 1999, Morgan Kaufmann.
Download


Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

R. Dani A., P. Gulati V. and K. Pujari A. (2005). DESIGN OF CONTINUOUS CALL MARKET WITH ASSIGNMENT CONSTRAINTS . In Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems - Volume 4: ICEIS, ISBN 972-8865-19-8, pages 182-187. DOI: 10.5220/0002550001820187


in Bibtex Style

@conference{iceis05,
author={A. R. Dani and V. P. Gulati and Arun K. Pujari},
title={DESIGN OF CONTINUOUS CALL MARKET WITH ASSIGNMENT CONSTRAINTS},
booktitle={Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems - Volume 4: ICEIS,},
year={2005},
pages={182-187},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0002550001820187},
isbn={972-8865-19-8},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems - Volume 4: ICEIS,
TI - DESIGN OF CONTINUOUS CALL MARKET WITH ASSIGNMENT CONSTRAINTS
SN - 972-8865-19-8
AU - R. Dani A.
AU - P. Gulati V.
AU - K. Pujari A.
PY - 2005
SP - 182
EP - 187
DO - 10.5220/0002550001820187