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Authors: Stephan Krenn ; Thomas Lorünser and Christoph Striecks

Affiliation: AIT Austrian Institute of Technology, Austria

ISBN: 978-989-758-209-7

Keyword(s): Unconditional Privacy, Verifiable Secret Sharing, Batch Verification.

Related Ontology Subjects/Areas/Topics: Information and Systems Security ; Privacy Enhancing Technologies

Abstract: We propose the first batch-verifiable secret sharing scheme with a significant security property, namely that of unconditional privacy. Verifiability and privacy of secret-shared messages are a crucial feature, e.g., in distributed computing scenarios, and verifiable secret sharing schemes with unconditional privacy (but without a batching feature) exist for a long time, e.g., Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson (STOC 1988). Unfortunately, those schemes are able to verify only a single message at a time which, however, is not a very realistic scenario in a more practical setting. Namely, large files in real-world implementations are often split into many message blocks on a several-byte level and, thus, many known single-message verifiable secret sharing schemes tend to behave inefficiently in such a scenario. To improve practicability, batch-verifiable secret sharing was proposed by Bellare, Garay, and Rabin (ACM PODC 1996). In their scheme, the servers are able to verify a batch of me ssages (instead of only one) at almost the same amortized efficiency costs in comparison to efficient existing verifiable secret sharing schemes that only deal with single messages. However, the Bellare-Garay-Rabin scheme does not consider the important security property of unconditional privacy. Unconditionally private schemes information-theoretically guarantee privacy even against computationally unbounded adversaries and, hence, can be seen to be private in a long-term sense. In this work, we lift the Bellare-Garay-Rabin scheme to the unconditional privacy setting in a rigorous manner while preserving the practicability of their scheme simultaneously. (More)

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Paper citation in several formats:
Krenn S., Lorünser T. and Striecks C. (2017). Batch-verifiable Secret Sharing with Unconditional Privacy.In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - Volume 1: ICISSP, ISBN 978-989-758-209-7, pages 303-311. DOI: 10.5220/0006133003030311

@conference{icissp17,
author={Stephan Krenn and Thomas Lorünser and Christoph Striecks},
title={Batch-verifiable Secret Sharing with Unconditional Privacy},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - Volume 1: ICISSP,},
year={2017},
pages={303-311},
publisher={ScitePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0006133003030311},
isbn={978-989-758-209-7},
}

TY - CONF

JO - Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - Volume 1: ICISSP,
TI - Batch-verifiable Secret Sharing with Unconditional Privacy
SN - 978-989-758-209-7
AU - Krenn S.
AU - Lorünser T.
AU - Striecks C.
PY - 2017
SP - 303
EP - 311
DO - 10.5220/0006133003030311

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